LIBRARY 

PRINCETON,  N.  J. 

No.  Case,      At^ll 

No.  Shelf,    Section..^'..;.. 

No.  Book,  ^^        Jg%  ; 


o9. 


(YLy\y\^CeX/rL^ 


^.^, 


5/?7 


1      v'     4 


T±LK 


CAPTAINS 


OF    THE    OLD    WORLD 


BY     HENRY   WILLIAM    HERBERT. 


NEW  TOEK: 


(!ll)arU0  Scribncr. 
1851. 


THE 


CAPTAINS 


OF    THE    OLD    WORLD; 


A8   COMPAFvRD   WITH 


THE    GRExiT    MODERN    STRATEGISTS, 


CAMPAIGNS,    CHARACTERS  AND    CONDUCT,   FROM   THE 
PERSIAN,   TO   THE    PUNIC    WARS. 


BY 
HENRY    WILLIAM    HERBERT. 


NEW  TOEK : 
CHARLES  SCRIBNER,  145  NASSAU  STREET. 

1852. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress  iu  the  year  1851,  by 

CHARLES    S  C  E  I  B  N  E  R, 

In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the  Southern 

District  of  New  York. 


C.    W.    BENEDICT, 
Stereotype R    and    Printke 
201  William  Street. 


TO 


€.   €.  /tltnn, 

REGENT     OF     HARVARD     ITNIVERSITT, 
&C.,   &C.,    &C. 


IN    MEMORY 

OF    MANY    PLEASANT    HOURS    HERETOFORE    SPENT    TOGETHER, 

AND    HOPE    OF    MORE    SUCH    HEREAFTER, 

NOR    LESS    IN    TOKEN 

OF    CORDIAL    REGARD    FOR    HIMSELF, 

AND    SINCERE    RESPECT    FOR    HIS    TALENTS    AND    ATTAINMENTS, 

THIS    VOLUME 

IS    DEDICATED,    BY    HIS    FRIEND, 

THE    AUTHOR. 


LIST   OF   EMBELLISHMENT.S 

DESIGNED   BY  THE   AUTHOR, 

AFTER    THE    BEST    AUTHORITIES. 


HALT  OP    ROMAN    KNIGHTS, 
CIIAEGE    OF   THE    EOMAN   LEGION, 
MAECH    OF    A- GREEK    ARMY, 
ONSET   OF    NUMIDIAN   HORSE,' 
ALEXANDER    AND    RHEOMITHRES, 
GREEK,    ROMAN    AND    PERSIAN    SPEARS, 


PAGE 

Frontispiece 

43 

.      1T2 

83& 

Vignette  Title 

Final  Vignette 


PREFACE. 


My  Dear  Felton: 

It  is  generally  the  custom,  and  a  custom,  I  think, 
like  comparatively  few  others,  more  honored  in  the 
observance  than  the  breach,  that  an  author  should  say 
a  few  words  for  himself  preparatory  to  his  book ;  not  as 
an  apology  for  writing,  since  if  that  written  be  so  im- 
pertinent as  to  require  an  apology,  it  had  better  never 
have  been  writ  at  all,  but  as  an  explanation  of  his 
motives  and  object  in  writing  it. 

This  is,  perhaps,  more  than  usually  necessary,  when 
he  selects  a  subject,  as  I  have  done,  from  the  annals 
of  those  ancient  classic  times,  the  vein  of  which 
is,  in  the  opinion  of  many,  already  worn  out  and  ex- 
hausted ;  while  it  is  too  apparent  to  you,  that  I  should 
need  to  point  it  out,  that  the  rich  and  pregnant  soil 
is  scarcely  stirred  as  yet,  much  less  the  treasures 
brought  to  light  from  its  unfathomed  and  almost 
unfathomable  mines  of  wealth. 

Until  the  beginning  of  the  present  century,  I  may 


Vlll  PREFACE. 

almost  say  that  to  a  few  secluded  and  solitary  scholars, 
only  was  a  glimpse  revealed  of  the  inner  life  of  the 
men,  and  the  true  history  of  the  nations  of  antiquity  ; 
while  to  the  rest  of  mankind,  nothing  was  disclosed  by 
the  weak,  drivelling  compilers,  who  called  themselves — 
Heaven  save  the  mark  ! — historians,  but  the  crudities, 
the  absurdities,  the  fables,  and  the  falsehoods  of  the 
old  annalists,  presented  to  them  in  one  crude  and  un- 
digested mass. 

Much,  indeed,  has  been  done  of  late  days  in  this 
branch ;  and  had  Arnold  and  Niebuhr  survived  to 
accomplish  their  immortal  histories  of  Rome ;  and 
should  Grote  be  spared  to  finish  his  labors  on  the 
fertile  field  of  Hellas,  little  more  would  be  left  to 
desire,  so  far  as  those  two  great  nations,  perhaj)S  the 
two  greatest  of  all  time,  are  regarded.  But  still,  as  no 
one  is  better  aware  than  yourself,  we  are  all  taught  in 
our  youth,  at  our  primary  schools,  and  in  all,  save  our 
very  best  colleges,  the  old  cranibe  repetita  of  Romulus 
and  Remus  and  the  she-wolf,  of  the  golden  fleece  of 
Theseus,  and  the  dragon  teeth  of  Kadmos,  not  as  beau- 
tiful myths  and  j)oetic  legends  of  the  old  time  when 
poetry  was  half  the  life  of  the  young  untarnished  earth ; 
but  as  facts  just  as  authentical  as  the  burning  of 
Moscow,  the  victory  of  Trafalgar,  or  the  battle  of 
Bunker's  Hill ;  thus  sjDending  half  our  lives  in  learning 
what,  if  we  desire  to  follow  literature  with  any  profit, 
we  must  spend  the  other  half  of  it  in  unlearning. 

ITor  would  it,  I  believe,  be  too  much  to  state  that,  to 


PREFACE. 


this  very  day,  nine-tenths  of  the  readers  of  England 
and  America,  who  know  a  little  of  such  things, 
imagining  that  they  know  a  good  deal,  possessing 
neither  means  nor  inclination  to  make  such  things  the 
study  and  business  of  their  lives,  regard  the  sieges  of 
Troy  and  Yeii,  just  as  veritable  events  as  those  of 
Syracuse  or  Carthage;  and  Camillus  and  Kodros  just 
as  authentic  persons  as  Julius  C£esar  and  Epaminondas. 

Anything,  therefore,  that  tends  to  popularize  history, 
and  to  bring  matters,  generally  too  abstruse,  too  dry, 
and  embodied  in  works  too  formidable  and  too 
voluminous  to  be  largely  popular ;  into  such  a  form 
as  shall  be  acceptable  to  the  masses,  is  in  my  opinion 
something  gained,  and,  at  all  events,  involves  no  waste 
of  time  or  labor. 

This  little  volume  does  not  pretend,  therefore,  to  be 
either  exactly  history,  or  historical  disquisition ;  least 
of  all,  does  it  desire  to  be  classed  with  that  most  con- 
temptible species  of  book-making,  usually  termed 
popularized  history ;  which  consists,  for  the  most  part, 
either  in  conveying  good  matter  in  a  low  and  vulgar 
manner,  or  in  compiling  all  the  gossij)ing  trash  and 
verbiage  of  twaddling  chroniclers,  with  a  careful 
avoidance  of  everything  solid,  salutary,  or  permanent 
of  ancient  or  modern  literature. 

Such  is  not  the  course  I  have  adopted  in  this  work, 
in  which  it  has  been  my  object  to  produce  authentic 
details  concerning  the  great  generals  of  antiquity,  with 
tlie  particulars  of  their  campaigns  and  conduct,  more 


PREFACE. 


elaborate  and  fuller  than  the  pages  of  general  history 
will  spare  from  other  matters  of  graver  import,  perhaps 
not  of  less  engrossing  interest ;  to  elucidate  their  feats 
and  exploits  hj  comparison  with  the  rules  and  princi- 
ples of  modern  warfare  ;  to  illustrate  them  by  keeping 
up  a  parallel  of  modern  geography — so  that  they  can 
be  verified  by  the  aid  of  any  common  map ;  to  give 
them  life  and  reality  by  accurate  accounts  of  dress, 
scenery,  and  habits ;  and  to  ascertain  their  real  merits 
and  comparative  degrees  of  skill  and  excellence,  by 
comparison  with  the  greatest  strategists  and  tacticians 
of  the  latter  ages. 

I  have  not,  of  course,  dreamed  of  including,  in  my 
list  of  captains,  all  the  men  who  set  battalions  in  the 
field,  or  fought  gallantly,  whether  for  patriotism  or 
ambition ;  but  have  selected  those  only  who  were,  in 
my  opinion,  really  eminent,  really  worthy  of  continued 
remembrance,  really  entitled  to  be  enrolled  in  the 
annals  of  all  time  as  great  generals. 

That  which  I  have  looked  to  most  in  thus  estimating 
their  value  as  soldiers,  and  ranking  them  in  the  order 
of  merit,  is  the  development  of  warfare  into  a  science, 
the  originating  new  principles  of  strategy  or  tactics, 
and  the  producing  great  efiects  and  lasting  influences 
on  the  progress,  rise,  and  fall  of  nations,  and  on  the 
comparative  growth  and  disapj^earance  of  various  races 
of  mankind. 

None,  who  do  not  comply  with  one  or  other  of  these 
propositions,  are  mentioned  in  this  volume  ;  and  this 


PREFACE. 


may  account,  to  my  readers,  for  the  omission  of  several 
great  and  heroic  names  of  Greek  history,  such  as 
Leonidas,  Lysander,  Phormion,  Chabrias,  Iphikrates, 
Agesilaos,  Pyrrhos  of  Epiros,  and  others ;  who, 
although  good  soldiers  and  gallant  officers,  were  dis- 
tinguished by  hardihood  and  valor — qualities  common 
and  natural  to  most  men,  and  all  animals,  when 
aroused  by  adequate  causes — rather  than  by  skill  and 
science ;  or  operated  on  too  small  a  scale,  and  with 
results  too  limited,  to  be  considered  in  the  light  of 
great  generals. 

There  is  another  class,  much  more  worthy  of  remark 
than  these,  as  possessing  abilities  equal,  if  not  superior, 
to  most  of  those  herein  cited,  who  are  also  excluded 
from  this  volume  ;  as,  though  not  inferior  to  many  in 
military  talent,  they  yet  owe  their  celebrity  to  statesman- 
ship), more  than  to  soldiership  ;  and  attained  greatness 
rather  by  the  extent  of  their  forecast  and  the  prudence 
of  their  councils,  than  by  their  prowess  in  the  tented 
field.  Such  men  I  mean,  as  Alkibiades,  Perikles, 
Philip  of  Makedon,  and  many  other  great  and  shining 
characters,  to  whom  I  propose,  hereafter,  to  introduce 
my  readers  in  another  volume,  or  series  of  volumes, 
each  in  itself  complete  and  unconnected  with  its  pre- 
decessor or  successor.  The  next  of  them  will  be  the 
Captains  of  Eome,  from  the  Punic  wars  to  the  division 
of  the  empires ;  for  it  will  be  remarked,  doubtless, 
that  no  Roman  makes  his  appearance  on  the  stage 
during  this  period ;  for  the  simple  reason,  that,  aside 


XU  PREFACE. 


from  the  meagreness  and  falsehood  of  the  Eoman 
legends  and  the  absence  of  all  contemporaneous 
history,  Rome  was,  at  the  period  to  which  only  this 
vohime  comes  down,  barely  emerging  from  barbarism  ; 
and,  although  she  had  produced  scores  and  hundreds 
of  brave  soldiers,  had  sent  forth  no  general,  until  the 
days  of  Scipio  Africanus.  He  just  falls  within  the 
cycle  comprised  in  this  volume,  which,  indeed,  he 
might  have  terminated ;  but  that  I  preferred,  for  the 
sake  of  uniformity,  to  defer  him  till  he  can  appear  in 
what  seems  to  me  his  more  appropriate  place  among 
the  greatest  men — E'iebuhr  says,  the  greatest — of 
his  own  great  country. 

The  other  volumes  of  the  contemplated  series,  to 
which  I  have  alluded,  should  the  time  be  spared  to 
me,  and  popular  -favor  not  prove  too  niggard  of  encour- 
agement, will  be  the  Captains  of  the  Eastern  Em- 
pire ;  The  Captains  of  Barbarians,  including  all  Pa- 
ganism and  Heathenism ;  the  Captains  of  the  Middle 
Ages,  and  the  Statesmen  and  Orators  of  each  of  tliese 
periods  in  succession;  to  which  may  be  added  the 
Hero  Kings  and  the  Tyrants  of  Greece.  Of  course,  no 
promise  of  these  is  intended ;  nor  is  such  a  promise 
necessary  ;  for  as  every  volume  will  be  complete,  and 
will  comprise  a  period  in  itself,  wherever  the  series 
may  terminate,  it  will  in  no  respect  be  an  unfinished 
work. 

Only  on  two  points  farther,  have  I  to  weary  your 
attention.     The  first,  you  will  perceive  at  once,  as  you 


PREFACE.  XIU 

peruse  the  work,  to  be  the  orthography  of  the  Greek 
names,  which  are  given  invariably  and  consistently  in 
all  respects  as  they  were  sj^elt,  and,  I  am  satisfied,  pro- 
nounced by  the  Greeks ;  though  the  forms  may  look 
quaint  and  the  sounds  of  some  familiar  names  ring 
strangely  at  first  in  a  modern  ear.  I  have,  as  you 
know,  since  we  have  often  spoken  on  this  head,  always 
deemed  it  an  utter  absm-dity  to  adopt  the  Latin  names 
of  Greek  gods,  who  were  not  synon3mious,  or  the  same 
in  the  two  mythologies  ;  and  the  Latin  spelling  of 
Greek  names.  The  practice  is  no  more  defensible, 
than  it  would  be  to  write  Italian  or  Spanish  names  in 
Russian  or  Magyar  orthography,  and  it  should  not  be 
tolerated  in  this  age  when  Greek  is  as  familiar  to  all 
well  educated  scholars  as  Latin  w^as  in  the  days  of 
Poj^e,  or  more  so ;  and  when  truth  is,  or  ought  to  be, 
the  token  of  all  research.  You  will  find,  therefore, 
that  I  have  adopted  the  hard  Greek  h  instead  of 
the  soft  Roman  c;  the  Greek  termination  os  and  e 
and  A,  instead  of  the  Latin  us^  a  /  and,  to  conclude, 
the  Greek  diphthongs  ai  and  oi^  instead  of  the  Latin 
(B  and  6B,  as  approximating  at  least  to  the  nomen- 
clature by  which,  in  their  own  days,  those  herein 
named  knew,  and  were  known  to,  one  another."^  I 
have  done  this  from  no  love  of  innovation  or  of  neo- 

*  The  reader  will,  I  regret  to  say,  perceive  in  this  introduction  and 
the  life  of  Miltiades,  a  few  variations  from  this  rule  have  occurred 
through  inadvertence,  and  the  natural  tendency  to  hang  unconsciously  to 
antiquated,  even  if  improper  usages. 


XIV  PREFACE. 

logy,  mncli  less  from  any  affectation  of  doing  some- 
tliing  new ;  but  from  a  real  conviction  that  a  reform  in 
tliis  fiiulty  habit  is  needed,  and  from  a  confidence  that 
it  will  be  generally  adopted,  since  it  is  sanctioned  and 
used  by  a  scholar  so  ripe  and  rare  as  Grote,  the  last 
and  best  historian  of  Hellas. 

Farther  than  this,  I  have  only  to  add,  that  whatever 
else  yon  may  find  in  this  volume,  and  whether  you 
regard  it  as  a  defect  or  a  merit,  you  will  find  no  dish 
warmed  up  from  the  cold  meat  of  other  English  writ- 
ers ;  no  facts  assumed,  no  dates  quoted  on  the  author- 
ity of  others,  w^ho  have  themselves  investigated,  bor- 
rowed, quoted  ;  not  a  description  selected,  or  an  opin- 
ion adopted  from  any  English  or  American  author, 
unless  it  be  a  few  thoughts  from  my  favorite  Arnold 
in  the  case  of  Hannibal,  for  which  due  credit  is  given. 
Right  or  wrong,  my  facts  are  deduced,  my  arguments 
drawn,  my  translations  made,  my  dates  verified,  and 
my  conclusions  adopted,  from  a  careful  and  dispassion- 
ate examination  of  the  contemporaneous  writers  whose 
names  will  be  found  in  the  ample  references  I  have 
made  at  the  foot  of  my  pages,  to  enable  others,  w^ho 
may  think  it  worth  the  wdiile,  to  verify  my  facts  or 
my  oj^inions  ;  for  the  former  of  which,  I  can  at  least 
assure  you,  I  have  not  drawn  on  my  imagination,  more 
than  for  the'latter  on  my  memory. 

Should  you  approve  tlie  tenor  and  spirit  of  this  vol- 
ume in  general,  though  I  may  hardly  hope  that'  you 
will  coincide  with  all  its  oj^inions  in  particular,  I  shall 


PREFACE.  XV 

feel  more  sanguine  than  I  do  now  of  meeting  some 
meed  of  popular  aj)probation. 

If  I  succeed  in  inducing  a  few  of  those  who  have 
hitherto  .confined  themselves  to  lighter  studies,  and  the 
more  ephemeral  fictions  of  the  day,  to  turn  to  the 
deeper  and  purer  well  of  history,  which  is  truth,  science, 
and  experience,  with  as  much  pleasure  as  profit  to  be 
derived  from  it,  all  in  one,  I  shall  have  gone  far  to 
have  attained  my  highest  object.  K I  merely  succeed 
in  averting  a  weary  hour,  soothing  a  sleepless  night, 
or  occupying  the  restless  ear  of  pain,  my  time  will  not 
have  been  lost,  nor  wholly  ill  employed — for  I  am 
secure,  at  least,  that  there  is  not  a  line  here  written 
adverse  to  morality  or  truth  ;  nor  one  which  may  not 
be  read  aloud  in  the  domestic  circle  before  the  purest 
ears,  without  one  moment's  hesitation,  or  the  fear  of 
calling  up  one  blush  on  the  cheek  of  chariest  virtue. 
Pray,  believe  me,  my  clear  Felton, 
Ever  and  most  faithfully  yours, 

IIeney  William  Hekbert. 

The  Cedars,  Sept  16,  1851. 


CONTENTS 


INTRODUCTORY. 

PAGB 

The  Three  Great  Wars— Identity  of  Tactics— Greek  Mercenaries— Greek  Patriot- 
ism— Homeric  Armies — Greek  Iloplitai — Their  Arms — Jhe  Phalanx — The 
Targeteers— Greek  Cavalry — Artillery — The  Phalanx — Charge  of  tlie  Phalanx 
— The  Oblique  Formation — Doubling  the  File— The  Gymnetes— Ehodian 
Slingcrs — Charge  in  Column — The  Legion — The  Ancient  Itoman  Legion — The 
Later  Koman  Legion — The  lioman  Tactic.  -  -  -  -  -     13 


II. 


MILTIADES,  THE  SON    OF  CIMON. 

Ilis  Love  of  Freedom— State  of  Europe— The  Chersonese— Story  of  the  Doloiiei— 
The  Son  of  Cimon— Returns  to  Athens— Persian  Shipwrecks— Demand  of  Earth 
and  AVater— The  Ten  Generals— Phidippides  the  Runner- The  Vision  of  the 
God  Pan— The  Plain  of  Maratlion— The  Athenian  Force— Reasons  for  Fighting 
-His  Responsibility- The  Field  of  Marathon— Absence  of  Persian  Horse— The 
Army  of  Dcitis— The  Charge— Reversed  Order— Aid  from  Sparta— Reward  and 
Punishment.  -  -  -  -  -  .  .  .  -52 


CONTENTS. 


m. 


THEMISTOKLES. 

PAGK 

Inconsistency  of  Attic  Genius— His  Parentage  and  Youth — Peculiarity  of  bis 
Intellect — Fleet  and  Army  of  Xerxes — First  Movement  of  the  Greeks— Fleet 
•  of  the  Greeks — Leonidas  at  Thermopylai — Bribe  of  the  Euboians — The  Storm 
—First  Stratagem — Attack  on  Delphi — The  Straits  of  Salamis — The  Second 
Stratagem— Numbers  of  the  Persians — Sea  Fight  at  Salamis — The  Persians — 
The  Third  Stratagem— His  Character. 9T 


IV. 


PAUSANIAS,   THE    SPARTAN. 

Fire  Signals— Answer  of  the  Athenians — PtCtreat  of  the  Persians— The  Field  of 
Battle— Cavalry  Action— Death  of  Masistios— Steadiness  of  the  Greeks— Second 
Position  of  the  Greeks — Persians  Eesolve  to  At*;ack — The  Greek  Retreat — 
The  Thebans  Charge  on  the  Left— Death  of  Mardonios— His  Soldiership— His 
Treason.         -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  137 


XENOPHON,  THE     ATHENIAN. 

His  early  Years -Obscurity  of  his  Early  Years— Alfairs  of  Persia— Kyros  and 
Artoxerxcs— His  Mercenaries— Number  of  the  Greeks— Disappearance  of 
Orontcs- Conduct  of  Kjtos- The  Melee— Victory  of  the  Greeks— The  Oath- 
Oriental  Treachery— The  Generals — Choice  of  New  Leaders— Losses  of  tlic 
Rear  Guard— Affairs  of  Light  Troops- Storm  of  a  Hill-Pass— Situation  of  the 
Greeks— Turning  the  Right— Direction  of  Retreat— Sources  of  the  Tigris- 
Losses  in  the  Snow— The  Sea,  the  Sea— A  Picture— Arrival  at  the  Greek 
Colonies— Strife  and  Dissensions— His  Character.  ....  172 


CONTENTS.  XIX 

VI. 

EPAMINONDAS,  THE  THEBAN. 

PAGE 

His  Youth— Changes  of  Greek  Policy— Ee-Captiire  of  the  Kadmeia— Passes  of 
the  Kithairon — Third  Invasion — Error  of  Agesilaos — Vain  Attempts  at  a 
General  Peace— War  Kenewed— The  Leuktridai- The  Yellow  Haired  Virgin 
—The  Oblique  Formation— The  Sacred  Band — Affair  of  Cavalry — Infantry  Fight 
at  Leuktra— Eetreat  of  the  Spartans— The  Peloponnesos  again  invaded— For- 
tune in  War — Battle  of  Mantineia— Death  of  Epaminondas.        .  .  .  226 


VII. 


ALEXANDER    OF    MAKEDON. 

His  Youth— Chaironeia— State  of  Greece— Attacks  Thebes— Destruction  of 
Thebes— Fate  of  Thebes— To  the  Hellespont— Through  Asia  Minor— Prepares 
for  Action— Passage  of  the  Granikos— Constitution  of  Armies — Cavalry  Service 
—Siege  of  Halikarnassos— His  Marches  in  Asia  Minor — March  to  Issos— Asia 
Minor — Countermarclies  before  Issos— Movements  of  the  Phalanx— Line  of 
battle  at  Issos— Alexanders  Charge — Flight  of  Darios — The  Captive  Queens  — 
Darios'  Family — Siege  of  Gaza— False  Movements— Before  Arbela— The  Field 
of  Arbela— The  Array  at  Arbela  -The  Attack  at  Arbela— Storm  of  the  Camp— 
The  Pursuit— His  Strategy— Summary  of  His  Character.  ...  265 


vm. 


HANNIBAL. 


IDs  Oath— Parallel  with  Napoleon— Alleged  Cruelty— March  to  the  Alps- 
Passage  of  the  Alps— The  Conflict— Battle  of  the  Trobia— March  through 
Northern  Italy— Lake  Thrasymenus- Enters  Samnium— Care  for  His  Cavalry 
— Array  at  Cann?e — The  Carnage — Fortune  of  War  Changes.    - 


INTRODUCTORY. 


.  EXAMi:f  ATION     OF      THE     SERVICES,     ARMATURE,     ARRAY     AND 
TACTICS    OF    THEIR  ARMIES  ;    AS    COMPARED    BETWEEN    THEM- 
"1^:    "  .  SELVES,  AND  WITH  THOSE  OF  MODERN  NATIONS. 

Considering  the  vast  influence  which  the  ware  of  the 
two  great  nations  of  antiquity  have  exercised  over  the  present 
condition,  it  would  scarcely  be  incorrect  to  say  over  the  actual 
fate,  of  modern  Europe,  and  through  her  of  the  world  at  large, 
it  will  be  neither  an  unpleasant  nor  an  unprofitable  niode  of 
passing  an  hour,  even  to  those  who  care  not  to  prosecute  deep 
and  diy  historical  researches,  to  inquii-e  a  httle  into  the  military' 
means  by  which  the  two  powei-s  produced  results  so  incalculably 
great  and  important.  It  cannot,  I  think,  have  escaped  the  ob- 
servation of  the  most  supei-ficial  reader,  that,  while  some  wai-s, 
although  long,  bloody,  well  contested  and  conducted  with  equal 
coui'age  and  abihty,  have  in  no  wise  affected  the  condition  or 
permanent  interests  of  humanity,  because  waged  between  identi- 


14  THE  THREE  GREAT  WARS. 

cal  or  kindred  races  and  tending  only  to  the  extension  of  power 
and  territory  on  the  one  side  or  the  other — there  have  been  other 
wars  of  conquest  and  extermination,  by  the  decision  of  which  the 
fate  not  only  of  empires,  but  of  races,  but  of  humanity  itself,  has 
been  detemiined. 

Of  these,  the  first,  and  scarcely  the  least  important,  was  the  at- 
tempt on  the  part  of  the  oriental  nations,  under  the  great  Persian 
kings,  to  subjugate  and  enslave  all  Western  Europe  ;  a  conclusion 
averted,  under  Providence,  in  the  fi^rst  instance  by  the  repulse  of 
the  invaders  at  Marathon,  Plataia,  Salamis,  and  Tliermopylte,  and 
finally  rendered  impossible  by  the  retaliatory  expedition  of  Alexan- 
der, and  the  domination  of  the  Eastern  peoples  by  Greek  arms 
and  Western  dynasties. 

The  second  is  to  be  found  in  the  famous  struggle  of  the  Punic 
ware,  between  Rome  and  Carthage ;  the  termination  of  which 
set  the  question  at  rest  whether  the  dominion  of  the  civilized 
world  should  belong  to  the  Caucasian  or  the  Semitic  Race ;  whether 
Greek  arts  and  Latin  arms  should  be  the  inheritance  of  Europe 
and  America,  or  the'  coiTuption,  idolatry  and  cruelty  of  Ca- 
naauitish  Cai'thage. 

The  third  and  last  and  gTeatest  contest  of  this  nature,  as  regards 
Europe  and  European  civilization — for  China,  India,  and  the 
Eastern  isles,  have  undergone  many  such — is  the  long-protracted 
warfare  between  the  Saracenic  Mahommedans,  and  the  nations 
of  Christendom ;  which  may  be  said  to  have  commenced  with 
the  destruction  of  a  Saracen  host  at  Tours,  in  the  heart  of  France, 
by  the  battle-axe  of  Charles  Martel  in  732 ;  to  have  continued 
throughout  the  crusades  of  the  middle  ages ;  and  to  have  been 
determined  only  by  the  artillery  of  Don  Jghn  of  Austria  at 
Lepanto,  and  the  lances  of  John  Sobieski  befofe  the  walls  of 
Vienna,  so  lately  as  the  years,  respectively,  of  1571,  and  1683. 

Of  these  three  great  struggles,  it  is  impossible  not  to  see,  that 
the  decisions,  had  they  been   revei-sed,  must   necessai-ily  have 


THE  THREE  GREAT  WARS.  15 

altered  so  completely  the  whole  constitution  of  human  polity, 
society,  and  morals,  that  no  sagacity  can  conjecture  what,  in  that 
event,  would  have  been  the  present  aspect  of  Europe  or  America. 

From  the  circumstances  of  other  sunilarly  situated  regions  we 
may  however  suppose,  that  had  Greece  succimabed  before  the 
countless  myi-iads  of  Dai'ius,  Xerxes,  and  then-  successors,  th'e 
civilization  and  society  of  Europe  to-day  would  have  nearly  re- 
sembled those  of  Ilindostan,  before  the  erection  of  the  Anglo- 
Indian  emph-e ;  and  that  had  Carthage  prevailed  ov^r  the  Eagles 
of  the  Repubhc,  a  bloody  superstition,  a  coiTupt  commercial 
tyranny,  an  ilhterate,  voluptuous,  unenhghtened  society,  such  as 
we  know  to  have  existed  in  Tyi-e  and  Sidon,  would  have  stood 
m  stead  of  the  pure  rehgion,  the  hberal  polity,  and  the  elevated 
social  condition  which  have  gradually  eliminated  themselves  from 
the  institutions  of  Rome,  and  through  her  of  the  elder  Hellas. 

That  the  question,  determined  by  the  Saracenic  and  Em-opean 
strife,  is  simply  whether  the  faith  of  the  world  should  ultimately 
be  that  of  Mahomet  or  Christ,  it  requires  no  sagacity  or  acumen 
to  discover ;  and  I,  for  one,  certainly,  shall  not  descend  to  argue 
whether  event  were  for  the  greatest  good  of  humanity  at  large. 

Of  these  three  great  wai-s,  by  which,  as  I  have,  I  think,  shown, 
the  fate  of  the  human  race  has  been  thi-ice  severally  decided,  the 
fii*st  two  were  won  for  posterity  by  the  valor  and  virtue,  the 
arms  and  the  mihtary  arts,  of  the  Greeks,  and  of  the  Romans,  and 
it  is  thence  especially  that  the  histories  of  these  two  great  nations 
are  so  full  to  us  of  interes't,  and  that  they  can  never  be  examined 
without  entertainment  and  advantage. 

That  Greece — when  her  mission  of  checking  the  irruption  and 
bridling  the  power  of  the  eastern  hordes,  of  giving  a  form  and 
body  to  imaginative  beauty,  of  creating  the  magic  of  lettere,  and 
making  for  the  dreams  of  genius  a  real  and  immortal  presence 
in  the  bhth  of  art — should  be  accomplished,  must  succumb  to  the 
more  vital  and  durable  energies  of  Rome,  was  clearly  in  the 


16  IDENTITY 

design  of  Providence ;  for  she  lacked  in  herself  the  practical  and 
legislative  wisdom,  which  born  in  the  Latin  republic  has  in  its 
maturity  filled  the  world,  and  formed  in  a  gi-eater  or  less  degree 
the  base  of  every  modern  constitution.  The  means  by  which 
she  overcame  the  barbaiian  myriads,  and  by  which  she  was 
herself  overcome  in  turn,  were  purely  natural  and  physical ;  and 
the  results  were  such  as  must,  to  an  almost  mathematical  cer- 
tainty, have  followed  from  the  emplojnuent  of  those  means. 

What  these  were,  and  wherefore  and  how  successful,  it  is  my 
purpose  now  to  investigate.  Nor  \^'ill  it  be  unimportant  or  un- 
instructive  to  see  how  little  the  real  principles  of  strategy  and 
tactics  have  been  altered  from  the  earliest  ages  to  the  latest 
times ;  and  how  continually,  in  spite  of  all  the  changes  and 
improvements  in  the  methods  and  instruments  of  warfare,  in 
spite  of  the  invention  of  gunpowder  and  the  consequent 
substitution  of  scientific  combinations  for  indi\idual  prowess, 
the  same  mihtary  principles  have  been  attended  with  the 
same  success ;  the  same  exercises  and  manoeuvres  have  been 
crowned  with  the  same  victory ;  whether  the  arms  of  the  com- 
batants were  the  pike  and  shield  of  the  Hellenic  phalanx,  the 
sword  and  buckler  of  the  Roman  legion,  the  bows  and  bills  of 
the  English  foot,  the  lance  and  battle-axe  of  the  Norman  chivaliy 
resistless  in  the  thundering  charge  of  their  barbed  horse,  or  the 
death-dealing  musketry  and  ordnance,  almost  annihilating  dis- 
tance, of  the  men  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

For  the  rest,  we  must  believe  that,  in  despite  of  all  the  efforts 
of  peace  scfcieties  and  peace  lecturers,  wai*s  will  continue  so  long 
as  the  human  race  shall  endure ;  and  we  know,  that — inasmuch 
as  war  and  its  attendant  circumstances,  while  they  display 
humanity  in  many  of  its  woi-st  and  most  repulsive  lights,  at  tho 
same  time  call  forth  many  of  its  noblest  and  grandest  character- 
istics ;  give  occasions  for  its  most  heroic  efforts  both  of  doing 
and  suffering ;  and  present  its  most  touching  sacrifices,  its  most 


OF  TACTICS.  17 

admirable  exemplai-s — the  history  and  the  romance  of  warfare 
will  never  grow  dull  to  the  ear,  or  dead  to  the  heart  of  auditors, 
who  must  from  the  very  nature  of  their  constitutions  glow  with 
admiration  and  thrill  with  sympathy  for  the  glorious  and  the 
good ;  must  exult  at  the  virtues  and  triumph  at  the  victories,  as 
they  must  mourn  over  the  weaknesses  and  weep  at  the  downfall, 
of  the  vii'tuous  and  the  vahant  of  humanity ;  for  though  triumph 
and  defeat  are  but  thing's  of  the  hour,  and  the  man  but  the  sport 
of  the  moment,  still  the  pains  and  the  passions  of  the  heart  are 
immortal,  and  its  sympathies  with  the  noble,  and  its  hatred  of  the 
base,  the  same,  yesterday  and  to-day  and  to-morrow  and  forever. 
And  now,  without  further  apology  or  preamble,  coming  at 
once  to  the  armature  and  array  of  the  Greeks,  we  shall  find  that 
from  the  earhest  period  of  recorded  historic  warfare,  the  inode  of 
arming  and  arraying  the  masses  was  identical,  or  nearly  so,  with 
all  the  Hellenic  tribes  or  nations.  These,  although  using  ditlerent 
dialects,  affecting  different  customs  and  forms  of  pohty,  often  at 
war  with  each  other,  and  claiming  various  descents  fi-om  divei-s 
demigods,  vrere  still  of  common  origin  and  language,  and  in 
truth,  howsoever  subdivided,  still  constituted  one  homogeneous 
population,  actuated  for  the  most  part  by  a  common  spirit  of 
independence  and  liberty,  of  dislike  to  pei'sonal  and  hereditary 
dominion ;  imbued  with  a  common  love  of  arms  and  admiration 
of  heroism  and  individual  prowess  and  adventure,  and  capable 
at  times  of  great  common  efforts  against  a  common  enemy. 
That  this  love  of  arms  and  adventure,  at  a  later  period  of 
Grecian  histoiy,  led  to  condottierism,  and  the  formation  of  mer- 
cenary bands  of  Greek  adventurers,  serving  under  almost  every 
banner  in  tlie  known  world,  must  not  be  ascribed  to  any  defect 
in  the  Greek  character,  or  want  of  patriotism  in  individuals,  but 
to  the  subdi^•ision  of  the  whole  country  into  numerous  small 
hostile  communities ;  and  to  the  multiplication  of  pohtical 
offences,  in  their  turbulent  and  fierce  democracies  or  pei"secuting 
2 


18  GREEK  MERCENARIES. 

oligarchies,  which  rendered  the  expatriation  of  the  best  states- 
men and  bravest  leaders  rather  the  rule  than  the  exception,  and 
annually  cast  out  hundreds  of  vahant  and  adventui'ous  soldiers 
on  the  world  with  no  other  resoiu'ce  than  the  employment  of 
their  swords  in  foreign  service.  Indeed  it  is  greatly  to  the 
credit  of  the  Greek  mercenaries,  or  poHtical  exiles,  for  the  terms 
are  nearly  synonymous,  that  they  rarely  if  ever  were  induced  to 
bear  arms  against  their  native  states,  or  to  serve  the  barbarian, 
who  was  their  usual  employer,  against  the  Grecian  name. 

A  similar  state  of  things  in  the  later  Italian  Repubhcs  of  the 
middle  ages  led  to  a  similar  growth,  and  diflPusion  of  mercenaiy 
Itahan  forces  serving  under  every  standard,  and  with  far  less  of 
honorable  scruples  than  their  Hellenic  prototypes ;  since  they 
rarely  hesitated  to  lead  or  folloAv  either  against  Italy  in  general 
or  then*  own  states  in  particular,  and  that  even  in  behalf  of  the 
Tm-k  or  the  Algerine. 

That  examples  of  common  efforts  of  combined  Hellenic  states 
against  homogeneous  foreign  enemies  are  less  frequent,  must  be 
ascribed  to  the  sectional  and  individual  jealousies,  ambitions,  and 
divided  interests  which  will  arise  between  petty  independent 
states,  united  by  no  common  league  or  constitution,  and  existing 
under  every  different  shade  of  government,  fi-om  the  wildest 
pantisocracy,  through  the  intermediate  forms  of  representative 
federacy,  to  the  closest  oligarchical  corporation,  as  of  Lacedsemon ; 
and  to  autocratic  monarchy,  as  of  Sicily  and  Macedon.  What 
would  be  the  consequence  of  such  a  state  of  things,  one  may  con- 
jecture, by  imagining  the  United  States,  as  connected  by  no 
constitutional  bonds,  and  linked  together  by  no  prevaihng  tie  of 
general  republicanism  ;  but  each  several  state  self-governed  as  it 
might  be,  one  with  the  limited  monarchy  and  powerful  aristocracy 
of  England,  another  with  the  autocracy  and  serfdom  of  Russia ; 
a  third  with  the  imbecile  legitimacy  of  Spain  or  Naples ;  a  fourth 
with  the  insane  and  visionaiy  socialism  of  France ;   a  fifth  under 


GREEK  PATRIOTISM.  19 

the  existing  system  of  ISTew  York  or  Massachusetts— then  throw 
in,  apart  from  sectional  interests  and  monetary  jealousies,  jarring 
national  rehgions,  conflicting  social  prejudices  and  distinctions, 
and  the  absence  of  one  general  national  language ;  and  it  would 
soon  appear  how  difficult  of  creation,  and  how  short  of  duration, 
would  be  any  alliance  for  common  purposes,  of  states  or  nations 
having  in  truth  no  common  cause.  It  is  probable  that  nothing 
short  of  the  invasion  of  foreign  hosts  bent  on  ttfe  general  exter- 
mination or  subjugation  of  the  race  could  unite  such  nations  even 
for  a  time,  and  that  the  defeat  of  those  hosts  would  be  the  dis- 
ruption of  the  union. 

To  the  Athenian  Attica  was  Greece,  as  to  the  Laconian  Sparta, 
or  to  the  Boeotian  Thebes ;  and  it  was  only  when  in  reference  to 
the  Barbarian,  meaning  almost  invariably  the  Persian  king,  that 
Hellas  was  considered  as  a  whole,  even  by  the  purest  of  the 
Hellenes.  In  latter  days  even  the  imminence  of  Roman  con- 
quest could  not  subsist  national  combination ;  and  the  Achaian 
league  was  dissolved  through  intestine  divisions,  before  the 
stranger  had  become  the  master  of  their  fortunes  and  their  land  ; 
for  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  Roman  came  not  as  an 
exterminator  to  abohsh,  but  rather  as  a  colonist  to  adopt,  thearts, 
the  literature,  nay  but  the  very  Gods,  of  Greece.  Themsehes 
half  of  a  kindi-ed  race  they  differed  less  from  many  of  the  Greeks, 
than  did  the  Greeks  from  one  another,  and  therefore  terror  of 
their  arms  could  lead  to  no  strenuous  or  durable  federation. 

Still,  although  in  a  national  sense  there  never  was  any  such 
actual  or  acknowledged  existence  as  Greece,  there  was  a  most 
distinct  and  real  existence  in  the  shape  of  Greek  strategy,  which 
word  I  now  use  in  its  broadest  sense  as  embracing  the  whole 
theory  and  practice  of  the  art  military,  from  the  smallest  detail 
of  individual  aniiature  and  discipline,  to  the  largest  combination 
of  men  and  measures.  For  throughout  all  the  states  of  Greece, 
though  this  or  that  might  excel  in  one  or  another  ai-m  of  the 


20  HOMERIC  ARMIES. 

service,  the  system  wa^  identical,  and  the  force  of  the  Greeks — 
ro  sXXtjvjxov — an  unity. 

The  force  and  system  we  first  find  described,  in  its  rude  and 
unimproved  form,  before  the  invention  of  the  trumpet  or  any 
other  martial  music,  and  previous  to  the  use  of  mounted  cavalry 
in  warfare,  in  the  Iliad,  as  operating  against  Ihon,  or  Troy,  a 
city  of  Asia  Minor,  apparently  of  Grecian  origin.  Without 
entering  at  all^into  the  question  of  the  truth  or  fallacy  of  the 
myth  of  Troy  di\ine,  or  arguing  on  the  probability  or  improba- 
bihty  of  such  a  confederation  of  kings  as  Homer  describes,  it  is 
desirable  to  point  out  that  the  pereonal  equipment  of  the  Greek 
warrior  of  the  Iliad  differs  but  slightly  from  that  of  the  Hop- 
lites,  or  hea^y-armed  foot-?.oldiers  of  the  authentic  historical 
period ;  and  that — although  the  maintenance  of  the  battle,  and 
the  ultimate  successes  are  invariably  attributed  to  the  indindual 
prowess  of  the  hero  kings  who  fought,  befoi-e  the  battles,  hurhng 
their  spears,  ja^•ehn-like,  from  two-horse  chariots,  or  leaping 
down  to  engage  in  single  combat  with  antagonists  of  equal  rank 
and  daring — the  peculiar  serried  order  of  the  Greek  phalanx  even 
then  prevailed ;  and  that  the  determination  of  the  fight,  when 
came  the  tug  of  war,  was  owing  to  the  sturdy  charge  of  the 
ponderous  infantry,  and  to  the  push  of  the  formidable  pike. 

The  following  lines,  which  are  a  very  hteral  rendering  of  one 
of  Homer's  most  spirited  battles,  would,  with  the  substitution  of 
true  historic  names,  furnish  as  accurate  a  picture  of  the  Mace- 
donian army  at  "  that  dishonest  fight  of  Chaironeia  fatal  to 
Hberty,"  or  of  the  deep  Baeotian  column  that  broke  sheer  through 
the  Spartau  centre  at  Mantineia,  as  of  any  fabulous  encounter 
before  the  fated  walls  of  Ilion  the  divine. 

"  Thus  speaking  the  earth-shaker  lent  the  Achaians  better  cheer, 
Ant]  made  the  bands  to  rally,  that  were  scattered  far  and  near. 
About  the  two  Ajaces  right  steady  with  the  spear; 


HOMERIC    ARMIES.  21 

That  neither  mighty  Mars  could  blame  their  order,  as  they  stood, 
Nor  Pallas  queen  of  hosts.     For  all,  that  gallant  were  and  good, 
Stood  steadfastly  the  Trojan  shock  and  Hector's  might  divine. 
Spear  clashed  with  spear,  and  shield  with  shield,  in  stifl'  and  stubborn 

line ; 
Targe  beat  on  targe,  rang  helm  with  helm,  met  hero  hero  then, 
And  nod(hng  crests  right  rankly  pressed  above  the  press  of  men. 
So  closely  were  the  hosts  arrayed  with  lances  brandished  high, 
By  gallant  hands,  by  noble  hearts,  that  each  would  each  outvie 
Right  forward  charging  manfully.     But  first  with  onset  dread 
The  Trojans  charged  the  serried  mass,  great  Hector  at  their  head. 
E'en  as  a  block  of  mass)'^  stone  leaps  down,  with  reeling  crash, 
When  wintry  floods  have  mined  its  base,  and  rains  with  ceaseless  plash 
Its  earthfast  hold  have  loosened  on  the  mountain's  summit  hoar. 
Down  thunders  it;  the  tortured  woods  resound  its  mighty  roar; 
But  unsubdued,  with  speed  renewed,  from  each  succeeding  steep 
Into  the  plain  it  rolls  amain,  and  there  forgets  to  leap. 
Thus  Hector,  who  so  lately  swore,  with  high  and  haughty  boast, 
Into  the  sea  victoriously  to  drive  the  Achaian  host, 
Thus  far  drave  furiously;  but  now  was  stopped  in  mid  career, 
Where  that  great  band,  so  firmly  manned,  stood  fast  with  shield  and 

spear. 
For  sturdily  with  sword  and  pike  the  Achaians  smote  and  slew. 
And  bore  him  back  in  his  bloody  track  for  all  that  he  could  do." 

Thus  it  would  a2)pear  that,  from  the  fii-st,  the  main  trust  of 
the  Greek  armies  was  in  the  heavy  infantry  clad  in  complete 
pano23ly,  armed  as  the  principal  instrument  of  otience  with  the 
long  pike,  the  sarissa  of  the  Macedonians,  Ly  whose  warlike 
kings  the  phalanx  was  undoubtedly  carried  to  its  perfection ;  and 
depending  on  the  single  steady  and  sustained  charge  of  the  deep 
sohd  column,  which,  in  most  cases,  especially  on  smooth  and 
level  ground,  carried  all  before  it.  At  first  this  phalanx  was 
prol^ably  little  more  than  a  dense  body  of  soldiei-s,  with  a 
tolerably  regular  front,  and  a  depth  varying  according  to  circum- 
stances, the  best  and  bravest  men  voluntarily  pressing  t<T  the  van, 
leaving  the  weaker  and  lower  s])ii-ited  to  form  the  mass  behind, 


22  GREEK  IIOPLITAT. 

lending  the  impetus  of  their  forward  pressure  to  the  advance, 
and  opposing  the  vis  inertise  of  their  dead  weight  to  the  retro- 
gression of  the  front.  In  after  ages  it  had  its  regular  divisions 
and  subdivisions,  with  duly  constituted  numbers  of  rank  and 
file,  and  officers  with  their  appointed  places  on  the  march  and  in 
action,  and  orderly  appropriate  manoeuvres,  by  the  tact  and 
timing  of  which  the  action  was  very  often  decided.  In  all  ages, 
hoAvever,  from  the  times  of  the  Homeric  myth  to  the  defeat  of 
Perseus  at  Cynocephaloe,  the  indi\idual  dress  and  equipment  of 
the  men  was  nearly  identical. 

This  dress,  or  uniform,  consisted,  at  the  period  of  which 
Xenophon  wi'ites,  when  the  Greek  army  was  in  its  most  perfect 
and  elaborate  efficiency,  both  as  regards  armature  and  tactics,  of 
a  chiton,  or  shirt  of  woollen  stuff  without  sleeves,  and  reaching 
barely  to  the  knee.  This  was  invariably  of  a  bright  crimson 
color,  and  the  writer,  whom  I  have  last  named,  frequently 
alludes  to  the  splendor  of  its  contrast  with  the  helmets,  breast- 
plates, and  greaves  of  polished  bronze  in  strong  and  -sivid 
language ;  for  he  states,  in  one  place,  of  the  army  of  Agesilaus 
that  "  it  apj)eared  all  bronze  and  scarlet ;"  and  in  another  pas- 
sage, speaking  of  the  ten  thousand,  whose  retreat  he  himself  con- 
ducted with  such  admirable  skill,  he  says  that,  "  when  they  all 
wore  casques  of  bronze  and  blood-red  chitons,  A\dth  brightly  bur- 
nished greaves  and  shields,  the  whole  plain  bloomed  with  crim- 
son, and  lightened  with  bronze."  The  shield,  which  was  the 
peculiar  and  characteristic  arm  of  the  Greek  hophtes,  as  w\as  the 
oblong  buckler  that  of  the  Roman  legionary,  was,  hke  the  casque, 
of  bronze,  ponderous  and  unwieldy,  of  a  perfectly  circular  form, 
Avith  a  boss  in  the  centre,  covering  the  whole  body  of  the 
soldier,  fi-om  above  the  shoulder  to  below  the  knee,  and  was  cer- 
tainly not  less  than  three  and  a  half  or  four  feet  in  diameter. 
Indeed,  so  great  was  the  incumbrance  of  this  great  piece  of 
defensive  armor,  that  every  heavy-armed  soldier  was  allowed  a 


THEIR  ARMS.  23 

servant  to  cany  it  on  the  march,  and  take  care  of  it  when  not  in 
action;  who,  when  the  army  was  engaged,  served  either  ^vith 
the  baggage-guard,  or  as  a  skirmisher.  The  technical  name  of 
this  shield  was  Asjns  ;  and  by  the  number  of  these  the  effective 
force  of  the  heaAy  Greek  foot  present  under  arms,  was  estimated, 
the  men  being  reckoned  by  shields,  as  in  modern  warfare  by 
bayonets  and  sabres.  In  addition  to  this,  which  was,  however, 
his  principal  defence,  the  Greek  soldier  wore  a  breast-plate,  or 
cuirass,  hkewise  of  bronze,  reaching  to  thaJbips,  sometimes  above 
a  buff  coat,  stolas  ;  and  greaves  of  the  same  metal,  protecting 
the  forepart  of  his  legs,  from  the  instep  to  a  short  distance  above 
the  knee.  His  offensive  weapons  were  the  formidable  pike,  or 
Macedonian  Sarissa,  which  was  tv/enty  feet  in  length,  and  when 
levelled  to  the  charge,  projected  fourteen  feet  in  front  of  the 
hue ;  so  that,  when  the  phalanx  was  engaged,  the  spear  points 
of  the  five  foremost  ranks,  at  least,  were  directly  serviceable,  and 
were  actually  opposed  to  every  front-rank  man  of  the  enemy. 
Besides  the  pike,  he  also  carried  a  short  stabbing  sword,  scarcely 
superior  in  length  to  a  large  knife  or  dagger,  a  most  ineffective 
weapon  ;  and  perhaps  left  as  such,  not  unintentionally ;  since  upon 
reliance  on  the  pike,  and  on  the  tactic  consequent  on  its  use,  the 
whole  efficiency  of  the  phalanx  depended ;  if  it  should  once  dis- 
close its  serried  order,  it  was  necessarily  at  the  mercy  of  any 
assailant,  and  the  hand  to  hand  single-combat  fighting  of  the 
Romans  was  as  abhorrent  to  its  system,  as  it  w^as  congenial 
to  that  of  the  legion.  The  order  of  the  phalanx  was  invariably 
a  close  column  varying  in  depth  from  twelve  to  fifty  men,  accord- 
ing to  the  nature  of  the  ground  and  j^leasure  of  the  leader.  Its 
smallest  subdivision  of  men  was  the  Enomoty,  or  as  the  name 
implies,  sworn-hand^  which  seems  to  have  consisted  originally  and 
properly  of  twenty-four  men  beside  the  enomotarck,  or  leader  of 
the  band  ;  yet  Thucydides  states  distinctly  that,  in  the  first  battle 
of  Mantineia,  fought  between  the  Lacedaemonians  and  Argives,  the 


24  THE    PHALANX. 

eiiomoty'^'  of  the  former  was  drawn  up  four  front  and  eight  deep, 
making  it  contain  thirty-two  men  beside  the  leader,  instead  of 
twenty-four  ;  while  we  have  the  authority  of  Xenophon-f  that  at 
the  battle  of  Leuctra  the  Spartan  enomoty  of  Cleombrotus  fought 
in  three  files  which  he  says  gave  them  a  depth  of  twelve,  while 
the  Theban  files  opposed  to  them  contained  not  less  than  fifty 
shields.  From  this  it  is  o])vious  that  the  number  of  men  in  the 
enomoty,  as  indeed  the  number  of  enomoties  in  the  next  larger ' 
division,  was  variable ;  though  from  the  name  of  this  division,  which 
was  2Jcntecost7/s,  signif^-ing  a  company  of  fifty  men,  led  by  a 
pentecoster  or  captain  of  fifty,  we  arrive  at  the  regularly  estimated 
number  of  men  in  the  original  enomoty  ;  two  of  which  formed  a 
pentecostys,  two  of  these  again  forming  a  lochus,  and  four  of  the 
hitter  a  mora,  or  division.  So  that  the  mora  with  its  polemarch 
or  general,  and  all  its  subordinate  officers  must,  as  originally 
constituted,  have  consisted  of  429  men  of  all  ranks.  The  num- 
ber of  men,  however,  in  the  divisions  is  unimportant,  unless  where 
it  is  desirable  to  calculate  the  numerical  force  of  antagonistic 
armies  ;  for  the  modes  of  manoeuvring  and  fighting  are  all  clearly 
laid  down  and  comprehensible  enough,  apart  from  the  consider- 
ation of  numbers,  although  I  should  be  inchned  to  set  down 
sixteen  ranks  as  the  ordinary  depth  of  the  latter,  or  Macedonian, 
phalanx. 

It  must  not  be,  however,  by  any  means  supposed  that,  because 
tlie  main  dependence  of  the  Greek  armies  was  placed  in  the 
])halanx  of  their  heavy  infinitry,  they  lacked  the  other  arms  of 
service.  Light  infantry,  or  skirmishers,  and  horse  in  a  smaller 
proportion,  but  of  excellent  quahty,  they  seem  to  have  possessed 
from  an  early  period ;  and  after  the  peace  of  Antalcidas,J 
Iphicrates  introduced  a  new  species  of  force,  intermediate  between 

*  Thucydldes,  416,  IV.  c.  68. 

t  Xenophon  Hellenics,  Lib,  VI.  c.  4.  Xen.  Rep.  Lac.  XL  4 

J  Olymp.  98.  IL  BC.  387.    Polybius.  16.  Diodorus  XV.  51. 


•  THE    TAROETEERS.  25 

tlie  heavy  foot  and  mci-e  skirmisliei-s,  wliicli  afterward  becrme  of 
very  great  importance  under  the  name  of  Peltastce^  which  is  well 
rendered  as  Targeteers.  The  arms  of  this  new  force,  w^hich. 
appeai-s  never  to  have  been  composed  of  citizens  of  any  of  the 
elder  Greek  repubhcs,  but  of  Thessalians,  OEtohans,  Acarnanians, 
Epirots,  and  perhaps  at  fii-st  of  barbarian  prisoners  and  manu- 
mitted slaves,*  wore  a  brazen  casque,  and  a  target,  Pelta, 
usually  of  a  creecent  or  semilunar  shape,  much  smaller  and 
hghter  than  the  great  sliield  of  the  Hoplites^  together  with  a 
quilted  hnen  jacket  instead  of  the  bronze  cuirass.  The  offensi\-8 
weapons'!"  of  the  targeteer,  as  improved  by  Ijihicrates,  were  a 
sword  double  the  length  of  that  of  the  heavy  foot  and  adapted 
for  cutting  as  well  as  stabbing,  together  with  a  spear  lengthened 
nearly  in  the  same  proportion.  On  this  latter  point  all  the 
authorities  agi-ee,  but  it  is  evident  to  me,  as  the  targeteers  are 
generally  described  as  javehneers  and  not  pikcmen,  that  the 
spear  alluded  to  must  have  been  the  ahontion  or  light  dart  of  the 
skirmishers,  and  not  the  sarissa  of  the  phalanx,  which  being 
already  twenty  feett  long  and  stout  in  proportion  could  not  have 
been  used  in  its  exlstino-  state  as  a  missile,  and  if  increased  to 
forty  feet  must  have  been  utterly  immanageable.  We  shall  hear 
much  of  these  targeteers  in  Xenophon's  masterly  retreat,  and  in 
the  fine  battles  of  Pyrrhus  and  Epaminondas. 

The  light-armed  troops  were  variously  equipped  as  archers, 
slingei-s,  and  javehneers,  wearing  merely  a  helmet  and  light 
shield ;  but  as  the  continental  Greeks  never  excelled  either  in 
archeiy  or  the  use  of  the  shng,  and  as  the  javelin  which  was  their 
usual  weapon  was  at  best  a  very  inferior  missile,  as  deficient  both 
in  range  and  certainty,  they  were  soon  found  to  be  so  much 
inferior  to  the  oriental  skirmishers,  that  th^y  appear  to  have  been 
discarded  so  soon  us  warfare  became  a  science,  and  armies  were 

*  Xen,  Anab.  IV.  S.     f  Diodorus  XV.  44.     J  Some  say  twenty-four. 


26  .  GREEK    CAVALRY. 

composed  of  regulars,  and  no  longer  of  mere  armed  levies  of 
citizens.  Afler  this  period,  we  find  Rhodian  slingers,  Cretan  and 
even  Scythian  bowmen,  and  horse-archery  from  Thrace,  employed 
in  the  Greek  armies,  as  were  the  natives  of  the  Balearic  Isles,  and 
the  Numidians  in  those  of  Carthage. 

The  face  of  the  country  throughout  Greece  proper,  especially 
the  Peloponnesus  and  Attica,  being  of  an  exceedingly  rough  and 
craggy  if  not  mountainous  character,  was  of  course  very  ill 
adapted  for  equestrian  exercise  or  for  the  use  of  cavalry  ;  and  we 
find,  of  consequence,  that,  although  horsemanship  was  much 
encouraged,  and  a  ^-aluable  breed  of  animals  maintained  at  a  great 
expense,  particularly  for  the  Olympic  contests,  the  cavalry  of  the 
original  Greek  cities  was  weak  in  numbers ;  and  that  of  Sparta 
in  particular  singularly  inefficient.  The  Thebans  were  the  first 
power  which  attained  to  any  great  proficiency  in  this  arm  of  the 
service,  in  consequence  of  their  finding  the  want  of  it  in  their 
wars  with  their  neighbors,  the  people  of  Orchomenos  and  Thespis  ; 
but  afterward  as  the  more  northern  nations  of  Greece  gradually 
rose  in  the  scale  of  ascendency,  and  the  plains  of  Thessaly,  Thrace, 
and  Macedonia  began  to  furnish  their  contingents,  the  cavalry 
became  a  favorite  arm,  the  rather  that  it  was  much  called  for  in 
the  contests  with  the  kings  of  Pei-sia,  which  were  now  transferred 
from  the  broken  country,  hills  and  defiles,  of  Greece  to  the  vast 
open  plains  and  champaigns,  swarming  with  admirable  nati\'e 
horse,  on  the  banks  of  the  Euphrates,  the  Tigris  and  the  Indus. 
On  the  proper  armament  and  service  of  the  hoi-se  we  have  a  very 
fine  and  elaborate  treatise  from  the  pen  of  Xenojyhon  the  Athe- 
nian, by  which  w^e  learn  tliat  the  Greek  cavalry  were  the  most 
completely  equipped  with  defensive  armor  of  any  branch  of  the 
service.  The  men  wore,  above  a  coat  of  buff",  a  heavy  cuirass  of 
bronze,  fitted  above  with  a  sort  of  rim  or  frill  of  the  same  metal, 
which  was  at  once,  according  to  the  author,*  an  ornament,  and  a 
'      *  Xenophon  de  re  equestri  XIII — Anabasis  III.  3. 


GREEK    CAVALRY.  27 

perfect  protection  to  the  neck  and  face  of  the  rider  so  for  as  to 
the  nose.  It  must  have  resembled,  in  a  considerable  degree,  that 
smgular  piece  of  defensive  armor  known  in  the  reign  of  Edward 
IV.  of  England  as  the  volant  piece,  which  may  be  seen  to  this 
day  in  the  suit  attributed  to  that  prince  in  the  Horse-armory  of 
the  Tower  of  London.  The  head  of  the  rider  was  protected  by 
a  Boeotian  casque,  covering  the  whole  face  down  to  the  tips  of 
the  ears  and  the  nostrils,  but  leanng  apertures  by  which  to  see 
and  breathe  without  difficulty.  On  the  left  arm  was  worn  no 
shield,  but  a  complicated  piece  of  armor,  known  by  a  word 
answering  to  our  gauntlet,  but  m  reality  corresponding  to  the 
whole  defence  of  the  arm  as  worn  by  a  knight  of  the  fom*teenth 
centmy  ;  for  it  is  said  to  have  protected  the  shoulder,  the  elbow, 
the  forearm,  and  the  hand  while  gi'asping  the  reins,  as  weU  as  the 
arm])it,  which  was  justly  regarded  as  one  of  the  most  vital  parts, 
and  the  most  exposed  in  a  horseman.  As  the  right  arm  must 
frequently  be  raised  whether  in  the  act  of  striking,  or  of  casting 
the  spear,  it  was  necessary  that  the  corslet  should  be  cut  away 
above  and  below  in  order  to  give  full  sway  to  the  muscles,  and 
the  defence  was  therefore  made  good  by  side-plates  hinged  on  to 
the  breastplate  so  as  to  give  and  return  again  with  every  motion 
of  the  wearer,  the  fore  arm  being  guarded  by  plates  of  metal 
strapped  upon  the  hmb,  but  not  attached  to  the  panoply.*  The 
loins,  flanks  and  abdomen  were  in  like  manner  protected  by 
jointed  plates  accommodating  themselves  to  the  movement  of  the 
body,  the  thighs  by  cuishes,  and  the  feet  and  shins  by  boots  of 
hosivj  leather.  The  horses  moreover  were  fully  caparisoned  with 
frontlets  on  the  head,  poitrels  on  the  chest,  and  bardings  protect- 
ing the  loins,  croupe,  and  thighs ;  so  that  in  fact  the  Greek 
cavalry  were  completely  harnessed  cuirassiei-s,  as  fully  accoutred 
as  the  steel-clad  chivalry  of  the  middle  ages,  and  as  impenetrable 
to  the  weaporus  of  ordinary  assailants. 

The  offensive  instruments  of  these  ponderous  cavaHers  were 


28  AT^TILLEPY. 

tv/0  s,pcars  of  cornel  wood,  or  wild  cheny,  which  was  esteemed 
the  best  adapted  to  that  purpose  by  the  ancients,  and  is  especially 
recommended  as  superior  to  all  othei-s  and  especially  to  the  reed, 
which  was  generally  used  for  lance  shafts,  by  the  writer  so  often 
named  above.  One  of  these  spears  wjis  to  be  hurled  at  the 
enemy  while  advancing,  in  order  to  check  his  onset  and  disar- 
range his  charging  line ;  the  other  was  to  be  couched,  as  the 
knightly  lance,  and  charged  in  close  encounter.  Besides  this  a 
sabre,  or  cutting  sw^ord,  of  Greek  manufacture,  and  probably  of  a 
crooked  form,  was  carried  in  heu  of  the  short  stabbing  blade 
cnri-ied  by  the  infantry,  which  was  from  its  very  form  inefficient 
for  mounted  men. 

Of  artillery  for  the  casting  of  darts  of  vast  size,  sometimes 
wrapped  with  tow  and  kindled  with  Greek  fire,  and  for  hurling 
stones,  whether  into  the  walls  of  beleaguered  cities,  or  fi-om  the 
walls  into  the  lines  of  the  besiegei*s,  the  Hellenic  nations  had  long 
b'jen  in  possession  ;  but  it  was  not  until  above  a  century  after  the 
death  of  Alexander  the  Great,  that  any  thing  like  the  use  of 
artillery  is  mentioned  as  opposed  to  movable  bodies  of  men  in 
the  field  ;*  when  IMachanidas  the  tyrant  of  the  Lacedaemonians 
endeavored  to  break  the  order  of  Philopoemen's  Achaian 
phalanx  by  discharges  of  heavy  missiles. 

Having  now  described  the  armature  of  a  whole  Greek  army, 
in  its  several  arms  of  service,  I  shall  proceed  briefly  to  point  out 
what  was  its  ordinary  mode,  what  the  defects,  and  what  the  ad- 
vantages of  its  array  ;  and  how  it  is  that,  invariably  ^^ctorious  as 
opposed  to  the  orientals,  even  when  overmatched  in  the  ratio  of 
ten  to  one,  the  whole  system  was  found  utterly  defective  when 
opposed  to  an  enemy  equally  brave  and  strong,  but  using  a  dif- 
ferent tactic. 

The  phalanx,  being  the  nucleus  of  every  Hellenic  force,  and  the 
key  of  its  tactic,  was  generally  thus  manceuvTcd.  Drawn  up  in 
*  Polybius,  XI..  Frag.  IH.  XT.  3.  XH.  4. 


THE    PHALANX.  29 

files  varying  from  eight  to  fifty  shields  in  depth,  the  average  and 
usual  mode  being  sixteen,  with  the  host  man,  and  offxcer  of  the 
smallest  subdivision,  in  front  as  file  leader,  and  a  good  veteran  as 
rear  rank  man,  itTormed  a  great  oblong  column,  serried  so  closely, 
when  in  battle  order,  that  the  shields  of  the  men  touched.  Accord 
ing  to  its  numbers  it  was  formed  in  one  or  more  sections  ;  but,  if 
the  full  force  of  a  Macedonian  phalanx  was  in  the  field,  sixteen 
thousand  strong,  it  usually  formed  three  divisions,  one  in  the 
centre  of  eight  thousand,  and  one  on  either  hand  of  four  thou- 
sand, with  intervals  between  for  the  convenience  of  manoemTing. 

The  skirmishei's  were  throwm  forward  in  front,  at  fii-st ;  but  as 
their  weapons  were  exhausted  and  the  enemy  drove  them  in, 
they  fell  back  as  best  they  might,  either  by  the  flanks,  or  by  the 
intervals  between  the  sections  of  the  phalanx,  where  and  in  the 
rear  they  rallied,  until  they  should  be  wanted  to  pursue  and  cut 
up  a  defeated  and  flying  enemy.  The  cavalry  was  always  on  the 
flanks,  and  it  was  with  this  arm  usurJly  that  the  action  com- 
menced. 

Then  came  the  formidable  charge  of  the  phalanx,  not  rapid  or 
dashing,  but  steady,  sohd,  and,  as  long  as  it  kept  its  order  and 
was  assailed  in  front  only,  almost  irresistible.  Against  the 
weaker  orientals,  as  in  the  battles  of  Marathon,*  Plataea,|  My- 
cale,];  Cynaxa,§  and  the  \ictories  of  Alexander,  it  was  clearly 
demonstrated,  that  the  shock  of  the  Macedonian  Sarissa  was  surely 
and  necessarily  \ictorious,  since  the  weaker  frame  and  foebUr 
morale  of  the  Asiatic  was  never  able  to  encounter  the  European 
hand  to  hand  wnth  a  chance  of  success,  nor  was  the  rush  of  that 
sohd  body  less  formidable,  so  long  as  its  flanks  were  protected,  to 
any  troops  armed  only  with  short  weapons  or  missiles ;  as  the 
Romans  found  to  their  cost  in  their  fii-st  battles  with  Pyrrluis  the 
Epii-ot  at  the  fords  of  the  Siris,}  and  again  on  the  field  of  A'-cu- 

•  Herod.  VI.  109.         f  Herod.  IX.  102.         %  Herod.  IX.  62.  63 
^  Xenoph.  Anab.  J.  R.  18.         ||  Plutarch.  Vit.  Pyrrhi,  XVI. 


30  CHARGE    OF    THE    PHALANX. 

lum,*  in  both  of  which  encounters,  long  and  desperately  con- 
tested as  they  were  by  Roman  valor,  the  hedge  of  speai-s  pre- 
sented by  the  phalanx  could  be  no  more  hewed  down  by  the 
swords  of  the  legionaries,  than  they  could  be  wrested  at  Platan  a 
fi-om  the  hands  of  the  Hoplites  by  the  naked  grasp  of  the  Pei-sian 
infantry.  "  When  Greek  met  Greek,  then  came  the  tug  of  war," 
and  then  so  often  as  phalanx  charged  phalanx,  fi-ont  to  front, 
accident  or  individual  prowess  decided  the  stiife,  if  it  were 
decided;  and  this  unquestionably  led  to  the  improvements  in 
tactics,  and  the  strategctical  inventions,  for  which  the  Hellenic 
leadei-s  soon  became  famous.  For  findino*  that  direct  onslaughts 
were  of  little  avail,  on  bodies  nearly  equal  in  physical  force, 
and  physical  courage,  and  exactly  equal  in  arras  and  organization, 
they  early  had  recourse  to  flank  attacks,  obhque  movements,  and 
■withdrawals  of  one  or  the  other  wing,  long  before  any  form  of 
battle  was  thought  of  by  the  Italian  captains,  beyond  that  of 
setting  their  armies  face  to  foce  with  the  foe,  and  then  fighting  it 
out  to  the  last  manfully. 

These  then,  which  have  been  thus  slightly  touched  upon,  were 
the  advantages  of  the  Greek  formation  and  tactic ;  the  force  of 
tlieir  charge  directly  forward,  like  that  of  a  bull,  or,  to  which 
Xenophon  hkens  Epaminondas'  onset  at  Mantinea,  of  a  galley 
under  full  headway,  was  hard  to  resist,  if  not  irresistible.  But 
once  their  flanks  uncovered  by  the  defeat  of  their  hoi-se,  the 
absence  of  tlieir  skirmishers,  the  accidents  of  the  ground,  or  the 
like,  the  whole  mass  was  vulnerable  to  the  very  heart ;  and  if 
once  disordered  the  length  and  unwieldiness  of  their  weapon,  and 
the  desuetude  of  the  men  to  any  thing  hke  single  combat 
rendered  them  an  easy  prey  to  any  active  and  movable  assail- 
lant.  They  were  moreover  the  most  inert  and  immovable 
column  that  can  be  conceived  ;  for  their  system  of  manoeuvring 
entirely  on  the  single  file,  so  as  to  bring  the  same  file-leader 
*  Plutarch.  Ibid.  XXI. 


THE    OBLIQUE    FORMATION.  31 

always  in  the  front  of  the  battle,  and  the  same  rear  rank  man 
always  in  the  rear,  compelled  every  moment  to  be  performed  by 
a  countermarching  of  all  the  files ;  so  that  if  the  phalanx  were 
surprised  or  menaced  with  a  sudden  attack  on  the  rear  or  either 
flank,  instead  of  simply  facing  the  men  right,  left,  or  about,  as  the 
necessity  of  the  case  might  indicate,  it  was  necessary  to  counter- 
march every  file  down  the  interval  between  itself  and  its  next 
neighboring  file,  including  the  expansion  of  the  front  to  nearly  or 
quite  double  its  original  extent,  in  order  to  allow  space  for  the 
passage  of  the  men,  and  the  corresponding  contraction,  so  soon  as 
the  front  rank  should  have  reached  the  rear,  and  so  have  inverted 
their  order  of  battle — a  slow  and  perilous  manoeuvre  to  execute 
under  the  eyes  of  a  vigilant  and  active  enemy,  eager  to  strike  a 
blow  and  knowing  where  to  plant  it. 

Tliis  was  its  grand  and  sovereign  defect,  and  consequently  wo 
find  that,  when  the  phalanx  was  once  formed  to  act  in  any  one 
du'ection,  any  movement  of  the  enemy,  compeUing  a  rapid  change 
of  disposition,  while  in  action,  was  almost  necessarily  victorious. 
Such  was  the  result  of  the  masterly  movement  of  Epaninondas  at 
Leuctra,''^  when  by  the  withdrawal  of  his  own  left  wing,  he  in- 
duced the  Lacedaemonians  to  extend  their  right,  and  charging 
their  centre  while  in  confusion,  first  with  the  sacred  band  of 
Pelopidas,  and  then  with  the  force  of  his  own  right  wing,  fifty 
shields  in  file,  cut  them  in  two  and  annihilated  them  with  such 
slaughter  as  had  never  before  fallen  upon  a  Spartan  army.  Such 
again  was  the  oblique  charge  upon  the  centre  of  Agesilaus,  by  the 
same  gi-eat  captain,  at  Mantineia|;  by  which  in  like  manner  he 
broke  through  the  whole  Spartan  i)halanx,  and  would  have  un- 
questionably slaughtered  them  as  at  Leuctra,  had  he  not  himself 
fallen  in  the  arms  of  victory,  leaving  no  officer  in  his  army  of 
sufficient  abihty  to  finish  the  work  which  he  had  so  gloriously 
commenced. 
*  Diod.  X\^.  55  Xen.  Hell.  VI.  4.      f  Diod.  XV.  86.  Xen.  Hell.  VII.  5. 


32  DOUBLING    THE    FILES. 

Of  the  like  nature  again  was  the  victory  by  Flaminius  over 
the  Macedonian  phalanx  of  Philip  at  Cynosceplialae  ;*  where  the 
Macedonian  king,  having  beaten  the  Roman  left  with  his  own 
right  on  the  level  gi'ound,  and  finding  his  own  left  somewhat 
shaken  by  the  broken  surface  of  the  knolls  among  which  it  was 
engaged,  endeavored  to  double  the  depth  of  his  files  while  actively 
engaged  with  the  legionaries  in  front ;  and  thus  disordered  them 
so  much  that  the  Romans  broke  up  their  front,  and  getting  within 
the  points  of  their  long  pikes  slaughtered  them  at  pleasure  with 
their  stout  stabbino;  swords.  Ao-ain,  at  the  final  overthrow  of  the 
Greek  power  under  Pei*seus  by  the  legions  of  ^milius  Paulu>^| 
at  Pydna,  the  battle  was  all  but  won  by  the  charge  of  the  phalanx, 
whose  spears,  locked  in  the  shields  of  the  hastati  and  principes 
of  the  Romans,  bristled  like  an  unbroken  row  of  palisades, 
keeping  an  even  front,  and  bearing  down  all  before  them  ;  when 
a  happy  inspiration,  or  instinct,  suggested  to  the  consul  the  idea 
of  withdrawing  his  alternate  maniples  and  charging  home  with 
his  reserves  at  different  intervals,  so  as  to  render  the  pressure  on 
the  great  column  irregular  and  uneven.  The  consequence  was  as 
sudden  as  the  idea ;  the  even  fi*ont  of  ^lacedonian  pikes  was  bent 
into  a  sinuous  line,  the  unopposed  portions  of  the  phalanx  pressing 
forward  into  the  intervals  between  the  maniples,  while  the  ranks 
which  were  attacked,  either  retrograded,  or,  at  best,  w^ere  held 
stationary ;  so  that  the  Roman  swordsmen  found  gaps,  and  ex- 
posed flanks,  into  which  they  broke  with  their  short  weapons,  and 
decided  the  fate  of  Greece  at  a  blow,  when  scarce  an  horn-  before 
their  leader  held  himself  already  half  defeated. 

This  then  was  the  great  and  principal  objection  to  the  Greek 
Tactic ;  and  this  was  the  principal  cause  of  its  defeat,  so  soon  as 
they  came  in  contact  with  men  neither  pei*sonally  bra\»er,  nor  phy- 
sically stronger  than  themselves,  but  differently  armed,  and  more 
effectively  arrayed.     There  was,  however,  another  defect  inherent 

*  Plut.  Flamin.  VIII.  f  Plut.  ^inil.  c.  XX. 


THE    GYMNETES.  33 

to  the  veiy  nature  and  composition  of  th'.s  force  ;  and  this  was 
its  incapacity  to  cover  its  own  retreat,  or  do  any  thing  for  its 
own  defence  if  once  broken  ;  and  its  equal  and  similar  incapacity 
to  destroy,  or  even  follow  up  with  any  adequate  or  close  pui-suit, 
a  disordered  and  flying  enemy. 

According  to  the  composition  of  Greek  armies,  in  which  the 
heavy  armed  foot  consisted  of  the  flower  of  the  middle  classes, 
while  the  light  troops  were  of  the  lowest  order  of  citizens,  too  poor 
to  be  able  to  arm  themselves  efiicientl}",  and  serving  in  some  sort 
as  the  varlets  or  servants  of  the  Hojdites — in  the  Spartan  armies, 
being  Helots,  they  were  hterally  their  sla\'es — very  little  depen- 
dence could  be  placed  on  the  Gymnetes,  as  they  were  termed 
from  their  ^\ant  of  defensive  armor,  in  case  of  the  ranks  being 
once  broken ;  nor  were  they  likely  to  risk  themselves  very  foi* 
from  the  support  of  their  sohd  columns  in  pursuing  an  enemy, 
especially  if  there  were  any  hkelihood  of  his  rallying  to  resist. 
The  cavalry  were  again  such  mere  handfuls  of  men  that  no  real 
or  efficient  service  could  be  expected  of  them. 

It  is  mentioned  that  the  victory  of  Marathon*  v»'as  admired  of 
all  men,  and  regarded  as  especially  wonderful  and  distinguished, 
from  the  fact  that  the  Athenians,  without  either  horse  or  archery, 
sliould  have  charged,  routed,  and  destroyed  a  host  so  greatly 
superior  to  themselves  in  numbers  as  the  Persian  armj",  and  that 
they  should  have  driven  the  fugitives  quite  to  the  ships  and 
captured  some  of  these  also.  This  I  think,  however,  proves  httle 
or  nothing,  more  than  that  the  distance  was  short ;  the  Medes 
fliid  Persians,  accustomed  to  conquer  the  inferior  races  of  bar- 
barians, were  utterly  astounded  by  the  fierce  Greek  onset ;  while 
tJie  king's  army,  from  some  unknown  reason,  made  no  use  of  the 
cavalry  in  which  arm  it  was  so  superior. 

What  is  much  more  to  the  point  is  the  opinion  of  Xenophon 
himself,  as  given  at  the  council  of  war  subsequent  to  the  death 
*  Herod.  VI.  109,116. 


34  RHODIAN    SLINGERS. 

of  Cyrus,  and  the  commencement  of  the  retreat  of  the  ten 
thousand,  -with  regard  to  the  inefficiency  of  the  unsupported 
phalanx. 

On  the  evening  of  the  fii-st  day  of  their  retreat,  when  being 
hard  beset  by  the  Persian  Archery,  Xenophon  had  charged  and 
pursued  the  enemy  with  the  Hophtes  and  targeteei-s  of  the  rear 
guard,  at  some  risk  of  being  cut  off  from  the  main  body,  Cheiri- 
sophus  and  some  of  the  elder  leaders  blamed  Xenophon  for  in- 
cun-ing  such  risk,  to  whom  that  leader,  frankly  admitting  his 
error,  and  acknowledging  the  danger  he  had  run,  gave  the  fol- 
lowing statement  as  his  defence,  and  as  cause  for  diiferent  future 
arrangements.  "  As  it  now  is,  the  enemy  outshoot  and  out- 
shng  us  so  far  that  the  Cretan  archers  and  our  javehneei-s  cannot 
reach  them.  But  in  case  we  pursue,  it  is  not  safe  to  do  so,  to 
any  distance  from  the  supporting  columns ;  and  in  a  short 
distance  even  swift  footmen  cannot  overtake  footmen  with  a  bow- 
shot start.  If,  therefore,  we  would  prevent  their  harassing  attacks, 
we  must  fit  ourselves  immediately  with  cavalry  and  shngei-s; 
and,  in  fact,  I  understand  that  we  have  in  our  army  Rhodian 
slingers  who  can  send  their  shot  to  twice  the  distance  of  the 
Pei-sians,  since  the  latter  cast  stones  large  enough  to  fill  the  hand 
from  their  slings,  while  the  Rhodians  use  leaden  bullets,  the  range 
of  which  is  infinitely  greater."* 

In  consequence  of  this  recommendation,  it  appeai-s  that  mea- 
sures were  taken,  and  light  troops  created,  by  whom  the  Pei-sian 
skirmishei*s  were  ultimately  defeated  and  kept  at  a  distance ;  so 
that  the  leaders  were  at  length  relieved  from  the  apprehension, 
which  they  had  at  fii-st  with  so  much  reason  entertained ;  namely 
that,  "  since  they  were  now  left  to  themselves  without  either 
hoi-se  or  allies,  they  must  evidently  be  cut  off  to  the  last  man  if 
worsted  in  action  ;  while,  if  victorious,  it  was  impossible  for  thera 
to  do  execution  on  the  routed  enemy.")- 

*Xenoph.  Anab.  III.  4.  13.  f  Ibid.  Lib.  III.  11. 


CHARGE    IN    COLUMN.  35 

Such  and  so  great  were  the  eiTors  and  defects  of  that  system, 
which,  in  spite  of  all,  produced  effects  so  permanent  and  im- 
portant, when  directed  by  such  heads  and  hearts  as  those  of 
Miltiades,  Epaminondas,  Phihp,  Alexander  the  Great,  and  last, 
not  least,  Pyi-rhus  the  Epirot ;  and  which  was  destined  only  to 
be  overthrown,  and  proved  useless,  when  brought  into  contact 
with  the  improved  Eoman  strategy ;  which  is  that  shown  by  all 
experience,  up  to  the  present  day,  to  be  founded  on  the  true 
scientific  principle,  and  whenever  put  into  practice  under  like 
circumstances  of  equality  between  the  opposing  ma'^ses,  to  be 
certain  of  success. 

The  principle  is  this,  that  whenever  great  solid  columns  with 
long  vulnerable  flanks,  are  launched  against  troops  in  hue,  the 
column  must  necessarily  be  enveloped,  overlapped  by  the  con- 
verging wings  of  the  enemy ;  overwhelmed  with  missiles  to  which 
they  can  make  no  reply,  whether  the  missiles  be  javelins,  arroAvs, 
and  bullets  from  the  Rhodian  and  Balearic  sling,  or  musketry 
and  grape,  rockets  and  shells  and  shrapnels,  and  all  the  terrible 
dedces  of  modern  European  warfare;  and  finally  ravaged  and 
torn  asunder  by  the  hand-to-hand  encounter  with  short  weapons, 
and  trampled  imderfoot  by  the  thundering  charge  of  the  exter- 
minating horse. 

Such  has  been  ever,  and  such  will  be  ever,  the  final  fate  of 
every  army  which  ventiu-es  to  rush,  blind  and  headlong  as  the 
charging  bison,  in  close  and  solid  column  into  the  centre  of  lines 
which  do  not  lack  the  courage  to  receive,  and  the  obstinate 
steadiness  to  sustain,  the  impetus  of  its  first  onset.  With  effemi- 
nate dastards,  or  unskilled  barbarians,  the  method  may  succeed  ; 
but  when  men  are  met  by  men,  in  any  degree  their  equals,  it 
must  be  fatal  to  the  assailants. 

All  nations,  in  all  ages,  have  at  some  time  or  other  attempted 
this  form  of  strategy  ;  all  have  at  some  time  or  other,  it  is  proba- 
ble, succeeded  with  it ;  all  when  matched  by  their  equals  in  deter- 


36  THE    LEGION. 

mination  have   succumbed,    through  no    want  of   valor,    but 
through  the  viciousness  of  the  \ery  principle  itself. 

That  the  Greeks  so  long  succeeded  with  it,  is  omng  to  the 
fact  that  they  vv'^ere  opposed  always,  either  to  efieminate  orientals 
who  could  not  endure  their  steady  charge,  nor  fiice  the  triumph- 
ant poeans  and  the  clash  and  clang  of  the  spearpoints  on  the 
brazen  shields,  which  formed  the  prelude  to  their  formidable 
onset ;  or  to  their  own  countrymen,  who  met  them  with  equal  arms 
and  the  same  manoeuvres,  and  left  it,  therefore,  to  valor,  or  the 
devices  of  individual  genius,  to  decide  the  fate  of  battles. 

The  Romans  charged  in  column  at  Cannae  into  the  centre  of 
the  Carthaginian  lines,  bore  all  before  them  for  a  while,  and  were 
annihilated  by  the  convergence  of  the  lines — the  same  fate  had 
previously  befallen  the  Epirot  Pyrrhus  at  Beneventum,  though  his 
charge  had  been  previously  checked  by  his  own  elephants,  which, 
maddened  by  the  missiles  of  the  enemy,  rushed  into  his  own  lines 
scattering  dismay  and  death.  Similar  were  the  routes  of  Philip 
at  Cynoscephalse,  and  of  Perseus  at  Pydna,  by  enemies  to  whom 
the  phalanx  had  at  first  seemed  so  terrible. 

Precisely  similar  the  route  of  the  confederate  peei-s  by  Philip- 
Augustus  at  Bo  vines ;  of  the  French  chivalry  at  Cressy  and 
Poitiers ;  and  in  more  modern  days,  and  with  weapons  and  war- 
fire  far  diiferent,  precisely  similar  the  discomfiture  of  the  great 
English  square  at  Fontenoy,  of  the  in^^ncible  column  of  Lannes 
at  Aspern,  and,  last  and  most  memorable  of  all,  of  Napoleon's 
young  guard  at  Waterloo. 

And  now  we  arrive  in  due  course  at  the  formation,  armature, 
and  tactic  of  the  Roman  legion,  which  succeeding  to  and  pre- 
vailing over  the  columnar  tactic  of  the  phalanx,  conquered  in 
point  of  fact  the  whole  ancient  world,  and  so  long  as  Romans 
continued  to  be  Romans  was  never  excelled  or  equalled  by  in- 
fantry. As  the  Western  empire  gradually  decayed,  and  the 
mannei-s  of  the  Eastern  became  more  and  more  orientalized. 


THE    ANCIEAT    liOI.IAN    LEGION.  37 

mercenary  troops  supplied  the  place  of  the  indomitable  Romans, 
and  cavahy  became  in  consequence  the  great  arm  of  the  ser\dce, 
and  the  great  engine  of  mediaeval  warfare ;  and  so  indeed,  until  the 
invention  of  gunpowder,  and  its  first  thoroughly  victorious  appli- 
cation, on  the  field  of  Pavia,  when  the  gallant  Francis  lost  to  his 
imperial  rival  "  all  save  honor,"  it  continued  to  be.  Nor  can  it 
be  said  that,  between  the  extinction  of  the  Roman  legionary 
tactic  and  the  commencement  of  the  mod'^rn  strategy  with 
musketry  and  ordnance,  with  the  exception  of  the  Swiss  confeder- 
ates at  Granson,  Nanci,  and  Morat,  victorious  over  the  mailclad 
Jancers  of  Burgundy,  and  the  English  bills  and  bows  fatal  to 
France's  noble  chivalry  at  Cressy  and  Poictiers  and  Agincourt, 
there  was  anything  worthy  of  the  name  of  infantry  in  Europe,  or 
anything  that  could  pretend  to  brook  the  levelled  lances  and 
barded  destriers  of  the  feudal  cavahy. 

With  these,  however,  we  have  at  present  nothing  to  do, 
beyond  the  passing  remark,  that  as  a  general  rule  the  tactic  of 
these  bodies,  the  S^viss  halberdiers  and  English  bill-men,  was 
akin  to  that  of  the  Romans,  as  using  short  against  long  weapons, 
and  affecting  the  formation  of  long  ranks  vvith  shallow  files,  as 
opposed  to  columns  of  comparatively  small  front  com^pensated  by 
depth  giving  weight  and  impetus  to  the  forward  onset. 

To  resume,  howevei*,  it  would  appear  that  the  constitution  of 
the  ancient  and  original  Roman  legion,  as  regulated,  it  is  said,  by 
Servdus  Tunias,-was  framed  in  accordance  to  the  means  of  the 
citizens  who  composed  the  various  classes,  from  which  the  forces 
of  the  year  were  raised.  The  wealthier  and  better  armed,  for 
the  terms  were  synonymous,  forming  the  hea\y  armed  infantry, 
fighting  in  the  front  and  bearing  the  brunt  of  battle,  the  poorer 
and  more  feebly  equipped  bringing  up  the  rear,  and  those  who 
possessed  nothing  skirmishing  in  front  with  hght  and  slender 
javelins  until  the  shock  of  real  war  began,  and  then  retreating  by 
the  flanks  to  rally  in  the  rear  of  the  battalia. 


38  THE    ANCIENT    ROMAN    LEGION. 

At  this  period,  it  is  on  many  accounts  evident  that  the  early 
Roman  battle,  so  long  as  the  Servian  constitution  was  in  exist- 
ence, coincided  with  that  of  the  Greeks;  that  their  formation 
was  the  column,  the  better  armed  burghers  in  the  front,  and  the 
lighter  and  feebler,  down  to  the  naked  supernumeraries,  intended 
to  assume  the  arms  and  fill  the  places  of  the  fallen,  holding 
themselves  aloof  from  the  shock  of  spears,  and  adding  only  the 
impetus  of  their  dead  weight  in  the  rear  to  the  force  of  the 
attack.  At  this  time  also  the  arms  of  the  Hastati  and  Principes 
were  the  round  shield,  the  long  pike,  and  short  stabbing  sword, 
and  their  order  of  fighting,  as  is  expressly  stated  by  Livy,  that  of 
the  Macedonian  phalanx,  while  those  of  the  second  class,  answer- 
ing to  the  triarii,  were  the  oblong  shield,  the  heavy  javelin,  and 
larger  sword  :  and  at  this  period  the  front  ranks  of  the  legion 
were  known  as  antepilani,  or  ranks  before  the  javehneei*s. 

The  formation  of  the  legion  under  the  Servian  constitution, 
which  seems  to  have  prevailed  until  neai-ly  the  termination  of  the 
Latin  wars,  was  of  this  nature.  All  those  citizens  who  possessed 
a  capital  of  one  bundred  thousand  asses,  or  pounds,  of  brass 
money  and  upward,  formed  the  first  class,  divided  into  eighty 
centuries,  forty  of  young,  forty  of  elder  men,  who  were  appointed 
to  bear  as  their  arms  defensive,  the  helmet,  circular  shield,  greaves 
and  breastplate,  all  of  bronze,  and  as  Aveapons  the  pike  and  sword. 
These  two  divisions  of  the  first  class  corresponding  to  the  divisions 
known  later  as  the  hastati  and  principes.  To- this  class  were 
added  two  centuries  of  mechanics,  who  bore  no  arms,  but  served  at 
working  the  military  engines.  The  second  class  consisted  of  those 
citizens  possessing  above  seventy-five,  and  below  a  hundred, 
thousand  asses,  and  they  bore  helmet  and  greaves  without  breast- 
plate, the  square  buckler  instead  of  the  shield,  the  spear  and 
sword.  The  third  class  rating  at  fifty  thousand  and  upward 
were  armed  as  the  last,  with  the  exception  of  the  greaves  which 
in  their  case  were  laid  aside.     The  fourth,  who  were  held  at  five 


THE    ANCIENT    ROMAN    LEGION.  39 

and  twenty  thousand,  wore  no  defensive  armor  and  carried  only 
a  pike  and  javelin,  acting  as  mere  skirmishei-s ;  together  with  the 
fifth  class  of  proletarians,  who  were  destitute  of  property,  sub- 
sisted by  their  own  labor,  and  fought  merely  with  shngs  and 
stones,  hovering  on  the  outskirts  of  the  action  and  never  coming 
up  to  the  close  encounter.  To  these  were  added  a  cavalry  com- 
posed of  six  centuries  of  equites,  a  sort  of  half  nobility,  to  whom 
hoi-ses  were  provided  at  the  pubhc  expense ;  and  this  was  the 
composition  of  the  original  Roman  army,  and  in  many  points, 
even  to  the  last  when  the  arms  of  the  classes  and  mode  of 
fighting  were  altered,  the  foundation  of  the  later  system. 

It  is  remarkable  enough  that,  although  we  have  Livy's  ex- 
press declaration  that  the  original  tactic  of  the  Romans  was  the 
Macedonian  phalanx,  which  is  moreover  self-evident  from  the 
nature  of  the  weapons  which  they  carried,  and  from  the  regular 
declension  in  the  quality  of  their  offensive  arms  in  proportion  as 
the  ranks  were  farther  removed  fi'om  the  front  of  battle,  still  all 
the  actions  which  he  has  described  so  vividly  and  ^vith  such 
minute  particular,  ascribe  to  the  legions  from  the  first  the  tactic 
of  the  manipule  and  the  use  of  the  sword  and  buckler.  This 
discrepancy,  however,  only  goes  to  show  the  imaginative  charac- 
ter of  the  writer  and  his  carelessness  in  adherence  to  facts,  which 
he  admitted,  when  not  carried  away  by  the  enthusiasm  and  glow 
of  composition. 

It  is,  however,  more  singular  that  it  is  nowhere  distinctly 
stated  at  what  time  the  change  of  armature  and  tactic  was 
adopted,  nor  why,  nor  from  whom  it  was  borrowed.  Livy,* 
indeed,  states  generally,  that  the  "  Romans  formerly  used  round 
shields,  chj-pd^  but  that  after  they  received  regular  pay,  or 
became  stipendiaries,  they  adopted  oblong  bucklei's,  scuta^  in  the 
place  of  shields" — and  Saliust  in  his  conspiracy  of  Catiline  makes 
Julius  Cassar  declaref  that  the  Romans  "  borrowed  their  arms 
*  Liv.  VIIT.  8.  t  Saliust,  Catil.  51. 


40  THE    ANCIEXT    ROMAN    LEGION. 

offensive  and  defensive  of  the  Saranites,  the  insignia  of  their 
magistracies  from  the  Tuscans" — and  farther  the  account  given 
by  Livy  of  the  splendid  armor  and  weapons  of  the  Samnite  host, 
which  was  defeated  by  the  Dictator  Papirius  Cui-sor  beyond  the 
Ciminian  hills,  corresponds  very  closely  with  w^hat  we  know 
from  contemporaneous  authorities  to  have  been  the  ai-mature  of 
the  later  legion.  "  There  were  two  bands,"*  says  he, "  the  buck- 
lers of  the  one  were  embossed  ^^^th  silver  ;  the  other  with  gold. 
The  form  wjis  that  of  the  buckler,  scutum.  But  it  wi^  broader 
at  the  top,  where  the  breast  and  shouldei*s  were  to  be  protected, 
-VN-ith  the  top  hue  level,  or  even,  and  wedge  fashioned  below,  for 
the  advantage  which  that  form  gave  in  handiness."  It  must  have 
been  fashioned  therefore  much  hke  the  heart-shaped,  or  as  it  is 
technically  called  heater-shaped  sliield,  which  was  suspended 
round  the  necks  of  the  knights  and  men-at-arms  of  the  middle 
ages."  "  Their  breasts  were  protected  by  sponge,  and  their  left 
leg  by  a  greave.  Their  casques  were  high-crested,  which  added 
to  the  appearance  of  the  soldiere'  stature."  AW  that  follows  this 
lively  picLure  shows  that  both  armies  fought  in  open  order,  and 
that  a  series  of  single  combats  with  the  buckler  and  stabbing 
sword  prevailed  along  the  whole  front  of  the  lines,  proving  that 
at  this  time  the  troops  of  the  two  nations  were  identical  in 
weaponing  and  disciphne,  which  of  the  two  borrowed  from  the 
other,  or  whether  either,  not  appearing. 

On  the  contrary,  Diodorus  assei*ts,  "  that  the  Romans  origi- 
nally had  quadrangular  bucklei-s  for  warfare;  but  afterward, 
seeing  that  the  Tyrrhenians  made  use  of  round  brazen  shields, . 
conquered  these  by  adopting  the  Hke  aiTnature."f  In  this  state- 
ment, however,  as  the  fii-st  assertion  that  the  quadrangular 
buckler  was  laid  aside  for  the  round  shield  is  manifestly  incorrect, 
much  stress  I  think  need  not  be  laid  on  the  second,  in  relation  to 
the  suggestion  being  borrowed  from  the  Tuscans.  It  is,  even, 
*  Liv.  IX.  40.  t  Diod.  XX I  XL  Eclog.  3.  501. 


THE    ANCIENT    ROMAN    LEGION.  41 

doubtful  in  my  opinion  whether  there  was  any  dhect  borrowing 
in  the  case  from  any  foreign  country.  All  that  we  know,  for 
certain,  is  that  at  the  commencement  of  the  Punic  wars,  through- 
out the  tei'rible  struggle  on  Italian  soil,  w^hich  shook  Rome  to 
her  very  foundations,  mth  the  unconquerable  Hannibal ;  through 
the  fierce  civil  wars  of  Sylla  and  Mai'ius,  Coesar  and  Pompey,  and 
that  mad  Triumnr  who  "  lost  a  world  for  a  woman,"  through  all 
the  series  of  yeai^  which  led  to  the  subjugation  of  the  whole  terra 
cognita — the  weapons,  the  order  of  fighting,  the  castrametation, 
the  field  equipage  and  the  disciphne  of  the  later  Roman  legion, 
was  that  which  we  have  accm'ately  and  minutely  laid  down  for 
us  by  the  contemporaneous  pen  of  Polybius,  the  friend  and  tent- 
companion  of  Laehus  and  the  greater  Scipio. 

According  to  my  judgment,  the  alterations  and  improvements 
in  the  art  mihtary,  adopted  by  the  Romans  some  time,  more  or 
less,  previous  to  the  commencement  of  the  fii-st  Punic  war,  and  in 
full  practice  at  the  time  of  the  invasion  of  Pyrrhus,  B.C.  280,  are 
far  more  likely  to  have  onginated,  as  did  the  similai*  emendations 
of  the  Greek  tactic  and  armature  by  Iphicrates  at  an  earher  date, 
B.C.  387,  in  a  perception  of  the  defects  of  the  colimanar  system 
of  the  phalanx,  of  its  unwieldiness,  and  its  liability  to  disarrange- 
ment and  destruction  bv  the  flank  attacks  of  a  lio-hter  and  more 
active  enemy.  In  the  same  manner  we  are  told  almost  in  the 
same  breath  that  the  Romans  learned  their  method  of  castrame- 
tation from  P}Trhus  of  Epims ;  and  again,  that,  being  out  with 
a  reconnoitring  party  on  the  eve  of  his  firet  encounter  with  these 
very  Romans,  the  same  Pyi-rhus  exclaimed  on  seeing  their  en- 
campment, "  The  tactic,*  0  Megacles,  of  these  barbarians,  is  in 
no  wise  barbarical,  and  we  shall  learn  their  prowess."  Two 
stories  in  themselves  so  discrepant,  as,  like  the  celebrated  cats  of 
Kilkenny,  to  annihilate  one  another  nor  leave  a  wreck  behind. 

But  to  come  at  once  to  the  later  legion,  that  I  mean  which  we 
*  Plut.  Vit.  Pyr.  26. 


42  THE    LATER    ROMAN    LEGION. 

find  in  full  operation  and  efficiency  in  the  fifth  century  of  Rome 
and  the  third  before  the  Christian  era,  we  discover  that  of  the 
legion  according  to  the  Servian  constitution  this  much  only  has  sur- 
vived, namely — that  the  whole  Roman  cavalry  were  composed  of 
a  separate  and  superior  order  of  the  state,  superior  to  the  mere 
burghers  but  inferior  to  the  great  Patrician  houses,  for  a  portion 
of  whom,  at  least,  chargers  and  one  mounted  attendant  to  each 
were  found  at  the  expense  of  the  republic ;  and  that  the  heavy 
armed  foot,  that  is  to  say  the  hastati,  principes,  and  triarii,  con- 
stituting the  force  of  the  legions,  were  ]e\ied  from  the  wealthy 
middle  classes,  possessing  the  same  original  qualification  of  proper- 
ty, although  there  was,  with  one  shght  exception,  no  pro  rata  dis- 
tinction in  their  armature,  and  none  whatever  in  their  place  in  the 
various  divisions,  which  had  reference  solely  to  age,  the  younger 
men  composing  the  ranks  of  the  hastati,  those  in  the  flower  of 
age  the  principes,  while  the  triarii,  who  were  differently  equip- 
ped, were  formed  of  the  tried  and  experienced  veterans  of  many 
wars,  on  whom  it  fell,  if  the  day  was  going  adversely,  to  restore 
the  shaken  ranks,  and  if  it  hung  balanced  to  decide  the  victory 
by  their  fresh  and  formidable  onset.  The  young  men  of  the 
poorer  classes  were  mustered  as  hght-armed  troops,  not  however 
acting  as  servants  to  the  heavy  foot,  which  was  the  practice  in  the 
Greek  armies,  but  serving  like  them  as  independent  citizens  and 
soldiers.  These  are  the  men,  known  among  the  Romans  as 
velites,  rorarii^  or  ferentarii,  names  equivalent  to  the  modern 
voltigeur  or  skirmisher,  and  to  the  Greek  writers  as  grospliomachi^ 
or  javehneers,  from  the  weapon  which  they  used  in  action,  the 
bow  and  sling  being  both  ineffective  if  not  unused  by  the  Latin 
nations  and  the  Greeks  of  Italy,  although  the  natives  of  many 
neighboiing  isles  were  famous  for  theu-  skill  in  archery  and 
shnging. 

These  light-armed*  troops  wore  plain  casques  on  theu'  heads, 
*  Polybius,  Milit.  Rom.  VI.  22. 


THE    LATER    ROMAN    LEGION.  43 

covered  with  wolf  skiiis,  or  the  spoils  of  other  animals,  both  for 
defence  and  distinction,  as  between  their  several  subdivisions. 
They  had  no  cuirass  or  defence  for  the  body  or  hrabs  beyond  a 
light  buckler,  imrma^  of  thi-ee  feet  in  diameter,  made  of  osier 
covered  \^dth  leather.  Their  weapons  were  a  cutlass,  and  several 
javelins,  which  appear  to  have  been  known  as  the  veru  or  spit 
by  the  Romans,  but  which  are  accurately  described  as  grosphi 
by  Polybius.  These  were  darts,  the  wood  of  which  wiis  about 
thi-ee  feet  in  length  by  an  inch  in  diameter,  with  a  point  of  a  span 
in  length  so  tapering  and  sharp,  whence  its  Latin  name  of  spit, 
that  it  would  bend  and  become  useless  after  a  single  blow ;  and 
this  was  done  intentionally,  in  order  to  prevent  the  same  weapon 
j6'om  being  returned  with  effect  by  the  enemy. 

Their  duty  was  to  skirmish  in  front,  and  cover  the  advance  or 
conceal  the  manoeuvres  of  the  legions,  until  driven  in  by  the 
approach  or  sustained  resistance  of  hea\'ier  troops,  when  they  fell 
back  upon  their  supports,  and  ultimately  retreated,  through  the 
intervals  of  the  manipules,  which  have  yet  to  be  described,  into 
the  rear,  whence  as  occasion  offered  they  continued  to  annoy  the 
enemy  with  their  missiles.  The  light  troops  were  divided  into 
small  bodies,  each  attached  to  a  manipule  of  heavy  foot  of  each 
of  the  three  divisions,  and  could  either  act  independently  in  force, 
or  with  the  troops  with  whom  they  were  brigaded  and  en- 
camped. 

The  Hastati,  Principes,  and  Triaiii,  forming  the  three  divisions 
of  heavy  foot,  wore  the  full  panoply  of  the  day,*  consisting  in  the 
first  place  of  the  buckler,  scutum^  which  was  quadrangular  and 
rectilinear,  two  feet  and  a  half  in  width  by  four  in  height,  not  flat 
but  curved  on  its  shortest  edge  so  as  to  assimilate  to  the  shape 
of  the  body.  It  was  composed  of  double  plank,  strongly  glued 
together,  lined  with  linen,  covered  on  the  exterior  surface  with 
calf-skin,  bound  with  a  strong  iron  verge,  as  a  defence  against 
*  Ibid,  VI.  23. 


44  THE    LATER    ROMAN    LEGION. 

sabre  cuts,  and  provided  with  a  strong  iron  boss  in  the  centre,  to 
ward  ofi'  pike-thrusts  or  the  blows  of  heavy  stones.  Together 
with  this,"  and  next  in  importance  to  it,  was  worn  the  short  mas- 
sive, two-edged,  sharp-pointed,  stabbing  sword,  the  principal  and 
most  effective  weapon  of  the  legionary ;  it  was  hung  on  the  right 
thigh  and  was  known  as  the  Iberian  sword,  whether  that  the 
blades  were  of  Spanish  temper  which  was  then  already  fiimous, 
or  that  the  weapon  itself  had  been  borrowed  from  the  Spanish 
foot,  who  certainly  in  Hannibars  army  did  make  use  of  the  same 
deadly  instrument.  The  legionary  also  carried  two  javehns,  the 
well-known  and  formidable  pila,  one  of  which  was  essentially  a 
javehn,  being  described  as  exactly  similar  to  a  slight  well-balanced 
boar-spear;  the  'other  a  ponderous  and  massive  spear  which 
could  either  be  hurled  at  a  short  distance,  from  forty  to  sixty 
paces,  with  tremendous  effect,  or  could  be  used  in  hand-to-hand 
encounter,  especially  to  repel  horse,  as  it  was  by  Caesar's  veterans 
at  Phai-salia  with  decided  advantage  against  the  high-born 
equites  of  Pompey's  patrician  army.  The  formation  of  thesa 
weapons  is  so  singular  as  to  deserve  a  more  minute  notice,  as  it 
is  not  easy  to  comprehend  how  instruments  so  ponderous  could 
be  so  efficient,  as  we  know  that  they  were,  whether  cast  from  the 
hand  or  charged  as  the  modern  bayonet.  The  shafts*  were  of 
wood,  four  and  a  half  feet  long,  and  either  round  or  qua<irangular 
in  shape,  in  the  former  instance  having  the  diameter,  in  the  latter 
the  flat  side,  of  no  less  than  a  palm,  or  three  Greek  inches,  being 
a  fraction  more  than  three  of  our  measure — a  thickness  which  it 
would  not  be  easy,  and  certainly  very  far  from  convenient,  to  grasp. 
These  ponderous  shafts  were  again  adapted  to  barbed  steel 
heads  of  a  length  equal  to  themselves,  the  lower  half  of  which 
formed  a  hollow  socket  into  which  one  half  of  the  shaft  was 
received  and  fjistened  with  many  clasps  or  bands,  so  that  the 
weapon  could  not  be  rendered  useless  except  by  the  breaking?- 
*  Polyb.  VI.  23. 


THE    LATER    ROMAN    LEGION.  45 

the  steel,  which  was  half  an  inch  thick  at  the  point  of  junction 
with  the  wood.  The  whole  weapon  was  therefore  six  foot  three 
inches  in  length,  about  eighteen  of  which  was  a  strong  triangular 
steel  head.  Their  farther  defensive  weapons  were  an  open  hel- 
met of  bronze,  with  a  projecting  peak  and  cheekpieces,  decked 
with  a  crest  of  plumes,  and  three  upright  feathers  of  black  or 
crimson  about  two  feet  and  a  half  in  height,  adding  greatly  to  the 
splendor  and  apparent  size  of  the  soldier,  and  a  plate  of  brass 
about  a  span  in  breadth  both  ways,  attached  upon  the  breast  and 
called  a  heart-defender.  Instead  of  this  defence,  those  who  were 
rated  at  above  ten  thousand  drachmae  wore  shirts  of  chain- 
mail,  The  Triarii,  or  reserve,  who  were  all  chosen  veterans,  were 
armed  and  weaponed  exactly  as  the  hastati  and  principes,  except 
that  in  heu  of  the  pila  they  carried  pikes  fitted  for  charging 
hand-to-hand,  although  these  were  not  so  ponderous  but  that 
they  could  on  occasion  be  hurled  as  javehns.  Indeed,  after  the 
account  given  of  the  pila,  it  would  be  difficult  to  imagine  what 
should  be  too  ponderous  for  that  purpose. 

To  complete  the  Roman  force,  we  must  not  pass  the  equites,  or 
cavalry,  three  hundred  of  whom  were  attached  to  every  legion, 
four  of  which,  two  forming  a  regular  consular  army,  constituted 
the  regular  peace  establishment,  as  we  may  call  it,  of  the  Roman 
republic.  The  armature  of  these  high-born  horsemen,  although 
they  often  did  good  service  when  matched  against  the  similarly 
armed  Latin  or  Samnite  hoi-se,  and  although  they  fought  with 
stubborn  gallantry  when  fearfully  overmatched  by  the  Greek 
cuirassiers  of  Pyrrhus,  was  ludicrously  inefficient;  and  they 
proved  wholly  unable  to  sustain  the  shock  of  the  Greek  or  Car- 
thaginian horse,  or  even  the  impetuous  onset  of  the  wild  Numi- 
dians,  with  their  unbridled  hoi-ses,  long  lances,  and  wild  desert 
horsemanship. 

They  wore  casques  indeed,  of  bronze  ornate  of  crest  and  plumes, 
but  they  had  neither  corslet,  thigh-pieces,  nor  greaves,  under  the 


46  THE    LATER    ROMAN    LEGION. 

idea  that  sucli  would  impede  their  agihty  in  leaping  on  their 
horses  or  dismounting.  Their  shields  were  of  simple  ox-hide,  with 
neither  boss  nor  binding ;  their  spears  were  of  brittle  reeds,  which 
shivered  to  the  grasp  at  the  first  thrust ;  and  their  short  Iberian 
swords,  the  same  as  those  so  deadly  in  the  hands  of  the  foot 
soldier,  were  as  useless  in  those  of  the  mounted  cavalier,  who  re- 
quires, if  any  one,  a  long  sabre,  capable  of  deahng  sweeping 
blows  and  doing  service  with  either  edge  or  point,  against  an 
enemy  without  arm's  length. 

The  legionaries  being  thus  armed  and  thus  divided,  their  array 
and  order  of  battle  were  as  follows.  Of  each  division,  hastati, 
principes,  and  triarii,  there  were  ten  manipules,  consisting  each 
of  two  centuries  under  their  proper  centurions,  subordinate  again 
to  a  tribune,  who  led  the  manipule.  Of  the  two  first  divisions, 
however,  the  hastati  and  principes,  each  manipule  contained  one 
hundred  and  twenty  men,  while  each  of  the  triarii  contained  but 
sixty.  Of  the  skirmishers,  an  equal  proportion  was  attached  man 
for  man  to  every  manipule,  forty-eight  to  each  of  the  hastati  and 
principes,  twenty-four  to  each  of  the  triarii.  The  legion  con- 
sisted, therefore,  of  three  thousand  heavy  armed,  and  twelve 
hundred  light-armed  infantry,  with  a  detachment  of  three 
hundred  horse  belong-ing  to  it,  the  whole  under  the  order  of  an 
officer  termed  legatus  in  the  Roman,  prsefectus  in  the  alUed 
Latin  legions,  which  were  similar  in  all  respects  to  them  except 
that  they  had  double  the  number  of  hoi-se.  A  regular  consular 
army  consisted  of  two  Roman  and  two  alhed  legions,  making  an 
aggregate  of  sixteen  thousand  eight  hundred  foot  and  eighteen 
hundred  horse.  At  a  subsequent  period  the  rank  and  file  of  the 
legion  were  increased  from  four  thousand  two  hundred,  to  five 
thousand  two  hundred,  raising  the  whole  force  to  twenty-two 
thousand  six  hundred  men.  Upon  the  whole,  about  twenty 
thousand  men  may  be  generally  computed  as  the  effective  force 


THE    LATER    ROMAN    LEGION.  47 

of  the  consular  army,  though  according  to  circumstances  it  might 
exceed  or  fall  short  of  that  complement. 

This  force,  when  the  day  of  battle  came,  was  di'awn  up  in 
three  hues  of  alternate  squares ;  for  each  manipule  in  itself,  when 
in  battle  order,  formed  a  sort  of  loose  square,  although  the  whole 
of  each  division  was  a  long  hne  pierced  with  equal  gaps  at  equal 
distances. 

Each  manipule,  as  I  have  said,  contained  one  hundred  and 
twenty  men,  I  speak  of  the  two  first  divisions,  and  these  were 
drawn  up  ten  deep,  consequently  with  a  front  of  twelve  soldiei*s, 
to  every  one  of  whom  a  space  of  five  feet  was  allowed  for  freedom 
of  play  with  the  sword  and  buckler,  and  hurhng  the  heavy  pilura. 
Thus  every  manipule  would  occupy  a  space  of  sixty  feet  rank  and 
fifty  feet  file,  and,  the  intervals  between  each  manijDule  being 
equal  to  the  whole  fi'ont  of  the  manipule,  each  division  of  a 
Roman  legion  would  form  a  line  of  eleven  hundred  and  forty 
feet  front,  really  occupied  by  only  one  hundred  and  twenty  men. 
It  must  be  observed,  again,  that  in  each  manipule  the  men  did 
not  cover  their  file-leadei's,  but  the  intervals  between  them,  and  in 
like  manner  the  several  manipules  of  the  principes  did  not  cover 
the  manipules  of  the  hastati,  but  their  intervals,  and  so  again  the 
triarii  of  the  principes.  So  that  in  fact  the  whole  Roman  legion, 
when  in  battle  order,  exactly  resembled  the  arrangement  of  three 
fines  of  a  chess  board,  each  containing  ten  squares  of  men,  and 
nine  square  intervals. 

There  was,  however,  a  longitudinal  lane  between  each  of  the 
three  divisions,  equal  in  width  to  the  transverse  lanes  betw^een 
the  manipules.  So  that  the  depth  of  the  whole  legion  would  bo 
tw^o  hundred  and  fifteen  feet,  since  the  manipules  of  the  triarii 
preserving  the  same  front  or  nearly  so  with  those  of  the  other 
divisions,  would  be  necessarily  but  three  deep  ;  and  a  whole  con- 
sular army  of  fom-  legions  would  form  a  treble  Hne,  independent 
of  the  cavalry  who  were  stationed  on  the  wings,  of  four  thousand 


48  THE    ROMAN    TACTIC. 

seven  hundred  and  ten  feet  front,  by  one  hundi'ed  and  fifteen 
feet  depth. 

The  consequence  is,  that  when  in  action  with  an  equal  force  of 
men  drawn  up  in  the  Greek  phalanx,  directed  against  their 
centre,  the  Roman  legionary  army  would  ovei-flank  them  at  each 
extremity  of  the  hne  by  at  least  a  thousand  feet,  so  that  by 
retiring  its  own  centre  manipules,  or  advancing  those  of  its  own 
Avings,  it  must  necessarily  envelope  and  overlap  them,  finally  in- 
volving them  in  such  and  so  fatal  a  catastrophe  as  those  of 
Cannge,  Fontenoy,  Aspern,  and  Waterloo. 

It  must  at  once  be  apparent  that  the  individual  fighting  of  a 
"Roman  legion,  dependent  as  it  was  on  the  personal  prowess, 
strength,  and  skill  with  his  weapons  of  the  individual  soldier,  must 
have  been  singularly  fine,  manful,  and  exciting. 

We  will  suppose  the  red  flag  hoisted  on  the  Praetorium,  or 
great  pavilion  of  the  general,  being  the  signal  for  delivering 
battle,  the  three  divisions  of  the  heavy  infantry,  steady  as  insu- 
lated towers,  mutually  supporting  one  another,  with  their  glitter- 
ing brazen  casques  and  erect  black  and  crimson  plumes,  their 
long  shields  advancing  all  in  line,  their  tremendous  pila  bran- 
dished in  the  air.  The  trumpet  gives  the  signal  and  out  flies 
a  cloud  of  nimble  skirmishers,  covering  the  onset  of  the  mani- 
pules and  disturbing  the  approach  of  the  enemy,  by  the  arrowy 
hail  of  their  keen  javehns.  Meanwhile  the  tramp  of  charging 
horse  and  the  clang  of  close  battle  peal  from  either  wing,  show- 
ing that  the  cavalry  are  at  work  already,  and  now  the  sldrmishei*s, 
driven  in  by  the  solid  advance  of  heavy  troops,  fall  back  by  the 
intervals  and  rally,  each  squad  in  the  rear  of  its  own  particular 
manipule.  Then  with  their  well-known  shout  and  the  long  stem 
trumpet  blast,  "  which  bids  the  Romans  close,"  in  rush  the  stout 
nastati,  sending  their  fearful  pila  hurtling  through  the  air,  rend- 
ing the  strongest  shields,  piercing  the  best  made  coi-slets  as  though 
they  were  but  paper,  and  then,  before  they  have  recovered  from 


THE    ROMAN    TACTIC.  49 

that  deadly  volley,  upon  tliem  with  the  sword  and  buckler — 'till 
the  whole  front  is  one  series  of  hand-to-hand  encountei-s.  If  the 
hastati  overmatched  retire  before  the  weight  of  the  enemy,  the 
principes  receive  them  in  the  intervals  between  their  fresh  mani- 
pules,  the  hue  is  restored  and  is  now  sohd  and  continuous,  and  if 
it  be  a  phalanx  which  they  are  engaging,  the  onset  of  the  triarii, 
with  their  long  pikes  wheeling  in  upon  either  flank,  decides  the 
victory,  and  almost  before  it  is  a  \ictory,  lo !  it  is  a  rout,  an 
extermination. 

Such  for  the  most  part  was  the  Roman  tactic ;  at  times  it  was 
altered  in  adaptation  to  chcumstances,  as  at  Zama,  where  Scipio 
covered  the  manipules  of  his  hastati  by  those  of  his  principes, 
and  those  again  by  his  triarii,  purposely  leaving  avenues  du-ectly 
through  his  hues,  down  which  his  skhmishers  were  instructed  to 
provoke  the  formidable  elephants  to  pursue  them.  The  ma- 
noeuvre was  successful,  the  terrible  monstei-s  were  disposed  of, 
and  the  long  contested  battle  was  determined,  the  hastati  and 
principes  having  been  both  successively  driven  in,  by  the  de- 
cisive and  overwhelming  charge  of  the  reserved  triarii.  But  of 
this  more  anon. 

Sometimes  the  tactic  was  abandoned,  and  always  fatally  ;  as 
at  Thrasymene  where  Flaminius  bhndly  rushed  in  column  into 
the  broken  defiles,  where  his  flank  was  exposed  to  the  terrible 
claymores  of  the  Gauls,  and  the  mad  charge  of  the  wild  Mumi- 
dian  lances,  while  his  van  was  fighting  stubbornly  against  the 
African  and  Spanish  foot,  who  barred  their  onward  way.  The 
result  was  that  of  an  army,  at  night-fall  not  a  man  hved,  save  as 
a  captive  to  the  merciless  Carthaginian.  As  again  at  Cannae, 
where  for  some  inconceivable  reason  the  Romans  fought  without 
intervals  between  their  manipules  or  between  their  three  several 
divisions,  but  rushed  in  one  vast  wedge-hke  column  into  the 
centre  of  the  enemy,  carrying  all  bodily  before  them,  imtil  the 
Punic  wings,  strens^thened  by  their  great  leader  to  that  very  end, 


50  THE    ROMAN    TACTIC. 

broke  in  on  both  their  naked  flanks,  while  Maharbal,  with  his 
victorious  horse,  thundered  upon  their  reai-,  and  the  carnage  of 
Waterloo  was  anticipated  by  above  two  thousand  years. 

And  now  I  have  briefly,  and  I  hope  clearly  sketched  out,  the 
precise  nature  of  the  tactics  of  these  two  great  powers  ;  I  have 
endeavored  to  show  that  the  success  of  the  one  and  defeats  of  the 
other  system  were  the  consequence  of  necessary  causes,  still 
existing  unaltered  even  by  the  alterations  of  modern  warfare,  and 
proving  I  hope  to  the  satisfaction  of  my  readers  that  of  troops 
equal  in  courage  and  manhood,  equal  or  nearly  equal  in  nume- 
rical force,  and  equally  well  led,  the  direct  attack  in  column  upon 
Mne  must  to  an  almost  mathematical  certainty  prove  destructive, 
even  to  extermination,  to  the  assaihng  column.  A  truth  which 
is,  I  think,  beginning  to  be  generally  perceived  and  admitted, 
whether  in  terrestrial  or  naval  warfare ;  so  much  so  that  I  believe 
thr  famous  manoeuvre  of  breaking  the  line  at  sea  by  a  perpen- 
dicular attack,  will  never  again  be  resorted  to  by  any  officer,  and 
that  if  it  be,  it  will  be  to  his  ruin.  There  can  be  Httle  doubt 
that,  if  the  circumstances  of  Trafalgar  had  been  reversed,  so  that 
the  French  had  borne  down  in  double  column  of  perpendicular 
attack  into  the  midst  of  an  English  receiving  semicircle,  the 
action  would  have  been  decided  in  a  quarter  of  the  time,  and 
would  have  been  guiltless  of  the  blood  of  Nelson.  Nor  is  there 
much  more  doubt,  that  if — which  heaven  forefend — an  English  and 
American  fleet  should  come  into  action  together,  and  one  or  the 
other  should  attack  a  hue  on  a  perpendicular,  as  that  great  sea- 
man did  at  Trafalgar,  the  attacking  fleet  would  never  open  its  fire, 
but  be  annihilated,  or  ere  it  should  come  along  side,  while  its 
leader  would  lose  together  his  fleet,  his  hfe  and  his  reputation. 

Hereafter,  a  review  of  the  lives  of  the  great  captains  of  old 
will  give  space  for  a  fuller  examination,  and  more  interesting  and 
graphic  description  of  their  great  actions;  and  will,  I  think, 
establish  the  fact  that  strategy  has  been,  and  will  be,  in  nil  ages, 


HOMERIC    ARMIES.  61 

ono  and  the  same ;  that  we  are  but  fighting  in  these  latter  days 
the  veiy  battles  that  were  fought  ages  before  the  Christian  era, 
and  winning  them  by  the  self-same  manoeuvi'es  that  won  them 
for  the  nations,  to  whom,  if  we  were  known  at  all,  we  were  known 
but  as  the  most  remote  and  barbarous  of  barbarians — that 
strategy,  in  a  word,  is  a  direct  anc  simple  science,  and  therefore 
Hke  truth  must  be  the  same  foi  ever,  and  all  its  principles  im- 
mortal. 


II. 

MILTIADES, 

THE  SON  OF  CIMON. 

HIS  BATTLE  OP  MARATHON,  CAMPAIGNS,  CHARACTER,  AND 
CONDUCT. 

A  tyrant !    But  our  tyrants  then 
Were  still,  at  least,  our  countrymen. 
The  tyrant  of  the  Chersonese 
Was  freedom's  best  and  dearest  ft-iend ; 
That  tyrant  was  Miltiades. — Tue  Isles  of  Greece. 

Thus  sang,  in  his  resonant  and  harmonious  verse,  and  in  the 
fulness  of  his  enthusiasm  for  that  fiiir  land  of  Hellas,  in  whose 
behalf  it  was  his  lot  to  die,  "  as  those  whom  the  gods  love  die," 
young.  Lord  Byron,  first  martyr  for  her  new-born  freedom.  But 
so  assuredly,  had  not  his  eyes,  dazzled  by  the  splendor  of  his 
great  fame  whom  he  celebrates,  refused  to  look  into  the  obscurer 
portions  of  his  career,  would  he  not  have  sung.  Nor  does  he  so 
sing  truly.  For  whatsoever  else  of  greatness  or  of  grandeur  may 
be  ascribed  to  the  life  of  Miltiades,  it  certainly  is  not  as  to  a  fast 
and  consistent  friend  of  freedom,  that  his  altar  will  be  erected  in 
the  shrine  of  national  honor ;  and,  though  he  did  fight  once  the 
good  fight  in  her  cause,  it  was  as  a  Hellene  earnest  to  die  for 
Hellas,  an  Athenian  careless  to  survive  Athens,  not  as  a  fi-ee- 


HIS    LOVE    OF    FREEDOM.  53 

man  sincere  in  his  love  of  liberty,  not  as  a  man  devoted  to  the 
emancipation  of  mankind.  Indeed,  it  would  be  scarcely  less  ab- 
surd to  heap  praises  on  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  and  the  Austrian 
Csesar,  as  sure  friends  of  freedom,  because  they  broke  the  chains 
of  Europe  under  the  walls  of  Leipsic  and  on  the  heights  of  ^lont- 
martre,  than  to  do  the  like  of  Miltiades,  because  he  preserved 
the  liberty  of  Greece  upon  the  plain  of  Marathon.  Not  to  desire 
to  be  a  slave  himself,  and  to  be  a  friend  of  freedom,  are  in  a 
man,  as  it  were,  moral  antipodes.  And  so  it  was  with  Miltiades. 
But  of  this  anon ;  inasmuch  as  my  first  concern  is  with  his  mih- 
tary  genius,  not  with  his  moral  character ;  and  it  comes  as  much 
within  my  plan  to  commemorate  the  strategetic  skill  of  "  a  Bor- 
gia or  a  Catiline,"  as  of  a  Tell  or  an  Epaminondas. 

It  will  be  necessary,  however,  before  coming  direct  to  the  cam- 
paigns and  career  of  my  hero,  with  his  one  almost  inimitable 
battle,  to  take  a  brief  glance  at  the  position  of  affairs,  and  the 
state  of  nations  in  Europe  at  the  period  of  the  Persian  wars,  as 
well  as  at  the  parentage  and  condition  of  Miltiades  himself,  in 
order  to  avoid  interruptions  of  the  narrative  when  once  begun, 
and  those  retrospective  episodes,  which  are  so  annoying  to  the 
reader. 

At  the  commencement  of  these  celebrated  wars,  which  was 
in  fact  the  commencement  of  the  long  struggle  for  existence  and 
supremacy  between  the  religion  and  polity  of  the  Eastern  and 
Western  races,  scarcely  terminated  until  within  two  centuries  of 
the  present  day,  the  kingdom  of  Persia  was  the  most  extensive, 
the  most  wealthy,  the  most  powerful,  and,  probably  as  a  whole, 
the  most  civilized  empire  in  the  world.  It  comprehended  all 
the  countries  between  the  Indus  and  the  Mediterranean,  between 
the  Euxine  and  Caspian  Seas  and  the  Indian  Ocean  ;  and  of  all 
these  countries  the  population  were  the  subjects,  the  hereditary 
or  appointed  princes  the  slaves,  of  the  great  king.  From  the 
Punjaub  and  the  banks  of  the  Scinde  to  the  Levantine  Sea  and 


54  MILTIADES. 

the  broad  rush  of  the  fertilizing  Nile ;  from  the  pearl-freighted 
waters  of  the  Persian  Gulf  to  the  wild  and  inhospitable  waves  of 
the  Black  Sea,  every  tribe  and  nation,  every  nomad  horde  and 
civilized  kingdom,  pom-ed  lavish  tribute  of  its  wealth  into  his 
central  tre^^uries,  sent  myriads  and  tens  of  myriads  to  perish 
under  the  banners,  and  at  the  shghtest  nod  of  that  most  sovei'eign 
monarch. 

Tyre  and  Sidon  were  his  marts  and  naval  depots,  Egypt  his 
granary,  and  the  wild  steppes  of  Northern  Asia  his  horse  pas- 
tures, and  nurseries  for  innumerable  cavalries,  indomitable  hordes 
of  archery.  And,  at  that  moment,  the  throne  of  this  gigantic 
kingdom  was  occupied  by  a  prince,  the  greatest  of  his  race,  ca- 
pable of  developing  and  employing  his  vast  resources  to  their 
fullest  extent,  eager  in  ambition,  fierce  lover  of  glory,  covetous 
to  enlarge  dominions,  which  already  embraced  seven-tenths  of  the 
known  world.  This  was  the  first  Darius,  son  of  Hystaspes  ;  who, 
having  already  added  the  Punjaub  to  the  dominions  of  the  Per- 
sian, which  Hardinge  and  Gough  have  the  other  day  attached  to 
those  of  the  British  crown — and  having  previously  met  \\'ith  his 
first  reverse  in  his  remarkable  Scythian  campaign,  whei-ein,  after 
crossing  the  Danube  and  penetrating  so  far,  according  to  some 
geographers,  as  the  Volga,  without  bringing  his  nomadic  and 
active  enemy  to  action,  he  lost  nearly  all  his  host  by  thii-st, 
fatigue  and  famine,  and  felt  himself  thrice  happy  to  find  the  bridge 
of  boats,  whereby  he  might  recross  the  Hellespont,  unbroken — 
now  determined  on  reducing  all  Greece,  but  Attica  especially, 
into  a  Persian  province.  At  this  period,  then — with  the  excep- 
tion of  Persia — Greece,  Sicily,  Italy,  and  Carthage  were  the  only 
free  and  civilized  states  of  Europe ;  for  the  Greek  cities  of  Asia 
Minor  and  of  Eastern  Europe,  along  the  borders  of  the  Helles- 
pont, and  most  of  the  Eastern  isles  of  the  Archipelago,  though 
highly  refined,  flourishing,  and  wealthy,  were,  like  Tyi-e  and 
Sidon,  Egypt,  and  even  Ethiopia,  depeiidents  on  the  Persian 


STATE    OF    EUROPE.  55 

empire,  and  as  such  bound  to  pay  their  tributes  in  peace,  and  to 
furnish  their  contingents  in  time  of  war.  Greece,  in  the  prime 
of  her  Hterary  splendor,  and  wanting  but  a  few  years  of  the  era 
of  her  greatest  artistic  glory,  consisted  of  a  few  antagonistic  and 
jealous  repubhcs,  rich  in  arts,  in  valor,  and  in  glory,  but  poor  m 
the  numbers  of  her  men,  poorer  yet  in  moneys  ;  and  rehed  only 
on  the  patriotism,  the  heroism,  the  inimitable  disciphne,  and  un- 
limited resources  of  the  Hehenic  mind.  She  extended  no  farther 
north  than  Mount  Olympus  and  the  mouth  of  the  river  Peneus, 
had  no  states  of  any  great  importance,  with  the  exception  of 
Thebes  and  Athens — for  Thessaly  and  Macedonia  were  still  but 
barbarous  regions — beyond  the  Peloponnesus,  or  as  we  should 
say  north  of  the  isthmus  of  Corinth,  and  could  not  compare  in 
magnitude  with  the  smallest  Asiatic  province,  or  in  united  opu- 
lence mth  several  of  the  tributary  cities  of  the  Persian  empire. 

Sicily,  which  was  rich  and  powerful,  was  too  much  occupied 
in  contesting  the  commercial  enterprise  and  wealth  of  the  Italian 
cities  of  Magna  Grsecia,  as  the  south-eastern  extremity  of  Italy 
was  then  called,  and  with  the  territorial  and  maritime  encroach- 
ments of  Carthage,  to  intermeddle  at  all  in  the  affairs  of  the 
East,  or  of  Eastern  Europe.  The  eyes  of  Carthage,  selfish  and 
undeviating  worshipper  of  Mammon  and  of  Moloch,  capable  of 
no  generous  sentiment,  no  intellectual  impulse,  were  turned  al- 
ready westward ;  westward,  beyond  x\byla  and  Calpe,  pillars  of 
Hercules,  far  into  the  great  unknown  ocean,  southward  to  the 
fortunate  isles,  the  soft  Canaries  and  the  Cape  di  Verds,  and 
northward  to  the  stormy  Cassiterides,  the  wave-lashed  crags  of 
Cornwall.  No  thought  had  she,  at  the  farthest,  to  cany  her 
arms  eastward  of  the  Adriatic,  and  little  cared  she  what  fell  out, 
so  long  as  her  galleys  might  sweep  the  Mediterranean  unmolested, 
rich  with  the  gold  and  silver  of  the  Spanish  Tarshish,  rich  with 
the  tin  and  copper  of  the  barbarous  Britons.  Rome,  to  com- 
plete the  tale,  can  scarcely  as  yet  be  said  to  have  fallen  within 


66  MILTIADES. 

the  pale  of  civilization.  Her  history,  so  far  as  this,  is  still  pure!}' 
fabulous,  though  no  longer  wholly  mythical.  She  counted  two 
hundred  and  sixty-three  years  of  existence  from  her  foundation 
by  the  sons  of  Mars  Quirinus  and  the  Latin  priestess  Iha ;  nine- 
teen of  liberty,  from  the  expulsion  of  the  Tarquins  by  Brutus, 
the  son  of  Marcus  Junius.  Her  consuls*  were  Marcus  Minucius 
Ligurinus,  and  Aulus  Sempronius  Atratinus.  Thus  far  the 
annahsts.  The  facts,  however,  show  that,  although  in  Italy  proper 
Rome  was  beginning  to  make  herself  known  and  in  some  sort 
respected,  though  she  had  even,  nineteen  years  before  this  date, 
ratified  a  treatyf  relative  to  navigation  and  commerce  with  the 
Carthaginians,  she  was  utterly  unknown,  as  a  power,  to  the 
world  at  large  ;  and  was  sufficiently  engaged  at  home  in  strug- 
ghng  for  national  existence,  with  her  neighbors  the  Etruscans 
and  the  Latins,  to  be  utterly  unwiUing  to  take  any  share  in  for- 
eign affairs  ;  even  if,  by  what  would  have  been  scarce  less  than 
a  miracle,  any  rumor  of  the  great  armament  of  the  Persian  king 
against  the  hberties  of  Greece  should  have  penetrated  through 
the  morasses  and  forests  of  central  Italy,  to  the  ears  of  the  Qui- 
rites,  busy  as  they  were,  establishing  on  sure  foundations,  their 
o  A'n  new-conquered  freedom. 

It  is  true,  that  some  time  before  the  planning  of  this  invasion, 
the  Athenians  had  afforded  a  pretext  to  Darius  for  interfering 
with  them  ;  when,  Miletus  having  revolted  from  the  Persian 
rule,  and  Aristagoras,  its  tyiant,  ha\'ing  required  their  aid,  they 
lent  twenty  of  their  ov/n  gaHeys,  to  which  the  Eretrians  added 
five  more ;  and,  not  content  with  succoring  Miletus,  invaded 
Asia,  and  burned  Sardis,  an  important  city  of  Lydia,  and  seat 
of  the  Satrap's  government.  This,  it  is  true,  was  an  unprovoked 
breach  of  a  treaty,  and  was  in  itself  a  very  sufficient  cause  of  war. 
It  cannot,  however,  I  think,  be  doubted,  that,  between  the  lust 
of   territorial   aggrandizement    on    the    part   of    the   Oriental 

*  Dionysius  Kal.,  VII.  20.  t  Polybius  III.,  22. 


THi:    CHEilSONESE.  57 

monarchs,  and  the  sturdy  love  of  liberty,  and  determination  to 
assist  freemen  when  fiofhtinjy  for  freedom  at  all  hazards,  on  that 
of  the  Athenians,  the  war  must  have  come  on  sooner  or  later, 
and  the  invasion,  which  might  have  been  delayed  awhile,  was 
but  precipitated  by  this  act  of  imprudent  interference. 

Such,  then,  was  the  state  of  the  world,  in  general,  at  this 
eventlful  moment ;  and  such  that  of  Greece,  Athens,  and  Sparta, 
with  Thebes,  as  an  inferior  tliird,  being  greatly,  in  all  respects, 
the  superior  powers  of  Hellas,  and  each,  singly,  superior  to 
several  of  the  smaller,  but  still  independent  states,  which  lent 
manful  contribution  to  the  general  cause.  Nor,  if  Attica  was 
thus,  in  some  sort,  already  mixed  up  in  the  desultory  hostihties 
which  had  been  going  on,  almost  from  time  immemorial,  between 
some  of  the  Hellenic  tribes,  the  lonians  more  especially,  and  the 
Oriental  empire,  v/as  JVIiltiades,  to  whom  her  fate  or  her  fortune 
gave  the  leading  of  her  phalanx  on  the  eventful  day  of  Mara- 
thon, less  remarkably  involved  in  almost  personal,  although 
hereditary  hostilities  with  the  king  of  Persia. 

It  fell  out  in  this  wise,  and  that  not  many  y^tirs  previous  to 
the  occurrences  which  are  to  be  related  hereafter.  The  tale  in 
itself  is*  somewhat  singular  and  romantic ;  and,  as  it  explains 
how  a  man  could  be  at  one  time  tyrant  of  the  Thracian  Cher- 
sonese— as  was  then  called  the  narrow  peninsula  lying  between 
the  gulf  of  Saros  and  the  Dardanelles,  or  Hellespont,  of  which 
it  forms  the  northern  or  European  shore — and  a  citizen  of 
Athens,  besides  thromng  some  light  on  the  chai-acter  of  "  free- ' 
dom's  best  and  dearest  friend,"  I  shall  not  pause,  but  introduce 
it,  no  less,  I  hope,  for  the  instruction,  than  for  the  amusement  of 
my  readers. 

Nor  will  it  be  absurd  in  this  place  to  say  a  few  words  on  the 
meaning  of  the  term  tpant,  as  one  which  will  occur  frequently 
throughout  this  volume,  and  which  has,  with  the  Greeks,  an 
absolute. and  positive  meaning,  from  which  it  never  wandei-s, 


58  MILTIADES. 

bearing  no  relation  whatever  to  the  moral  qualities  of  the  man, 
or  the  manner  in  which  he  administered  his  authority,  hut  to 
the  means  only  hy  which  he  attained  it.  The  mildest  and  most 
moderate,  the  wisest  and  most  beneficent  of  men,  might  easily 
bear,  under  the  Greek  interpretation  of  the  term,  the  name  of 
tyi-ant ;  and  such  was  actually  the  case  of  Gelo,  and  the  second 
Hiero  of  Syracuse,  as  of  many  others,  on  wdiom  we  need  not 
dwell.  Again,  it  is  not  true,  as  some  have  asserted,  that  the 
Greeks  held  the  office  and  very  name  of  king  in  such  abhor- 
rence, that  they  gave  to  all  kings  the  opprobrious  name  of  tyi'ant. 
So  far  from  this,  to  the  end  of  their  polity  the  Spartan  republic 
was  administered  by  two  kings,  basileis,  hereditary,  from  two 
royal  houses,  though  their  power  w^as  restricted  by  the  privileges 
and  authority  of  the  epJiori  and  senate ;  while  the  Epirots,  Mace- 
donians and  other  northern  nations,  were  governed  by  hereditary 
princes,  who  ruled  with  sovereignty  and  state  not  less  than  that 
of  Louis  the  Fourteenth  of  France.  Lastly,  in  no  one  instance 
is  the  king  of  Persia,  whom  they  did  most  detest,  as  they  had 
the  most  reason  to  detest  him,  styled  tyrant  but  invariably  king, 
with  the  emphatic  accent  preceding  it,  so  as  to  signify  the  king, 
as  equivalent  to  the  great  king.  The  fact  is,  that  the  Greek 
Tyrant,  Tjpawocr,  signifies  one  who  raised  himself,  or  was  raised 
by  othei-s,  even  the  people  themselves,  to  a  power  which  did  not 
belong  to  him,  or  which  was  not  recognized  by  the  state  in  which 
it  existed.  Our  term  usurper  is  the  nearest  to  it,  but  is  scarcely 
so  extended  in  its  sense.  For  if  a  democratic  state  became  weary 
of  its  own  democracy,  and  elected  a  man  as  its  sovereign,  he 
would  be  a  tyrant ;  and  so  also,  if  in  a  country  ruled  by  a 
dynasty  of  king's,  a  foreign  and  victorious  power  should  over- 
throw one  line,  and  erect  another  in  its  stead,  the  princes  of  the 
intrusive  line  wwild  be  tyrants.  The  latter  was  a  common  case  ; 
as  the  Spartans,  themselves  strictly  oligarchical,  were  constantly 
setting  up  in  conquerel  cities  individual  rulei-s,  as  in  the  case  of 


STORY    OF    THE    DOLONCI.  59 

the  thirty  tyrants  at  Athens  ;  and  the  king  of  Persia  did  little 
more,  in  the  subject  Ionian  cities,  than  set  individual  Gre^^k 
rulei-s  over  them,  abolishing  republican  forms,  and  imposing  a 
moderate  tribute.  Sometimes  the  aristocratic  and  democratic 
tendencies  of  a  state  were  so  nearly  balanced,  that  it  were  diffi- 
cult to  say  which  fonn  the  people  really  prefen-ed.  Still  the 
prince  was  a  tyrant.  Sometimes  the  prince  revolted,  on  behalf 
of  his  own  people,  against  the  power  which  had  made  him  their 
lord,  and  was  sustained  by  them.     Still  he  was  a  tyrant. 

The  more  general  meaning  of  the  terra,  however,  is  one  who 
holds  regal  office,  where  such  does  not  legally  exist,  or  where  it 
belongs  to  another,  supporting  himself,  contrary  to  the  will  of 
the  citizens,  by  aid  of  foreign  mercenary  forces  ;  and  such  a 
tyrant  was  Miltiades. 

How  he  became  so,  as  I  have  observed  above,  is  a  curious 
story,  and  singularly  characteristic  of  those  wild  early  times,  in 
which  the  highest  refinement  in  Uterature  and  the  arts  was 
blended  with  simplicity  of  mannei-s  almost  patriarchal ;  and  thus 
it  runs. 

In  the  latter  part  of  the  reign  of  Cyrus,  the  Dolonci,  a  Thra- 
cian  tribe,  who  occupied  the  Thracian  Chersonese,  being  hard 
pressed  by  their  mainland  neighbors,  the  Apsinthians,  sent  their 
kings*  to  consult  the  oracle  at  Delphi,  by  what  means  they 
should  sustain  themselves.  To  them  the  oracle  made  answer  : 
"  "Who  fii'st  shall  receive  you  as  his  guests  into  his  house,  return- 
ing homeward  from  this  temple,  him  take  along  with  you,  to  be 
your  general."  So  they  turned  home  again,  and  they  traversed 
Phocis,  traversed  Boeotia,  and  none  offered  them  hospitality, 
none  received  them.  And,  late  on  an  evening,  they  entered 
Athens  travel-stained  and  weary.  Now,  at  this  time,  Pisistratus 
held  rule  in  Attica,  not  of  right,  nor  of  the  popular  choice,  but 

*  Herodotus,  Erato,  VI.,  32. 


60  MILTIADES. 

self-imposed,  a  tyrant ;  and  of  tlie  fii*st  citizens  in  the  state,  was 
Miltiades,  the  son  of  Cypselus,  of  noble  race,  descended  from 
^acus  and  JEerina,  of  a  house  famous  for  its  chariot  victories  at 
Olympia,  and  himself  a  four-horse  victor  ;  and  he  was  ill  disposed 
towards  the  ruler  of  the  state.  But  he,  happening  to  sit  in  the 
portico  of  his  house  as  the  ambassadors  of  the  Dolonci  passed, 
observing  their  outlandish  dresses  and  the  strange  fashion  of 
their  spear-head?,  shouted  after  them,  and,  when  they  returned, 
proffered  them  lodging  and  guest-rites  ;  and  they,  mindful  of  the 
oracle,  accepting,  entered  in ;  and,  choosing  their  time,  told  him 
all  their  errand,  and  begged  him  to  go  with  them  and  be  their 
general.  And  he,  in  no  wise  indisposed,  inchned  to  their  will ; 
and,  after  consulting  the  oracle  upon  it,  sailed  with  them,  accom- 
panied by  many  Athenian  volunteers  ;  and  so,  by  the  choice  of 
the  people,  became  the  tyrant  of  the  Chersonese.  How  he  con- 
quered their  old  enemies,  the  Apsinthians,  and  how,  warring 
against  Lampsacus,  he  fell  into  an  ambush  and  was  captured, 
and  how  he  owed  his  release  to  the  good  offices  of  his  friend 
Criesus,  king  of  Lydia,  may  be  read  elsewhere ;  for  it  is  not  with 
him  that  I  have  to  do,  but  with  his  nephew,  Miltiades  the 
son  of  Cimon. 

Being  rescued  thus,  Miltiades  returned  again  to  his  Chersonese, 
and  died  there  soon  after,  much  beloved  of  his  Dolonci,  childless, 
leaving  his  place  and  power  to  his  brother  Cimon's  son,  Stesa- 
goras.  Miltiades,  the  son  of  Cypselus,  might  be  termed  friend 
of  freedom,  since  freely  chosen  by  a  free  people,  he  ruled  them 
by  their  own  laws,  and  freed  them  from  their  enemies. 

Stesagoriis  in  his  own  turn  died  also,  knocked  on  the  head 
with  an  axe  by  a  man  of  Lampsacus,  in  seeming  a  deserter,  but 
indeed  a  most  active  enemy,  he  too  childless,  and  intestate. 
There  was  no  tyrant  now  of  the  Dolonci.  But  the  sons  of 
Pisistratus,  Hippias  and  Hipparchus,  who  now  held,  not  filled, 
their  father's  place  in  Athens,  partly,  it  may  be  thought,  from  a 


THE    SON    OF    CIMON.  61 

desire  of  supporting  tyi'annies  in  the  abstract,  more  from  the 
wish  to  get  rid  of  a  dangerous  citizen,  lent  a  trireme  mth  its 
crew  to  Stesagoras'  brother,  Miltiades  the  son  of  Cimon,  and  sent 
him  to  try  his  fortune  ^^ith  the  Dolonci.  He,  by  a  rare  mixture 
of  force  and  fraud,  succeeded,  and  became  tpant  of  the  Cherso- 
nese, holding  it  with  a  force  of  five  hundred  foreign  mercenaries, 
and  marrying  a  daughter  of  Olorus,  king  of  the  Thracians,  there- 
by strengthening  himself  in  his  usurped  authority.  Assuredly 
a  deep  and  crafty  statesman,  as  he  afterward  approved  himself  a 
brave  and  able  soldier,  but,  to  my  mind,  in  no  respect  a  friend  of 
freedom. 

Thereafter  his  career  was  adventurous  and  full  of  vicissitudes. 
For,  since  the  arrival  of  the  Dolonci,  seeking  a  general  in  Athens, 
great  changes  had  occurred  the  world  over.  Not  only  JMiltiades, 
the  son  of  Cypselus,  was  dead,  and  Stesagoras  his  nephew  and 
successor,  but  his  friend  Crsesus,  no  longer  king  of  Lydia,  con- 
quered of  Cyms,  and  Cyrus  too  his  conqueror,  and  Cambyses  son 
of  Cyi'us,  and  Smerdis  the  Magian,  who  usurped  the  throne  of 
Persia ;  and  now  Darius,  son  of  Hystaspes,  had  become  the 
KING,  and,  being  set  to  conquer  the  European  Scythians,  who 
were  in  all  probability  the  Huns  of  later  ages,  he  summoned  the 
contingents  of  all  the  Greek  cities,  and  of  the  Chei'sonese  among 
the  rest ;  and  then  passing  over  the  Busphorus  into  Europe,  by 
a  bridge  of  boats,  marched  onward  into  the  Northern  deserts 
with  a  host  of  seven  hundred  thousand  Asiatics.  The  guardian- 
ship of  the  second  bridge  of  l^oats,  on  which  he  crossed  the 
Danube,  between  Ismail,  it  is  said,  and  the  Pruth,  he  entrusted 
to  the  Ionian  leaders  of  the  fleet  by  which  it  was  composed,  and 
among  them  to  Miltiades  the  son  of  Cimon,  and  Ilistitcus,  tyrant 
of  Miletus.  But  the  march  of  Darius  and  his  seven  hundred 
thousand  was  the  very  prototype  of  the  march  of  a  far  greater 
than  Darius,  into  the  same  inhospitable  regions,  though  from 
a    different   quarter.       The    Scythians   would  not   fight    him, 


62  MILTIADES. 

or  fought  him  only,  Parthian-like,  retreating ;  until  the  coun- 
try and  the  chmate,  and  disease  and  weariness  and  want  had 
conquered  the  great  host,  that  it  turned,  desperate,  to  retreat.  Then 
Cossack-like  they  hung  upon  his  rear,  never  seen  till  they  were 
felt,  invisible,  yet  ever  present,  and  slaughtered  the  weary  Asi- 
atics, unresisted  and  unsparing.  And  they  sent  secret  word  to 
the  lonians,  who  had  guard  of  the  bridge,  that  they  should  break 
it  and  get  them  home  ;  and,  had  they  done  the  bidding  of  the 
Scythians,  the  Danube  had  been  an  earher  Beresina  ;  and  there 
had  been  no  Marathon  nor  Salamis,  nor  perhaps  any  wars  for 
ever  more  of  Greece  and  Persia.  And  Miltiades  was  very  urgent 
with  the  confederates,  that  they  should  break  the  bridge,  for  that 
the  Persian  was  the  natural  enemy  of  all  Greeks,  and  that  the 
lonians  owed  him  neither  fealty  nor  faith,  but  followed  him  as 
tributaries  only  on  compulsion.  But  Histiaeus  of  Miletus,  and 
the  tyrants  of  the  other  Ionian  cities,  declared  against  Miltiades ; 
saying  that  if  Darius  were  the  enemy  of  Greeks,  he  was  the 
fi-iend  of  tyrants ;  and  that,  he  dead,  all  they  should  lose  their 
cities  and  hold  tyrannies  no  longer.  And  they  prevailed  over 
Miltiades,  and  the  bridge  was  maintained.  So  Darius  returned 
to  Asia  to  execute  conquest  of  the  Punjaub,  to  meditate  conquest 
of  Greece.  Nor  had  not  Miltiades,  thereafter,  his  reward  at  the 
king's  hands  for  his  treason ;  for,  in  the  third  year  of  his  sove- 
reignty, the  Nomadic  Scythians,  at  instigation  of  Darius,  broke 
into  the  Chersonese  and  over-ran  it,  hoping  to  take  him  for  the 
king,  who  had  him  at  feud  on  account  of  the  bridge  over  the 
Danube.  But  he  escaped  and  absented  himself  from  his  do- 
minions until,  the  Scythians  retiring,  the  Dolonci  brought  him 
back  again,  showing  thereby  that  although  an  usurper,  he  was 
by  no  means,  in  our  sense  of  the  word,  a  tyrant,  but  had  in  some 
sort  gained  the  good  will  of  his  subjects.  Not  now,  however, 
was  it  his  fate  lono:  to  reim  over  them ;  for  learnino-  that  a 
Fhcenician  fleet  was  stationed  at  Tenedos,  and  hovering  03"  his 


RETURNS    TO    ATHENS.  63 

coasts,  with  what  intent  he  knew  but  too  well,  he  put  his  pro- 
perty on  board  five  triremes,  and  setting  sail  from  the  city  of 
Kardia  on  the  gulf  of  Mel  as,  now  the  gulf  of  Saros,  took  leave  of 
the  Chersonese  for  ever,  and  steered  for  Athens,  whence  his 
enemies  Hippias  and  Ilipparchus  had  been  expelled  by  Harmo- 
dius  and  Aristogeiton.  Meanwhile  his  ill-fortune  followed  him. 
The  Phoenicians,  whom  he  had  hoped  to  elude,  gave  chase,  and 
took  one  of  his  ships,  commanded  by  his  eldest  son,  Metiochus, 
born  of  a  previous  marriage,  not  of  the  Thracian  princess.  Ilim, 
the  Phoenicians  handed  over  to  Darius,  that  he  might  work  his 
will  on  him  in  revenge  for  the  treason  of  the  bridge.  But  Darius 
did  him  no  ill,  but  good  ;  and  gave  him  a  house  and  lands  and  a 
Persian  woman  to  his  wife,  of  whom  he  had  children  that  were 
altogether  Persians. 

With  the  four  other  ships,  hard  pressed,  Miltiades  got  into 
port,  at  Imbros,  and  difficultly  thence  to  Athens.  Nor  here  did 
the  spite  of  fortune  leave  him ;  for  the  laws  of  Attica  were  so 
strenuous  against  tyrants,  that,  although  he  had  been  sent  out  in 
an  Athenian  vessel,  under  Athenian  orders,  to  do  precisely  as  he 
did,  he  was  put  on  his  trial  for  his  life,  and  was  acquitted  by 
popular  favor,  not  because  he  had  not  made  himself  tyrant  of  the 
Dolonci,  but  because  when  their  tyrant  he  had  not,  like  the  other 
Ionian  princes,  made  common  cause  with  Darius,  but  had  re- 
mained a  Greek  at  heart,  although  a  tyrant,  and  had  even 
preferred  the  common  good  of  Greece,  to  the  maintenance  of  his 
usurped  authority. 

Heartily  sick  was  he  probably,  of  his  tyranny  of  the  Cherso- 
nese, and  heartily  glad  to  escape  its  consequences,  for  in  truth  he 
had  played  but  a  poor  figure  in  the  part ;  and,  had  his  career 
ended  with  it  little  would  the  world  have  ever  heard  of  Miltiades 
the  t}Tant  of  the  Chei-sonese. 

But  now  a  greater  contest  was  at  hand,  a  wider  field  was 
open  for  the  display  of  military  genius,  for  the  gratification  of 


64  MILTIADES. 

"  vaulting  ambition  that  overleaps  itself  and  falls  on  tlie  other 
side,"  and  of  all  others  Miltiades  was  the  man  to  gi-asp  the  golden 
opportunity. 

I  have  stated  above,  that  there  had  been  a  deep-set  animosity 
long  kindled  in  the  heart  of  Darius  against  the  Athenians,  who 
had  presumed,  daring  and  insolent  republicans,  to  assist  his 
rebels  of  Miletus,  and  burn  his  royal  city  of  Sardis.  And  now, 
his  time  was  fully  come ;  his  own  dominions  were  composed  in 
the  deep  tranquiUity  of  servitude,  the  vast  conquests  of  Cyi'us 
and  Cambyses  thoroughly  consolidated,  and,  by  his  own  late  vic- 
tories in  the  Punjaub,  the  utmost  portions  of  his  enormous  em- 
pire were  guaranteed  from  the  incursions,  for  a  while  at  least,  of 
the  fierce  and  unruly  Indians. 

There  was  now  no  need  any  longer,  that,  as  the  king  sat 
down  to  meat  with  his  assembled  nobles,  his  criers  should  make 
proclamation  thrice,  as  had  been  the  usage  ever  since  the  confla- 
gration of  Sardis,  "  Master,  remember  the  Athenians" — for 
already  he  had  remembered  them. 

The  conduct  of  the  war  was  entrusted  to  Mardonius,  the  son 
of  Gobryas,  who  had  lately  espoused  the  king's  daughter  Arto- 
zostra,  and  the  preparations  were  made  on  the  scale  in  which 
oriental  warfare  has  in  all  ages  been  conducted.  I  am  aware 
that  it  has  been  the  fashion  to  doubt  and  deny  the  numbei-s  of 
the  Persian  armies,  as  related  by  the  Greek  authors  ;  but  when 
we  look  to  the  facts,  which  have  been  clearly  ascertained  within 
the  last  half  century,  concerning  the  enormous  numerical  force 
which  Eastern  armies,  and  even  European  armies  fighting  in  the 
East,  are  compelled  by  the  necessities  of  the  climate  to  bring  into 
the  field,  counting  the  mere  camp  followers  and  baggage  drivere 
by  hundreds,  the  elephants  and  camels  by  tens,  of  thousands,  till 
the  united  numbers  nearly  swell  to  millions,  I  see  no  cause  to 
doubt  the  accounts  given  to  us  of  the  hordes  urged  forward  by 
the  will  of  a  despot,  unUmited  in  resources  either  of  men  or 


PERSIAN    SHIPWRECKS.  65 

moneys,  for  the  accomplishment  of  the  dearest  object  of  his  am- 
bition. 

A  fleet  sailed  from  the  Hellespont,  with  orders  to  reduce  the 
Ionian  cities  of  the  coast  and  the  Greek  islands,  and  thereafter  to 
rendezvous  at  the  isle  of  Thasos,  where  it  would  meet,  and  act  in 
communication  with  the  land  forces  of  five  hundi*ed  thousand 
men,  which  crossing  the  Dardanelles,  should  march  through 
Thrace  upon  Macedonia ;  nor  until  reaching  its  frontiers  did  they 
look  to  encounter  enemies.  In  the  first  instance,  the  movements 
of  the  fleet  were  entirely  successful,  the  Ionian  cities  submitting 
to  receive  tyrants  in  lieu  of  their  own  democratic  governments, 
and  the  islands  of  the  Archipelago  surrendering  without  a  blow. 
The  fleet  reached  Thasos,  loaded  with  booty,  flushed  with  suc- 
cess, and  confident  of  future  victory — confidence  soon  to  be 
changed  to  despair.  For  as  they  attempted  to  round  Mount 
Athos,  now  the  Monte  Santo,  the  huge  and  towering  head 
land  of  the  easternmost  of  those  three  long  protruding  pro- 
montories which  formed  the  Macedonian  district  of  Chalcidice, 
separated  from  the  mainland  of  Greece  by  the  Thermaic 
Bay,  now  the  Gulf  of  Salonica,  a  \'iolent  north  wind,  with  a 
heavy  broken  sea,  drove  them  upon  the  craggy  shores  of  the 
promontory,  where  above  three  hundred  war-ships  were  wrecked 
and  twenty  thousand  men  perished.  On  a  fii-st  glance  at  the 
map,  this  account  would  appear  preposterous,  and  the  catastrophe 
impossible,  as  connected  with  a  north  wind  blowing  at  the  time ; 
since  the  true  course  which  to  steer  from  Thasos  to  clear  the 
headland  is  south,  about  three  points  westerly ;  so  that  a  north 
wind  instead  of  setting  them  upon  Athos  would  have  carried 
them  clear  off  it,  and  the  first  land  they  would  have  made,  run- 
ning dead  before  it,  would  have  been  the  isle  of  Scyros,  about 
two  degrees  distant.  As  is,  however,  in  such  instances  very  often 
the  case,  the  very  discrepancy,  as  it  seems,  proves  the  fact ;  for 
if,  instead  of  steering  broad  out  into  the  open  sea  and  stretching 
4 


'66  MILTIADES. 

away  straight  for  the  headland,  they  had  crept  close  in  shore, 
following  all  the  sinuosities  of  the  coast,  round  the  Gulf  of  Con- 
tessa,  Sinus  Strymonicus^  they  would  ultimately  find  themselves 
embayed  du-ectly  to  the  northward  of  the  stern  and  rock-bound 
coast ;  and  that  they  did  so  is  certain,  as  it  is  stated  by  Herodo- 
tus,* that  they  anchored  for  the  night  at  Akanthos,  the  modern 
Hieriso,  which  is  situated  at  the  southern  extremity  of  such  a 
bay,  and  weighing  thence  encountered  the  gale  which  destroyed 
them,  as  it  necessarily  must  do,  since  to  work  out  thence  and 
round  the  headland  they  must  needs  lay  a  northeast  course. 

The  fleet  being  destroyed  thus  and  its  crews  lost,  some  dashed 
upon  the  rocks,  some  perishing  of  cold,  and  some  devoured,  as 
Herodotus  informs  us,  by  the  monsters  which  abound  in  those 
most  prolific  seas,  scarcely  a  relique  was  saved  to  tell  of  the  dis- 
aster. 'Nov  was  Mardonius  much  more  successful  with  his  land 
forces  than  he  had  been  by  sea ;  for  having  reached  the  confines 
of  Macedonia,  the  Biygian  tribe  of  Scythians  beat  up  his  quar- 
ters at  night,  and,  forcing  his  defences,  handled  him  so  severely 
that,  although  he  was  subsequently  able  to  chastise  them,  i.nd 
even  to  reduce  them  to  permanent  subjection,  he  was  so  much 
weakened  by  their  first  onslaught  and  by  the  subsequent  opera- 
tions, that  he  perceived  the  utter  hopelessness  of  prosecuting  any 
schemes  of  conquest,  when  unsupported  by  a  fleet,  di*ew  off  his 
shattered  forces  and  returned  home,  disgracefully  beaten,  even 
to  humiliation. 

For  two  or  three  years  subsequent  to  this  disaster,  Darius 
employed  himself  in  humbling  his  own  immediate  tributaries, 
especially  the  Thasians,  in  whose  island  there  were  exceeding  rich 
gold  mines,  of  which  he  made  himself  master ;  not  neglecting, 
however,  to  make  preparations  for  a  fresh  attack  on  Greece, 
which  to  subdue,  his  very  reverses  had  but  the  more  obstinately 
determined  him.  In  the  opening  of  the  third  season,  he  sent 
*  Herod.  Erato.  VI.,  44. 


DEMAND  OF  EARTH  AND  WATER.  67 

ambassadors  to  demand  earth  and  water,  implying  unconditional 
surrender,  by  land  and  sea,  of  all  the  Hellenic  states.  On  the 
main  land  this  concession  was  made  by  all  the  semi-barbarous 
kingdoms  of  Thessaly,  Macedonia,  and  Epirus,  and  even  by  the 
civihzed  and  powerful  confederacy  of  Boeotia — m  the  islands  it 
was  denied  by  none  of  whom  it  was  demanded;  and  thence 
arose  a  fierce  naval  warfare  between  Athens  and  the  ^scinetans, 
who  had  submitted,  inhabiting  an  island  almost  within  bowshot 
of  the  coasts  of  Attica.  This  war  was  strenuously  insisted  on  by 
Themistocles,  the  Avisest  of  Greek  statesmen,  and  undeniably  a 
gi'eat  commander ;  who,  foreseeing  the  tempest  which  was  about 
to  break  over  Athens,  from  a  point  far  remote  and  unsuspected 
by  the  many,  and  knowing  the  restless  impatience  of  his  coun- 
trymen under  taxation,  except  when  under  the  impulse  of  any 
immediate  excitement,  made  use  of  this  tri\aal  quarrel  'as  a  pre- 
text for  an  increase  of  the  navy  wholly  disproportionate  to  the 
present  object,  to  which  in  the  end  the  preservation  of  Greece 
itself  from  the  barbarian  yoke  has  been  ascribed,  and  not  I  think 
without  sufficient  reason.* 

But  now  the  decisive  moment  had  arrived.  In  the  beginning 
of  the  year  490,  before  the  Christian  era,  being  the  19th  of  the 
Roman  repubhc,  and  the  4th  of  the  7 2d  Olympiad,  Darius, 
constantly  whetted  to  action  by  the  instigation  of  Hippias — the 
fugitive  tyrant  of  Athens,  who,  disappointed  of  Spartan  aid  to 
avenge  him  on  his  native  land.,  had  fled  to  Pei-sia — and  smarting 
under  his  late  defeat,  raised  a  new  force  under  Datis,  the  Mede, 
and  his  brother's  son,  Artaphernes.  To  these  he  gave  six  hun- 
dred triremes,  each  carrying  two  hundred  men,  besides  horse- 
transports,  with  orders  to  destroy  Athens  and  Eretria,  that  not 
one  stone  should  stand  upon  other,  and  to  bring  away  all  the 
population  in  chains,  to  be  sold  as  bond-slaves ;  and  sent  the 

*  Plutarch.  Themist  5. 


68  MILTIADES. 

traitor  Hippias,  to  whom,  of  all  infamies,  this  last  was  only  want 
ing,  to  guide  them  and  reveal  the  weak  points  of  his  country. 

These  leaders  justly  dreading  the  stormy  cape  of  Athos, 
marched  down  their  forces  by  land,  through  Asia  Minor,  en> 
barked  them  at  the  isle  of  Samos,  and  steered  their  coui-se  through 
the  islands  of  the  Ai'cliipelago,  taking  Naxos  which  had  not 
surrendered  the  prenous  year,  right  upon  Euboea,  the  Negro- 
pont,  there  to  obey  their  master's,  commands,  in  reference  to  the 
city  of  Eretria.  There  the  inhabitants  were  panic-stricken,  and 
wavering  between  three  minds,  whether  to  desert  the  city  and 
take  refuge  among  the  craggy  fortresses  of  the  island,  whether  to 
accept  the  assistance  of  four  thousand  Hoplitai  from  the  colonists 
of  Chalcidice,  or  lastly  whether  to  submit  themselves  to  the 
mercy  of  the  Persians.  Naturally,  as  ever  is  the  case  with 
waverei-s,  they  determined  on  nothing ;  some  fled  to  the  hills  for 
shelter  fi*om  the  tempest,  and  escaped  it ;  some  took  refuge  in 
Oropus,  on  the  mainland  of  Boeotia ;  and  a  few  made  fruitless 
resistance  on  the  walls,  which  were  stormed  after  an  assault  of 
six  days,  when  four  hundred  prisoners  only,  ten  of  the  number 
being  women,  were  taken  and  transported  to  Asia,  according  to 
Darius'  orders  ;  \yhere  they  were  entreated  kindly  and  settled  in 
the  district  of  Crissa. 

In  the  meantime,  the  Athenians,  not  unmindful  of  their  peril, 
nor  unmindful  either  of  their  past  deeds  and  present  glory,  made 
preparation  for  a  stern  resistance,  being  resolved  as  gallant  men, 
and  who  can  resolve  more,  to  deserve  at  least,  if  they  might  not 
command,  success. 

They  raised  men,  heavy-armed  foot  all,  the  prime  of  their  best 
citizens,  to  the  number  of  nine  thousand,  for  so  many,  only  in 
such  an  emergency,  could  the  fii*st  city  of  Hellas  muster,  to 
defend  her  national  existence ;  and  to  command  this  handful,  for 
such  it  was  as  compared  to  the  vast  array  of  the  orientals,  which 
embraced  the  contingents  of  no  less  than  six  and  forty  nations, 


THE    TEN    GENERALS.  69 

they  elected  ten  generals,  the  last  chosen  of  whom  was  Miltiades 
the  son  of  Cimon,  who  should  command  on  alternate  days,  in 
addition  to  the  Polemarch,  or  second  Archon  of  the  year,  whose 
office  it  was  at  this  time,  although  at  a  later "  period  he 
seems  to  have  performed  the  duties  rather  of  war-minister  than 
warrior,  to  command  the  right  wing  of  the  army.  A  disposition 
more  subvei*sive  of  all  true  mihtary  principles  cannot  possibly  be 
imagined  than  this;  for,  however  well  it  might  succeed,  as 
regards  the  mere  tactics  on  the  day  of  action  in  the  face  of  the 
enemy,  it  must  of  course  prevent  and  nullify  any  long  series  of 
combined  strategetical  movements,  unless  in  the  case  of  unani- 
mity, a  thing  hardly  to  be  expected  ;  since  a  single  malcontent 
could,  on  the  return  of  his  day  for  commanding,  disarrange  and 
frustrate  all  the  movements  of  the  past  nine  days,  and  bring  on 
or  decline  action  on  his  own  individual  respousibihty.  It  is 
singular  enough,  considering  that  in  strategy,  above  all  other 
sciences,  promptitude  in  determining,  decision  in  acting,  and  per- 
tinacity in  adhering  to  a  course  of  action  once  taken,  are  empha- 
tically the  qualities  most  essential,  and  that  these  can  only  be 
attained  by  unity  of  counsel,  combined  with  unity  of  command, 
how  many  nations  have  erred  by  insisting,  almost  unto  their  own 
destruction,  on  this  subdi\'ision  of  respousibihty,  and  partition  of 
command.  It  would  seem  to  have  been,  in  most  cases,  prompted 
by  a  jealousy  of  entrusting  too  much  power  to  the  hands  of  a 
single  individual ;  since  it  is  always  in  the  most  ultra  republics 
that  we  observe  this  strange  fallacy  most  predominant.  By  the 
Athenians,  it  was  far  more  consistently  acted  upon,  than  by 
any  other  nation ;  yet  we  find  it  showing  itself,  at  times,  even 
among  the  wise  and  politic  Romans  ;  as  in  the  case  of  Terentius 
Varro,  and  ^mihus  PauUus,  whose  alternate  command  led  to 
the  fatal  defeat  of  Cannae ;  and  again  in  that  of  Fabius  and 
Minucius,  where  a  similar  result  was  prevented  only  by  the 
celerity,  most  unusual  in  him,  and  genius  of  the  old  dictator.     It 


70  MILTIADES. 

was  a  regular  principle  with  the  Venetians,  to  send  with  e  v^ery 
fleet  and  army,  a  citizen  proveditore^  or  overlooker,  whose 
province  it  was  to  command  the  commander,  hamper  him  in  all 
his  movements,  and  dictate  to  him  in  his  own  profession.  The 
detestable  demagogues  of  the  French  directory  introduced  the 
same  invention,  attaching  to  all  their  expeditions  a  representative, 
as  he  was  called,  of  the  French  people.  The  object  of  the  di- 
rectory was,  however,  different,  being  in  fact  the  procuring  of 
fresh  and  illustrious  victims  for  the  guillotine  ;  as  the  duty  of  the 
representative  was  merely  that  of  spy  and  informer.  These 
gentlemen  did,  however,  less  harm  than  would  have  been  ex- 
pected, as  they  invariably  ran  away  at  the  first  shot ;  hke  citizen 
Jean  Bon  St.  Andre,  representative  on  board  the  French  flag 
ship,  on  the  fourth  of  June,  who  at  the  first  broadside  of  the 
Queen  Charlotte,  dived  into  the  cockpit,  and  was  seen  no  more 
until  the  firing  ceased.  It  is  more  remarkable  than  this,  that  the 
cold  autocratic  Austria,  so  lately  as  the  last  great  European  war, 
should  have  hampered  the  movements,  and  frustrated  the  suc- 
cesses of  her  greatest  leader,  the  Arch-duke  Charles,  by  the  slow 
and  stupid  intervention  of  her  Aulic  council.  In  all  ages,  by 
whatever  polity  or  form  of  government  it  has  been  adopted,  it 
has  been,  and  it  ever  will  be,  impolitic,  disastrous,  and  well  if  it  be 
not  fatal.  Better  two  pilots  in  a  ship,  battling  with  the  tempest 
amid  reefs  and  breakers,  than  two  leaders,  equal  in  authority, 
upon  a  day  of  battle. 

Such  had  well  nigh  been  the  case  at  Marathon,  and  such  it 
would  have  been,  but  for  the  prudence,  wisdom,  and  moderation 
of  one  man — one  man  very  great,  because  he  was  so  very  good  ; 
for  boyond  this,  the  closest  examination  of  history  shows  us 
nothing  conspicuously  striking  in  the  character  or  conduct  of 
Aristides.  Nowhere  do  we  discover  any  brilHant  talents,  much 
less  any  genius,  in  his  serene  and  even  course  of  action.  He  was 
no  orator,  he  was  not  a  great  strategist ;    but  he  was  something 


PHIDIPPIDES    THE    RUNNER.  Yl 

better,  he  was  a  man  of  such  sterling  probity,  such  unquestionable 
truth,  candor,  justice,  and  integrity,  that  men  greater  and  abler, 
and  far  more  brilliant  in  themselves  than  he,  submitted  them- 
selves to  his  guidance,  and  sun-endered  even  their  own  convictions 
to  the  certainty  that  his  judgment,  founded  on  his  integi-ity,  must 
needs  be  sound  and  sohd  ;  and  so  indeed  it  was. 

But  I  must  not  anticipate,  nor  indeed  is  there  occasion,  for  the 
crisis  is  even  now  at  hand,  and  the  struggle  imminent.  The  fii*st 
question  which  arose  between  the  numerous  commandei-s  turned 
on  the  method  of  defence  to  be  adopted ;  a  majority  in  the  first 
instance  wishing  to  remain  within  the  city,  and  risk  an  assault ; 
the  insanity  of  such  a  plan  being  obvious  on  its  face,  when  the 
overwhelming  numbers  of  the  Persian  would  enable  them  to 
attack  on  all  points  at  the  same  moment,  or  if  they  should  prefer 
blockading,  to  carry  out  lines  of  circumvallation  in  the  least  given 
space  of  time.  On  this  Miltiades  insisting  strenuously,  and 
defending  his  insistency  by  good  and  soldierly  reasons,  for  it  was 
founded  on  a  true  principle  of  warfare,  that  to  stand  a  siege  when 
there  is  no  hope  of  relief  from  without  is  an  absurdity,  he  pre- 
vailed so  far  that  his  colleagues  consented  to  march  out,  and  for- 
tify a  camp  at  a  few  miles  distance  from  the  city.  Before  leav- 
ing the  walls,  however,  a  herald,  of  that  class  called  7}^s^65^oixoi, 
men  who  can  run  through  an  entire  day,  was  despatched  to 
Sparta,  to  inform  the  Lacedaemonians,  how  Eretria  was  taken  and 
all  its  inhabitants  carried  into  bondage,  in  what  present  peril 
Athens  stood,  and  to  implore  their  present  aid  and  succor.  The 
name  of  this  runner  was  Phidippides.  Now  as  this  runner,  full 
of  enthusiasm  and  of  high  thoughts  concerning  his  country,  and 
her  ancient  glories,  and  her  ancient  gods,  sped  onward,  having 
long  pa-ssed  the  Corinthian  isthmus,  and  entered  the  mountainous 
and  forest-mantled  country  of  Arkadia,  and  passed  beneath  the 
dark  and  solemn  heights  of  Mount  Parthenios,  near  the  city  of 
Tegea,  he  imagined — for  imagination  it  must  have  been,  unless 


72  MILTIADES. 

we  are  prepared  to  believe  that  evil  spirits  actually  were  the  gods 
of  the  old  time,  which  I  at  least  am  not — that  a  strange  voice, 
greater  than  human,  shouted  to  him  from  the  hill-side,  "  Phidip- 
pides,  Pliidippides" — and  that  as  he  turned  him  round,  the  wood 
god  Pan  stood  manifest  before  him,  and  bade  him  tell  the 
Athenians  "  that  they  should  take  no  fear  of  him,  since  he  was 
friendly  to  the  Athenians,  and  oftentimes  had  aided  them  before, 
and  so  would  now,  and  again  in  the  times  to  come." 

Such  tales  as  these  are  curious ;  not  that  we  must  do  aught 
but  discard  them  altogether  as  matters  of  every  day  fact ;  and 
yet  they  were  indeed  the  cause  of  facts  and  great  ones.  There 
was  a  freshness  in  the  world  in  those  days,  a  fi-eshness  and  sin- 
cerity and  youth  in  the  heart  of  man  such  as  we  find  rarely  now- 
a-days ;  and  then  only  in  some  earnest,  shy,  and  world-secluded 
student ;  in  some  half  precocious,  half  dull-witted  child ;  or  per- 
haps in  some  remote  mountaineer,  from  the  wildest  and  most 
solitary  district. 

The  earth,  with  all  its  unshorn  garniture  of  woodlands,  its 
sacred  fountains,  its  mysterious  tarns  and  umbrageous  moun- 
tains ;  was  full  of  poetry ;  and  from  it  poetry  had  welled  up  into 
the  heart  of  every  man,  in  a  greater  or  less  degree ;  and  whether 
the  poetry  had  engendered  the  rehgion,  or  the  rehgion  created 
the  poetry,  there  they  were,  two  in  one,  self-existent  in  every 
heart ;  so  that  to  dream  and  muse,  until  the  mortal  senses 
became  conscious  as  it  were  of  their  real  presence,  of  white 
nymphs  sporting  round  their  crystal  waterfalls,  or  wood-gods 
waking  wild  melodies  fi'om  reedy  pipes,  or  huge  heroic  shades 
brooding  in  giant  majesty  over  their  lonely  barrows,  was  a  thing 
usual  and  common ;  and  neither  the  seer  nor  the  hearer  doubted, 
for  an  instant,  the  absolute  reality  of  such  creations  of  the  fantas- 
tical and  teeming  brain,  or  hesitated  to  place  imphcit  confidence 
in  their  reported  revelations.  For  I  dismiss,  at  once,  as  mere 
pedantic  efFoiis  to  explain  away,  in  a  matter  of  fact  counting- 


THE    VISION    OF    THE    GOD    PAN.  73 

house  style,  things  which  cannot  be  explained  at  all,  the  attempts 
of  a  certain  school  of  would-be  classical  authorities  and  exposi- 
tors, who  are,  however,  daily  becoming  rarer  and  less  intrusively 
absui'd,  to  represent  such  messages  and  apparitions,  as  this,  as 
being  devices  and  inventions  of  this  or  that  leader,  for  the  en- 
couragement of  his  own  people  or  the  discomfiture  of  his  enemy. 
Indeed  it  is  as  plain  as  anj'thing  can  be,  that  the  leaders  believed 
themselves — beheved,  and  often  trembled,  as  much  as  the  mean- 
est of  their  people.  It  is  a  well-known  fact,  that  of  uncultivated 
men,  the  inhabitants  of  forest  and  mountain  lands  are  far  more 
imaginative  and  even  superstitious,  if  you  will,  than  those  of  the 
broad  valley  or  the  open  plain.  The  inexplicable  phenomena  of 
light  and  shade,  of  atmospheric  and  perhaps  subteiTanean,  even 
volcanic,  influences,  producing  sounds  and  sights  for  which  no 
science  of  theirs  can  account,  are  to  them  voices  from  the 
past  or  tidings  of  the  future,  manifestations  of  demigods  and 
demons,  perhaps  revelations  from  the  great  gods  themselves. 
Just  such  a  land  was  Greece,  so  framed,  so  modelled,  vvith  un- 
seen subterranean  torrents,  whose  murmurs  struggled  upward 
oppressed  to  the  doubting  ear,  and  twilight  passes  through  the 
crags,  and  glades  and  gorges  full  of  strange  accidents  of  hght, 
suo-gjestino^  strano^e  imaonnations.  And  when  to  this  the  bent  and 
incUnation  of  the  national  mind,  the  almost  univei'sal  prevalence 
of  poetiy,  and  the  direct  tendency  of  the  national  religion  were 
added,  ^rengthening  every  half-doubted  fancy,  and  giving  ear  to 
every  wildest  mythos,  how  shall  we  doubt — we  who  know  that 
even  to  this  day  of  Christian  illumination  and  mid-day  blaze  of 
almost  skeptical  science,  doubting  all  things,  denying  all  things, 
that  are  not  mathematically  proven,  the  Scottish  belief  in  the 
Ta/i/mf?*  or  second  sight  is  absolute  in  many  a  highland  glen  and 
corrie — how  shall  we  doubt,  I  say,  that  the  intellectual,  dream- 
ing, sensuous  Greek,  five  hundred  yeai*s  before  the  birth  of 
Christ,  nourished  the  conviction  of  his  real  intercourse  with 
4 


74  MILTIADES. 

Dryad  and  Nereid,  Pan  and  Sylvan,  as  we  cherish  the  most 
lovely  doctrines  of  our  own  pure  religion. 

Therefore,  I  say  that  to  Phidippides  the  god  Pan  did  appear, 
and  that  he  did  speak  thus — for  to  Phidippides  and  to  the  audit- 
ors of  Phidippides,  whether  it  was  a  scathed  pine  tree  blackening 
in  the  forest  amid  the  silver  moonlight,  or  a  mist  wreath  ghtter- 
ing  through  the  shadows,  it  was  the  great  god  Pan.  And  it 
was  the  voice  of  that  god  Pan,  whether  that  voice  were  the 
night  wind  howhng  through  the  pine-tops,  or  the  torrent  bel- 
lowing through  the  ravine,  which  bade  them  be  of  good  cheer 
and  conquer ;  and  they  were  of  good  cheer,  and  they  did 
conquer. 

The  power  of  faith,  as  stated  in  holy  wi'it,  even  if  apphed  to 
mortal  matters  and  to  mere  physical  efforts,  is  scarcely  ov' errated. 
He  who  has  faith  that  he  can  accomplish  anything  rarely  fails, 
even  if  he  task  his  strength  almost  beyond  the  utmost,  to  accom- 
plish it.  He,  who  doubts  his  owti  powei*s,  surely  fails  to  execute 
that  which  he  could  have  performed  with  ease,  had  his  heart 
been  hiojh  of  cheer  and  courao;e. 

Therefore,  to  the  Athenians,  to  those  who  fought  at  Marathon, 
Pan,  who  appeared  to  Phidippides  on  Mount  Parthenios,  near 
Tegea,  was  a  fact,  and  a  true  fact.  And  it  helped  the  runner  on 
his  way  doubtless,  for  on  the  second  day  from  Athens  he  stood 
before  the  Ephori  in  Sparta,  and  said  what  the  time  required. 
And  the  Spartans  were  much  moved,  and  eager  to  rush  to  the 
rescue ;  and  they  promised  speedy  reinforcement,  but  not  yet ; 
for  it  was  now  the  ninth  day  of  the  month,  and  between  the 
ninth  day  and  the  full  of  the  moon  it  was  forbidden  to  the  Spar- 
tans to  set  on  foot  any  expedition,  to  go  forth  in  arms  beyond 
the  city  gates.  And  this  they  said,  not  seeking  pretexts,  nor 
wishing  to  defer  their  succor  until  they  might  withhold  it  alto- 
gether ;  for  they  perceived  the  urgency  of  the  common  peril,  and 
perceived,  too,  that  should  Athens  perish,  the  brunt  must  fall  on 


THE    PLAIN    OF    MARATHON.  76 

themselves  the  next,  with  none  at  hand  to  succor  them.  But  it 
was  their  rohgion  and  their  law  that  they  must  await  the  full  of 
the  moon.  And  the  religion  must  not  be  despised,  nor  the  law 
broken.  So  they  awaited  the  full  of  the  moon ;  and  Phidippides 
returned  home,  full  of  the  vision  which  he  had  seen,  and  elated 
by  the  thought  that  instead  of  mortal  aid,  he  brought  back  to 
his  countrymen  the  tidings  of  an  immortal  alliance. 

When  he  returned,  the  Athenians — ^having  been  joined  by  the 
little  city  of  Plataia,  their  subordinate  ally,  which  with  a  rare 
fidehty  had  turned  out,  in  this  desperate  emergency,  mindful  of 
past  benefits,  not  of  present  peril,  with  every  man  that  she  could 
muster  capable  of  bearing  arms,  to  the  number  of  a  thousand 
shields  all  of  Hoplitai — had  marched  out  and  sat  down  in  a  forti- 
fied camp  at  the  opening  of  the  valley  of  Marathon,  now  Vrana, 
where  its  torrent  issues  from  the  hills  to  discharge  itself  across 
the  plain  into  the  Gulf  of  Eghina. 

The  mountains  look  on  Marathon, 
And  Marathon  looks  on  the  sea — 

says  Byron — than  whom  there  are  few  more  accurate  observers 
or  vi\dd  describers  of  natural  scenery  ;  and  accordingly  we  find 
from  other  authorities  that  the  scene  of  this  celebrated  battle  is 
an  elevated  plain  of  about  two  miles  and  a  half  in  width,  hemmed 
in  at  either  extremity  by  diflScult  craggy  heights,  and  bounded  to 
the  southeast  by  the  sea.  At  the  northwestern  extremity  of  the 
plain  a  deep  gorge-like  valley,  in  the  upper  part  of  which  the  vil- 
lage of  Vrana  is  situated,  opens  into  the  plain,  discharging 
across  it  a  torrent  which  falls  into  the  middle  of  the  Bay  of 
Marathon  by  three  shallow  channels.  The  northern  boundajy 
of  the  bay  is  a  narrow  rocky  point,  close  to  which  is  a  salt 
stream  connected  with  a  shallow  lake  and  a  large  extent  of  mai-sh 
land.  Such  to  this  day  are  the  features  of  this  great  natural 
battle-field,  with  scarce  an  exception,  the  only  gi'ound  in  Attica 


76  MILTIADE8. 

fit  for  a  charge  of  cavalry,  and,  as  such,  selected  for  his  place  of 
debarkation  by  the  traitor  renegado  Hippias.  To  complete  the 
picture,  as  it  meets  the  modern  eye,  towards  the  middle  of  the 
plain  stands  a  large  tumulus  or  barrow,  about  twenty-five  feet 
high,  resembling  those  on  the  plain  of  Troy,  says  the  traveller 
whom  I  quote,  and  I  will  add  closely  resembhng  those  scattered 
through  many  of  the  western  states,  beneath  which  sleeps  undis- 
turbed all  that  is  mortal  of  those  high  spirits,  whom  Demos- 
thenes was  wont  to  adjure — swearing  "  By  those  who  died  at 
Marathon  !"  It  is  said,  also,  that  the  remains  of  marble  monu- 
ments and  trophies  may  be  seen  still  on  the  salt  marsh.  But  on 
that  day  there  was  no  mound,  no  monument,  no  trophies ;  only 
the  long,  dry,  bent  grass,  tossing  in  the  gentle  sea-breeze  over 
the  smooth  plain,  and  the  broom  and  heather  waving  upon  the 
craggy  sides  of  the  gray  hills,  whither  the  bees  came  often  from 
Hymetos  to  recruit  their  stores. 

In  the  mouth  of  the  glen,  between  the  village  and  the  sea,  lay 
the  Athenian  army  in  its  fines,  ten  thousand  shields  of  heavy 
infantry,  full  armed,  without  taking  into  account  their  servants, 
who  are  not  indeed  numbered  in  any  of  the  accounts  of  the  battle 
extant,  but  whom  I  confidently  set  down  at  ten  thousand  more ; 
since  it  was  the  invariable  practice  with  Hellenic  armies,  and 
expressly  so  stated  by  Herodotus'*  of  the  battle  of  Plataia,  that 
every  heavy  armed  soldier  had  one  citizen  of  a  lower  class  to 
carry  his  shield  on  the  march,  and  otherwise  attend  on  his  per- 
son— these  men  forming  the  fight  troops  in  action,  and  generally 
known  as  gymnetes,  or  naked  men,  from  their  carrpng  no  offen- 
sive armor  beyond  a  light  casque  and  buckler.  The  Spartans 
proper,  when  in  the  field,  were  attended  each  by  no  less  than 
seven  helots  ;  so  that  the  Spartan  shield  represented  eight  fight- 
ing men,  as  the  term  lance  in  the  middle  ages  was  understood 
to  embrace  five  pereons,  the  man-at-arms  himself  and  foui*  var- 
*  Herod.  IX.  29. 


THE    ATHENIAN    FORCE.  ?Y 

lets.  The  whole  fighting  force  of  the  Athenians  at  Mai-athon 
may  therefore  be  set  down,  unhesitatingly,  at  twenty  thousand 
men  ;  only  ten  thousand  of  whom,  however,  were  capable  of 
breasting  the  brunt  of  battle ;  although  the  rest  might  do  good 
service  with  their  javeHns,  skirmishing  in  the  van  until  driven  in, 
and  in  cutting  up  and  routing  a  beaten  enemy.  To  this  last 
employment  their  duties  on  this  occasion  must  have  been  limited, 
since  the  circumstances  of  the  action,  to  which  I  shall  come  forth- 
with, precluded  the  possibility  of  skirmishing.  Among  other 
great  deficiencies  of  the  Athenians,  the  greatest  of  which  was 
being  infeiior  to  their  enemy  in  the  ratio  of  something  more  than 
one  to  five,  was  their  total  lack  of  either  horse  or  archers,  in  the 
presence  of  an  army  which  was  incomparably  the  best  in  the 
world  in  those  senices.  With  none  of  the  continental  Greeks 
was  the  bow  a  favorite  weapon,  but  with  the  Athenians  it  was 
regarded  as  slaAdsh  and  degrading  to  the  hands  of  a  freeman. 
The  absence  of  their  cavalry  at  Marathon  must  be  ascribed,  I 
suppose,  to  their  prudently  holding  it  back  as  utterly  useless,  con- 
sisting at  this  time  of  not  above  two  hundred  young  men  of  the 
noblest  famihes,  who  could  only  have  been  hterally  trampled 
under  foot  by  the  overwhelming  charge  of  ten  thousand  Oriental 
horse. 

In  the  mean  time,  while  the  x\thenian  force  lay  encamped 
near  to  the  mouth  of  the  valley  of  Marathon,  within  the  conse- 
crated ground  and  grove  of  the  Iferakleion,  or  temple  of  Her- 
akles,  at  the  distance  of  about  fifteen  English  miles  from  the 
Acropolis,  Hippias,  who  appears  fi-om  the  arrival  of  the  arma- 
ment upon  the  shores  of  Greece  to  have  succeeded  to  the  chief 
command,  landed  the  captives  whom  they  had  secured  at  Eretria, 
on  the  small  island  of  JEgileia  ;  and  then  bringing  to  his  vessels 
in  the  bay  of  Marathon,  disembarked  all  his  powTr,  and  arrayed 
it,  as  for  battle,  in  the  plain,  between  the  sea  and  the  Athenian 
encampment. 


18  MILTIADES. 

On  that  night,  a  council  of  war  was  held  in  the  camp  of  the 
Greeks  ;  and,  as  invariably  is  the  ca'^e  with  councils  of  war,  even 
when  composed  of  men  individually  the  most  daring  and  even 
rash,  the  decision  was  not  to  light ;  for  where  there  can  be  no 
individual  censure  or  responsibility,  every  one  shelters  himself 
under  the  impunity  of  the  whole,  and  easily  admits  or  advises 
actions,  which  if  personally  and  solely  accountable,  he  would  be 
ashamed  to  adopt,  much  more  to  recommend.  Indeed,  as  it  has 
become  a  proverb  everywhere  that  corporations  have  no  con- 
science, so  might  it  be  urged,  and  with  even  more  justice,  that 
councils  of  war  have  no  courage.  Another  palpable  argument 
against  the  subdivision  of  military  command. 

The  ten  generals  were  divided ;  five  voted  to  give  battle,  five 
insisted  that  their  numbers  were  so  desperately  inadequate,  until 
the  Spartans  should  arrive,  that  to  fight  was  merely  to  die 
without  aiding  their  country  or  advancing  the  cause  of  freedom. 
The  names  of  the  voters  are  not  given  by  Herodotus,  who  merely 
states  the  fact  that  Miltiades  urgently  but  vainly  insisted  on  dehver- 
ing  battle,  the  ten  generals  being  divided ;  and  that  he  prevailed  by 
inducing  Callimachus  the  Poleraarch,  who,  according  to  the  Athe- 
nian law,  had  an  equal  vote  with  each  of  the  generals,  to  throw 
his  casting  vote  in  favor  of  fighting.  Plutarch  asserts,  however, 
that  the  change  in  the  ultimate  decision  of  the  council  was  greatly 
attributable  to  the  efforts  of  that  noble  man  Aristides,  who,  as 
well  as  Themistocles,  was  a  general  on  that  occasion,  and  with 
him  commanded  the  centre,  in  the  action  which  ensued. 

The  arguments  produced  by  Miltiades  can  easily  be  imagined. 
If  not  to  fight  for  what  were  they  sent  thither  ?  for  what  pui*- 
pose,  indeed,  had  an  army  been  raised  at  all  ?  The  ground,  if 
favorable  to  ths  Persian  horse,  was  no  less  favorable  to  the  pha- 
lanx, which  could  not  manoeuvre  with  effect  in  broken  ground, 
and  required  a  level  and  unbroken  surface  to  make  its  charge 
effective.     If  not  there — thero,  at  Marathon,  where  were  thev  to 


REASONS    FOR    FIGHTING.  lQ 

give  battle  ?  In  broken  ground  and  among  craggy  eminences 
the  missiles  and  short  weapons  of  the  Orientals  would  be  supe- 
rior to  their  long  and  unwieldy  pikes.  Lastly — this  he  urged 
on  Callimachus,  it  is  said,  in  private — it  could  not  be 'doubted, 
if  the  army  lay  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy  long  ina<;tive,  that 
a  revolution  would  take  place  in  the  minds  of  the  Athenian  de- 
mocracy, and  that  the  state  would  in  all  probabihty  surrender, 
and  accept  Median  usages,  and  a  Median  governor.  Besides 
this,  he  expressed  a  full  conviction  in  their  power  of  winning  the 
battle,  in  spite  of  all  the  superiority  of  the  enemy  in  numbei-s, 
horse,  and  archery ;  a  conviction  arising  doubtless  from  his  long 
acquaintance  with  oriental  armies — having  seen  them  in  the  field, 
and  having  learned  how,  by  fighting  on  their  side,  to  fight 
against  them  with  effect ;  a  conviction,  which  proved,  as  it  is  by 
the  event,  to  have  been  founded  on  no  vainglorious  over-estimate 
of  himself,  or  of  the  men  under  his  command,  on  no  weak  and 
unsoldierly  contempt  of  his  antagonist,  is  in  itself  an  e\ddence 
of  his  possessing  the  genius  of  a  great  and  veritable  captain.  AU 
his  decisions — so  far  as  we  know  them — were  correct ;  all  his 
perceptions  lucid ;  all  his  conclusions  just.  His  first  determina- 
tion to  leave  the  walls  and  dehver  battle  in  the  field,  was  sol- 
dierly ;  and  not  soldierly  only,  but  politically  sound  and  wise. 
Soldierly,  for  he  knew,  that  men  will  fight  better  always,  as  the 
black  Douglas  wont  to  say,  where  they  can  hear  the  lark  sing 
than  the  mouse  squeak — that  to  give  men  courage  and  confi- 
dence before  the  enemy,  their  general  must  show  that  he  has 
confidence  in  them — politically  A\'ise,  because  to  show  Hellas 
that  Athens  despaired  neither  of  Athens  nor  of  Hellas,  was  the 
only  hope  to  kindle  anything  of  general  or  impulsive  ardor  in  the 
hearts  of  Greeks ;  was  the  surest  mode  of  bringing  Sparta  in 
arms  to  the  rescue.  His  second,  to  deliver  battle  then  and 
there,  was  no  less  sound  and  masterly  judgment ;  since  he  had 
nothing  on  which  to  retreat  except  the  city,  from  which  he  had 


80  MILTIADES. 

just  marched  out ;  when  to  retreat  on  that  would  have  crowned 
the  spirits  of  the  Pei-sian  hordes,  and  their  traitor  general  Hip- 
pias,  with  the  certainty  of  triumph,  and  depressed  those  of  his 
countrymen,  it  is  most  like,  as  he  predicted,  even  to  the  point  of 
instant  submission. 

Fortunately  Kallimachos  the  Polemarch,  on  whom,  as  having 
the  casting  vote,  something  of  pei*sonal  responsibility  now  rested, 
was  a  man  both  of  nerve  and  judgment,  and  he  decided  instantly 
for  battle.  And  thereupon  arose  one  of  those  strange  and  sud- 
den conversions,  which  are  not,  after  all,  so  unnatural  as  they  at 
fii'st  appear,  among  the  very  men  who  had  so  strenuously  oppos- 
ed Miltiades  but  a  moment,  as  it  were,  before.  They  now,  on 
the  motion  of  Aristides,  determined,  each  one  on  the  day  when 
his  turn  of  command  should  come  about,  to  resign  it  to  Miltiades, 
vii'tually  constituting  him  sole  general  and  commander  in  chief, 
as  his  right,  in  behalf  of  superior  military  genius. 

I  have  said  that  this  was  not  so  wonderful  as  it  would  seem  at 
first  sight — for  it  was  not  that  those  generals  lacked  patriotism, 
or  judgment,  or  perception  of  what  w^as  right,  or  generos- 
ity, or,  least  of  all,  courage.  It  was  that  they  shunned — as 
ninety- nine  men  in  a  hundred  do  and  ever  will  shun — responsi- 
bihty,  when  it  may  be  shuffled  off  without  disgrace;  and, 
although  they  were  defeated  in  their  argument,  and  the  counter 
opinion  had  prevailed,  it  was,  not  improbably,  with  something 
of  gratitude,  that  they  regarded  the  man  who  had  reheved  them 
of  that  onerous  burthen. 

Nor,  be  it  observed,  was  it  an  unnatural  thing  for  the  bravest 
to  shrink  from  assuming,  or  even  from  involuntarily  incurring, 
responsibility  to  the  people  of  Athens — for  with  all  their  splen- 
did intellectual  capacities,  all  their  briUiancy  and  wit,  all  their 
fiery  courage,  and  impulsive  appreciation  of  the  good  and  great, 
there  was  nothing  in  them  of  that  stern  and  perdurable  resolu- 
tion, that  constancy  not  elevated  by  success  nor  prostrated  by 


HIS    RESPONSIBILITY.  81 

revei-se,  which  in  truth  belongs  not  to  democracies — such  as 
that  I  mean  which  prompted  the  Roman  Senate  to  thank  the 
fugitive  Van'o,  escaped  with  a  mere  handful  from  the  field  of 
Cannse,  all  but  fatal  to  the  state,  "  for  that  he  had  not  despaired 
of  the  republic." 

With  the  Athenians,  to  be  entrusted  with  command,  and  to 
bring  home  defeat  instead  of  victory,  ruin  instead  of  glory,  was 
in  nine  cases  out  of  ten,  to  die  a  criminal.  As  to  defeated 
general  of  the  French  Repubhc  was  the  guillotine,  so  to  the 
Attic  captain,  unsuccessful,  was  the  draught  of  hemlock;  and 
such  it  may  be  held,  with  Httle  doubt,  would  have  been  the 
fate  of  Miltiades,  if,  having  overborne  the  scruples  of  his  col- 
leagues, fighting,  he  had  lost  his  amiy,  and  so  returned  to  the 
Acropohs. 

But  of  such  things,  it  is  clear,  he  never  thought ;  never,  pro- 
bably,  contemplated  the  possibility  of  defeat.  He  knew,  what 
probably  no  other  man  upon  the  field,  of  either  arraj^,  knew,  the 
men  of  whom  he  was  himself  the  leader,  and  the  men  against 
whom  he  was  about  to  lead  them.  A  soldier  almost  by  profes- 
sion ;  a  soldier,  almost  an  adventurer ;  the  wearer  of  a  sword 
prompt  to  leap  from  its  scabbard — not  hterally  for  hire,  but  in 
any  cause  where  reno^\^l  and  riches  were  to  ^vin — a  soldier  as 
opposed  to  an  armed  citizen,  Miltiades  had  of  coui-se  studied 
strategy  as  a  science ;  and,  as  a  most  important  part  of  that  sci- 
ence, had  observed  the  characters  of  men  and  nations.  He  was 
acquainted  with  the  arms,  the  mode  of  fighting,  the  tactics,  the 
very  mental  characteristics  of  every  different  nation,  tribe,  or  no- 
mad horde,  which  was  to  be  marshalled  against  him  under  the 
banners  of  the  Persian  monarch.  He  had  partaken  their  war 
against  the  Scythians,  and  seen  its  miserable  and  disgraceful  ter- 
mination. He  knew,  too,  his  countrymen,  their  perfect  disci- 
pline, their  fiery  yet  manageable  valor,  the  compact  aiTay  of  their 
impenetrable  phalanx,  and  the  eflfect  of  its  tremendous  onset. 


MILTIADE9. 


Ke  knew  all  this,  and,  knowing  it,  was  serene  in  the  security  of 
his  conviction. 

Fifty  years  afterwards,  what  Miltiades  did,  winning  thereby 
renown  immortal,  would  have  been  done  by  any  leader  whom 
chance  placed  at  the  head  of  a  Greek  phalanx ;  for  it  was  then 
an  established  fact  that  the  bravest  of  the  orientals  could  not 
stand  for  an  instant  the  p?eans  and  the  pikes  of  the  Hellenic 
column,  which  cut  through  them  as  the  war-ship  cuts  the  bil- 
lows, and  scarce  feels  that  they  resist  her  passage. 

But  now,  this  was  not  so  ;  the  trial  had  not  yet  been  made, 
much  less  decision  had  ;  and  so  far  as  the  prestige  went,  it  was 
in  favor  of  the  Medes  and  Persians,  and  against  the  Europeans. 
Within  a  few  years  the  former,  from  being  a  small  inland  state 
of  Asia,  had  raised  themselves  under  three  successive  monarchs 
— I  say  successive,  for  the  reign  of  Smerdis  the  Magian  was  a 
mere  interlude — Cyrus,  Cambyses,  and  the  present  king,  to  the 
mastery  of  the  whole  Eastern  continent,  and  that  by  mere  force 
of  arms  and  courage.  No  enemy  had  yet  been  found  to  oppose 
them  with  equality,  much  less  with  success.  For  if  Cambyses 
lost  a  host  in  the  Egyptian  deserts,  it  was  the  fatal  simoom,  and 
the  shifting  sand-pillars,  not  the  hand  of  man  that  smote  him. 
And  if  Darius  left  the  bones  of  nations  to  whiten  on  the  steppes 
of  Scythia,  it  was  that  the  roving  tribes  let  the  elements  and  the 
country  do  their  battle  for  them,  not  that  they  met  the  invadei-s 
beard  to  beard,  and  beat  them  back  by  vahant  opposition.  And 
of  this  very  battle,  Herodotus  observes,*  that  "  the  Athenians  at 
Marathon,  were  the  first  men  who  endured  the  sight  of  the  Me- 
dian garb,  and  resisted  men  so  clad,  for  that  at  this  time  it  was  a 
terror  to  the  Greeks,  only  to  hear  the  name  of  the  Medians." 

The  greatness  of  Miltiades'  genius,  therefore,  is  e\ident  in  this ; 
that  he,  from  observation,  drew  a  conclusion  directly  opposite  to 
that  of  all  the  men  of  his  da}^,  amounting  to  a  perfect  conviction 
•Herod.  VI.  112. 


THE    FIELD    OF    MARATHON".  83 

of  success ;  which  conviction,  success  proved  sound  and  true. 
That,  from  theory  and  principle,  he  himself  devised  and  invented 
a  mode  of  attack  on  these  dreaded  antagonistics,  which  was  not 
only  overwhelmingly  successful,  but  which  was  ever  after  the 
mode  of  Greek  attack  on  onentals,  hy  the  best  generals,  never 
improved  upon,  and  invariably  crowned  ^vith  complete  triumph, 
even  in  the  days  of  Alexander,  who  found  nothing  to  innovate 
on  the  charge  of  Marathon. 

Being  thus  appointed  commander-in-chief,  and  that  too  by  the 
vohmtary  cession  of  his  colleagues,  and  ha^^ ng  accepted  the 
appointment,  it  is  somewhat  remarkable  that  Miltiades  did  not  at 
once  put  his  own  plans  in  force,  and  give  battle  on  the  instant. 
For  some  reason,  however,  which  we  cannot  now  fully  ascertain, 
he  did  not  do  so  until  his  own.  proper  day  of  command  came 
round.  That  he  was  not  waiting  the  arrival  of  Lacedsemonian 
succors  is  certain  ;  for  the  day  on  which  they  would  leave  Sparta, 
was  accurately  known,  and  the  time  which  it  would  require  to 
bring  them  on  the  field,  could  be  judged  to  a  nicety ;  yet  he  did 
deliver  battle  before  their  ariival,  and  that  only  by  a  single  day. 
That  he  could  be  actuated  by  any  mere  vanity  as  to  fighting  on 
his  own  proper  day  of  command,  is  out  of  the  question  ;  and, 
although  it  is  possible  that  he  might  have  been  deterred  from 
using  a  day  ceded  to  him  by  some  other  leader,  through  the  appre- 
hension that  he  might  attempt  to  interfere,  or  re-assume  the  chief 
command ;  there  are  yet  strong  reasons  for  believing  that  there 
was  a  deeper  cause,  for  his  not  delivering  battle  until  the  moment 
when  he  did  so.  Marathon,  as  I  have  stated,  hes  on  the  eastern 
coast  upon  the  straits  of  Egiipo,  Euripus^  at  about  fifteen  miles 
distance  from  Athens,  midway  between  that  city  and  Carystus 
now  Castel  Rosso,  in  Boeotia,  something  to  the  southward  of 
Eretria,  which  had  just  been  captured.  It  had  been  selected 
probably  by  the  Athenian  commander,  as  his  post,  from  the 
facilities  of  observation  it  gave  him  ;  since,  at  whatever  point  of 


84  MILTIADES. 

Attica,  the  enemy  might  land,  he  must  be  within  striking  dis- 
tance, while  in  those  narrow  seas,  the  fleet  could  not  make  a 
movement  without  being  seen  by  a  thousand  eyes  ;  while  Hij)- 
pias  had  chosen  it  as  his  point  of  debarcation,  from  its  being  the 
spot  of  all  Attica,  most  adapted  to  the  manoeuvres  of  his  nume- 
rous and  powerful  cavalry.  The  Athenians,  as  we  have  seen, 
were  encamped  in  the  gorge  of  a  valley,  opening  from  the  north- 
west upon  this  plain,  which  runs  from  northeast  along  the  coast, 
southwesterly.  They  were,  therefore,  interposed  directly  between 
the  Persians  and  the  city.  Now,  it  is  clear  that  it  was  in 
the  power  of  the  Persians,  either  to  attack  Miltiades  in  his 
lines,  or  to  turn  either  of  his  flanks  by  the  rough  ground,  and 
march  upon  the  city.  The  first  of  these,  Hippias  probably  dared 
not  do,  on  account  of  the  strength  of  the  position,  and  of  the 
lines  themselves,  which  were  fortified,  according  to  Cornelius 
Nepos,*  by  an  abattis  of  felled  timber — although  he  ascribes  a 
purpose  to  it,  which  the  circumstances  of  the  battle  by  no  means 
bear  out.  The  second,  which  would  unquestionably  have  been 
the  true  movement,  especially  against  such  a  force  as  the  phalanx, 
unable  either  to  manoeuvre  or  fight  advantageously  in  uneven 
gi-ound,  and  still  more  so  when  he  could  have  observed  them, 
and  masked  his  own  operations,  by  his  clouds  of  horse,  he  was 
probably  deterred  from  doing  by  the  peril  of  leaving  such  a  force 
in  his  rear,  as  that  under  Miltiades. 

For  several  days,  therefore,  and  it  would  seem  to  have  been 
ten,  from  the  fact  that  Miltiades  is  stated  to  have  been  tenth 
chosen,  the  two  armies  lay  face  to  face,  with  about  one  mile 
intervening ;  Hippias  not  daring  to  attack  the  Athenian  camp, 
Miltiades  not  choosing,  although  eager  to  deliver  battle  on  the 
fii*st  chance,  for  some  unknown  reason,  to  attack  the  Persians. 
Now  there  is  an  obscure  story  or  tradition,  connected,  by  some 
persons,  with  the  account  of  the  abattis  of  trees  descnbed  by 
*=  Miltiades,  Chap.  V. 


ABSENCE    OF    PERSIAN    HORSE.  85 

Nepos,  which  appears  to  me  to  explain  the  whole.  "  In  the 
explanation  of  the  proverb  /w^ig  innBig''"^ — I  quote  from  Pro- 
fessor Anthon's  classical  dictionary,  not  having  an  opportunity 
of  referring  to  the  original — "  we  read  that  when  Datis  invaded 
Attica,  the  lonians  got  upon  the  trees  (?)  and  made  signals  to  the 
Athenians,  that  the  cavalry  had  gone  away,  w;  ei^v  /moI;  6t 
iTTneig,  and  that  Miltiades  upon  learning  its  retreat,  joined  battle 
and  gained  the  victory." 

The  lonians  alluded  to,  are  of  course  the  Asiatic  or  Island 
Greeks,  in  the  host  of  Datis  and  Artaphernes ;  the  trees  Profes- 
sor Anthon  conceives  to  be  an  allusion  to  the  abattis  named 
above.  This  does  not  however  appear  to  me  probable  or 
requisite  to  the  solution  of  the  case. 

The  Asiatic  army  consisted,  according  to  JS'epos,  of  one  hun- 
dred thousand  foot  and  ten  thousand  horse,  present  under  arms, 
besides  a  hundred  thousand  camp  foUowei's  and  non-combatants ; 
and  this  number  agrees  consistently  and  well  with  the  numerical 
force  of  the  fleet,  six  hundred  galleys,  beside  horse  transports,  as 
stated  by  Herodotus,  who  elsewhere  assigns  two  hundred  fighting 
men  to  each  Persian  trireme. 

Now  it  is  self-evident  that  the  daily  consumption  of  food  by 
such  a  host,  in  an  enemy's  country,  unprovided  with  magazines, 
and  compelled  to  make  war  support  war,  must  be  enormous; 
and  that  in  a  poor  and  sterile  country  like  Attica  supplies  could 
only  have  been  procured,  even  for  a  few  days,  by  sweeping  the 
country  to  a  very  considerable  distance  ;  for  which  purpose  horse 
would  of  necessity  be  employed.  Again,  although  we  are  dis- 
tinctly informed  that  Hippias  selected  Marathon  as  his  point  of 
debarcation  for  the  sake  of  employing  his  hoi-se,  yet  in  the  battle 
itself  not  only  are  no  hoi-se  mentioned,  but  it  is  pretty  clear  that 
none  could  have  been  there ;  since  such  a  pursuit  and  slaughter 
as  occurred  could  not  have  taken  place  in  the  teeth  of  cavalry 
over  an  open  plain. 

*  Suidas,  Ant.  14.  73.— Scholt. 


86  MILTIADES. 

All  this  would  necessarily  be  seen  and  anticipated  by  such  a 
general  as  Miltiades  approved  himself  to  be  ;  and  I  cannot  doubt 
that,  perceiving  the  unwilHngness  of  Hippias  to  attempt  his  hues, 
and  foreseeing  the  time  when  he  must  send  off  his  horse  to  for- 
age at  a  distance,  he  waited  patiently  until  the  moment  should 
arrive,  as  it  did  on  his  own  proper  day  of  command  ;  when  he 
at  once  gave  the  signal  and  joined  battle. 

The  plain  of  Marathon  must  have  presented  a  singular  and 
gorgeous  sight  upon  that  summer  morning.  The  magnificent 
array  of  the  Cyprian  and  Phoenician  galleys,  drawn  upon  along 
the  beach,  and  covering  the  narrow  straits  of  the  Euripus ;  the 
gorgeous  tents  of  the  Asiatics,  glittering  in  barbaric  splendor,  of 
gold  and  purple  and  embroidery,  toward  the  green  marge  of 
the  salt  mai-sh ;  and  all  along  the  plain,  between  the  mountains 
and  the  sea,  the  countless  multitudes  of  the  barbarian  arm}-.  It 
was  the  boast  of  the  Athenians,  when  ten  years  later,  on  the 
field  of  Platsea,  they  contended  with  the  Tegeatans  of  Arcadia 
for  the  leading  of  the  right  wing  of  the  combined  Hellenic  forces, 
that  they  had  conquered  forty-six  nations  at  Marathon ;  and  it 
is  not  a  little  remarkable  that  this  is  the  precise  number  of  tribes 
whose  names  and  arras  are  given  by  Herodotus,  in  his  description 
of  the  muster  made  by  Xerxes  of  his  army  before  crossing  the 
Hellespont,  on  his  most  calamitous  expedition.  Moreover,  to 
this  day  flint-headed  Ethiopian  arrows  are  found  on  Marathon, 
proving  that  one  at  least  of  the  tribes  enumerated,  and  that 
tri^e  the  most  remote  of  the  Persian  empire,  was  present  in  that 
bloody  battle. 

In  the  centre,  therefore,  of  the  barbarian  hues  might  be  seen 
the  Pei-sians,  with  their  high  straight  tiaras,  their  many-colored 
tunics  of  gay  needlework,  their  brigantines  glittering  with  fish- 
like  scales  of  steel,  their  quivers  swinging  at  their  left  sides,  their 
long  bows  and  straight  daggers  on  the  right ;  and  next  to  these 
the  Medes,  in  similar  array  ;  Assyrians,  with  brazen  casques  and 


THE    ARMY    OF    DATIS.  87 

steel-shod  war  clubs  and  Egyptian  daggers ;  Sacians,  with  lofty 
caps  recurved,  trowsers,  and  brazen  shields  and  battle-axes ;  In- 
dians, in  dresses  wrought  of  palm  leaves,  with  bows  and  steel- 
tipped  shafts  of  reeds,  from  the  Oxus  or  the  Ganges ;  Bactrians, 
Chorasmians,  Parthians,  each  in  their  native  garb,  with  bows 
and  javelins ;  Caspians,  in  shaggy  goat  skins  ;  Sarangians,  in 
long  many-colored  garments,  flowing  to  their  heels ;  Arabians, 
with  high-turbaned  brows  and  doubly-bended  bows ;  Ethio- 
pians, wrapped  in  panther  skins  and  lion  hides,  with  bows  and 
obsidian-headed  arrows,  and  spears  pointed  with  staghorn,  and 
huge  war-clubs,  black  as  night,  some  of  them  woolly-headed — 
the  woolliest-headed  of  mankind* — their  bodies  painted,  half 
white  with  gypsum,  half  red  with  vermilhon  ;  the  first  negroes 
probably  who  ever  trod  on  European  soil.  Then,  there  were 
Libyans,  clad  in  leather,  with  spears  fire-hardened  ;  and  Paph- 
lagonians,  with  chain-mail  hoods  of  brass,  small  bucklei-s,  and 
high  buskins,  armed  with  spears,  javelins  and  daggers ;  Bithy- 
nians,  with  their  foxskin  casques,  and  variegated  robes  and  buck- 
skin leggins ;  Thracians,  with  shields  of  raw  bull-hides,  and  each 
two  wolf-spears  in  his  hand,  and  helmets  on  their  heads,  with 
horns  and  ears  of  oxen  wrought  in  brass,  and  towering  crests 
over  all ;  there  were  Moschians  and  Mosynacians,  Tibarenians, 
and  Macrones  with  little  bucklers  and  long  pikes  ;  Colchians,  in 
wooden  head-pieces,  with  shields  of  bull-hide  and  long-crooked 
scymetars ;  and  Alarodians  and  Saspserians,  aj-med  like  the  Col- 
chians ;  and  Lydians,  clad  hke  the  Greeks  in  panoply — and 
tAvice  as  many  more,  wild  strangers  from  the  utmost  ends  of  the 
earth,  staring  with  eyes  of  savage  wonder  on  the  new  world 
that  met  their  gaze  for  the  first  time,  in  Europe. 

And  to  confront  this  army  and  armament  of  nations,  Milti- 
ades  drew  out  his  handful,  his  ten   tribes  of  Attica,  his   bravo 
Platseans,  and,  as  light  troops,  the  slavesf — on  that  day,  for  the 
*  Herod.  VII.,  70.      f  Pausan.  Attic.  1,  32, 


88  MILTIADES. 

first  time,  trusted  with,  arms  in  Attica.  Steadily,  but  without 
delay,  he  formed  his  army,  which  he  was  compelled  to  extend, 
even  to  the  weakening  of  his  centre — where  fought  Themistocles 
and  Aristides,  with  the  tribes  Leontis  and  Antiochis — in  order 
to  avoid  being  surrounded  by  the  enemy,  who  overflanked  him 
on  both  sides ;  to  counteract  which  peril  he  had  reinforced  his 
wino-s  with  double  files.  Kallimachos,  by  virtue  of  his  office,  led 
the  right  wing  ;  the  brave  Plataeans  held  the  next  post  of  honor, 
in  acknowledgment  of  their  prompt  rescue,  on  the  left.  His  lit- 
tle band  thus  marshalled,  the  sacrifices  proved  propitious ;  and, 
in  a  few  brief  words,  he  spoke  to  them  as  soldiers  should  be 
spoken  to.  His  words  are  not  recorded,  nor,  were  they,  should 
I  quote  them  ;  for  it  is  well  known  that  in  ancient  history  the 
speeches  introduced  embody  only  the  author's  understanding  of 
the  leader's  motives — but  we  may  confidently  feel  how  an 
Athenian  must  have  spoken,  when  the  sacred  earth  of  his  coim- 
try  was  polluted  by  such  a  scum  of  all  barbarous  nations ;  when 
he  was  leading  forth  from  the  consecrated  grove  of  Herakles  ; 
when  he  was  almost  under  the  eyes  of  Athene  on  the  Acropolis. 
Nor  could  he  have  failed  to  point  out  to  the  sensuous  and  super- 
stitious Greeks,  that,  within  sight  of  the  battle-field  selected  by 
the  enemy  himself,  was  the  cave  of  the  god  Pan,  a  little  higher 
up  the  plain,  and  his  baths,  and  the  scattered  stones,  goat-shaped, 
which  had  from  immemorial  time  been  known  and  honored  as 
his  flock — the  god  Pan,  who  had  announced  himself  their  sure 
ally,  and  promised  them  his  succor. 

Then,  without  further  pause,  he  gave  the  word,  and  contrary 
to  all  previous  usage,  led  them  at  a  run  against  the  enemy, 
although  the  distance  intervening  was  eight  stadia,  a  little  short 
of  an  English  mile.  The  pace  could  not,  of  com-se,  have  been 
rapid  ;  since  it  was  absolutely  necessary  to  the  veiy  existence  of 
the  phalanx  that  .it  should  come  in  with  all  its  large  round 
shields  close  serried,  and  all  its  pike  points  in  a  row ;  neither 


THE    CHARGE.  89 

could  the  men,  after  running  a  mile  at  speed,  have  been  in  breath 
to  maintain  a  close  struggle.  The  dgofiog  of  the  Greeks,  which 
is  rendered  run,  was  probably  somewhat  analogous  to  the  French 
pas  de  charge,  or  our  double  quick  time,  hurried  undoubtedly, 
within  the  last  few  yards,  to  a  headlong  and  overwhelming  rush. 

The  object  of  this  movement  was  threefold ;  iirst  to  precipitate 
the  Athenians  into  action  as  rapidly  as  possible,  without  gi^'ing 
them  time  to  consider  the  number,  or  calculate  the  odds  against 
them  ;  second,  to  dismay  and  surprise  the  barbarians  by  attack- 
ing, instead  of  waiting  to  be  attacked ;  lastly,  to  get  hand-to- 
hand  at  the  earhest,  and  to  avoid  the  storai  of  javelins  and 
an-ows,  which  must  have  been  shot  and  hurled  into  their  ranks 
hke  hail ;  since  they  had  neither  horse  to  make  a  divei-sion  in  their 
favor,  nor  archeiy  to  cover  their  advance. 

Down  they  came,  closing  their  ranks  still  as  they  rushed  on, 
and  quickening  their  pace  at  every  stride,  "  a  long  array  of  hel- 
mets bright,  a  long  array  of  speai-s,"  shouting  their  paeans,  and 
hymning  Enyalios,  the  war  god — for  to  the  Greeks,  as  to  our 
Anglo-Norman  race,  the  same  shout  was  the  charging  cry  of 
battle,  and  the  cheer  for  victoiy — shouting  their  paeans,  till  the 
craggy  heights  of  Brilessos  sent  back  the  prophetic  clamor ;  and 
clashing  their  spear-heads  against  their  shields  of  bronze,  till  the 
whole  air  was  ahve  with  the  brazen  clangor. 

The  Persians  saw  them  come,  and  joyously  stood  forth  to  meet 
them.  For,  as  they  saw  them  charging,  as  men  never  charged 
before,  with  flanks  unguarded  either  by  archery  or  hoi-se,  they 
beheved  that  some  madness,  and  most  destructive  madness  too, 
had  fallen  upon  the  Greeks,  and  that  the  gods  had  given  them 
into  their  hands.  Thus  thought  the  barbarians,  and  shot,  and 
slung,  and  darted,  and  received  them  fi-ont  to  front,  manfully. 

What  Hippias,  the  renegado  and  ex-tyrant,  thought,  what  felt, 
when  he  heard  those  peahng  paeans,  prophetical  of  triumph,  and 
saw  those  serried  shields  come  down  abreast,  with  the  briirht 
5 


90  MILTIADES. 

spear  points  all  advanced,  in  swift  unbroken  order,  history  has 
not  told  us,  could  not  tell  us — but  he  well  knew  what  was  that 
madness,  which  swelled  the  Attic  war  note. 

"  AVlien  the  Athenians  broke  down  upon  the  barbarians,  in 
close  ordei-,"  says  Herodotus,  "  they  fought  worthily  of  mention. 
But  a  long  time  elapsed  while  they  were  engaged  hand-to-hand." 
There  is  no  greater  error  than  to  fancy,  because  they  were 
perpetually  beaten  by  numbers  so  far  inferior,  that  the  Asiatics 
were  pusillanimous  or  dastards.  Inferior  in  physical  sti-ength  to 
the  Europeans,  to  the  Greeks,  trained  athletes  all,  they  were 
undoubtedly ;  and  in  arms,  weapons,  disciphne,  most  hopelessly 
beliind  them.  But,  in  all  instances,  they  fought  worthily  of  their 
ancient  renown,  even  to  striving  to  break  with  their  bare  hands, 
or  wrest  from  the  gi-asp  of  the  Greek  Hoplitai,  the  formidable 
pikes,  whose  bristling  lines  they  could  not  penetrate,  and  now,  in 
the  centre,  where  fought  the  Persians  proper,  and  the  Sacians, 
they  actually  forced  back  the  weak  lines  of  the  attenuated, 
phalanx,  and  drove  them  in  confusion  toward  the  upland,  broken 
but  still  resisting  and  retreating  with  their  faces  to  the  foe.  In 
the  meantime,  however,  on  both  wings,  where  the  files  were 
doubled,  the  Attic  charge  had  been  irresistible ;  and,  though  the 
enemy  fought  well,  faUing  where  they  stood,  rank  after  rank,  and 
giving  way  only  when  bodily  borne  down  by  the  brunt  of  the 
unbroken  spears,  they  were  now  routed  utterly  and  fled  toward 
the  sea.  Such  a  resistance  only  can  account  for  the  length  of 
time  consumed  in  an  action,  which  was  decided  by  one  charge, 
without  much  subsequent  manceuvi-ing. 

Still  at  this  moment,  the  battle  so  far  from  being  won,  might, 
like  Marengo  by  the  Austrians,  have  been  lost  right  easily  by  a 
single  error.  Had  Miltiades  chased  with  his  wings,  as  was 
Rupert's  wont,  his  centre  would  have  been  annihilated  before  his 
return  ;  the  barbarians  would  have  renewed  the  battle  on  the 
following  day ;  and,  the   Greeks  disheartened,  numbei-s  would 


REVERSED    ORDER.  91 

probably  have  carried  it.-  But  tlie  Greek  captain  was  too  able 
so  to  err.  Halting  both  wings  simultaneously,  and  wheeling 
both  inward,  this  to  the  spear,  that  to  the  shield,  he  closed  them 
both  into  a  compact  body,  in  an  inverse  direction  to  that  in  which 
they  fought  before,  with  their  backs  now  to  the  sea,  and  their 
faces  to  the  mountains. 

One  charge  more  full  on  the  rear  of  the  \'ictorious  Persian 
centre,  Themistokles  and  Aristides,  rallying  their  men  stoutly 
in  their  front,  and  the  l.-ist  enemy  was  broken  ;  and,  all  but  the 
after  slaughter,  the  day  won. 

The  Persians  fled,  not  to  their  camp — that  they  left  with  all 
its  pomp  and  treasures,  striking  no  blow  to  defend  it — but  to  their 
ships,  slaughtered  mercilessly  now,  not  by  the  phalanx  only,  but 
by  the  light-armed  slaves,  who  butchered  them  at  pleasure. 
About  the  ships  the  fight  again  waxed  hot  and  furious  ;  and  here 
it  was  a  melee,  each  man  fighting  for  himself,  so  that  the  Greeks 
had  less  advantage  either  of  discipline*  or  weapons.  And  here 
was  slain  the  Polemarch  Kallimachos,  a  man  of  great  note  on  that 
day ;  and  here,  Stesileos,  son  of  Thrasyleos,  one  of  the  ten 
generals ;  and  here,  vnih  many  other  notable  Athenians, 
Kynegeiros,  son  of  Euphorion,  but  more  remarkable  as  brother 
of  the  poet  Aischylos,  his  arm  lopped  off  with  a  battle-axe,  as  he 
grasped  the  stern-decoration  of  a  Phoenician  galley. 

The  Greeks  took  seven  triremes,  and  won  gold  and  silver  in 
heaps,*  and  wealth,  in  plate  and  garments,  unspeakable.  But 
they  won  more  than  this — they  won  their  liberty,  and  fame  im- 
mortal, fame,  even  to  this  time  unforgotten  ;  that  men  who  fight 
to-day  for  freedom, 

"  Still  point  to  Greece,  and  turn  to  tread, 
So  sanctioned,  on  the  tyrant's  head." 

Of  the  barbarians  there  had  fallen  about  six  thousand  and 

*  Plutarch,  Aristides,  V. 


92  MILTIADES. 

four  hundred  men ;  of  the  Athenians  one  hundred  and  ninety- 
two.  B'lt  severe  as  had  been  the  defeat,  and  total  the  discom- 
fiture of  the  Oriental  army,  still  the  actual  loss  of  six  thousand, 
out  of  one  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  men,  was  a  mere 
nothing  tow^ard  cripphng  them  or  putting  an  end  to  farther 
operations ;  unless  so  f^u'  as  the  moral  effect  of  the  rout  is  to 
be  considered. 

Accordingly,  so  soon  as  the  fleet  was  under  way,  it  steered 
straight  for  the  headland  of  Sunion,  now  knowm  as  Cape 
Colonna,  with  wind  and  tide  both  favoring  it,  and,  some  of  the 
ships  pausing  to  take  on  board  the  Eretrian  captives  from  the 
isle  of  ^gileia,  doubled  the  promontory,  and  made  all  sail  for 
Athens,  hoping  to  surprise  it,  empty  of  its  defenders ;  it  is  said, 
also,  having  secret  information  from  the  Alkmaionidai ;  w4iich 
last  is  not  credible,  since  it  was  they  who  expelled  Hippias.  Nor 
can  it  be  doubted,  that  the  appearance  of  the  fleet  at  that  junc- 
ture, before  the  arrival  oi  news  from  the  army,  might  have  pro- 
duced a  fatal  result,  as  the  Athenians  would  naturally  have 
supposed  their  forces  to  be  annihilated,  and,  if  they  had  not  sur- 
rendered, would  have  probably  made  but  a  weak  defence.  Mil- 
tiades,  however,  and  the  noble  troops  he  commanded  were  equal 
to  the  emergency ;  as  they  stood,  reeking  from  that  wonderful 
and  glorious  battle,  without  staying  to  rest  themsehes,  or  to 
break  bread,  wdth  their  heavy  panoply  and  great  shields,  they 
made  a  forced  march,  with  nine  tribes  of  the  ten,  and  the  Pla- 
taians,  at  their  utmost  speed — for  with  tide  and  wind  favoring, 
plying  sail  and  oar,  the  fleet  might  reasonably  be  off  the  Pha- 
lerum,  then  the  port  of  Athens,*  in  six  hours,  and  they  had  more 
than  fifteen  miles  to  march  ere  they  could  reach  it — and  arrived 
there  that  same  evening,!  and  encamped  on  the  hill  of  Kyno- 
sarges,  without  the  city,  and,  what  was  remarked  at  the  time  as 

*  Herod.  VI.,  116.  f  Plutarch,  Aristides,   V. 


AID    FROM    SPARTA.  93 

singular,  again  in  a  Herakleion,  consecrated  ground  of  Herakles. 
The  Persians  made  land  shortly  after  their  arrival,  and  cast 
anchor  in  the  roadstead,  but,  seeing  themselves  anticipated, 
weighed  again  and  made  sail  for  Asia.  One  tribe  alone,  the 
tribe  Antiochis,  was  left  to  guard  the  ground,  the  captives,  and 
the  treasui-e.  If  Athens  had  but  one  captain  who  could  deliver 
such  a  battle  as  that  of  Marathon,  she  had  but  one  man  who 
could  guard  such  a  booty,  and  that  was  Ai-istides. 

On   the   following   day,  true   to   their   word,   for  they  had 
marched  so  soon  as  the  moon  was  full,  and  with  such  speed  that 
they  performed  within  three  days  a  distance  of  a  hundred  and 
fifty  miles,  came  the  Lacedaemonians,  with  two  thousand  shields, 
to  the  rescue ;  and,  though  they  came  too  late,  wishing  to  see 
the  Medes,  they  marched  to  Marathon.     One  can  conceive  the 
joy,  the  pride,  the  pomp  of  that  procession — all  Athens  pouring 
forth  her  youth,  her  manhood,  and  her  beauty,  to  escort  those 
brave  auxiliaries,  to  that  field  of  unexampled  glory.     One  can 
imagine  how  they  were  entranced  by  the  barbaric  splendor  of 
the  camp,  the  tents,  the  spoils,  the  captured  galleys ;  ^^^th  what 
wonder,  blended  with  disgust,  they  surveyed,  now  for  the  first 
time,  the  flat  faces,  and  thick  lips,  and  woolly  heads,  of  the  black 
Ethiopians,  cold  and  stark  in  their  lion  hides  and  war  paint ; 
vnih  what  curiosity  they  turned  over  the  ox-eared  and  ox-horned 
helmets  of  the  Asiatic  Thracians  ;  how  they  proved  the  gleam- 
ing scale  armor  of  the  Pei-sians  ;  how  they  balanced  the  battle- 
axes  of  the  Sacians,  and  tried  the  edges  of  the  Colchian  scyme- 
tare.    One  cannot  doubt  how  they  were  feasted  in  the  Akropolis, 
how  the  temples  rang  with  triumphant  Pseans,  how  the  city 
smoked  with  incense.     Then  greatly  praising  the  Athenians,  and 
giving  them  great  glory  for  that  which  they  had  done,  they 
returned  home  secure  and  rejoicing. 

Here  ended  Marathon  ;  and  would  that  here  had  ended,  also, 
the  career  of  its  conqueror. 


94  MILTIADES. 

Miltiades  was  now  the  first  man  in  Athens ;  his  influence  was 
immense,  his  popularity  unbounded.  Athens  was,  in  those  days, 
poor  and  incorrupt ;  barbaric  wealth  had  not  yet  invaded,  barbaric 
luxury  not  vitiated,  Hellas  ;  so  for  his  great  reward  the  Athenians, 
iu  the  picture,  which  they  caused  to  be  painted  of  Marathon  and 
suspended  in  the  portico  called  Poikile,  the  beauteously  adorned, 
he  and  Kallimachos  were  depicted,  apart  from  the  rest,  in  the 
foreground.  Pausanias  saw  that  very  picture,  in  the  days  pro- 
bably of  the  Antonines,  with  the  battle  shown  there,  as  it  raged 
hand  to  hand,  the  Plataiaiis  and  Athenians,  side  by  side ;  and  a 
Uttle  farther  off  the  Persians  flying  and  entangled  in  the  salt 
marsh,  and  the  Greeks  slapng  them  ;  and  conspicuous  above  all 
the  combatants  KaUimachos  and  Miltiades,  and  the  hero  Echet- 
los,  whose  terrible  eidolon  the  soldiers  saw  in  the  thickest  of  the 
fray,  ^vith  his.  beard  overshado^\ing  all  his  buckler ;  and  in  the 
distance  the  Phoenician  galleys. 

But  to  return  to  the  hero  of  this  wonderful  day,  w^ho  should 
either  have  reposed  here  on  his  glory,  or  gone  on  to  things  yet 
greater,  if  greater  there  might  be — for  there  is  no'lBattle  known 
which  in  every  point  reflects  more  credit  on  its  winner,  than  this 
of  Marathon  on  Miltiades. 

But  history  must  be  written,  if  history  it  is  to  be,  truly ;  no 
place  for  partiahty,  no  room  for  prejudice. 

Availing  himself  of  his  unbounded  popularity  and  w^eight,  he 
now  asked  the  Athenians  for  seventy  galleys,  with  a  land  force 
to  correspond,  and  a  military  chest  proportionate  ;  telhng  them 
nothing  of  his  intents,  but  that  he  would  enrich  them  beyond  all  • 
their  hopes,  by  this  expedition.  And  they,  confiding  in  him 
absolutely,  and  supposing  that  he  was  about  to  foray  on  the 
maritime  cities  of  the  king,  granted  him  all  he  asked,  unques- 
tioning. Then  he  sailed  straight  to  Paros,  under  the  pretext  of 
exacting  punishment  or  ransom  from  them,  because  they  had 
served  the  Persians  against  Greece ;  but  in  reality  to  avenge  a 


REWARD    AND    PUNISHMENT.  95 

private  injury  done  to  him  by  one  of  their  citizens,  Tisagoras, 
who  had  accused  him  to  Hydarnes  the  Persian,  in  the  original 
matter,  it  is  to  be  supposed,  of  the  bridge  over  the  Danube.  Be 
that  as  it  may,  he  demanded  of  them  a  hundred  talents,  equal  to 
about  twenty-five  thousand  pounds  sterling,  which  they  refused 
to  pay,  and  thereafter  resisted  him  so  strenuously,  that,  after 
being  himself  severely  wounded,  he  was  obliged  to  draw  off  his 
army,  and  return  to  Athens,  disgraced  and  defeated. 

Here  he  was  at  once  impeached  for  malversation,  and  tried 
for  his  life.  Making  no  defence  himself,  on  the  plea  of  illness, 
he  was  brought  into  court,  wounded,  in  his  htter,  and  his  brother 
being  present  pled  his  cause  strenuously  with  the  people — so 
strenuously,  that,  although  he  was  convicted,  in  pity  for  his  fallen 
greatness,  and  in  gratitude  for  the  great  deeds  he  had  wrought 
in  the  dehverance  of  Athens,  the  capital  condemnation  was 
remitted ;  and  he  was  only  cast,  as  in  a  civil  suit,  for  the  expenses 
of  the  expedition,  which  he  had  diverted  from  the  pul^lic  service 
to  the  prosecution  of  his  own  private  animosities,,  and  the  fur- 
therance of  his  own  individual  interests.  As  great  a  crime,  cer- 
tainly, as  any  of  which  the  pubhc  servant,  however  high  in  sta- 
tion or  renown,  of  a  free  state,  can  well  be  guilty,  and  meriting 
as  severe  and  ignominious  punishment. 

Those  expenses,  amounting  to  some  fifty  talents,  half  the  sum 
which  he  had  endeavored  unjustly  to  extort  from  the  Parians,  he 
was  unable  to  pay  on  the  moment ;  and,  being  thrown  into 
prison,  he  chanced  there  to  die  of  his  wound,  which  probably 
would  have  proved  fatal  anywhere. 

It  was  a  sad  fate,  truly,  for  such  a  man,  for  such  a  captain. 
But  it  is  far  sadder,  that  a  man  who  was  capable  of  exploits  so 
noble,  should  also  be  capable  of  crimes  so  base,  as  to  render 
such  a  fate  less,  not  greater,  than  his  desert. 

Much  obloquy  has  been  heaped  on  Athens  on  his  account ; 
much  ink  has  been  spilt ;  and  much  fine  writing  wasted  there- 


96  MILTIADES. 

anent,  concerning  the  ingratitude  of  that  state  in  particular,  and 
of  democracies  in  general.  Myself,  I  have  little  faith  in  the  gi-ati- 
tude  of  governments  at  all ;  unless  gratitude  be,  as  defined  by 
the  witty  Frenchman,  a  keen  sense  of  benefits  to  come  ;  and  I 
beheve  that  democracies  are  more  hable  to  vehement  and  stren- 
uous impulses,  than  to  persistency  in  anything,  whether  good  or 
evil ;  but  all  the  outcry  in  this  case  is  futile,  unjust,  and  absurd. 
Miltiades  was  a  successful  and  victorious  soldier ;  he  was 
rewarded,  according  to  the  laws  of  his  state,  to  the  utmost — he 
wiTs  the  first  man  in  Athens.  He  was  a  bad  citizen,  almost  a 
traitor,  and  all  the  severity  and  disgrace  of  his  punishment 
was  remitted  in  memory  of  his  great  deeds  past.  Is  this  ingrati- 
tude ? 

His  character  is  summed  up  in  ten  lines. 

As  a  captain,  in  genius,  resource,  conception,  execution,  sound- 
ness of  principle,  rapidity  of  coup  d'oeil,  briUiancy  and  sudden- 
ness of  action,  he  never  had  a  superior ;  perhaps,  as  an  origin- 
ator, never  an  equal.  So  long  as  the  Greek  tactic  endured,  his 
system  was  never  improved,  never  altered — it  was  invariably 
used ;  invariably  victorious. 

As  a  man — it  must  be  said — he  was  flawed.  Wholly  unfit- 
ted to  be  a  citizen  of  a  free  state,  he  might  command  others,  but 
he  could  not  command  himself. 

It  is  not  a  little  strange,  though  true,  that  the  man  who 
fought  perhaps  the  best  fight  the  world  ever  saw  for  freedom, 
should  be  in  his  heart  a  tyrant.  But  so  it  was  ;  and  gallant  soldier 
as  he  was,  I  cannot  doubt  that  the  tyrant  of  the  Chei-soneso 
would  have  been  no  wise  loth,  had  occasion  offered,  to  vniie  him 
self  tyrant  of  Hellas  also. 


III. 

THEMISTOKLES 


HIS  SEA-FIGHT  OFF  SALAMIS,  HIS    CAMPAIGNS,  CHARACTER,    AND 
CONDUCT. 


A  king  sat  on  the  rocky  brow, 

That  looks  o'er  sea-born  Salamis; 

And  ships  by  thousands  lay  below, 

And  men  by  nations — all  were  his. 

He  counted  them  at  break  of  day, 

And  when  the  sun  set,  where  were  they  ?— Thk  Isles  of  Gkekce. 

It  cannot,  one  woulil  imagine,  have  failed  to  strike  every 
thoughtful  reader  of  the  histoiy  of  Greece,  that  there  is  some- 
thing entii-ely  peculiar,  original,  and  different  from  the  ordinary 
stamp  of  human  nature,  in  the  character  of  almost  every  one  of 
the  distinguished  citizens  of  Athens — that  marvellous  state  and 
city  which,  with  a  territory  inferior*  in  dimensions  to  a  modern 
county  of  America  or  England,  and  within  a  period  of  a  century 
and  a  half,f  performed  more  extraordinary  actions,  gave  birth  to 

*  The  territory  of  Attica  extends  from  N.  E.  to  S.W.,  about  80  miles, 
with  an  average  breadth  of  40. 

t  The  battle  of  Marathon,  whence  dates  Athens'  greatness,  was  fought 
B.C.  490.  That  of  Chaironeia,  which  destroyed  her  independence,  B.C. 
338. 


98  THEMISTOKLES. 

more  extraordinary  men,  and  produced  more  extraordinaiy  im- 
pressions on  moral  and  intellectual  humanity,  than  any  other 
nation  of  the  universe,  in  as  many  generations  as  she  counted 
yeai-s  of  existence. 

Think  of  her  citizens.  AAHbat  men!  Generals,  statesmen, 
orators,  historians,  buffoons,  tragedians,  sculptors,  rhetoricians, 
pedants,  philosophei*s,  patriots,  incendiaries,  all  in  their  hne,  the 
greatest ;  unequalled  in  the  splendor  of  their  genius  and  their 
virtues,  inimitable  in  the  depth  of  their  infamy  and  baseness ; 
various,  as  nature  hei-self,  in  genius,  character,  conduct,  concep- 
tion, principle,  it  yet  seems  to  me  that  in  one  point  only  all  were 
closely  similar ;  that  in  them,  the  seeds  of  vice  and  virtue, 
nobleness  and  dishonor,  innocence  and  infamy,  patriotism  and 
disloyalty  were  sown  more  rankly  intermingled,  and  shot  up  more 
inextricably  blended,  than  in  any  other  race  of  men  who  ever 
lived;  unless  it  be  the  French,  whom  they  most  resemble, 
during  the  brief  fury  of  the  first  revolution. 

Where  else,  in  the  history  of  the  whole  world,  shall  we  look 
for  such  prodigies,  for  instance,  of  versatility  and  genius,  of  pub- 
lic capacity  and  domestic  worthlessness,  of  political  wisdom  and 
private  folly,  of  honor  and  disgrace,  as  Miltiades,  as  Themistokles, 
as  Kimon,  as  Alkibiades,  as  any  one  of  half  a  dozen  others  who 
successively,  and  more  or  less  successfully  also,  swayed  the  for- 
tunes of  this  strange  repubhc.  England,  in  her  whole  long  career 
of  centmies,  has  produced  one  Sheridan  ;  but  these  Athenians,  in 
wit  and  wildness,  in  eloquence  and  eccentricity,  in  the  glory  of 
their  genius  and  the  grossness  of  their  debaucheries,  were  all 
Sheridans.  France — nay,  but  the  world !  since  Athens  ceased 
to  be — has  given  birth  to  but  a  single  Mirabeau  ;  and  it  is  to  be 
hoped  that,  when  she  generated  him,  she  destroyed  the  monster- 
making  matrix  ;  but  what  were  all  these,  in  the  vei-satility  both  of 
their  vices  and  their  virtues,  in  the  pollution  of  their  lives  and 
the  perfection  of  their  policy,  in  the  facility  and  indifterence  with 


INCONSISTENCY    OF    ATTIC    GENIUS.  99 

which  they  could  soar  into  the  empyrean  of  glory,  or  sink  into 
the  abyss  of  infamy — what  were  all  these,  but  so  many  earlier 
Mirabeaus  ? 

In  that  singular  and  splendid  state,  we  can  discern  everything, 
save,  with  a  single  exception,  one — for  Aristides  was  a  consis- 
tent, single-minded,  honest,  rational,  straightforward  man  and 
citizen  ;  and  it  is  for  this  reason  that  he  stands  out  in  such  bold 
and  positive  rehef,  from  the  glittering  back-ground  of  splendid 
Charlatans  and  glorious  Mountebanks,  by  whom  he  was  sur- 
rounded. Aristides  might,  in  strength,  sohdity,  steadiness,  and 
sincerity  of  mind,  judgment,  purpose  and  performance,  have  been 
an  Englishman  or  an  American — he  alone  of  all  his  people. 
And  I  know  scarce  another  of  the  age,  for  I  do  not  regard  the 
immortal  Demosthenes  as  belonging  to  that  period,  though  his 
career  actually  commenced  within  it ;  I  know  scarce,  I  say, 
another  of  the  age,  however  brilliant  his  exploits,  however  splen- 
did the  services  rendered  to  his  country,  wlio  did  not  taint  those 
exploits,  and  tarnish  those  services,  by  some  trickiness  and  indi- 
rection of  his  whole  career,  by  some  crowning  act  of  political 
baseness  and  tergiversation,  or  by  some  habit  of  daily  and 
familiar  infamy,  which  in  any  other  country  would  have  con- 
signed him  to  utter  exclusion  from  society,  much  more  from  the 
head  of  affairs,  if  indeed  it  had  not  subjected  him  to  the  direct 
censure  and  judgment  of  the  laws. 

To  this  fact,  indeed,  far  more  than  to  the  generally  alleged 
l-vity,  inconsistency  and  ingratitude  of  the  Athenian  democracy, 
is  it  to  be  attributed  that  so  many  of  the  leading  general-*  aiid 
statesmen,  so  many  of  what  are  generally  regarded  as  the  greatest 
benefactoi-s  of  Athens,  died  in  exile,  died  as  suicides,  died  by  the 
hands  of  the  common  executioner ;  and  that  so  few  escaped,  at 
some  period  of  their  career,  the  penalties  of  criminal  jurisdiction. 
I  do  not  write  thus  from  any  prejudice  in  favor  either  of  the 
people  or  the  policy  of  Attica  ;    since  I  regard  the  former,  as  in 


1 00  THEMISTOKLES. 

the  main,  a  turbulent,  instable,  and  impulsive  rabble ;  and  the 
latter  as  the  worst  form  of  government  ever  devised  by  the 
human  mind,  and  scarcely  worthy  even  to  be  called  a  govern- 
ment ;  but  simply  because  I  believe  that  there  was  a  distinct 
peculiarity  in  the  Attic  mmd,  from  the  highest  to  the  lowest 
order,  both  of  the  rulers  and  the  ruled,  which  rendered  them  all 
indisposed  to  take,  if  not  incapable  of  taking,  the  direct  road  to 
any  object ;  which  led  them  to  prefer  and  select,  as  if  of  set  pur- 
pose, the  most  tortuous  and  intricate  paths  of  intrigue,  where 
the  beaten  highroad  of  common  sense  and  honesty  would  have 
led  them  to  the  very  point  they  desired  to  gain,  with  no  sacrifice 
of  character  or  credit. 

Treachery  and  chicanery  appear,  in  a  word,  to  have  been  two 
requisites  almost  indispensable  to  the  composition  of  an  Athe- 
nian statesman,  and  although  Kimon  and  Perikles  are  clearer 
than  most  others  on  this  point,  though  both  deeply  tainted  in 
their  private  lives  with  that  moral  filth  in  which  even  the  philoso- 
phers of  Athens  were  not  ashamed  to  wallow,  still  there  is 
enough  of  obliquity  and  corruption  in  the  methods  which  they 
adopted  to  conciliate  or  secure  popularity  and  public  favor,  to 
justify  the  generalness  of  the  charge. 

And  this  appears  to  have  been  pecuharly  an  Attic  character- 
istic ;  for,  although  we  find  traitors  in  other  Hellenic  states,  and 
uiiscrupulousness  of  various  kinds  and  degrees  prevailing  in  the 
policy  of  each  and  all,  we  no  where  else  find  the  same  systematic 
hypocrisy,  duphcity  and  falsehood,  as  in  the  conduct  of  Athe- 
nian generals  and  ministers ;  and  that  too  recorded  by  their  own 
writers,  without  a  blush,  as  traits  of  laudal)le  finesse  and  states- 
manship, worthy  of  invitation. 

Nor  of  any  one  is  this  more  true  than  of  Themistokles ;  who 
but  for  this  almost  inexplicable  passion  for  the  indirect,  must 
have  ranked  as  one  of  the  greatest  men,  not  merely  generals  or 
politicians,  of  the  world. 


HIS  PARENTAGE  AND  YOUTH.  101 

Every  thing  was  in  his  favor,  nothing  was  adverse  to  his  am- 
bition, wild  as  it  might  be.  AUhough  not  properly  a  full  free- 
born  Athenian  citizen — for  although  Neokles,  his  father,  was  of 
the  tribe  of  Leontis  and  the  demus  Phrearion,  yet  he  not  a  man 
of  much  distinction,  his  mother  was  an  ahen,  some  say  from 
Thrake,  others  from  Akarnania,  and  othei's  yet  again  a  Lydian 
from  Hahkarnassos — he  began  at  a  veiy  early  age  to  interaiingle 
in  public  afFaii*s,  constantly  frequenting  the  forum  and  the  courts, 
and,  applying  himself  with  the  most  remarkable  diligence  to  all 
soi-ts  of  practical  science  and  civil  knowledge,  while  he  wholly 
discarded  the  hghter  arts  and  accomplishments  then  generally 
studied,  displayed  so  much  abihty  and  earnestness,  that  he 
speedily  drew  on  himself  general  attention,  the  first  step  toward 
notoriety  and  celebrity. 

The  rivalry  which  existed  throughout  life  between  himself  and 
Aristides,  had  commenced  already,  sharpened,  it  is  said,  while 
they  were  yet  mere  youths,  into  something  partaking  strongly  of 
personal  animosity  by  antagonism  in  love  affairs,  and  still  more, 
it  is  not  to  be  doubted,  by  the  contempt  which  a  man  of  Aris- 
tides' sohd  and  sterhng  character  must  naturally  feel  for  the 
tortuous  trickery  of  Themistokles'  entire  career,  and  which  his 
candor  as  certainly  would  not  permit  him  to  conceal. 

So  early  as  the  first  invasion  of  Greece  by  Datis  and  Arta- 
phernes  for  Darios,  the  two  rivals  were  of  the  number  of  the  ten 
generals  who  fought  at  Marathon ;  and  they  two  had  command 
of  the  Athenian  centre,  which  was  very  severely  handled,  and 
indeed  broken,  by  the  Persians  after  a  stubborn  resistance,  each 
at  the  head  of  his  own  tribe. 

Both,  of  course,  shared  the  credit  and  the  honors  of  the 
-victory,  and  obtained  a  degree  of  favor  with  their  citizens ;  but 
so  f^ir  was  this  from  satisfying  the  fierce  and  ardent  ambition  of 
the  young  j.  litician,  that  he  is  reported  to  have  exclaimed  con- 
stantly, "  that  the  trophies  of  Miltiades  would  not  suffer  him  to 


102  THEMISTOKLES. 

sleep  of  nights  ;*  and  foreseeing  fresh  troubles  and  wai-s  with 
the  Asiatics,  he  kept  himself,  as  it  were,  constantly  anointed  and 
in  training  for  the  contest,  in  which  he  already  anticipated  that 
he  should  occupy  the  prominent  position. 

At  this  period,  we  have  the  fii-st  instance  of  that  pecuHar 
obliquity  of  d'  aling  to  the  charge  of  which  his  whole  career  is 
obnoxious.  Previous  to  the  invasion  of  Darios  and  the  battle  of 
Marathon,  a  war  already  existed  between  the  Athenians  and  the 
peoj^le  of  Aigina,  the  former  desirous  of  inflicting  punishment  on 
these  for  submitting  to  the  Pereian  by  the  rendition  of  earth  and 
water  to  his  anibassadoi's.  The  rapid  and  disastrous  termination 
of  that  formidable  invasion,  and  the  immense  influence  and 
authority,  as  well  as  fame,  which  it  gave  to  the  Athenians 
throughout  Hellas,  by  no  means  induced  them  to  seek  for 
reconciliation,  or  to  discontinue  the  war.  On  the  contrary,  they 
felt  better  disposed  than  ever,  to  take  am]>le  vengeance  of  all 
who  had  been  untrue  to  the  general  cause  of  Greece. 

And  to  this  Themistokles  urged  and  incited  them  with  all  his 
exquisite  plausibility,  all  his  shrewd,  pointed  and  persuasive  elo- 
quence. Not  that  he  valued  Aigina,  her  alhance,  or  her  disaf- 
fection, at  a  pin's  fee,  but  that  he  saw  in  her,  as  being  then  the 
most  powerful  state  of  Greece  in  maritime  force,  and  in  fact  the 
mistress  of  the  seas,  an  instrument  for  the  exciting  and  main- 
taining a  war  spirit  among  the  Athenians,  for  compelling  them 
to  establish  and  keep  up  a  sufficient  navy,  and  to  support  a  large 
force,  at  all  times  in  readiness  against  any  emergency. 

It  seems,  that  he  liad  already  determined  it  to  be  the  true 
policy  of  Athens  to  constitute  lierself  a  maritime  power — which 
was  in  all  probability  the  case,  as  the  extent  of  her  territory  and 
the  character  and  avocations  of  her  inhabitants  were  not  such  as 
to  enable  her  to  cope  either  with  her  Peloponnesian  or  conti- 
nental neighbors,  in  the  number  and  efficiency  of  "ler  land  ser- 
*  Plutarch.  Themist.  4. 


PECULIARITY    OF    HIS    INTELLECT.  103 

\'ice,  which  was  defective  in  material,  both  for  light  troops, 
archers  more  especially,  and  cavahy ;  notwithstanding  that  the 
quahty  of  her  heavy  foot  was  not  to  be  surpassed  by  any,  as  had 
been  proved  already  on  the  glonous  plain  of  Marathon,  and  as 
was  shown  thereafter  in  many  a  sanguinary  conflict  both  on 
European  and  Asiatic  soil. 

All  other  politicians  at  this  period,  it  would  seem,  considered 
that  tlie  danger  of  Oriental  invasion  was  completely  at  an  end — 
the  courage  of  the  Persians  having,  as  they  argued,  been  tho- 
roughly broken,  and  their  hopes  of  success  permanently  over- 
thrown, by  the  check  they  had  encountered  from  Miltiades.  Not 
so  Themistokles.  He  was  by  far  too  good  a  judge  of  human 
nature  in  general,  and  of  the  vainglorious,  heaven-reaching  ambi- 
tion of  the  Pei-sian  king's  in  particular,  to  believe  that  the  defeat 
of  Marathon  would  have  any  other  effect  than  to  convert  what 
had  been,  in  the  first  instance,  but  a  passing  scheme  of  ambi- 
tion and  aggrandizement,  into  a  settled  purpose  of  hatred  and 
revenge. 

It  would  not,  however,  have  been  Themistokles  to  stand  forth 
manfully  and' boldly  on  the  turret- top,  hke  the  mariner,  who, 
from  the  mast-head,  peei-s  with  eager  eyes  into  the  gathering 
gloom  of  the  horizon,  where  his  experienced  eye  can  presage, 
and  his  alone,  the  brooding  of  the  tempest  that  shall  bui-st  anon 
in  wreck  and  devastation,  and  cry  to  all  the  city,  "  Sleep  no 
more !  Gird  up  your  loins,  and  belt  your  swords  upon  your 
thighs,  and  keep  your  watch  fires  burning  ;  for  lo  !  in  the  hour 
that  you  think  not  the  Pei-sian  cometh."  No  !  had  he  been  cer- 
tain that  his  words  would  have  found  ears  to  hear  him  and 
hearts  to  leap  at  his  warning,  that  coui-se  he  would  not  have 
taken.  To  convince  men  to  their  good,  seemed  to  his  acute, 
subtle,  and  casuistical  intellect  a  poor,  homely,  and  unscientific 
way  of  coming  to  his  eud.  In  order  to  be  satisfactory  to  him, 
the  result,  whatever  it  was,  at  issue,  must  be  gained  by  skill,  by 


104  THEMISTOKLES. 

craft,  by  playing  a  deep  artificial  game.  All  men,  whether 
friends  or  foes,  must  be  tricked  and  cheated — his  friends  and 
countrymen  cheated  to  their  own  good ;  his  antagonists  and  ene- 
mies cheated  to  their  rum. 

And  thus  it  was,  throughout  his  whole  career ;  he  was  per- 
petually playing  games  of  political  chess  with  whomsoever  he 
came  in  contact ;  and  it  was  his  highest  satisfaction,  his  most 
exquisite  delight,  when  he  could  see  them  squirming  and  writhing 
impotently  to  avoid  his  imminent  checkmate. 

Thus  he  induced  the  impulsive  and  improvident  populace  to 
raise  their  navy  to  two  hundred  admirable  triremes,  which  were 
the  finest  class  of  war-ships  then  in  use,  thoroughly  manned,  in 
the  most  effective  state  of  equipment,  and  with  crews  in  rigid 
disciphne  through  constant  practice.  Nay  I  he  even  obtained  a 
decree,  setting  aside  the  whole  revenue  of  the  silver  mines  on 
the  promontory  of  Laurion  for  the  expenses  of  the  navy,  and  for 
the  annual  building  of  twenty  new  galleys.  And  all  this,  with- 
out one  word  concerning  Asia,  one  hint  at  the  danger  approach- 
ing from  Persia,  Darios,  or  Xerxes.  There  Wiis  the  crowning 
rapture !  One  can  fancy,  when  the  Persian  actually  came,  and 
instead  of  empty  dockyards,  an  impoverished  treasury,  a  navy  to 
be  hastily  knocked  together  and  manned  with  slaves  and  mer- 
chant sailors,  the  wily  statesman  found  himself  with  the  finest 
and  best  manned  fleet  on  earth  in  his  command,  with  ample  sup- 
plies, and  with  all  the  sinews  of  war  strung,  and  as  it  were  case- 
hardened — one  can  fancy,  not  how  he  rejoiced  with  a  noble  and 
statesmanlike  exultation — this  is  my  doing ;  I  it  was  who  fore- 
warned my  people  of  this  peril,  wjien  it  was  yet  afar  oft'  and 
invisible,  and  they  believed  me,  and  lo !  here  we  are  prepared  to 
beat  the  peril  back — oh  no  !  But  how  he  grinned,  and  chuck- 
led, and  crowed  in  the  secret  places  of  his  cunning  heart,  that  he 
had  checkmated  his  rash  and  headstrong  fellow-citizens — tricked 
them,  sorely  against  their  own  will,  to  their  own  advantage. 


FLEET  AND  ARMY  OF  XERXES.  105 

And  so  it  was.  And  so  lie  played  many  political  chess-games 
in  his  life ;  and  checkmated  all  who  played  against  him.  But, 
like  all  men  of  his  stamp,  he  played  one  game  too  many,  and 
checkmated  himself  at  last.  For  w^hen  all  was  done,  there  was 
no  man  linng  who  could  cheat  Themistokles,  except  Themis- 
tokles. 

It  was  precisely  ten  yeare  after  the  first  unfortunate  invasion  of 
Darios,  and  the  decisive  battle  of  Marathon,  that  Xerxes,  who 
had  succeeded  his  father  on  the  Pei-sian  throne,  thouo-h  without 
either  the  fortune  or  abihty  of  his  father — after  spending  four 
whole  years  in  the  collection  of  forces  and  preparation  for  their 
armature  and  commissariat,  as  well  as  in  cutting  a  navigable 
canal  across  the  isthmus  of  Mount  Athos,  by  means  of  which  to 
avoid  the  peril  of  doubhng  that  formidable  headland,  and  the 
chance  of  such  a  disaster  as  had  befallen  the  great  fleet  of  Darios 
— set  on  foot  the  gigantic  expedition,  which  must  have  appeared 
even  to  minds  less  arrogant  and  sanguine  than  his  own,  sufficient 
to  overrun  every  territory  and  overturn  every  government  of 
Hellas,  almost  without  an  eflbrt. 

His  fleet  consisted  of  twelve  hundred*  and  seven  galleys, 
manned  by  above  five  hundi-ed  thousand  souls  ;  his  land  aiTay, 
according  to  Herodotos,f  amounted  to  one  million  seven  hundred 
thousand  fighting  men — camp-foUowers,  and  non-combatants, 
who  were  equal  probably  in  numbers  to  the  whole  force  enume- 
rated, not  included ;  and  added  to  these  eighty  thousand  admira- 
ble horse,  exclusive  of  Sagartian  and  Arabian  camel-squadrons, 
and  charioteers  from  Libya  and  India,  rated  at  twenty  thousand 
more.  With  such  a  multitude  of  combatants,  both  by  land  and 
sea,  the  Pei-sian  king  set  forth,  in  the  early  spring  of  the  fifth  year 
of  his  reign,  which  coi*responds,  according  to  the  synchronism 
of  Diodorus  Siculus,|  to  the  first  year  of  the  seventy-fifth  Olym- 

*  Herod.  VII.,  89.     Aischylos,  Persae,  34. 

t  Herod.  VII.,  60.  |  Diod.  XI.  I. 


106  THEMISTOKLES. 

piad,  archonship  at  Athens  of  Kalliades ;  to  the  two  hundred 
and  seventy-third  year  of  Rome,  twenty-ninth  year  of  the  repub- 
hc,  consulship  of  Spurius  Cassius,  and  Proculus  Virginius ;  and 
to  the  year  four  hundred  and  eighty  before  the  Christian  era. 

Thus  prepared,  he  marched  boldly  and  successfully  onward ; 
and,  with  no  losses  beyond  the  ordinary  casualties  of  so  great  a 
multitude  of  men  and  so  long  a  route,  traversed  the  wide  regions 
of  Thrace,  and  entered  the  territories  of  Continental  Greece, 
receiving  on  his  way  southward  the  submission,  and  in  most 
instances  the  alliances  of  the  Thessahans,  Dolopians,  Ainianians, 
Perrhabians — these  being  at  this  jDeriod  hardly  considered 
Greeks — and  of  the  Lokrians,  Magnesians,  Mehans,  Achaians  of- 
Phthiotis,  Thebans,  and  indeed  all  the  Boiotians  with  the  excep- 
tion of  the  Thespians  and  Plataians,  who  were  held  firm  in  then* 
allegiance  to  the  cause  of  Hellas,  by  their  gratitude  to  Athens, 
their  protectress,  and  their  inveterate  hatred  of  the  Thebans. 

To  meet  this  very  deluge  of  war-ships  and  warriors,  the 
Greeks,  divided  among  themselves  by  selfishness,  jealousy,  and 
something  of  feudal  animosity,  had  none  on  whom  they  could 
rely  but  the  kingdoms  within  the  Peloponnesos,  or  Morca  ;  and, 
without,  Athens,  with  her  allies  of  Thespiai  and  Plataia,  and  two 
or  three  small  communities  on  the  western  side  of  the  continent, 
bordering  on  the  Adriatic.  Nor,  even  among  these,  the  only 
staunch  defenders  of  liberty,  was  there  that  perfect  unanimity 
and  mutual  confidence,  which  is  the  only  safe  and  efiectual  bond 
of  strength  and  security  between  aUied  bodies* — idem  velle  atque 
idem  nolle,  ea  demum  jirma  amicitia  est — for  the  Athenians 
and  other  Greeks  to  the  northward  of  the  Isthmus  of  Corinth, 
which  was  in  process  of  fortification,  suspected,  and  as  the  event 
showed,  not  wholly  without  reason,  that  the  Peloponnesians  felt 
little  inchnation  to  risk  the  delivering  battle  without  their  own 
guarded  confines,  and  might  e^isily  be  determined,  if  they  were 
*  Sallust.  Catilina,  20. 


FIRST    MOVEMENT    OF    THE    GREEKS.  10*7 

not  so  already,  to  abandon  them  and  their  countries  to  the  first 
furious  irruption  of  the  barbaric  hordes,  whose  brunt,  at  all 
events,  they  must  encounter  foremost.  Indeed,  so  well  satisfied 
was  Themistocles,  even  earher  than  this,  of  the  impossibility  of 
defending  Attika,  or  even  the  city  of  Athens,  by  land,  that,  taking 
advantage  of  two  oracles  rendered  from  Delphi — the  one  fore- 
telling the  capture  and  conflagration  of  the  city,  the  other  declar- 
ing that,  when  all  their  other  strongholds  should  be  taken,  their 
w^ooden  walls  would  hold  out,  to  the  pi-eservatiou  of  their  children 
and  themselves — he  persuaded  the  people,  with  great  difficulty, 
to  abandon  their  fortifications,  desert  their  homes,  remove  their 
seat  of  government  to  the  isle  of  Salamis,  entrust  their  women, 
children,  and  non-combatants  to  the  kind  offices  and  good  faith 
of  the  Troizenians  and  their  Peloponnesian  neighbors,  and 
embark  all  their  fighting  men  on  board  the  two  hundred  excel- 
lent triremes,  which  he  had  induced  them  to  build,  on  the  pre- 
text of  the  war  with  the  Aiginetans. 

The  first  movement  of  the  combined  Greek  allies  was  to  send 
an  army  of  Lakedaimonian  and  Athenian  heavy-infantry,  ten 
thousand  strong,  respectively  commanded  by  Evainetus,  the  son 
of  Karenus  and  Themistokles,  by  sea  to  the  city  of  Alos,  in  Thes- 
saly,  at  the  head  of  the  Sinus  Pagasaeus,  now  the  gulf  of  Yolo, 
with  instructions  to  march  northward  to  the  valley  of  Tempe, 
and  the  outlet  of  the  river  Peneios,  now  Salambria,  and  occupy 
the  defiles  through  which  the  great  road  winds  down  from 
Makedonia,  between  the  mountains  of  Olympus  and  Ossa,  into 
the  plains  of  Thessaly  ;  where  with  the  assistance  of  the  Thes- 
sahan  cavalry,  then  the  best  in  Greece,  it  was  expected  that  they 
would  be  able  to  make  an  effective  stand  against  the  Pei-sian 
host.  After  remaining  there  encamped  a  few  days,  on  receiving 
intelligence  from  Alexander,  the  son  of  Amyntas,  advising  them 
that  the  embouchure  of  the  Peneios  was  not  defensible,  and  taither 
that  the  position  could  be  turned  by  the  pass  of  Gonni,  some  ten 


108  THEMISTOKLES. 

or  twelve  miles  to  tlie  southwestward,  they  broke  up  from  their 
position,  and  retm-ning  to  their  ships,  made  the  best  of  their  way 
to  the  Hellenic  head-quarters,  on  the  Isthmus.  And,  thereupon, 
the  Thcssalians,  having  indeed  no  alternative,  as  thus  abandoned 
by  their  alhes,  submitted  to  the  Persians,  and  adopting  theu- 
alliance,  heartily  and  in  good  earnest,  proved  themselves  right 
serviceable  men  in  action. 

Thereafter,  it  was  determined  by  the  Greeks  to  defend  the 
narrow  pass  of  Thermopylai,  lying  between  the  precipitous  crags 
of  Mount  Oita,  on  the  left,  and  the  waters  to  the  right  of  the 
Sinus  Mahacus,  or  Gulf  of  Zituni ;  a  pass,  which  scarcely  ad- 
mitting the  transit  of  a  single  chariot,  at  two  different  points  of 
the  defile,  at  that  time — for  the  ground  has  been  greatly  altered 
in  the  lapse  of  ages,  by  the  deposit  of  the  river  Spercheios,  and 
the  consequent  encroachment  of  the  land  on  the  sea — was 
tenable  by  a  mere  handful  against  a  host.  Thither,  then,  an 
advanced-guard  consisting  of  three  hundred  Spartans,  a  thousand 
Tegeatians  and  Mantineans,  eleven  hundred  and  twenty  Arka 
dians,  four  hundred  Korinthians,  two  hundred  and  eighty 
Mykenaians  and  Phliuntians,  seven  hundred  Thespians  and  four 
hundred  Thebans,  the  last  unwilling  as  secretly  friends  to  the 
Persians  and  under  compulsion ;  in  all  four  thousand  four  hun- 
dred hoplitai  of  Peloponnesians,  with  a  thousand  Lokriaiis, 
Opuntians,  and  Phokians,  inhabitants  of  that  district,  were  thrown 
forward  to  hold  the  enemy  in  check,  and  to  give  courage  to  the 
allies  by  demonstrating  the  good  faith  of  the  Greeks  within  the 
Isthmus. 

It  appears  that  the  Persian  armament  had  even  outstripped 
the  anticipation  of  the  Hellenes,  for  it  was  by  no  means  intended 
that  this  small  band  should  be  opposed  to  the  vast  hordes  of 
Xerxes;  on  the  contrary  the  whole  Peloponnesian  force  was 
destined  to  support  them,  so  soon  as  the  religious  festival  of  the 
Karneia  at  Sparta  and  the  Olympic  games,  then  both  in  process 


FLEET    OF    THE    GREEKS.  109 

of  celebration,  should  permit  the  marching  of  the  reinforcements. 
What  is  more  singular  than  this  miscalculation  is,  that  to  no  one 
of  all  the  assembled  nations,  gathered  in  council  of  war,  at  tho 
Isthmus,  was  the  existence  known  of  a  practicable  route  through 
an  elevated  valley  to  the  west  of  Thermopylai,  by  which  the 
position  of  the  defendei-s  might  be  easily  turned  by  the  left  flank, 
and  themselves  attacked  in  the  rear. 

At  the  same  time,  with  this  advanced  guard,  the  Hellenic 
fleet,  consisting  of  one  hundred  and  twenty-seven  Attic  triremes, 
manned  by  Athenian  citizens,  and  twenty  more  with  Chalcidean 
crews,  with  a  hundred  and  twenty-four  others  furnished  by  the 
Peloponnesian  confederates,  forty  of  which  were  Korinthians,  and 
the  remainder  made  up  by  the  small  contingents  of  inferior  states, 
amounting  in  all  to  two  hundred  and  seventy-one  sail  of  war- 
ships, besides  twelve  pentecontei-s,  or  long  single-banked  vessels, 
pulled  by  fifty  oars  on  one  range,  took  post  at  Artemision,  the 
northern  promontory  of  the  Island  of  Euboia,  now  Egripo,  at  the 
mouth  of  the  strait  di\dding  it  from  the  mainland,  lying  over 
against  the  gulf  of  Volo,  to  the  northward,  and  nearly  opposite 
to  the  station  of  the  land  forces  at  Thermopylai,  toward  the 
southwest. 

There,  almost  as  soon  as  they  arrived,  they  encountered  Xerxes 
and  his  host,  the  land  forces  occupying  the  plains  beyond  the 
pass,  about  the  rivers  Melas  and  Asopos,  and  the  fleet  twelve 
hundred  and  seven  galleys  strong,  anchored  ofi"  Aphetai  or 
Trikhiri,  the  eastern  headland  at  the  mouth  of  the  gulf  of  Volo, 

And,  here,  so  strenuously,  and  with  such  stern  and  steady 
resolution  did  Leonidas,  the  Spartan  king,  defend  the  defiles, 
that  had  the  confederates  from  the  Isthmus  come  up  in  time 
with  reinforcements,  enabling  him  to  occupy  the  upper  pass  of 
Anopaia  Avith  a  sufiicient  body  of  Peloponnesians,  there  can  be 
little  doubt  that  Xerxes  would  have  been  arrested  at  this  point 
and  have  returned  foiled  and  disappointed  into  Asia. 


110  TIIE.MISTOKLES. 

I  am  not  writing*  the  life  of  Leonidas,  nor  have  I  anything  to 
do  with  the  battle  of  Thcrmopylai,  otherwise  than  as  it  is  neces- 
sarily connected  with  the  events  which  followed  it ;  for,  although 
as  a  soldier  and  a  hero,  the  Spartan  king  is  unsurpassed  if  not 
unequalled  through  all  time,  and  as  a  display  of  valor  and  self- 
devotion  the  struggle  in  the  pass  is  inimitable,  yet  neither  had 
the  chieftain  an  opportunity  of  exerting  any  strategetical  talents 
which  he  might  possess,  nor  was  the  action  remarkable  for  any 
thing,  but  the  immovable  courage  and  constancy  of  the  Greeks. 

The  result  is  known  to  the  world.  A  ^lelian  traitor,  Ephialtes 
by  name,  betrayed  the  upper  pass  of  Anopaia  to  Xerxes,  and 
guided  Hydarnes  with  the  ten  thousand  Persian  immortals  by 
the  ravines  Oita,  round  their  left  flank  to  the  rear  of  the  Greeks ; 
this  movement  being  known  to  Leonidas,  he  dismissed  all  his 
forces,  except  his  own  three  hundred  Spartans,  who  had  all 
devoted  themselves  with  him  to  death,  the  four  hundred  Thebans 
whom  he  had  detained  unwilling  hostages,  and  seven  hundred 
Thespians,  who  refused  to  leave  their  captain,  preferring  such  a 
death  to  ignoble  safety.  The  Phokians,  who  had  been  detached 
to  defend  the  upper  pass,  failed  of  then-  duty,  the  Immortals 
forced  the  defile,  the  Spartans  and  Thespians  were  slain  to  a  man, 
the  Thebans  laying  down  their  arms  at  the  first  onset,  and  the 
pass  of  Thermopylai  was  carried ;  but  with  such  terrible  carnage 
of  the  Orientals  as  reixlercd  their  success  more  similar  to  defeat 
than  to  victory.  It  were  useless  to  debate  the  utihty  or  moral 
propriety  of  such  a  sacrifice  at  the  present  day ;  inasmuch  as 
modern  ideas,  both  of  expediency  and  duty,  are  utterly  at 
variance  with  those  of  the  ancients,  and  more  especially  with 
those  of  the  Spartans.  It  cannot,  however,  be  doubted,  that  in 
very  many  instances  the  desperate  defence  of  untenable  posts  by 
self-devoted  handfuls,  has  proved  the  preservation  of  armies, 
nay,  even  of  nations,  by  giving  time  for  the  bringing  up  of  rein- 
forcements ;  for  the  matming  of  plans,  and  for  the  organizing  of 


LEON  ID  AS    AT    THERM  OP  V  LAI.  HI 

large  and  general  operations.  These  could  not,  however,  have 
been  the  principles  on  which,  in  this  case,  Leonidas  acted ;  for 
he  well  knew,  before  dismissing  the  main  body  of  his  forces,  that 
110  reinforcement  was  on  the  way,  or  could  by  any  chance  come 
up  in  season  to  make  good  or  recover  the  disputed  pass. 

This  notion  of  duty,  then,  was  founded  partly  on  the  princi- 
ple of  obedience  to  the  Spartan  laws,  which  declared  flight  from 
the  field  to  be  the  last  disgrace,  as  death  upon  it  was  the  highest 
glory,  of  the  citizen ;  pai-tly,  on  the  necessity  of  setting  a  gi-eat 
example  of  constancy  and  devotedness  to  the  hesitating  and  ter- 
ror-stricken nations  of  Hellas  ;  and  partly,  on  the  desire  of  win- 
ning immortal  glory  for  himself  and  his  companions  in  arms. 
x\nd,  if  it  wTre  so,  his  object  was  gained  from  point  to  point — ■ 
the  obedience  to  the  law^s  was  granted,  even  by  his  rigid  coun- 
trymen, to  be  perfect  as  it  was  marvellous ;  the  example  was  fol- 
lowed imphcitly  so  long  as  a  Persian  stood  on  the  sacred  soil  of 
Greece ;  the  glory  has  been  so  far  immortal,  that  now,  after  the 
lapse  of  well  nigh  four  and  twenty  centuries,  the  memory  of 
Leonidas  lives  as  freshly,  and  his  bays  flourish  as  greenly,  the 
wide  world  over,  as  they  did  then  through  the  brief  confines  of 
narrow  Hellas. 

Two  monuments  were  erected  over  their  ashes,  buried  on  the 
spot  where  they  fell — monuments  nobler  than  trophies,  even  as 
then*  defeat  and  death  were  grander  than  any  victory — one,  to 
the  memory  of  those  who  died  fighting,  their  flank  not  yet 
turned,  in  the  hope  of  victory ;  the  other  above  those  who 
remained  to  die,  when  not  a  hope  was  left  save  of  an  honorable 
death.  Their  epitaphs  run  thus,*  preserved  by  Herodotus,  who 
was  himself  almost  their  contemporary,  rendered  literally  from 
the  Greek  Hexameter  and  Pentameter  into  the  heroic  couplet — 
of  the  fii-st, 

*  Herod.  II.,  228. 


112  themistoki.es. 

"  Here  did  we  fight  with  Persian  millions  three, 
Peloponnesians,  twice  two  thousand,  we." 

And  of  the  second,  sacred  to  the  three  hundred  only, 

"  Go  tell  the  Spartans,  friend,  that  here  we  lie, 
Obedient  to  their  laws,  which  bade  us  die." 

And  this  latter  one,  it  is  to  be  presumed,  gives  us  as  nearly  as 
possible,  the  true  sentiment  and  spirit  of  those  true  self-sacrificing 
heroes.  There  is  yet  another  splendid  tribute  to  their  memory, 
in  the  form  of  a  brief  elegy  by  the  jDoet  Simonides,  so  beautiful  in 
phraseology,  and  withal  so  terse  and  pointed,  that  I  would  fain 
here  embody  it,  but  that  my  limits,  as  well  as  the  strict  observ- 
ance of  my  proper  subject,  admonish  me  to  abstain. 

In  the  meantime,  the  Greek  and  Persian  fleets  had  encoun- 
tered thrice ;  and,  after  some  hard  fighting,  had  been  thrice  sepa- 
rated by  nightfall,  with  no  very  decided  advantage  to  either  party. 
In  the  first  place,  indeed,  beholding  the  Straits  and  the  whole 
surface  of  the  Gulf  of  Volo  covered,  so  far  as  the  eye  could  reach, 
with  the  tall  and  splendid  triremes  of  the  Phoinikians  and  Sido- 
nians,  crowded  with  fighting  men,  and  bearing  down  on  them  to 
offer  action,  the  Greeks,  as  was  in  no  wise  wonderful,  were  dis- 
mayed and  confounded  at  sight  of  the  desperate  odds  which  they 
had  to  meet,  in  seas,  too,  so  open  in  their  idea,  though  the  straits 
were  not  above  ten  miles  in  width ;  and  had  almost  determined 
on  retreating  to  the  isthmus,  where  they  might  take  advantage  of 
narrower  waters,  in  which  they  might  better  cope  with  the  vast 
navy  of  the  Asiatics.  And,  here,  was  first  brought  into  play, 
during  the  actual  imminence  of  warftire,  the  singular  obliquity 
of  mind,  and  proneness  to  deceit  and  stratagems  of  all  kinds, 
which  I  have  mentioned  as  the  leading  characteristic  of  the  Athe- 
nian commander. 

The  Euboians,  it  seems,  had  discovered  the  purpose  of  the 
Greek  captains  to  withdraw  their  fleet,  from  the  watei-s  of  Euboia, 


BRIBE    OF    THE    EUB0IAN9.  113 

witliiii  Cape  Suiiion  and  into  the  Saroiiic  gulf;  and,  dreading 
the  consequences  of  being  thus  abandoned  to  the  fury  of  tho 
Persian,  besought  Eurybiades  the  Lakedaimonian,  who  had  been 
appointed  commander-in-chief  at  the  instance  of  the  alhes — who 
were  from  jealousy  reluctant  to  serve  under  the  Athenians — that 
he  would  at  least  tariy  until  they  could  place  their  children  and 
families  in  security.     On  his  refusal,  they  bribed  Themistokles 
the  leader  of  the  Athenians,  with  the  great  sum  of  thirty  talents 
— in  round  numbers  thirty-five  thousand  dollai-s — to  await  the 
enemy,  and  dehver  battle  off  the  coast  of  Euboia.    He,  receiving 
the  money  nothing  loth,  set  himself  forthwith  to  gratify  the 
Euboians ;  for  indeed  he  was  from  the  first  well  incHned  to  fio-ht 
had  he  not  been  over-ruled ;  and  this  he  effected  by  purchasino- 
the   opinion  of  Eurybiades  at   the  price  of  five,   and  that  of 
Adeimantos  the  Korinthian,  of  three  talents,  which  he  gave  as 
presents  on  his  own  account,  and  which  his  colleagues  beUeved 
to  be  furnished  to  that  end  by  the  Athenians.     They  tarried, 
therefore,  and  gave  battle,  Themistokles  quietly  pocketing  the 
remainder  of  the  enormous  prize,  and  probably  consoling  himself 
in  the  idea  that  his  conduct  was  unimpeachable,  inasmuch  as  he 
had  only  accepted  money  for  doing  that  which  he  had  previously 
resolved  to  do,  if  possible,  as  most  to  the  advantage  of  his  own 
country ;  perhaps  he  went  so  far,  in  his  self-justification,  as  to 
convince  himself  that  it  was  by  means  of  the  bribe  alone  that  he 
was  enabled  so  to  serve  his  country,  and  that  the  taking  of  it 
was,  therefore,  not  excusable  only,  but  highly  virtuous  and  patri- 
otic.    Nor  do  I  well  know  why  he  should  not  have  succeeded 
in  so  convincing  himself;  since  such  is  the  argument,  neither 
more  nor  less,  which  a  brilhant  and  plausible  historian*  of  our 
own  day  adduces  in  defence  of  Algernon  Sidney ;  who  took  bribes 
from  Louis  the   Fom-teenth  of  France,  in  order  to   carry  on 

♦  Macaulay,  Hist,  of  England.     Charles  II. 


114  THEMISTOKLES. 

intrigue,  against  the  ministry,  and  to  embarrass  and  frustrate 
the  poHcy  of  his  own  government. 

As  afterwards  at  Salamis,  so  now,  the  Persians,  seeing  that  the 
Greeks  would  abide  them,  and  eager  in  their  confidence  of  tri- 
umph near  at  hand,  sent  off  two  hundred  triremes,  with  ordei-s 
to  round  the  island  of  Skiathos  to  the  northward,  to  circum- 
navigate Euboia,  and  to  interpose  themselves  between  the  Gre- 
cian fleet  and  its  harbors,  with  a  view  of  cutting  it  off  in  its  anti- 
cipated flight — not  intending  themselves  to  fight  until  signals 
should  be  made  them  that  their  own  galleys  were  in  the  enemy's 
rear.  But  hi  this  they  were  frustrated,  again,  by  the  judgment 
of  Themistokles  ;  who  had,  not  without  difficulty,  persuaded  the 
Hellenic  leaders,  almost  unanimous  before  to  receive  the  enemy's 
onslaught,  that  it  were  wiser  to  sail  out  and  assume  the  offensive 
without  delay. 

There  is  little  doubt  that  this  wily  and  accomplished  leader 
was  perfectly  acquainted  with  the  extraordinary  and  unaccount- 
able changes  and  seasons  of  the  tide — or  current  rather,  since  the 
Mediterranean  is  all  but  tideless — as  they  prevail  in  those  nar- 
row watei-s ;  and  that  he  so  chose  his  hour  of  attack  that  the 
rush  of  water  "  which  changes  its  direction  many  times  a  day 
like  the  wind,"  as  Livy  expresses  it,  "  from  one  point  to  another, 
and  is  hurried  along  like  a  torrent  tumbling  from  a  steep  moun- 
tain," should  be  advei-se  to  the  manoeuvres  of  the  lofty  and 
unmanageable  vessels  of  the  Persian.  In  the  first  onset,  the 
Greeks  took  and  sunk  thirty  sail  of  the  eneni}^,  and  made  pri- 
soner Philaon  the  son  of  Chersis,  nephew  of  Gorgos,  king  of  the 
Kyprian  Salamis — a  man  of  considerable  repute — but  when  the 
fleets  joined  in  close  action,  and  the  encounter  was  hand  to  hand, 
both  parties  suffered  heavy  mutual  loss,  and  fighting  stm'dily, 
with  no  thought  of  flight,  were  separated  only  by  night,  "  that 
common  comforter  of  weary  and  dismantled  armies." 
^    That  hve-long  night,  the  thunder  roared  over  the  whole  vault 


THE    STORM.  115 

of  heaven,  which  was  alive  with  hghtnings  flashing  from  the  top 
of  Pelion ;  and  the  rains  descended  insatiate,  and  the  winds 
lashed  the  sea  into  fury,  fighting  for  the  Athenians,  even  as  the 
tempest  and  the  ocean  fought  for  England,  on  that  Christmas 
night  when  Hoche's  armament  was  dispersed,  never  to  be  com- 
bined again,  which  had  anchored  at  sunset  in  Bantry  bav, 
already  in  their  hopes  victorious.  The  triremes,  which  had  been 
sent  round  on  the  outside  of  Euboia,  were  caught  helpless  by  the 
tempest,  hard-jammed  upon  a  lee-shore,  were  driven  in  upon  the 
breakers  and  the  craggy  coast,  where  they  perished  with  their 
crews,  almost  to  a  man ;  while  the  corpses  and  the  fragments  of 
the  wrecks  were  drifted  into  the  Persian  anchorage  ofFAphetai, 
where  they  whirled  in  the  eddies  about  the  prows,  and  hampered 
the  oar-blades  of  the  barbarians,  filhng  their  minds  with  present 
awe,  and  presages  of  future  ruin.  On  the  following  day  the 
Greeks  were  reinforced  by  fifty-three  new  Athenian  galleys ;  and 
cheered  by  this  accession  to  their  strength,  as  well  as  encouraged 
by  previous  successes,  they  again  stood  out  from  Artemision,  at 
the  same  season  of  the  tide,  and  falhng  on  the  Kilikian  squadron, 
which  they  handled  pretty  roughly,  but  still  without  accomplish- 
ing any  thing  decisive,  fought  until  it  was  quite  dark,  when  they 
returned  once  again  to  their  moorings  off  the  promontory.  On 
the  third  day,  indignant  at  finding  themselves  held  in  check  so 
long,  and  by  so  mere  a  handful,  and  dreading  the  vrvath.  of 
Xerxes,  the  Persians  no  longer  awaited  the  attack  of  the  Greeks, 
but  weighing  all  at  once,  bore  down  on  them  in  a  vast  semicircle, 
with  its  wing's  thrust  forward  so  as  to  turn  both  their  flanks  and 
envelope  them.  But,  at  the  same  instant,  the  Athenians  met 
them  midway,  and  the  battle  waxed  fm-ious,  and  was  maintained 
with  dogged  o])stinacy  until  nightfall,  the  loss  being  very  great 
and  neai-ly  equal  on  both  sides ;  for  the  very  size  and  numbei-s 
of  the  enemy  embaiTassed  them,  faUing  on  board  each  other  and 


116  THEMI8TOKLE8. 

giving  rise  to  confusion  worse  confounded,  so  that  they  derived 
no  advantage  from  their  superiority. 

On  these  three  very  days,  the  conflict  was  raging  by  land  also 
in  the  defiles  of  Thermopylai,  with  the  same  object,  and  for  a 
while  with  the  same  result;  the  Persians  in  either  position 
striving  to  force  the  passes  by  dint  of  superior  numbers,  the 
Greeks  resisting  and  debarring  their  further  ingress,  and  at  fii'st 
with  absolute  success.  But  that  same  evening  tidings  were 
brought  to  the  leaders  of  the  fleet,  how  that  the  Persians  had 
turned  the  position  of  Thermopylai,  by  the  left,  and  how  dis- 
missing the  aUies,  Leonidas  had  fallen  worthily  of  his  royal 
parentage,  and  of  his  warlike  country ;  and,  their  own  position 
being  in  like  manner  turned  and  rendered  untenable  by  the 
advance  of  the  barbarians,  whom  there  was  now  no  possibility  of 
checking  to  the  northward  of  the  Isthmus,  they  fell  back  in  good 
order  to  Salamis,  where  they  were  again  in  communication  with 
their  land-forces,  and  in  readiness  to  act  in  concert  with  them  for 
the  defence  of  the  Peloponnesos.  Before  he  retreated,  however, 
Themistokles,  still  as  ever  intent  on  stratagem,  ran  in  with  the 
best  sailers  of  his  squadron,  to  the  mouths  of  the  rivers  in  search 
of  drinking  water ;  and  landing  there,  caused  inscriptions  to  be 
carved  on  various  stones,  which  were  left  scattered  here  and  there 
for  the  purpose  of  being  found  by  the  enemy  on  their  advance. 
These  were  addressed  to  the  lonians  in  the  Persian  service, 
exhorting  them  to  remember  their  Hellenic  parentage,  and  to 
make  common  cause  with  their  natural  friends  and  kinsmen, 
against  the  common  enemy  of  Greeks  and  lonians ;  or,  should 
that  prove  impossible,  at  least  to  misconduct  themselves  in  action, 
bearing  it  in  mind  that  the  Athenians  had  fii*st  incurred  the 
resentment  of  the  king,  in  consequence  of  their  friendly  aid, 
freely  rendered  to  the  lonians  of  Miletos. 

And  in  this  stratagem  there  was  a  double  craft,  a  sharpness 
cutting,  as   it  were,  on  both  edges  ;  first,  if  it  might  be,  and 


FIRST    STRATAGEM.  117 

chiefly,  to  prevail  upon  the  Kanans  and  lonians  to  revolt  from 
the  king,  which  he  was  well-assured  they  had  good  will  to  do, 
were  they  not  enforced  to  obedience ;  secondly,  if  that  device 
should  be  useless,  to  render  them  suspect  to  Xerxes,  and  so 
throw  the  germs  of  jealousy  and  discord  into  the  camp  of  the 
enemy. 

On  this,  finding  himself  master,  both  by  sea  and  land,  of  the 
long  contested  straits,  though  at  a  fearful  cost  of  hfe,  for  at 
Thermopylai,  twenty  thousand  men  lay  dead  in  the  bloody 
defiles,  and  between  shipwreck  and  slaughter  not  less  than  fifty 
thousand  more  had  fallen  around  Artemision,  Xerxes  prepared 
to  advance  into  the  interior.  But  first,  after  performing  a  deed 
so  unworthy  as  the  mutilation  of  the  corpse  of  the  hero  Leonidas, 
by  cutting  of  his  right  hand  and  head,  as  it  was  the  Persian 
custom  to  do  with  rebels,  he  concealed  the  e^'idences  of  the  heavy 
loss  he  had  sustained,  burying  all  his  dead,  with  the  exception 
of  a  thousand,  whom  he  left  on  the  plain,  together  with  the 
bodies  of  the  slaughtered  Greeks,  until  they  should  be  seen  by 
the  crews  of  the  fleet,  whom  he  caused  to  land  and  survey 
the  scene  of  his  recent  triumph.  Yet  the  stratagem  availed  him 
nothing ;  for,  although  he  had  ordered  the  earth  from  the  pits 
and  trenches  to  be  cast  into  the  sea,  that  their  whereabouts  should 
not  be  betrayed  by  the  mounds  above  them,  and  the  disturbance 
of  the  soil  to  be  masked  by  heaps  of  dead  leaves  scattered  on  the 
surface,  the  deceit  was  too  palpable  even  for  oriental  credulity ; 
when  they  saw  the  thousand  Persian  corpses  lying,  as  they  had 
fallen,  scattered  here  and  there  about  the  little  plain  of  Anthela, 
just  without  the  pass,  while  the  Greeks,*  to  the  number  of  four 
thousand,  all  lay  piled  together  in  one  heap  of  carnage,  for 
there  were  many  helots  among  them,  who  were  readily  distin- 
guished from  the  citizens  of  Thespia  and  Plataia,  being  in  all  but 
a  thousand  men.  And  this  fact  would  seem  to  show  that  at 
*  Herod.  VIII.  25. 


118  THEMISTOKLES. 

Thermopylai,  there  was  even  a  larger  proportion  of  these  light- 
armed  slaves,  than  subsequently  at  Plataia,  v^'here  seven  were 
allotted  to  each  Spartan ;  for  it  is  probable  that,  in  the  three 
consecutive  days  of  victory,  the  number  slain  of  the  Greek 
Hoplitai  must  have  been  entirely  inconsiderable,  not  exceeding, 
to  take  the  average  of  their  losses  as  against  the  light-armed 
orientals,  fifty  or  a  hundred  men  ;  and  this  would  require  nearly 
three  thousand  helots  to  make  up  the  tale  of  the  Hellenic  dead. 
During  that  day  the  fleet  was  deserted,  all  crowding  to  glu* 
their  eyes  with  the  bloody  spectacle,  but  on  the  following  morn 
ing,  the  mariners  returned  to  Histaia,  a  city  of  Euboia,  situate  a 
little  to  the  west  of  Artemision,  wiiere  the  Persian  na\y  had 
fixed  its  head-quarters  after  the  retreat  of  the  Greeks  to  the 
Isthmus ;  and  the  land-forces  broke  up  from  their  encampment, 
and  poured  down  on  the  lower  country,  like  a  deluge,  devastating 
and  laying  waste  all  the  lands,  and  burning  all  the  temples, 
villages,  and  cities,  far  and  near,  except  within  the  territory  of  the 
Boiotians,  who,  from  hatred  to  the  Athenians,  had  joined  the 
bai'barian  to  a  man.  One  division,  conducted  and  urged  on  by 
the  Thessahans,  who  had  an  old  grudge  against  the  Phokians, 
broke  through  the  gorge  of  the  Asopus,  into  the  valley  of  the 
Kephisus,  burning  every  town  they  entered,  but  finding  no  in- 
habitants, on  whom  to  wi-eak  their  vengeance.  All  had  fled,  old 
and  young,  male  and  female,  to  the  wild  and  cloud-capped  sum- 
mits of  Parnassos.  A  second  band  marched  direct  on  Delphi, 
with  especial  orders  from  the  king  to  plunder  the  rich  treasury 
of  all  its  hoarded  stores,  its  golden  ingots,  vases,  statues,  tripods, 
consecrated  to  the  God  through  ages.  But  when  these  were 
involved  in  the  dim  and  twilight  passes  of  the  mountain,  among 
the  solemn  gloom  of  pine  forests  and  thickets  of  wild  bay,  with 
the  strange  din  of  subterranean  waters  and  headlong  cataracts 
thmidering  around  them,  and  the  superstitious  awe  of  the  dread- 
ful sanctity  of  the  spot,  the  dark  religio  loci,  ovei*shadowing  their 


ATTACK    ON    DELPHI.  119 

souls,  a  fearful  tempest  burst  above  them  with  continuous  bel- 
lowing of  thundei-s,  reverberated  fi'om  the  craggy  summits,  and 
vivid  flashes,  and  fiery  balls  shooting  above  their  heads ;  while, 
to  complete  their  consternation,  an  earthquake — no  rare  occur- 
rence in  that  hmestone  region,  though  now  attributed  to  the 
immediate  action  of  Apollo — shook  the  hills,  that  two  mighty 
fragments,  severed  from  the  twin  summits  of  Parnass  s,  came 
crashing  down,  among  the  riven  and  roaring  forests,  and  plunged 
into  their  serried  masses,  crushing  and  maiming  many,  and  turning 
all  to  panic-stncken  and  disordered  flight.  Then  di-eadful  voices, 
and  shouts  mightier  than  human,  pealed  forth  from  the  Korykian 
cave  with  a  clang  as  of  immortal  arms — for  in  that  haunted 
grotto,  and  the  pathless  woods  and  crags  ai-ound  it,  the  whole 
population  of  Delphi  lay  concealed,  with  the  exception  of  sixty 
men  who  abided  in  the  temple  with  the  Prophet.  And  when 
these  saw  the  terrified  barbarians,  into  what  an  ecstacy  of  terror 
they  had  fallen,  they  rushed  down  upon  them  from  the  moun- 
tain, rolling  great  stones  and  trunks  of  trees  from  the  precipices, 
and  hurling  shafts  and  javelins  into  their  ranks,  amid  the  storm 
and  lightnings,  until  the  Persians,  in  the  abject  terror  of  their 
hearts,  swore  that  they  saw  two  gigantic  heroes,  armed  in  proof, 
pui-suing  them  with  ruthless  slaughter.  And  these  the  Delphi- 
ans  said  were  the  phantasms  of  Autonoos  and  Phylakos,  indi- 
genous heroes  of  the  place,  who  had  their  shrines,  this  by  the 
Kastahan  fountain  under  the  summit  Hyampeia  of  Parnassus, 
that  by  the  roadside,  above  the  temple  of  Athene  Proneie.  The 
third  di\ision,  which  was  in  truth  the  main  body,  under  the  com- 
mand of  Xerxes  in  pei-son,  passed  through  Boiotia,  sparing  the 
country  as  being  received  by  the  inhabitants  with  submission  and 
proffered  alliance,  destroying  only  Thespia  and  Plataia,  into 
Attika,  which  they  devastated  from  end  to  end,  cutting  down  the 
ohve  trees  and  vineyards,  killing  the  cattle  even  to  the  smallest 
domestic  animals,  and  burning  all  from  the  private  villa,  and  the 


1-0  TH-MISTOKLES. 

smallest  hainlct,  to  tlie  city  itself,  with  the  Acropolis,  whicli  he 
took  by  a  coup-de-raain,  after  a  long  siege,  with  the  handful  of 
men  who  defended  it,  the  only  citizens  of  Attika,  who  fell 
into  his  power.  The  rest,  either  before  the  battle  of  Artemision, 
or  after  the  return  of  the  fleet  to  Salamis,  had  taken  refuge,  some 
in  the  island  of  Aginse,  some  in  the  smaller  isle  of  Salamis,  and 
some  in  Troizene  of  the  Peloponnesos,  where  they  were  received 
hospitably,  a  daily  allowance  of  provision-money  being  assigned 
to  them  with  public  lodgings,  and  permission  to  gather  of  the 
vintage  at  their  pleasure. 

Salamis  is  a  small  rocky  island,  now  called  Colouri,  situate  at 
the  inmost  extremity  of  the  Saronic  gulf,  now  the  gulf  of  Eghina, 
which  it  nearly  bare  from  each  side,  lea^dng  only  two  narrow  straits 
between  either  extremity  and  the  main  land  of  Attika  and 
Megara,  communicating  with  an  interior  bay,  completely  land- 
locked, about  ten  miles  in  breadth  by  half  that  length  inland. 
The  isle  itself  is  ruo^o^ed  of  surface,  in  the  form  of  an  irreo-ular 
narrow  horse-shoe,  its  outer  circumference  being  about  eighteen 
miles,  and  its  width  varying  from  three  to  five.  It  contained  at 
this  period  three  cities,  the  principal  of  which  was  of  the  same 
name  with  the  island ;  and  some  of  its  ruins,  with  traces  of  walls 
four  miles  in  circumference,  and  remains  of  a  temple,  supposed 
to  be  that  of  Aias,  exist  to  the  present  day ;  but  all  the  more 
elevated  portions  of  it  were  clothed  to  the  very  top  of  its  rugged 
and  craggy  hills,  with  a  luxuriant  growth  of  pine  trees — ^whence 
its  ancient  name  Pityusa.  Thus  shaped,  it  lay  close  off  the 
coast  of  Attika,  opposite  to  Eleusis,  and  due  west  from  the  triple 
harbor  of  Piraeus,  Munychia  and  Phaleron,  at  about  six  miles 
distant,  and  having  Megara  about  equi-distant  to  the  eastward. 
The  isle  of  Aigina  lay  to  the  south,  in  the  middle  of  the  bay, 
within  ten  miles,  its  splendid  temple  of  Jupiter  Panhellenios  and 
the  towering  cliffs  of  the  tall  mountain  behind  it,  in  view. 

Here,  then,  in  that  small  and  sheltered  bay  the  confederate 


THE    STRAITS    OF    SALAMIS.  121 

Greeks  still  lay,  having  put  in  thither  on  their  retui-n  from  Arte- 
mision,  for  the  purpose  of  taking  off  those  of  the  Athenians  who 
had  been  left  within  the  city ;  and  here,  it  was  at  once  clear  to 
the  mind  of  the  Athenian  leader,  that  battle  could  be  delivered 
by  the  Greeks  with  the  most  advantage,  since  the  advantage  of 
numbers  on  the  part  of  the  Persians  would  be  so  far  neutralized 
by  the  narrowness  of  the  scene  of  action  that  they  would  be 
enabled  to  bring  up  no  more  ships  in  line  at  once  than  could 
be  met  prow  to  prow  by  the  Hellenic  fleet.  Not  such,  how- 
ever, was  the  opinion  of  the  other  leaders,  especially  of  Eurybi- 
ades,  the  commander-in-chief,  and  Adeimantos  the  Corinthian 
captain.  These  argued  that  to  give  battle  in  the  bay  or  the 
straits,  Attika  being  already  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy, .  would 
be  in  the  last  degree  impolitic,  since,  in  the  event  of  a  defeat, 
they  had  no  retreat  except  the  isle  of  Salamis,  on  which  they 
could  be  easily  blockaded,  and  forced  to  unconditional  surrender. 
They  proposed,  therefore,  to  remove  to  the  Isthmus,  on  which 
their  land  forces  were  already  collected,  and  which  they  were 
rapidly  fortifying,  and  there  to  fight,  having,  in  the  worst  view 
of  affairs,  the  whole  of  the  Peloponnesos  on  which  to  fall  back. 

Themistokles  well  knew,  however,  that  if  once  they  retired  to 
the  isthmus,  the  confederates  would  rapidly  disperse  to  their 
respective  cities,  and  that  all  regular  and  organized  resistance  to 
the  Persian  would  at  once  be  at  an  end.  He  argued,  therefore, 
earnestly,  vehemently,  and  eloquently — for  he  was  a  powerful 
speaker,  and  the  best  and  strongest  feeling-s  of  his  nature  were 
aroused.  Delicacy  was  needful  also,  for  he  dared  not  allude  to 
his  distrust  of  the  Peloponnesian  confederates,  and  his  argument 
was  necessarily  limited  to  the  military  advantages  of  the  one 
station,  and  disadvantages  of  the  other  ;  since,  by  fighting  at  the 
Isthmus,  they  would  be  compelled  to  engage  in  the  open  sen, 
where  they  might  be  surrounded  by  the  enemy's  ships,  and 
overwhelmed  by  numbers,  the  rather  that  they  were  duller  sail- 
6 


122  THEMISTOKLES. 

ers — ^^cfQvziouL — than  the  Phoinikian  and  Sidonian  war-ships 
of  the  king. 

Eurybiades  appears  to  have  been  a  cold,  cautious,  calculating 
leader,  but  top-full  of  that  overweening  pride  and  assumption, 
which  was  characteristic  of  the  Lakedaimonians — to  him,  there- 
fore, Themistokles  was  obHged  to  preserve  an  air  of  deference 
and  almost  of  humihty,  by  which  he  in  a  great  degree  concili- 
ated his  good  will ;  but  when  Adeimantos  the  Corinthian 
taunted  him,  that  "  he,  a  man  without  a  city,  should  presume  to 
advise  men  of  free  states" — for  Athens  was  in  the  hands  of 
Xerxes,  and  the  ruins  of  the  Akropohs  were  still  smoking  in 
plain  view  of  the  fleet — his  natural  impetuosity  burst  out,  and 
he  exclaimed  proudly  and  fiercely,  that  the  Athenians  had  a  city, 
and  the  best  city  of  all  Hellas,  too,  for  the  present  service,  their 
good  two  hundred  galleys,  with  which  they  were  present  there, 
to  fight  the  battle  of  all  Greece;  and  m  which,  should  the 
Greeks  desert  them,  they  would  embark  all  the  citizens,  their 
famiUes,  and  treasures,  and  sail  away  to  Siris,  in  Italy,  which 
had  belonged  to  them  of  old,  and  where  they  would  plant  a  col- 
ony that  should  be  to  them  a  new  Athens.  iVnd  this  threat  for 
a  while  decided  them.  But  when  the  great  armament  of 
Xerxes  came  into  view,  augmented  by  the  accession  of  the 
Malian,  Dorian,  Lokrian,  and  Boiotian  contingents,  and  by  rein- 
forcements from  Karystos,  Andros,  Tenos,  and  other  of  the  Greek 
islands,  so  that  it  was  more  numerous  than  that  which  had 
fought  at  Artemision,  consternation  again  fell  upon  the  Greeks, 
and,  after  a  long  and  stormy  debate,  they  determined  to  weigh 
in  the  morning,  and  sail  by  the  western  strait  along  the  coast  of 
Megara  for  the  Isthmus,  leaving  the  Athenians  only  with  the 
Megarenses  and  Aiginetans  to  defend  Salamis  and  Megara. 
Then  it  was  that  Themistokles  had  recourse  to  his  fomous  strata- 
gem, by  which,  in  the  event,  he  saved  Greece,  though  he  might 
♦  Herodotus  VIII.,  60. 


THE    SECOND    STRATAGEM.  123 

almost  as  readily  have  lost  it  by  the  same  device.  He  had  a 
Persian  in  his  service,  by  name  Sikinnos,  as  tutor  to  his  children, 
and  as  usual  a  slave.  By  this  man  he  sent  a  message  a<?ross  the 
straits  to  Xerxes,  who  lay  at  the  Phaleron,  coming  from  himself, 
as  if  he  were  disaffected  to  his  country,  and  desirous  of  serving  the 
king — to  the  effect  that  the  Greeks  were  about  to  fly  to  the  Isth- 
mus, and  that  if  he  desired  to  crush  them  at  a  blow,  for 
they  were  all  in  a  state  of  panic  and  confusion,  and  incapable  of 
resistance,  he  would  do  well  to  suri-ound  the  passes  of  the  island, 
and  prevent  their  egi-ess.  Xerxes  believed,  and  so  promptly  did 
he  act — for  conti'ary  to  the  prudent  advice  of  Artemisia,  he  had 
determined  to  deliver  battle — that  he  caused  all  his  ships  to  put 
out  at  once,  although  it  was  already  night,  and  blockaded  both 
the  straits,  and  landed  a  strong  Persian  force  on  the  httle  islet  of 
Psittaleia,  on  which  he  expected  that  many  wrecks  of  the  enemy 
would  be  driven.  And  all  this  was  accomphshed  with  such 
celerity,  that,  while  the  council  was  yet  in  session,  news  of  the 
movement  was  brought  to  Themistokles  by  his  personal  and 
poUtical  enemy,  Aristides,  whose  ostracism  he  had  procured  of 
old,  but  who  had  now  returned  to  serve  his  ungrateful  country 
in  her  extremity,  and  in  the  greatness  of  his  noble  nature  set 
aside  all  individual  feeUngs,  and  co-operated  heart  and  hand  with 
his  gallant  antagonist  and  rival.  To  him  Themistokles  commu- 
nicated his  stratagem,  and  on  meeting  his  approbation,  requested 
him  to  carry  the  intelligence  to  the  assembled  leaders,  for  that 
they  would  not  beheve  himself,  but  would  suppose  it  to  be  a  ruse 
for  the  prevention  of  their  departure.  But  still  there  was  doubt 
and  dismay  among  the  Greeks — for  the  greater  part  of  the  lead- 
ei*s  were  incredulous,  until  a  Tenian  ship  came  in  ;  a  deserter 
from  the  Pei-sian  fleet,  confirming  the  tidings  which  Aristides 
brought,  he  having  only  escaped  capture  with  difiiculty,  as  he 
came  in  a  row-boat  from  Aigina. 

It  cannot  well  be  doubted  that  this  strange  trick  of  Themis- 


124  THEMISTOKLES. 

tokles  was  played  in  good  faith  to  his  country,  and  this  is  estab- 
lished by  his  confession  of  it  to  Aris tides ;  yet  it  is  not  easy  to 
believe,  especially  when  we  consider  the  habitual  double-deahng 
of  the  man,  and  the  termination  of  his  career,  that  it  was  not  in 
some  degree  actuated  by  the  desire  of  obtaining  Xerxes'  good 
will  and  favor,  in  the  event  of  an  unfavoi-able  issue. 

The  next  morning,  however,  terminated  all  discussion,  for  with 
the  early  dawn,  the  Persian  navy  sailed  in  through  the  straits, 
bore  down  upon  the  Greeks,  who  were  drawn  up  in  hue  to 
receive  them,  the  Athenians  on  the  right  toward  Eleusis,  and  the 
Peloponnesians  on  the  left,  towards  Phaleron. 

The  number  of  the  Greek  triremes,  according  to  Herodotus, 
amounted  to  three  hundred  and  eighty,  including  the  Tenian 
ship,  and  another  a  Samian,  which  had  deserted  at  Artemision, 
although  in  his  enumeration  of  the  different  nations  who  were 
engaged,  he  does  not  come  up  to  that  amount  of  galleys. 
Aischylos,  on  the  other  hand,  who  was  himself  present  in  the 
action,  and  who  greatly  distinguished  himself,  asserts  that  the 
v/hole  force  of  the  Hellenes  was  three  hundred,  with  ten  of 
superior  swiftness  added  ;  while  that  of  Xerxes  was  one  thousand, 
with  two  hundred  and  seven  of  unusual  speed,  and  selected  for 
that  quality  from  the  rest,  agreeing  in  this  precisely  with  Hero- 
dotus, who  states  expressly  that  this  was  the  number  which  sailed 
from  Persia,  in  the  first  instance,  and  that  after  the  shipwrecks  and 
losses  at  Artemisium,  it  was  furnished  to  the  original  number  by 
the  accession  of  the  Greeks  who  had  medizcd^  as  the  phrase  went, 
or  those  who  had  joined  the  party  of  the  invaders.  This  coinci- 
dence on  one  point,  renders  the  difference  on  the  other  more 
strikino^,  and  althouo;h  Herodotus  is  a  most  coi'rect  and  veracious 
historian,  I  incline  in  this  instance  to  give  more  credit  to  the 
Tragedian,  as  having  been  present  under  arms  on  the  occasion, 
and  as  giving  all  the  details  of  the  battle,  modestly  and  truth- 
*  Herodotus,  VIT.  89.  VIII.  i6.  f  ^schylus  Persoe,  34Q. 


NUMBERS    OF    THE    PERSIANS.  125 

fully  with  no  poetical  inflation,  or  paitizan  exaggeration.  The 
following  are  his  words,  which  although  attributed  in  the  tragedy 
to  a  Persian  messenger,  seem  to  bear  something  of  a  personal 
character : 

This,  then,  know  surely.     The  barbaric  host 
In  force  of  ships  prevailed.     For  of  the  Greeks 
Ten  thirties  were  the  sum,  and  ten  beside 
Select.     But  Xerxes,  for  I  know  it  well, 
A  thousand  ships  conamanded,  and  yet  more, 
In  swiftness  all  surpassing,  hundreds  twain     • 
And  seven.     So  runs  the  tale. 

In  any  event,  the  superiority  of  the  Persian  in  numbei-s  was 
so  extraordinaiy,  that  the  boldest  might  well  have  despaired,  and 
that  every  advantage  of  position  became  necessary  to  equalize 
the  conflict.  At  the  first,  as  the  Persians  entered  the  bay  and 
bore  down  upon  the  Greeks,  the  latter  retreated  tow^ard  the  shoal 
waters  at  the  head  of  the  bay,  expecting  to  gain  something  by 
the  change  which  is  not  easily  discernible  at  present ;  but  it  may 
have  been  done  in  order  to  cause  the  Orientals,  rowing  rashly 
onward  as  if  in  triumphant  pursuit,  to  break  their  order,  if  they 
had  any,  and  to  attack  one  by  one  in  hurry  and  confusion.  If 
this  were  the  design  it  was  decidedly  successful,  for  the  barbaric 
triremes  kept  no  array  or  order  of  battle,  nor  sailed  or  fought,  as 
Herodotus  has  it,  on  any  principle,  or  with  any  show  of  intellect 
and  reason ;  yet  they  fought  better  iar  and  more  stubbornly 
than  on  the  three  pre\ious  days  at  Artemisium,  for  shame  and 
emulation  spurred  them  on,  and  to  these  powerful  incitements 
the  fear  of  punishment  was  added,  for  upon  a  spur  of  the  moun- 
tain Aigaleos,  projecting  into  the  sea  opposite  to  Salamis,  sat 
Xerxes  on  his  golden  throne,  with  a  royal  canopy  above  him, 
scribes  crouching  around  him  with  their  books  wherein  to  inscribe 
the  names,  tie  countries  and  the  cities  of  the  trierarchs  or  cap- 
tains of  galleys  who  should  distinguish  themselves  in  the  engao-e. 


126  THEMI3TOKLE8. 

ment,  and  if  he  were  like  to  prove  a  munificent  rewarder  of  merit 
and  valor,  it  was  no  less  certain  that  he  would  mercilessly  visit 
on  the  heads  of  delinquents,  the  penalty  of  failure,  as  if  it  were 
Qecessarily  the  consequence  of  misconduct  and  poltroonery — and 
all  along  the  mountain  ridges  of  the  mainland,  spectators  from 
the  Akropohs,  from  the  rocky  brow  of  thePnyx,  from  the  heights  of 
the  Areopagos,  the  far-famed  hill  of  Mars,  westward  so  far  as  to 
Eleusis,  glittered  the  gorgeous  masses  of  the  army,  with  all  their 
bravery  of  many  colored  banners  fluttering  in  the  sea-breeze, 
with  the  rich  magnificence  of  oriental  garments,  and  the  gleam 
of  gilded  armature,  beholding  every  incident  of  the  encounter,  as 
if  fi-om  the  rows  of  an  amphitheatre,  acknowledging  every  deed 
of  valor  by  shouts  that  seemed  to  rend  the  very  skies,  and  sym- 
pathising even  to  tears  with  the  disasters  of  their  countrymen. 

It  is  stated  by  Plutarch,  that  Themistokles  avoided  engaging 
until  the  hour  arrived  when  a  brisk  sea-breeze  was  always  wont  to 
blow,  bringing  in  through  the  straits  a  heavy  and  broken  surge, 
which  embarrassed  the  tall  Pei*sian  vessels,  with  their  castellated 
sterns  and  elevated  decks,  driving  them  on  board  one  and  anothei', 
atid  drifting  them  so  as  to  expose  their  defenceless  sides  and 
quarters  to  the  beaks  of  the  Hellenic  triremes ;  and  this  may 
perhaps  explain  the  temporary  retreat  of  the  Greek  squadron. 
How  the  battle  commenced  is  not  perfectly  clear,  since  the  Aigin- 
itans  assei't  that  one  of  their  ships  first  turned  upon  the  enemy ; 
while  the  Athenians  claim  that  honor  in  behalf  of  Ameinias,  the 
brother  of  the  poet  Aischylos,  who  at  the  close  of  the  day 
obtained  the  prize  proclaimed  for  the  n^ost  vahant;  and  this 
appears  the  more  probable,  as  we  find  him  repeatedly  named 
by  Herodotus  and  Plutarch ;  while  his  brother,  in  the  Persians, 
ascribes  the  first  attack  to  an  Athenian  ship  on  a  Phoinikian, 
which  coincides  precisely  with  the  account  of  Herodotus,  who 
states  that  Ameinias,  of  the  tribe  of  Pallene — Plutr.rch  says  of 
Dekeleia — went  about,  and,  running  on  board  an  enemy's  ship, 


8EA    FIGHT    AT    SALAMig.  127 

got  foul  of  her  so  that  the  rest  of  the  fleet  were  compelled  to 
bring  to,  and  come  to  close  action,  in  order  to  relieve  him.  It  is 
certain  that  the  Athenians  and  Aiginetans,  on  the  extreme  right 
of  the  Greek  fleet,  came  into  action  first ;  which  can  only  be  ex- 
plained by  supposing  the  Phoinikian  galleys  opposed  to  them 
to  have  greatly  outsailed  the  other  Orientals ;  since  the  left  wing, 
consisting  of  the  Peloponnesians,  extending  eastward  toward  the 
Piraios  and  the  strait  between  Salamis  and  Attika — by  which  it 
would  seem  probable  that  the  Persians  entered  from  the  Phaleron 
— would  have  been  much  nearer  to  the  enemy ;  unless,  indeed,  the 
Phoinikians  had  been  detached  to  guard  the  bay  of  ISIegara,  and 
so  entered  by  the  western  strait,  rounding  the  headland  of  Nisaia, 
and  came  at  once  in  contact  with  the  right  wing  and  the  Athe- 
nians. It  was  not  long,  however,  before  the  Lakedaimonians 
were  closely  engaged,  also,  ^^^th  the  lonians,  who  attacked  on 
the  side  of  the  Piraios,  and  the  action  was  carried  on  with  the 
utmost  spirit  on  both  sides.  It  was  then  that  Amenias  and 
Sosides  at  the  same  moment  ran  into  the  opposite  broadsides  of 
the  great  ship  of  the  Persian  admiral,  Ariamenes*  or  Ariabig- 
nesf — for  authorities  differ  as  to  his  name — the  best  and  bravest 
of  the  brothers  of  Xerxes,  from  w^hich  the  archers  and  javelineers 
shot  and  darted  as  from  a  lofty  fortress  ;  and  these  two  driving 
their  brazen  beaks  into  its  ribs,  boarded  it,  fighting  hand  to  hand 
with  their  long  spears,  and  bore  the  admiral  himself  overboard 
into  the  sea,  where  he  was  drowned;  so  that  his  body  was 
swept  along  with  fragments  of  wreck,  and  being  recognized  by 
A.rtemisia,  was  carried  to  Xerxes,  after  the  close  of  that 
bloody  day. 

This  was  not,  however,  the  mode  of  fighting  generally  adopted 

/  the  Greeks,  whose  triremes  for  the  most  part  were  manned 

only  with  eighteen  fighting  men,  four  of  whom  were  archers, 

and  the  rest  hoplitai,  so  that  it  was  not  for  their  advantage  to 

*  Phil.  Themist  XIV.  f  Herod.  VIII.  39. 


128  THEMIST0KLE9. 

corae  to  close  quarters.  They  depended,  therefore,  on  their  supe- 
rior seamanship  and  the  rapidity  of  their  evolutions,  shattering 
the  unwieldy  ships  of  the  enemy  with  the  violent  onset  of  their 
sharp  beaks,  and  throwing  them  into  confusion  and  disorderly 
flight. 

Some  of  the  Peloponnesians,  however,  purposely  behaved 
amiss  from  ill  will  to  the  Athenians  and  Themistokles,  but  not 
many ;  and  not  a  few  of  the  Pereians  conducted  themselves  with 
honorable*  spu-it  and  valor,  even  to  the  capturing  or  sinking  sev- 
eral of  the  Greek  triremes,  the  crews  of  which  for  the  most  part, 
except  those  who  were  killed  or  wounded  in  the  conflict,  escaped, 
by  swimming  to  the  shores  of  Salamis.  Among  these  Theo- 
mestor,  son  of  Androdamas,  and  Phylakos,  the  son  of  Histiaios, 
Samians,  both  captured  the  ships  opposed  to  them  ;  the  former 
of  whom  was  made  tyrant  of  Samos,  for  his  deeds  on  that  day, 
and  the  latter  w\^  entitled  benefactor  of  the  king,  in  the  Pei-sian 
tongue  Orosanges,  and  endowed  with  large  territories.  Artemi- 
sia also,  queen  of  Halikarnassos  and  the  island  of  Kos,  so  con- 
ducted herself  that  she  extorted  from  Xerxes  the  exclamation, 
that  their  women  on  that  day  were  men,  and  their  men,  women  ; 
and  this  by  a  singular  and  somewhat  treasonable  stratagem ;  for 
being  so  closely  pui-sued  by  Ameinias  that  she  had  no  chance  of 
escape,  a  reward  of  ten  thousand  drachm le  having  l^een  oflered 
for  her  head  by  the  Athenians,  and  so  thickly  crowded  the  fugi- 
tives ahead  of  her,  she  put  up  her  helm  and  run  her  beak 
directly  amidships  into  the  trireme  of  Dama^ithumos,  king  of 
the  Kalynaians,  which  went  down  at  once  with  all  its  crew,  not 
one  of  whom  escaped  to  tell  the  tale.  Ameinias  seeing  this, 
supposed  her  ship  to  be  either  a  Greek  or  a  deserter  from  the 
king,  and  so  bore  up  and  discontinued  his  pui-suit;  while  Xerxes, 
on  the  other  hand,  beheving  the  sunken  vessel  to  be  a  Greek, 
gave  her  great  praise  and  honor  for  the  deed.  In  the  midst  of 
the  conflict,  ag.^in,  a  Samothrakian  vessel  ran  down  and  sank  an 


SEA    FIGHT    AT    SALAMIS.  129 

Athenian  sliip,  and  was  hei-self,  iu  turn,  run  down  by  an  Aigin 
etan, — when  the  Samothrakian  crew,  being  javelineei-s  and  bow- 
men, vastly  superior  in  numbei-s  to  the  Greek  fighting  men,  over- 
whelmed them  with  missiles,  and  making  themselves  masters  of 
the  vessel  which  had  destroyed  their  own,  came  off  scatheless. 
The  greater  number,  however,  of  the  Greek  ships,  captured  or 
disabled,  were  retaken  by  their  countrymen ;  as  was  the  case  of 
the  Aiginetan  guardship  of  the  isle  of  Skiathos,  which  being 
taken  by  a  Sidonian  vessel,  was  with  her  captor,  jointly  pursued 
by  Themistokles,  in  his  flag-ship,  and  by  Polykritos,  the  son  of 
Krios  ;  and  was  recovered  by  the  latter,  who  thus  saved  the  life 
of  Pytheas,  the  son  of  Ischenor,  her  commander,  who  was  pri- 
soner to  the  Pei*sians,  and  by  them  condemned  to  a  cruel  death, 
in  vengeance  for  his  resolute  resistance. 

After  a  fierce  conflict  between  the  leading  squadrons  of  the 
Asiatics  and  the  Greek  triremes,  in  which,  though  they  fought 
long  and  stubbornly,  the  former  were  completely  outmanoeuvred, 
shattered,  and  dismantled  by  the  sharp  onslaughts  of  the  bi-azen 
beaks,  the  Persians  turned  to  fly  ;  and  from  that  instant  all  was 
lost,  all  was  over,  but  the  wild  confusion  and  the  ruthless  carnage. 
For  as  the  leading  ranks  of  the  van  turned  to  fly,  the  rear  had 
come  rushing  up  through  the  narrow  straits,  before  a  fresh  breeze 
and  following  sea,  and  in  those  narrow  passes  they  fell  prow  to 
prow  into  their  own  retiring  galleys ;  so  that  they  shattered  one 
another,  and  were  ultimately  wedged  together  into  one  helpless 
weltering  mass,  upon  which  their  swift  and  active  enemy  did 
fearful  execution.  The  vessels  of  the  Aiginetans  had,  moreover, 
taken  advantage  of  the  blind  and  reeling  fury  of  the  tumult  to 
get  below  the  enemy,  and  taking  post  in  the  throat  of  the  straits 
toward  Phaleron,  were  ready  to  intercept  them,  when  they  should 
turn  to  flight ;  and  thus  the  Athenians,  shattering  with  their  beaks, 
the  prows  of  those  who  still  resisted,  and  thundering  down  upon 


130  THEMISTOKLES. 

the  sterns  of  those  who  fled,  and  the  Aiginetans  cutting  theni  off" 
as  they  strove  to  escape,  the  defeat  and  slaughter  were  signal 
and  decisive. 

How  decisive,  is  evident  from  the  fact,  that  Xerxes,  although 
his  land-forces  were  entire,  unbroken,  encouraged  by  victory,  and 
fierce  for  renewed  action ;  and  his  fleet,  terribly  beaten  and 
shattered  as  it  had  been,  still  probably  superior  in  numbei-s  to 
the  whole  Hellenic  power ;  perceiving  how  completely  all  his  forces 
of  both  services  were  demorahzed  and  spirit-broken  by  the  result 
of  that  disastrous  day,  gave  up  all  thoughts  of  proceeding  with 
his  design  of  conquest,  and  gave  order  for  immediate  retreat, 
fearing  that  the  Greeks  might  anticipate  him  and  break  the 
bridges  of  the  Hellespont,  by  which  alone  he  could  make  good 
his  escape  into  Asia.  As  it  may  be  agreeable  to  my  readers  to 
compare  the  prose  account  of  this  remarkable  and  splendid  sea- 
fight,  which  in  its  magnitude,  completeness,  and  greatness  of 
ulterior  consequence,  is  in  no  respect  inferior  to  Actium,  Lepanto, 
or  Trafalgar,  with  the  poetical  narrative  of  the  great  tragedian 
who  was  an  eye-witness  and  participator  in  the  glories  of  the 
day,  I  have  thought  well  to  subjoin  a  translation  of  the  follow- 
ing fine  passage  from  the  Persians  of  Aischylos. 

What  time  the  morning  with  her  steeds  of  light 
Had  climbed  the  sky  and  filled  with  radiance  clea* 
The  universal  earth,  a  cheering  shout 
Of  bold  defiance  from  the  Greeks  arose, 
Hymning  their  battle  anthems  ;  and  the  voice 
Of  answering  echo  from  the  island  rock 
Sent  back  the  thrilling  clamor.     Deep  dismay 
Fell  on  the  Persians  in  their  hopes  deceived ; 
For  not  as  flying  did  the  Hellenes  chaunt 
Their  solemn  paeans,  but  with  souls  afire 
Fierce  rushing  to  the  fight.     The  trumpets'  breath 
Inflamed  all  hearts  to  glory,  and  their  oars 
Cleft  the  rough  billows  with  harmonious  sweep. 
Nor  long  the  pause,  'ere  seen  distinct  and  clear 


THE    TERSIAXS.  13] 

Their  squadrons  hove  in  view — the  right  wing  first, 
With  serried  ranks  well  nnarshalled,  and  hard  after 
On  came  the  fleet.     Then  loud  and  long  upwent 
The  nfiighty  clamor,  "  Sons  of  the  Greeks,  arise  ! 
"Strike  for  your  country's  freedom,  for  your  wives, 
"  Your  children,  for  the  temples  of  your  Gods, 
"The  graves  of  your  forefathers  !  now  strike  home  ! 
"  The  contest  is  for  all."     Nor  pealed  the  while 
In  fainter  accents  from  the  Persian  host 
Their  roar  of  battle.     Doubt  was  not,  nor  fear. 
But  ship  to  ship  with  shock  of  brazen  beaks 
Was  urged  incessant — first  a  Greek  trireme 
Razed  the  tall  bulwarks  and  the  carven  pride 
Of  a  Phoinikian  ship  ;  then  through  the  hosts 
Each  against  other  drave  his  trirem©  strong : 
And  first  the  mighty  flood  o'  the  Persiari  fleel 
Sustained  the  onset,  but  anon  the  throng 
Of  their  own  numbers,  in  the  strait  confused, 
Wrought  tumult  to  themselves  and  disarray. 
Nor  each  his  neighbor  aided ;  but  the  beaks 
And  arrowy  prows  of  brass  their  groaning  sides 
Ungovernably  smote,  and  brake  their  oars. 
Meantime  the  Hellenic  ships  with  constant  charge 
Thundered  around  them,  that  the  foamy  surge 
Was  covered  by  the  broken  hulls  o'erset 
Of  sinking  galleys,  not  a  wave  to  see 
For  drifting  wrack  and  weltering  warriors  slain. 
The  sea-beat  shores,  the  reefs  were  piled  aloft 
With  armed  carcases.     The  barbarous  host 
No  longer  strove,  but  in  disordered  flight 
Rowed  wildly  onward,  while  the  avenging  foe 
Slew  them,  like  tunnies  in  the  meshy  toils 
Enveloped,  and  with  broken  oars  and  spars 
Of  shattered  vessels,  beat  the  flyers  down. 
And  smote  and  slaughtered.     Havoc,  and  despair, 
And  lamentation  o'er  the  deep  prevailed, 
'Till  night's  dim  eye  closed  o'er  the  glooming  sea. 

And  this,  I  doubt  not,  is  as  true  a  picture  of  the  scene  as  evei 


132  TIIEMISTOKLES. 

was  drawn  by  the  pen  of  poet.  And  yet  it  would  seem,  from 
other  accounts,  that  the  strife  was  over  at  an  earlier  hour.  Since 
the  Athenians  had  time  to  land  a  body  of  hoplit.'ii,  under  Aris- 
tides,  on  the  island  of  Psittaleia,  and  cut  off  to  a  man  the  Per- 
sians who  had  been  landed  on  it,  in  view  of  a  widely  different 
termination;  and  after  that,  to  secure  such  of  the  wrecks  as 
floated  toward  Salamis,  where  they  anchored  and  repaired 
damages,  so  that  they  were  perfectly  ready  to  renew  the  action, 
if  as  they  hoped,  the  king  would  again  offer  battle. 

Xerxes,  moreover,  even  in  the  midst  of  his  vexation  and  dis- 
tress, found  opportunity  to  make  such  demonstration  of  intending 
to  prosecute  the  war,  as  prevented  the  Athenians  from  taking 
meiisures  to  intercept  his  escape,  and  actually  began  making 
preparations  to  throw  a  mole  across  the  strait  to  Salamis,  though 
he  had  indeed  no  thought  but  to  fly  on  the  instant,  and  that 
with  all  speed. 

But  when,  at  dawn  of  the  following  day,  the  Greeks  saw  that 
the  army  still  held  its  ground  about  Athens,  they  rejoiced,  as 
thinking  to  find  the  fleet  off  the  Phaleron,  and  sailed  out  at 
once  in  order,  eager  to  deliver  battle.  But  the  ships  were  gone, 
Xerxes  having  entrusted  his  children  to  the  charge  of  the  brave 
queen  Artemisia ;  and  though  the  Greeks  chased  so  far  as  to  the 
isle  of  Andros,  they  never  got  sight  of  a  sail.  And  here,  indeed, 
the  campaign,  and  the  military  career  also  of  Themistokles, 
terminated ;  for  when  he  proposed  that  the  confederates  should 
at  once  sail  to  the  Hellespont,  and  break  the  bridges,  so  that,  as 
he  expressed  himself,  they  might  capture  Asia  in  Europe,  the 
other  Greeks  overpowered  his  opinion,  on  the  ground  that  it  was 
dano-erous  to  reduce  an  enemy  yet  so  powerful  to  the  necessity 
of  finding  valor  in  despair,  and  fighting  not  for  conquest  but 
existence.  And  he  again  had  recourse  to  his  characteristic 
trickery,  scinding  Sikinnos  once  again  to  Xerxes,  with  a  message 
to  the  effect  +bat  ^.e,  Themistokles,  had  prevailed  with  the  Grpokji 


THE    THIRD    STRATAGEM.  133 

not  to  break  the  bridges,  as  wishing  well  to  the  king,  and  ad\'ised 
him  to  make  the  best  of  his  way  back  to  Asia,  or  ere  he  should 
be  pursued  in  force ;  and  this,  as  he  represented,  to  get  rid  of  him 
the  quicker. 

After  this,  on  the  return  of  the  fleet  of  the  Isthmus,  Xerxes 
having  already  fled  with  the  bulk  of  his  forces,  nearly  the  whole 
of  whom  perished  before  reaching  the  Hellespont,  of  fatigue, 
pestilence  and  famine,  leaving  Mardonios  only  with  three  hundred 
thousand  men,  rather,  as  Herodotus  conceives,  to  cover  his 
retreat  than  to  effect  any  thing  real  toward  the  subjugation  of 
Greece ;  the  prizes  of  valor  were  ascribed,  among  the  states,  to 
the  Aiginetans  ;  among  the  men  to  Polykritos  of  JEgina,  and  to 
Ameinias  of  Pallene,  and  Eumenes  of  Anagyrasis,  both  Athe- 
nians. But  to  Themistokles,  of  the  leaders,  the  highest  honors 
were  assigned  by  general  consent ;  and  afterwards,  on  his  visiting 
Sparta,  by  invitation,  an  olive  wreath  was  presented  to  him  as 
the  wisest  of  captains ;  and,  on  his  departure,  he  received  a  gift 
of  the  finest  chariot  in  Lakedaimon,  and  was  escorted  over  the 
frontiers  by  a  guard  of  honor  of  three  hundred  Spartan  nobles, 
mounted  in  war  array — a  tribute  of  merit  never  paid  before  or 
after  to  any  citizen  by  that  stern  and  rigid  people. 

It  would  be  well,  if  the  life  of  Themistokles  had  terminated 
here  ;  for,  though  all  the  remainder  of  it  was  marked  by  talent 
and  sagacity,  not  inferior  to  what  he  had  already  displayed,  it 
was  all  tainted  with  deceit,  trickery,  and  baseness,  and  closed, 
I  fear,  in  treason.  His  first  course,  was  under  the  pretext  of 
punishing  the  islanders  who  had  Medized  to,  and  of  levying  a 
fund  for  the  maintenance  of  future  ware  against  the  Persians,  to 
enrich  himself  by  pillage  and  extortion,  the  most  barefoced  and 
atrocious  ;  and  he  did  this  to  such  an  extent,  that,  after  his  exile 
and  the  transference  of  the  greater  part  of  his  property  to  Asia, 
there  were  still  found  and  confiscated  above  eighty  talents,  equal 
to  about  eighty-five  thousand  dollars,  when  before  the  war  he 


1 34  THEMIST0KLE9. 

had  possessed  barely  three  thousand.  It  is  true,  he  prevented 
the  iniquitous  attempt  of  the  Lakedaimonians,  to  keep  Athens  in 
a  subordinate,  if  not  subject  state,  by  opposing  the  rebuilding  the 
fortifications  demolished  by  Xerxes ;  but  this  was  effected  by  a 
degree  of  chicanery  and  falsehood,  which,  though  it  may  in 
some  sort  be  paUiated  by  the  necessity  of  the  case,  and  the  ill- 
faith  of  Laced ?emon,  in  no  light  redounds  to  the  credit  of  the 
tricky  diplomatist  who  planned  it. 

Shortly  thereafter,  his  open  corruption  and  overbearing  arro- 
gance of  demeanor,  as  if  assuming  the  whole  merit  of  Xerxes' 
defeat,  together  with  the  growth  of  the  opposite  faction  in  the 
state,  led  to  his  ostracism,  or  temporary  banishment;  during 
which  he  remained  at  Ai-gos ;  until  the  manifest  treason  of  Pau- 
sanias  being  discovered  at  Sparta,  and  himself  imphcated  in  it, 
as  appeared  from  the  private  papers  of  the  Spartan  leader,  he 
was  pursued  both  by  the  Lakedaimonians  and  Athenians  with 
such  rancor,  that  he  escaped,  not  without  difficulty,  to  the  Asi- 
atic continent;  where  he  was  received  with  the  warmest  and 
most  honorable  welcome  by  the  king,  who  indeed  used  him  as  a 
private  and  familiar  Mend  and  associate,  and  allotted  to  him  the 
revenues  of  three  royal  cities  for  his  maintenance.  Here  he 
resided  several  years  in  luxury  and  ease,  till  Artaxerxes  planning 
a  new  expedition  for  the  conquest  of  Greece,  and  summoning 
Themistokles  to  advise  with  him,  and  aid  him  in  his  enterprise, 
the  vns,e  and  wily  Greek  died,  just  in  time  to  spare  his  memory 
the  charge  of  overt  and  armed  treason ;  as  Herodotus  writes,  by 
poison,  self-administered ;  but  as  Thucydides  beheves,  to  whom 
I  attach  more  faith — not  as  more  honest,  but  as  less  credulous — 
of  disease  engendered  by  the  disappointment  of  his  vanity,  the 
frustration  of  his  ambition,  and  the  shame  he  must  needs  have 
felt  at  the  thouo;ht  of  having  once  been  the  best  citizen  and 
savior,  and  being  now  the  worst  enemy  of  Athens. 

In  regard  to  his  character  as  a  statesman  and  strategist,  there 


HIS    CHARACTER.  135 

can  be  but  one  opinion — in  both  departments  he  was  unsur- 
passed, if  not  unsurpassable.  To  him  alone  may  be  ascribed 
the  preservation  of  the  liberties  of  Greece,  and  the  continued 
Europeanism  of  Europe.  His  strategy  was  of  that  class  which 
relates  rather  to  the  management  and  manoeuvring  of  forces  out 
of  the  enemy's  sight,  than  to  their  disposition  or  conduct  in 
action.  But  his  foresight  of  events,  his  selection  of  times  and 
places,  his  calculation  of  results,  seem  to  have  been  almost  infal- 
hble,  while  his  coup  d'ceil  was  certain,  and  his  resources  inex- 
haustible. 

For  his  individual  and  mor^il  character  no  one  can  have  the 
slightest  respect,  or  hold  with  him  the  slightest  sympathy.  To 
enemies  and  friends,  whether  it  was  actually  traitorous  or  not, 
his  course  was  invariably  indirect  and  tortuous.  And,  even  if  it 
be  granted,  that,  in  view  of  the  benefits  conferred  on  his  country, 
his  ostracism  was  unjust  and  harsh ;  that  his  comphcity  in  the 
manifest  treason  of  Pausanias  was  unproved ;  that  in  the  then 
state  of  the  Hellenic  mind  he  could  have  had  no  fair  trial ;  and, 
that  he  had  no  other  recourse  for  safety  than  flight  to  the  Asiatic 
— still,  when  we  look  to  his  continual  tampering  with  the  kin'>-s  of 
Persia,  to  his  transference  of  his  ill-gotten  gains  to  Asia,  previous 
to  his  own  flight,  and  to  the  open  manifestations  of  gratitude 
due  to  him  from  Artaxerxes,  and  paid  even  to  excess  of  interest, 
I  fear  we  must,  impartially  judging  from  the  evidence,  pronounce 
him  a  traitor,  even  as  we  have  pronounced  Miltiades  an  enemy, 
to  freedom ;  even  though  it  were  the  lot  of  both  to  save  iheir 
country,  and  to  win,  perhaps,  the  two  greatest  victories  on  record 
in  behalf  of  liberty. 

At  all  events,  a  career  so  bright  and  glorious  in  its  commence- 
ment, should  never  have  been  so  dark,  so  doubtful,  and  so  des- 
perate, in  its  close  ;  and  if  one  were  innocent,  he  would  do  better 
far  to  die  nobly  like  Sokrates  and  Phokion,  \-ictims  to  calumny 


136  TIIEMISTOKLES. 

and  ingratitude,  than  to  live  basely,  a  self-constituted  object  of 
suspicion,  an  exile  in  a  hostile  land,  and  the  creature  of  a 
foreign  tyrant,  like  Themistokles,  the  great,  but  alas !  not  good, 
Athenian. 


IV. 

PAUSANIAS, 

# 

THE   SPAKTAN. 

HIS  BATTLE  OF  PLATAIA  ;    HIS  CAMPAIGNS,  CHARACTER,   AND 
CONDUCT. 

It  is  not  a  little  remarkable,  that  of  the  greatest  Hellenic  ca^)- 
tains,  several,  and  those  not  the  least  distinguished  of  the  eariy 
times,  were  what  the  Greeks  termed  fiov6f^a/ot,  or  single  fight- 
ers, not  in  the  usual  sense  of  single  combatants  or  gladiators,  but 
men  distinguished  for  their  conduct  in  a  single  battle.  Of  this 
class  were  Miltiades,  Themistokles,  Pausanias,  the  subject  of  the 
present  notice,  Kimon,  and  others  scarcely  inferior  to  these  in 
celebrity.  This  great  and  fortunate  leader  was  of  the  royal  blood 
of  Sparta,  though  not  himself  a  king,  being  the  son  of  Kleom- 
brotos,  and  so  descended  directly  from  Hyllos,  son  of  Herakles ; 
but,  as  cousin  german  and  next  of  kin  to  Pleistarchos,  son  of 
Leonides,  who  had  succeeded  to  his  father's  dignity  although  a 
minor,  he  was  appointed  to  be  his  guardian,  and  to  command  the 
confederate  land  forces,  after  the  battle  of  Salamis  and  the  flight 
of  Xerxes.  His  colleague  Leotychides,  the  other  king  of  Lake- 
daimon,  was  absent  with  the  fleet  which  he  commanded,  and 
7 


138  PAUSANIAS, 

which  was  now  employed  in  hberating  the  lonians  of  the  islands^ 
and  observing  the  Persian  squadrons  in  the  Hellespont  and  on 
the  coasts  of  Asia  Minor. 

We  liave  seen  above*  that  the  battle  of  Thermopylai  occurred 
during  the  celebration  of  the  Karnean  festival  at  Sparta,  and  the 
Olympic  games  at  Elis — the  coincidence  of  which  shows  that  it 
took  place  in  the  beginning  of  the  Athenian  month  Metageit- 
nion,  corresponding  to  the  end  of  our  August  and  the  beginning 
of  our  September.  The  sea-fight  of  Salamis  ensued  in  the  Octo- 
ber of  the  same  year,  and  the  flight  of  Xerxes  with  the  main 
body  of  his  host  followed  without  an  interval.  Mardonios,  how- 
ever, was  left  behind  with  three  hundred  thousand  picked  troops, 
independent  of  camp-followers,  composed  of  the  Persian  Immor- 
tals and  horse-cuirassiers,  all  the  Medes,  Sakians,  Bactrians,  and 
Indians,  both  horee  and  foot,  together  with  the  best  men  of  the 
other  national  contingents.  These  troops  had  all  wintered  in 
Makedonia  and  Thessaly,  where  all  the  Greeks  had  Medized,  and 
where  the  fertile  and  extensive  plains  aftbrded  grain  for  his  men 
and  forage  for  his  numerous  cavalry,  which  he  could  not  have 
procured  in  the  barren  and  limited  territory  of  Attika,  already 
devastated  by  the  circumstances  of  the  last  campaign.  Sixty 
thousand  men,  how^ever,  under  Artabazos,  having  been  detached 
as  an  escort  *to  the  king,  had  been  employed  during  three  months 
of  the  winter  in  the  reduction  of  Potidaia  and  Pallene,  which 
had  revolted,  had  lost  great  numbers  of  their  force  by  a  vioieni 
and  unexampled  iiTuption  of  the  sea,  and  had  now  rejoine<J 
Mardonios,  greatly  diminished  in  strength ;  though  this  loss  was 
more  than  compensated  by  the  alliance  of  the  Medizing  Greel  s 
Thessalians,  Boiotians,  and  Phokians,  the  latter  of  whom  fought 
reluctantly  and  on  compulsion.  These  Hellenic  aUies  are  com- 
puted vaguely  by  Herodotus  at  fifty  thousand,  in  round  num- 
bei-s,  though  he  states  that  they  were  never  enumerated ;  and  he 
*  Miltiades. 


FIRE    SIGNAI.S.  IHO 

farther  estimates  the  Persians  at  full  thirty  myriads,  ^vhicll  can, 
of  coui-se,  be  considered  merely  as  an  approximation,  since  that 
is  the  exact  force  said  to  have  been  originally  left  by  Xerxes, 
-without  any  allowance  for  the  heavy  losses  of  Artabazos,  or  the 
unavoidable  casualties  of  so  large  a  body  of  men  encamped  in  a 
foreign  countiy. 

The  following  campaign  appeai-s  to  have  opened  early  by  a 
descent  on  Attika,  in  force,  made  contrary  to  the  advice  of  the 
Medizing  Greeks,  who  strongly  urged  it  on  Mardonios  to  remain 
in  a  state  of  "  masterly  inactivity,"  trusting  to  the  international 
jealousies  and  selfishness  of  the  confederated  Greeks,  and  to  the 
influence  of  his  bribery,  for  which  he  had  unbounded  means,  in 
plate,  coin,  bullion,  rich  raiment,  and  the  like;  by  which  he 
might  disperse  the  allied  forces  gathering  at  the  Isthmus,  and  so 
reduce  the  enemy  in  detail.  And  such,  it  can  hardly  be  doubted, 
would  have  been  the  result,  had  that  sound  advice  been  fol- 
lowed ;  but  Mardonios,  influenced  partly  by  a  puerile  vanity,  and 
partly  by  the  desire  of  conveying  to  his  king  tidings  of  the  re- 
occupation  of  Athens,  by  fire-signals  through  the  islands,  insisted 
on  active  operations  ;  and,  re-taking  Attika,  proceeded  to  destroy 
and  lay  waste  all  that  had  escaped  the  ravages  of  the  preceding- 
year.  It  is  stated,  by  that  enlightened  traveller.  Colonel  Leake, 
to  whose  topographical  researches  I  am  largely  indebted,  that  for 
the  transmission  of  such  fire-signals  the  following  stations  would 
have  sufficed  :  Mount  Hymettos,  the  isles  of  Tia,  Syra,  Myconos, 
Nicaria,  and  Samos,  across  the  Aigean,  and  mounts  Gallesos  and 
Tmolus,  in  Asia  Minor.  It  is  not  a  little  curious  to  contrast  with 
this  route,  drawn  up  from  actual  survey  by  an  intelligent  and 
experienced  geographer,  the  long  line  of  fire  telegraphs,  described 
by  Aischylos,  in  his  Agamemnon,*  over  the  same  country,  with 

*  It  need  not  be  prenaised  that  in  the  poetic  narrative  of  Aischylos, 
the  line  of  route,  instead  of  following  down  the  shore  of  Asia  Minor  to 
the  narrowest  part  of  the  Archipelago,  where  the  islands  lie  the  thickest, 


140  PAUSANIAS. 

this  exception  only,  tliat  the  one  line  runs  from  Troy  to  Argos, 
the  other  from  Athens  to  Sardis ;  the  starting  places  and  ter- 
minations being  respectively  within  a  hundred  miles  one  of  the 
other. 

Previous,  however,  to  entering  Attika,  Mardonios  sent  Alexan- 
der of  Makedon  to  treat  with  the  Athenians,  in  the  hope  of  induc- 
ino-  them  to  Medize ;  and  so  gi'eatly  were  the  Peloponnesians, 
then  engaged  in  fortifying  the  Isthmus,  alarmed  at  the  prospect 
of  their  defection,  that  they  also  sent  ambassadors,  to  promise 
aid  and  confirm  their  resolution.     But  there  was  no  occasion 

crosses  directly  to  the  European  side,  and  descends  the  long  indented 
coast  of  Thessaly  and  Upper  Greece,  the  stations  being  so  far  apart, 
above  sixty  miles  on  the  average,  as  to  render  the  transmission  of  news 
by  any  ordinary  system  of  lights  impossible.  The  lines  are.  however, 
so  spirited,  and  it  seems  so  probable  that  the  idea  was  suggested  to 
Aischylos  by  this  device  of  Mardonios,  that  I  have  not  scrupled  to  intro- 
duce them  here,  from  my  own  version  of  the  noble  tragedy  named 
above.  The  Choreutes  asks  Klytaimnestra,  what  messenger  could  have 
conveyed  to  her,  so  speedily,  the  tidings  of  the  fall  of  Troy,  and  she 
makes  answer — 

Hephaistos,  forth  from  Ida  sending  light. 
Thence  beacon  thitherward  did  beacon  speed 
From  that  fire-signal.     Ida  to  the  steep 
Of  Hermes'  hill  in  Lemnos  ;  from  the  isle 
Zeus'  height  of  Athos  did  in  turn  receive 
The  third  great  ball  of  flame.     The  vigorous  glare 
Of  the  fast-journeying  pine-torch  flared  aloft, 
Joy's  harbinger  to  skim  the  ridgy  sea. 
Sending  its  golden  beams,  even  as  the  sun, 
Up  to  Makistos'  watch  towers.    Nothing  loth 
Did  he,  nor  basely  overcome  by  sleep, 
Perform  his  herald  part.     Afar  the  ray 
Bjrst  on  Enripos'  stream,  its  beaconed  news 
Telling  the  watchers  on  Mesapion  high. 
They  blazed  in  turn,  and  sent  the  tidings  on, 
Kindling  with  ruddy  flame  the  heather  gray. 


ANSWER    OF   THE    ATHENIANS.  141 

why  they  should  have  doubted  that  generous  and  high-spirited 
people,  who  with  their  open  villages  in  ruins,  their  capital  yet 
smoking,  their  sacred  Akropolis  and  the  hohest  temples  of  their 
gods  in  ashes,  theu'  women  and  children  safe  in  the  Peloponnesos, 
and  their  government  beyond  the  reach  of  the  enemy,  in  Salamis, 
were  httle  likely  now  to  yield  to  an  enemy  who  had  wi'eaked  on 
them  the  extreme  bitterness  of  his  fuiy,  and  could  injure  them 
no  farther.  And  if  they  did  doubt,  the  noble  answer  of  the 
Athenians  to  Alexander  and  to  their  own  delegates  must  needs 
have  reassured  them.  "  Go  tell  Mardonios,"  they  replied,  "  that 
the  Athenians,  '  so  long  as  the  sun  travels  the  same  path  which 
he  now  follows,  never  will  submit  to  Xerxes;  but,  trusting 
to  the  gods  and  heroes,  our  alUes — whose  temples  and  whose 
statues,  respecting  none  of  them,  he  burnt  with  fire— we  ^\i\\  go 
out  in  arms,  and  fight  him  to  extremity"— and  to  the  Greeks — 
"  There  is  not  gold  enough  on  the  face  of  the  whole  earth,  nor 
any  region  so  excellent  in  virtue  and  beauty,  that  to  receive  it 
we  would  Medize,  and  be  the  means  of  enslaving  Hellas."     And 

Thence,  nought  obscured,  went  up  the  mighty  glow, 
And.  like  the  smiling  moon,  Asopos'  plain 
O'erleaped,  and  on  Kithairon's  head  awoke 
Another  pile  of  telegraphic  fire. 
Nor  did  the  watchmen  there,  with  niggard  hand, 
Deny  the  torch  that  blazed  most  bright  of  all. 
Athwart  the  lake  Gorgopis  shot  the  gleam. 
Stirring  the  guards  on  Aigiplanctos  hill, 
Lest  it  should  fail  to  shine  the  appointed  blaze. 
Kindled  with  generous  zeal,  they  sent  aloft 
The  mighty  beard  of  flame  that  streamed  so  high, 
To  flash  beyond  the  towering  heights  which  guard 
The  gulf  Saronic.     Thence  it  shot— it  reached 
Arachnes'  clifl^,  the  station  next  our  town, 
Down-darting  thence  to  the  Atreides'  root- 
Child  of  that  fire  which  dawned  on  Ida's  hill. 

Agamemnon.  331. 


142  rAUSANIAS. 

again — "  Know,  therefore,  this,  if  you  knew  it  not  before,  that  so 
long  as  one  Athenian  shall  survive,  we  never  will  submit  to 
Xerxes."  Such  is  the  way  in  which  men  should  speak,  and  so 
spoke  the  Athenians — and  as  they  spoke  they  acted.  But  to 
the  shame  of  the  Peloponnesians,  it  must  be  recorded,  that  their 
noble  confidence  in  their  own  valor  and  the  good  faith  of  their 
alHes,  elicited  no  corresponding  generosity  from  the  cold  Pelo- 
ponnesians. They  promised,  indeed,  to  send  their  full  force  to 
the  rescue,  and  in  conjunction  with  the  Athenians,  to  deliver 
battle  in  the  Thriasian  plain  before  Eleusis,  on  the  frontier  of 
Attika ;  but  when  Mardonios  poured  down  his  hundreds  of 
thousands,  through  the  passes  of  Mount  Kithairon,  into  Attika, 
and  re-occupied  the  Akropolis,  and  swept  all  the  Megaris  with  his 
superb  cavalry,  their  hearts  failed  them,  or  their  selfishness  pre- 
vailed— for  the  Isthmus  was  now  fortified  from  sea  to  sea,  with 
a  strong  wall  and  a  system  of  redoubts — and  not  a  man  issued 
from  their  lines  to  succor  Athens,  in  this  her  second  calamity. 
Nor  was  it  until  a  deputation  came  from  Salamis,  reproaching 
them  severely  with  their  bad  faith  and  cowardly  terg-iversation, 
and  informing  them  that  if  unassisted  they  had  no  option  left 
but  to  Medize,  and  so  escape  extermination  as  a  state,  that  the 
Peloponnesians  perceived  how  surely,  in  spite  of  all  theii'  walls 
and  fortresses,  they  must  fall,  should  Athens  join  with  the  inva- 
der to  attack.  Then  at  length,  nor  then  until  after  fresh  delays 
on  the  old  plea  of  sacred  festivals — for  it  was  now  the  Hyacinthia 
— they  did  bestir  themselves,  and  sent  out  from  the  Lakedaimon, 
five  thousand  Spartans,  the  very  flower  of  their  fighting  men, 
accompanied  each  Spartan  by  seven  light-armed  Helots,  in  all 
forty  thousand  combatants,  and  these  were  speedily  followed  by 
five  thousand  Lakonians  of  the  surrounding  country,  each  with  a 
single  attendant,  and  in  rapid  succession  by  the  contingents  of 
the  other  confederated  cities. 

Intelligence  of  this  movement  was  conveyed  to  Mardonios,  by 


RETREAT    OF    THE    PERSIANS.  143 

the  Argives,  who  from  hatred  of  Sparta  had  Medized,  though 
tney  dared  not  openly  join  the  enemy,  and  he  began  to  fall  back 
aeiiberately  on  the  friendly  territory  of  Boiotia.  Suddenly 
learning,  however,  that  an  advanced-guard  of  one  thousand 
Lakedaimonians  were  already  in  the  Megaris,  he  wheeled  upon 
them  in  the  hope  of  cutting  them  off  before  the  arrival  of  their 
supports,  and  launched  his  horse  over  the  open  country  to  inter- 
cept and  isolate  them.  In  these  movements  it  is  stated  by 
Herodotus,*  that  the  Persian  army  reached  the  farthest  western 
point  it  ever  attained  in  Hellas — an  error  well  corrected  by  Col. 
Leake,!  for  they  had  attempted  Delphi,  the  preceding  year, 
which  lies  at  least  forty  miles  to  the  westward,  though  almost  as 
many  north,  of  the  Megaris.  Had  he  said  southern  instead  of 
western  point,  he  would  have  hit  the  mark,  but  even  the  most 
accurate  of  the  ancient  writers  have  little  idea  of  the  comparative 
bearings  even  of  places  well  known  to  them  ;  and  little  reliance 
can  be  placed  on  their  geography. 

It  was  not  long  before  the  Persian  commander  learned  that 
the  whole  Peloponnesian  force  had  arrived  at  the  Isthmus,  when 
he  called  off  his  cavalry  and  retreated  upon  Thebes,  at  about  six 
miles  in  front  of  which,  on  the  northern  or  right  bank  of  the 
river  Asopos,  and  on  the  edge  of  the  plain  of  the  Platais,  he 
estabhshed  himself  in  an  entrenched  camp,  containing  something 
above  a  square  mile  of  gi-ound,  palisaded  and  fortified  with  lofty 
wooden  towei-s. 

Here  he  was  joined  for  the  first  time  by  the  Phokians,  to  the 
numbei"  of  a  thousand  hoplitai,  who  had  as  yet  made  no  active 
movement  in  his  favor  ;  and  so  little  was  he  satisfied  with  their 
tardy  aid  that  he  made  a  formidable  demonstration  of  attacking 
them  Avith  his  cavalry,  which  seems  indeed  to  have  been  pre- 
vented from  becoming  something  more  serious  than  a  demonstra- 

*  Herod.  IX.  14. 

t  Travels  in  Northern  Greece,  Vol.  II.  339.  Chap.  XVI. 


144  PAUSANIAS. 

tion  only  by  the  bold  front  maintained  by  the  Phokian  foot,  who 
formed,  what  is  termed  the  synaspismos^  an  order  of  battle  in 
which  only  a  foot  and  a  half  each  way  was  occupied  by  every 
soldier,  so  that  their  large  shields  were  in  close  contact,  and  their 
bristling  spears  were  as  close  as  quills  upon  the  fretful  porcupine. 
After  this  trial,  however,  they  were  amicably  treated,  and  ad- 
mitted to  foi-m  a  portion  of  the  army. 

The  plain  of  the  Platais,  so  named  from  the  city  of  Plataia, 
situated  on  a  lofty  spur  of  Mount  Kithairon,  now  Elatia,  on  its 
south-eastern  verge,  lies  to  the  north  of  the  main  ridge  of  that 
mountain,  which  is  four  thousand  three  hundred  feet  in  height, 
descending  very  steeply  to  the  walls  of  the  town,  and  an  inferior 
branch  of  the  same  mountain,  extending  eastward  to  Mount 
Parnes,  parted  from  it  by  a  gorge  called  Dryoskephalai,  the  oak- 
heads,  in  which  are  some  of  the  sources  both  of  the  Asopus  and 
the  Oerope,  and  through  which  wind  two  different  roads  from 
Megara,  and  the  Isthmus  northward. 

In  front  of  Plataia  are  a  number  of  low  spurs  and  ridges,  the 
principal  of  which,  at  about  a  mile  and  a  half  eastward  of  the 
city,  is  the  water  shed  between  the  straits  of  Euripos  and  the 
Korinthian  gulfs,  sending  off  the  head  waters  of  the  Asopos,  east- 
ward to  the  former,  and  those  of  the  Oerope,  south-westward  to 
the  latter,  theii*  fountains  which  are  large  and  numerous  being 
nearly  intermingled. 

At  about  two  miles  distant,  north-eastward  of  the  city,  lie  the 
ruins  Hysiai,  and  nearly  at  the  same  distance  and  on  the  same 
line,  those  of  Erythrai,  both  on  the  Parnes  ridge  of  Kithairon, 
eastward  of  the  pass  of  Dryoskephalai,  and  the  latter  one  mile 
due  south  of  the  main  river  Asopos,  now  the  Vuriendi,  which 
here  runs  nearly  east  and  west,  receiving  the  tributary  from  the 
oak-heads  falling  into  it  almost  at  right  angles  to  the  principal 
channel.  To  the  west  of  this  tributary,  and  directly  in  front  of 
Plataia,  with  the  temple  of  Here  at  the  extreme  northern  point 


THE    FIELD    OF    BATTLE.  14,5 

of  the  city  o\'erlooking  it,  lies  what  is  termed  in  Herodotus,  the 
Island ;  but  it  is  no  island,  but  a  low  flat  meadow,  intei-sected 
and  luxuriantly  watered  by  half  a  dozen  rivulets,  which  form 
the  river  Oerope.     Midway  between  Plataia  and  the  oak-heads 
to  the  eastward,  is  the  ridge  Arg'iopios,  of  very  inconsiderable 
elevation,  with  the  shrine  or  Heroum  of  Androcrates,  and  the 
fountain  of  Vergutiani,  supposed  to  be  that   in  which  Actaion 
saw  Diana  bathing,  at  its  northern  and  southern  extremities,  and 
again  nearly  midway  between  the  Argiopios  and  the  tributary 
of  the  Asopos,  alluded  to  above,  is  the  fountain  of  Gargraphia, 
often  alluded  to  in  the  account  of  the  great  action  which  ensued. 
Farther  than  this  I  have  only  to  add  that  the  plain  of  the  Pla- 
tais,  measured  to  the  northward  from  the  pass  of  Dryoskephalai 
to    the  Asopos,    is    four    miles    in  width,  intersected  by  many 
rivulets    and    low  hills,   but    every  where    suitable    for  cavalry 
operations.     Beyond  the  Asopos,  northward  yet,   the  ground 
slopes  upward  very  gradually  in  open  do^vns,  perfectly  adapted 
to  military  manoeuvres  to  the  walls  of  Thebes,  six  miles  distant. 
In  length,  from  the  ruins  of  Erythrai,  to  the  western   extremity 
of  the  island,  the  measure  does  not  fall  short  of  six  miles.     It 
must  be  observed,  that  all  the  positions  and  all  the  fighting  in 
Pausanias'  great  battle  was  to  the  southward  of  the  Asopos, 
although  the  Persian  camp  lay  to  the  northward  of  it  opposite 
Erythrai,    and  extending  westward    until    nearly  over   ao-ainst 
Hysiai.     A  careful  reading  and  correct  understanding  of  this 
geographical  account  is  almost  indispensable  to  a  clear  compre- 
hension of  what  follows,  as  the  manoeuvres  are  as  complicated  as 
those  of  any  ancient  battle.      I  shall   merely  add,  previous  to 
entering  on  the  details  of  the  battle,  that  it  is  the  opinion  of 
Colonel  Leake,  which  is  of  the  greatest  militaiy  authority  as  a 
distinguished  officer  of  rank,  that  there  is  no  reason,  as  has  been 
repeatedly  asserted   there  is,  for  disputing  the  number  of  the 
troops,  as  given  by  Herodotus,  who  were  engaged  on  that  day 


146  PAUSAXIAS. 

on  the  score  of  the  incapacity  of  the  Platais  to  contain  them. 
Assuming  the  number  of  the  Greek  force  at  ninety  thousand 
men  at  the  very  smallest,  he  sa3^s  "  for  such  an  army  the  space 
was  amply  sufficient  in  each  of  the  three  positions  which  they 
occupied.  In  the  first  and  second,  the  front  was  about  three 
miles  in  length,  with  an  indefinite  space  in  the  rear.  On  the 
day  of  battle  the  hoplitai  formed  three  separate  bodies,  two  of 
these  had  each  a  mile  for  their  front,  and  there  was  nearly  a 
square  league  of  ground  to  contain  all  the  light  troops,  together 
with  those  hoplitai,  who  had  formed  the  centre  of  the  Greek 
fine  in  their  second  position,  and  who  in  the  third  were  in  the 
rear  near  the  Herseum."  Again  speaking  of  the  Pei-sian  host, 
he  observes,  "  even  on  the  supposition  that  they  were  three  to 
one,  there  was  sufficient  space  for  them  in  the  Platais,  as  none 
but  the  choicest  infantry  were  immediately  opposed  to  the  Greeks, 
and  the  cavalry,  as  well  as  the  light-armed,  on  both  sides  may 
have  been  spread  over  a  space  of  twelve  or  fourteen  square  miles. 
Even  in  modern  warfare,  in  which  the  range  of  missiles  has 
created  an  order  of  battle  much  less  deep  than  that  of  the 
Ancients,  examples  might  be  found  of  fields  of  battle  as  small  in 
proportion  to  the  numbers  as  that  of  Plataea,"  and  in  a  note  he 
adds — "at  Borodino,  two  hundred  and  fifteen  thousand  men 
fought  for  fifteen  hours,  within  the  space  of  little  more  than 
a  square  league."* 

This  may  be  received  in  my  opinion  as  perfectly  conclusive 
whether  we  regard  it  as  that  of  a  clear  sighted  and  intelligent  eye- 
witness, or  as  that  of  a  distinguished  artillery  officer  whose 
judgment  on  mattei's  of  mihtary  science,  range  and  distance , 
must  be  superior  to  that  of  the  ablest  civilian.  And  now,  with- 
out farther  preamble  I  shall  proceed  at  once  to  the  details  and 
incidents  of  this  most  important  and  decisive  action. 

Maruonios  then  was  encamped  in  his  entrenched  position, 
*  Travels  in  Northern  G  reece,  Vol.  II.  355- 


CAVALRY     ACTION.  147 

north  of  the  main  Asopos,  at  the  eastern  extremity  of  the 
Platais  opposite  to  the  small  town  of  Erythrai,  on  the  spurs  of 
the  Parnes  ridge  of  Kithairon,  and  his  force,  only  approximated 
by  Herodotus  in  his  rating  it  at  three  hundred  and  fifty  thousand, 
cannot  reasonably  be  computed  at  less  than  three  hundred 
thousand,  account  being  taken  both  of  Artabazos'  losses,  and  of 
the  accession  of  Greek  auxiliaries. 

To  meet  these  the  Peloponnesians  marched  out  under  Pausa- 
nias,  the  son  of  Kleombrotos,  from  the  Isthmus,  and  were  joined 
at  Eleusis  by  the  Athenians,  who  had  crossed  over  from  Salamis, 
led  by  Aristidles,  when  being  well  informed  of  the  enemy's  posi- 
tion on  the  Asopos,  they  advanced  by  the  pass  of  the  Oak-heads,' 
and  bearing  to  the  north  eastward  of  the  large  southern  tributary 
of  the  river,  formed  Hue  of  battle  on  the  left  bank,  opposite  to  the 
Persian  camp,  from  which  their  centre  was  about  fifteen  hundred 
yards  distant,  their  right  somewhat  advanced  in  front  of  Erythrai, 
and  their  left  in  about  the  same  degree  retired  before  Hysiai,  and 
a  large  walled  fount  still  extant.  The  whole  of  this  position  is 
on  the  lower  spur  of  the  Parnes  branch  of  Kithairon,  so  often 
mentioned,  and  was  in  general  nearly  inaccessible  to  cavalry,  of 
which  they  were  themselves  entirely  destitute,  not  having  even 
wherewithal  to  protect  their  convoys  coming  up  from  the 
Isthmus,  or  to  cover  the  approach  of  reinforcements  which  were 
continually  pouring  in  from  the  rear. 

Seeing  that  the  Greeks  were  resolved  by  no  means  to  descend 
into  the  plain,  Mardonios  at  once  determined  to  launch  his  cav- 
alry against  them,  which  he  did  under  the  leading  of  Masistias, 
who  was  esteemed  the  second  best  man  in  the  army.  This 
splendid  arm  of  the  Persian  service,  which  cannot,  according  to 
the  usual  proportion  of  horse  and  foot  in  Oriental  armies,  be 
computed  at  less  than  sixty  or  eighty  thousand,  came  dashing  up 
the  steep  and  rugged  banks,  in  all  the  pride  and  pomp  of  East- 
ern war,  wth  barbaric  music  sounding — cymbals,    and  gongs, 


148  PAUSANIAS. 

and  kettle-druins — and  hundreds  of  bright  banners  waving,  and 
their  full-blooded  barbs  literally  shaking  the  earth  beneath  the 
thick-redoubled  clatter  of  their  furious  gallop,  and  the  clash  and 
clang  of  the  mail-coats  of  their  riders,  and  kindling  the  very  air 
with  their  furious  neighings.  On  front  and  flank,  at  once,  they 
charged  almost  upon  the  serried  spears  of  the  solid  phalanxes, 
which  met  them  everywhere,  unmoved,  on  the  brink  of  the  stony 
heights,  and  hurled  their  sharp-barbed  javehns,  and  shot  their 
hail  of  arrows  into  the  solid  ranks  ;  and  wheeled,  as  if  to  fly,  but 
in  flying  still  shot  and  darted  their  clouds  of  missiles,  and  again 
charged  home,  and  wheeled  again,  flitting  and  circling  to  and 
fro  hke  clouds  of  sea-fowls ;  making  no  impression,  it  is  true,  on 
the  firm  array,  but  wholly  unmolested  by  them ;  for  the  light 
infantry  of  the  Greeks — never,  until  after  the  creation  of  target- 
eers  by  Iphicrates,  a  favored  arm  of  the  Hellenic  service — was  at 
this  time  especially  deficient,  for  they  had  scarcely  any  archery, 
and  it  seems  that  aim  was  uncertain  with  the  javelin,  and  the 
range  short  and  ineflective.  At  length  the  Megai-ensians,  to  the 
number  of  three  thousand,  who  were  posted  in  a  situation  far 
more  accessible  to  cavalry,  and  nearly  on  level  ground,  were  so 
hard  pressed  by  the  horse,  who  rode  in  resolutely  to  their  very 
spear  points,  threatening  literally  to  tramplet  hem  under  foot 
by  their  desperate  and  incessant  charges,  and  so  severely  galled 
by  the  clouds  of  projectiles  which  fell  on  them  in  all  directions, 
that  they  sent,  still  preser\'ing  their  order  and  sustaining  the 
attack  with  stubborn  resolution,  to  the  general  for  reinforce- 
ment. It  is  not  stated  by  any  of  the  historians  in  what  part  of 
the  line  the  Megarensians  were  stationed,  nor  is  it  easy  to  dis- 
cover this,  as  the  lower  spurs  of  the  hill  on  which  the  Greek 
was  posted,  in  a  veiy  obtuse  angle,  with  the  apex  toward  the 
enemy,  are,  apparently,  nearly  contiruious  and  equally  abrupt  at 
all  points;  but  on  a  close  examination  of  the  map,  I  am  inclined 
♦  Herod.  TX.,  '21.     Plutarch,  Aristides,  XIV. 


DEATH    OF    MASISTIOS.  149 

to  believe  that  they  must  have  stood  exactly  in  the  centre,  where 
the  valley  of  a  rivulet  flowing  northward  to  the  Asopos,  nearly 
bisects  the  position,  and  probably  has  some  level  ground  on  its 
banks,  which  would  favor  a  charge  of  horse.    If  it  be  so,  the  attack 
was  doubly  formidable,  and  the  danger  imminent ;  for  it  would 
appear,  that  if  the  Megarensians  should  give  way,   the  army 
would  be  cut  in  two,  and  the  enemy's  hoi-se  might  have  passed 
up  the  ravine,  and  so  gained  the  rear  of  the  whole  army,  which 
would  then  have  been,  of  course,  assailed  in  front  by  the  infantry 
of  the  Immortals,  and  other  picked  troops  of  the  enemy.    At  all 
events,  the  hazard  seemed  so  great  that  volunteers  were  called 
for,  and  three  hundred  of  the  Athenian  hoplitai,  under  Olympio- 
doros,  the  most  active  and  eager  of  the  captains,  were  detached, 
having  bowmen  mingled  with  their  files,  to  their  succor ;  and 
these,    who  had  been  on  the  advanced  guard  before  Erythrai, 
rushed  forward,  cheering  loudly,  with  so  much  impetuosity,  and 
with  so  well  sustained  a  flight  of  arrows,  that  the  battle  was 
restored.     Still,  however,  the  Persian  horse  fought  undauntedly, 
and  made  charge  after  charge,  as  if  resolute  to  break  in  upon 
the  pikes  of  the  phalanx ;  but,  at  length,  the   Greek   archei-s 
shooting  singly,  and  with  dehberate  aim,  as  the  cavalry  dashed 
in  upon  them  rank  after  rank,  the  charger  on  which  Masistios 
rode  was  pierced  through  the  flank  by  an  arrow,  and,  on  the 
anguish  of  the  wound,  reared  bolt  upright,  and  unseated  his  gal- 
lant master.     Then  before  he  could  recover  his  feet,  being  over- 
loaded by  the  weight  of  his  panoply— for  he  was  armed  not  only 
on  the  head  and  breast  but  on  all  his  hmbs,*  with  gold,  and 
brass,  and  steel — the  Athenians  rushed  upon  him,  and  captured 
his  charger,  which  was  bedecked  with  bits  and  necklaces  of  gold, 
and  in  the  end  slew  him,  resisting  desperately,  and  well  defended 
by  a  coi-seletf  of  gold  scale  armor,  above  which  he  wore  a  crim- 
son tunic.     For  so  well  tempered  was  the  armor  that  it  turned 
*  Phit.  Aristides,  XIV.  f  Herod.  IX.    22. 


150  PAUSANIAS. 

all  their  blows  and  thrust?,  and  he  remained  unvvounded,  until 
he  was  stabbed  at  length  with  the  reverse  point  of  a  javelin, 
through  an  opening  of  his  helmet  and  his  eye,  into  the  brain. 
He  was  the  tallest  man,  it  is  said,  and  the  handsomest,  in  the 
Persian  army;  and  was  held  both  by  the  Persians  and  the 
king  as  their  most  considerable  personage  after  Mardonios.  At 
first  the  Barbarians,  who  had  not  seen  what  had  befallen  him  in 
the  tumult,  wheeled  off  and  began  to  retire ;  but  when  they 
learned  that  Masistios  had  fallen,  they  brought  all  their  horses 
round  unanimously  and  charged,  no  longer  in  successive  squad- 
rons, but  all  abreast,  in  one  great  solid  mass.  Then  the  three 
hundred  Athenians,  seeing  themselves  completely  overwhelmed 
by  numbers,  and  finding  themselves  borne  back,  in  spite  of  all 
their  resistance,  and  compelled  to  abandon  the  body,  shouted 
aloud  for  reinforcement  to  the  army ;  and,  the  heavy  hoplitai 
rushing  in  from  all  quarters  to  the  rescue,  the  horse  w^ere  no 
longer  able  to  endure  their  onset  with  the  pike,  or  to  carry  off 
the  dead,  but  wheehng  off  on  all  sides,  and  rallying  at  about  two 
stadia*  distance,  held  council,  what  they  were  to  do  in  this  emer- 
gency. Then,  after  a  while,  they  fell  off,  aod  retreated  to  Mar- 
donios, as  being  now  without  a  leader — leaving  the  honors  of 
the  day  and  the  body  of  their  commander  as  a  trophy  to  the 
Greeks. 

And  the  lamentation  and  mourning  for  Masistios  was  great  in 
the  Persian  camp ;  for  they  not  only  wailed  and  howled  for  the 
slain,  till  all  Boiotia  was  filled  with  the  echo  of  their  lamenta- 
tions, but  the  men  shaved  off  their  boards  and  ej^ebrows,  and 
cut  off  the  manes  and  tails  of  their  mules  and  horses,  such  was 
the  raod6  and  measure  of  their  sorrow  for  Masistios. 

And  the  Greeks  only  becamo  acquaintsd  with  the  greatness  of 
the  exploit  by  the  emphatic  grief  of  the  enemy,  for  beside  the 
leader  they  had  slain  but  a  few  of  the  horse.  Yet  they  exulted 
*  A  quarter  of  a  mile  English  measure. 


STEADINESS    OF    THE    GREEKS.  151 

gieatly  and  prided  themselves  on  their  success  in  beating  off 
such  a  cavahy.  Nor  did  they  so  without  good  cause — for  no 
horse  on  earth — not  the  Mamekikes  against  Napoleon's  fire- 
breathing  infantry  at  the  Pyramids — not  Milhaud's  cuirassiers 
against  the  immovable  British  squares  at  Waterloo,  could  have 
behaved  better  than  did  the  Persian  cavalry,  on  the  first  day  of 
Plataia.  They  charged  home,  not  once,  but  repeatedly,  on  the 
pike-points  of  the  phalanx,  and  no  men  can  do  more ;  for  if  the 
triple  Hnes  of  a  modern  square,  armed  only  with  the  short 
musket  and  bayonet,  can  fearlessly  defy  the  onset  of  horse  so 
long  as  they  preserve  their  equal  order,  what  must  have  been  the 
effect  of  files  eight  deep,  and  sarissse  twenty-four  feet  in  lengthy 
in  resisting  a  similar  attack.  At  the  same  time,  we  must  re- 
member that  the  Greeks  had  every  reason  to  be  proud  of  their 
steadiness  on  this  memorable  occasion ;  for  if  it  is  to  this  day 
held  the  most  trying  duty  of  infentry,  and  the  highest  proof  of 
their  soldierly  quahties,  to  resist  charging  horse,  even  while  the 
musketry  of  their  rear  rank  is  decimating  their  assailants  with 
an  incessant  roll  of  fire  ;  much  more  difficult  and  tiying  must  it 
have  been  to  troops,  who,  themselves  harassed  and  cut  up  by 
the  missiles  of  the  cavalry,  bad  no  projectiles,  and  could  offer 
only  a  passive  resistance  to  an  enemy,  thus  to  them  invulnerable. 
This  action  is  further  memorable,  as  one  of  the  very  few  occasions 
in  the  ages  of  classic  warfare,  on  which  horses  attempted  to 
charge  unbr<jken  infantry  front  to  front ;  and  as  the  first 
instance  on  record  of  infantry  charging  cavalry  in  line,  with  the 
pike,  and  that  too  successfully  ;  for  such  was  the  movement  by 
which,  after  a  repulse,  they  recovered  the  body  of  Masistios  from 
his  countrymen. 

The  consequences  were  important,  though  the  loss  on  either 
side  was  inconsiderable,  so  far  as  numbers  were  concerned  ;  for 
the  Greeks  were  so  greatly  encouraged  by  their  success  in  beat- 
ing off  the  formidable  hoi-se  of  the  Persians,  that  they  now 


152  PAUSANIAS. 

ventured  to  cliange  their  position,  which  was  disadvantageous 
owing  to  the  scarcity  of  water ;  there  being  but  one  small 
fountain,  to  the  north  east  of  Hysiai,  in  the  rear  of  their  extreme 
left,  wherefrom  to  water  ^e  whole  army,  the  right  of  which  was 
at  least  two  and  a  half  miles  distant.  On  the  very  afternoon  of 
this  sharp  affair,  therefore,  after  parading  the  armed  body  of 
Masistios  in  a  chariot  through  their  ranks,  they  countermarched, 
by  the  road  from  Athens  through  Phyle  to  Plataia,  passing 
through  Hysiai,  and  by  several  springs,  where  the  modern 
village  of  Kriakuki  now  stands,  at  the  opening  of  the  Gorge  of 
Dryoskephalai  into  the  plain. 

This  circuitous  route,  in  taking  which  they  must  have  appeared 
to  be  in  full  retreat,  they  chose,  because  it  lay  along  the  sleeper 
spurs  of  Mount  Kithairon,  and  when  it  descended  into  the  low 
ground,  left  both  the  river  x\sopos  and  its  largest  tributary 
between  them  and  the  enemy.  On  reaching  the  spring-s,  they 
turned  northward  by  the  road  to  Thebes,  and  took  up  a  new 
position,  partly  in  the  plain,  partly  on  a  series  of  low  ridges 
divided  by  many  rivulets  falling  into  the  Asopos. 

It  was  at  this  stage  of  the  proceedings,  probably,  that  a 
dispute  ai'ose  between  the  men  of  Attika  and  the  Tegeatans  for 
the  post  of  honor  on  the  left  wing,  which  the  Spartans  at  onco 
decided  in  favor  of  the  Athenians,  as  the  conquerors  of  jNIaratlion  ; 
for  immediately  afterward  they  formed  hue  of  battle  by  nations, 
in  the  following  order. 

The  Lakedaimonians,  holding  the  right  wing,  advanced  from 
the  Theban  road,  and  formed  line,  in  an  obtuse  angle,  its  apex 
pointing  due  east,  and  its  upper  limb  facing  the  south-western 
corner  of  the  fortified,  camp  of  the  Persians.  Its  lower  limb 
occupied  a  line  of  heights  forming  the  west  bank  of  the  large 
tributary  stream  so  often  mentioned,  having  the  fountain  Gar- 
gaphia  in  the  rear  of  its  right,  while  the  left  rested  on  a  strong 


SECOND    POSITION"    OF    THE    GREEKS.  153 

stream    running    due  north,  close,   and  nearly  parallel,   to  the 
Theban  road. 

The  Spartans,  Laconians,  and  Tegeatans,  who  composed  this 
division,  were  eleven  thousand  five  hundred  strong  of  hoplitai, 
ten  thousand  of  whom  were  from  Lakedaimon  ;  with  them  fought 
forty-one  thousand  five  hundred  light  troops — seven  helots  to 
each  of  the  five  thousand  Spartans,  and  one  to  every  other  shield 
— raising  the  full  force  of  the  division  to  fifty  thousand  soldiers^ 
The  centre,  which  lay  on  a  line  nearly  at  right  angles  to  the 
general  direction  of  the  right,  facing  the  Asopus  and  the  north, 
was  composed  of  five  thousand  Korinthians,  three  hundred 
Potidaians,  and  six  hundred  Arkadians  of  Orchomenos  ;  Sikyon- 
ians,  three  thousand ;  Troizenians,  one  thousand  ;  Epidaurians, 
eight  hundred ;  and  Lepreans,  two  hundred.  From  Mykenai 
and  Tiryns  came  four  hundred ;  Philius  sent  a  thousand ; 
Eretria,  Styris,  and  Chalkis  of  Eiiboia,  a  thousand  more ;  Am- 
broia,  Anactorium,  and  Leukas  thirteen  hundred ;  Kephallenia 
contributed  two  hundred  ;  Aigina,  five  hundred  ;  Megara,  three 
thousand;  and,  to  conclude,  Plataia  gave  six  hundred.  The 
centre  was  composed,  therefore,  of  nineteen  thousand  two  hun- 
dred hoplitai,  with  an  equal  number  of  light  armed  soldiers ;  or 
in  all,  of  thirty-eight  thousand  four  hundred  fighting  men.  The 
left  ^^'ing,  consisting  of  the  Athenians,  eight  thousand  strong  in 
shields,  with  as  many  more  light-armed,  were  formed  again  in 
another  obtuse  angle,  a  little  in  advance  of  the  left  of  the  centre, 
with  their  own  left  resting  on  the  north-westerly  road  to  Thebes, 
and  pushed  forward  to  within  a  hundred  paces  of  the  Asopos. 
This  di\asion,  therefore,  contained  sixteen  thousand  men  of  all 
arms  ;  but  to  these  must  be  added,  I  presume,  eighteen  hundred 
Thespians,  who,  according  to  Herodotus,  were  in  the  camp  as 
supernumeraries,  and  these  not  hoplitai.  The  addition  of  these 
Thespians  would  raise  the  force  of  the  left  wing  to  seventeen 
thousand  eight  hundred  men,  and  that  of'  the  whole  army  to 


154  PAUSANIAS. 

one  hundred  and  nine  thousand  two  hundi'ed  soldiers,  of  whom 
thirty-eight  thousand  were  completely  armed  hophtai,  and 
seventy  thousand  five  hundred  light  armed  skirmishers.* 

The  whole  position  which  they  now  occupied,  the  two  wings 
forming  obtuse  angles  in  different  directions,  like  bastions,  with 
a  horizontal  centre,  hke  a  flat  curtain,  between  them  included  a 
semicircular  space  of  ground  surrounded  on  three  sides,  as  by  a 
wet  ditch,  by  the  Asopos  and  its  tributaries.  It  was  well  sup- 
[ilied  with  water,  by  the  fountain  Gargaphia  in  the  right  rear  of 
the  riglit  wing,  by  four  large  rivulets  passing  through  the  posi- 

*  Herod.  IX.,  "28,  29,  30.  The  above  enumeration  is  made  up  from 
Herodotus,  who  singularly  enough  has  made  an  error  in  his  summing 
up,  which  all  his  successors,  even  Colonel  Leake,  have  followed,  not 
having  troubled  themselves  to  verify  his  numeration.  The  following 
are  his  facts — 10,000  Lakedaimonians,  half  Spartans,  and  1,500  Tegea- 
tans=ll,500.  Allied  Greeks  of  the  centre,  19,200.  Athenians,  8000.— 
That  is—]  1,500+19,200+8,000=38,700.  And  so  he  correctly  states  it. 
Then  add  for  the  5,000  Spaitans — seven  Helots  to  each=35,000;  add  for 
every  other  Hoplites— for  this  38,700  Hoplitai— 5000  Spartans=33,700, 
one  man  each— 33,700.  Again,  38,700X35,000  ^33,700=107,400.  Then 
add  1800  light-armed  Thespians,  whom  he  mentions  subsequently,  and 
we  have  107,400+1800=109,200  men.  This  is  precisely  as  he  states  it; 
for  after  enumerating  the  hoplitai  at  38.700  shields,  5000  of  whom  were 
Spartans,  he  adds  the  following  words :  *'  But  the  force  of  the  light- 
armed  was  as  follovv^s ;  to  the  Spartan  band,  35,000  men,  as  being  seven 
to  each  man,  and  of  these  every  one  was  equipped  for  war ;  but  to  the 
Lakonians  and  the  other  Greeks,  thirty-four  thousand  five  hundred  being 
one  to  every  man."  The  error,  it  is  true,  amounts  only  to  800  men, 
and  is  scarcely  worth  altering,  as  it  would  be  quite  fair  to  reckon  a  force 
of  109,200  men,  in  round  terms,  at  110,000,  particularly  where  the 
numeration,  as  in  Greek,  is  made  by  so  many  ten-thousands  i^vptdSti ; 
but  when  the  particulars  are  so  closely  laid  down,  and  the  error  lies 
merely  in  a  miscalculation  by  the  original  writer ;  it  is  curious  to  ob- 
serve how  that  error  is  perpetuated,  and  it  proves  how  necessary  it  is  to 
verify  every  quotation  by  actual  examination,  instead  of  taking  it  on  the 
faith  of  any  modern  historian,  how  accurate  soever  he  may  be. 


SECOND    POSITION.  155 

tion,  two  through  the  right,  the  others  through  the  centre, 
besides  the  Asopus  itself  in  the  front  and  a  considerable  brook 
on  the  left  of  the  Athenians. 

The  Lakedaimonians,  who  with  their  hght  auxiharies  formed 
nearly  half  the  army,  were  the  most  securely  posted  on  a  series 
of  moderate  heights ;  4;he  combined  Greeks  of  the  centre,  and 
the  x^Lthenians  on  the  left  were  in  the  open  plain.  On  the  whole 
it  was  a  good  one  and  well  chosen,  covering  the  pass  of  the  Oak- 
heads  by  which  their  reinforcements  and  supplies  would  come 
up,  co\'ering  the  two  principal  roads  through  that  pass  to  Athens, 
and  having  a  retreat  first  on  what  was  called  the  island  among 
the  ri\-ulets  and  sources  of  the  Oeroe,  and  thence  to  the  strong 
heights  around  the  w^alls  of  Plataia  and  the  abrupt  spurs  of  the 
true  Kithairon. 

In  this  second  position  the  Greeks  remained  eight  days  inac- 
tive, their  soothsayers  promising  them  victory  in  case  they 
should  act  purely  on  the  defensive,  besides  which  their  leader 
must  have  been  aware  that  without  horse  to  cover  his  flanks,  he 
could  not  advantageously  advance  the  phalanx  to  attack  across 
an  open  plain.  Why  Mardonios  made  no  movement  of  any 
kind  for  so  long  a  time  is  less  evident,  though  it  is  stated  that 
he  also  was  advised  by  the  Greek  prophets  in  his  army  to 
remain  on  the  defensive ;  but  it  is  probable  that  the  severity 
with  which  his  cavalry  had  been  handled  and  repulsed  in  the 
first  affair,  led  him  to  adopt  their  counsels.  On  the  eighth  day, 
however,  at  the  instance  of  Timegenides,  a  Theban,  he  sent  off 
his  horee  across  the  Asopos,  and  probably  along  the  same  road 
by  which  the  Greeks  had  countermarched  to  take  their  new  posi- 
tion, turning  their  right  flank,  with  ordei-s  to  take  post  in  the 
pass  of  the  Oakheads,  and  to  cut  off  the  supphes  and  rein- 
forcements which  were  continually  coming  up  fi-om  Attika  and 
the  Peloponnessos.  This  movement,  which  he  ought  evidently 
to  have  made  much  earher,  was  very  successful,  as  the  horse 


156  PAUSANIAS. 

immediately  intercepted  a  train  of  frve  hundred  head  of  cattle, 
bringing  up  grain  for  the  army  from  the  isthmus,  with  all  their 
drivei-s  and  followers.  All  these  fell  into  their  hands  ;  and,  till 
they  were  wearied  out  with  slaughtering,  they  spared  neither 
men  nor  animals.  The  result  of  this  was  soon  visible  in  the 
straitening  the  Greeks  of  their  provisions  ;  yet  their  numbers 
still  increased,  and  they  remained  so  firm  in  their  position,  that 
Mardonios  still  felt  unwilling  to  assail  them  in  it ;  though  he 
had  already  a  powerful  detachment  of  cavalry  in  their  rear 
with  which  he  might  have  created  a  most  effective  diversion  in 
that  quarter,  by  charging  them  from  the  higher  ground  while  he 
himself  attacked  in  front  with  his  main  force.  It  is  remarkable, 
that  neither  does  Mardonios  appear  to  have  been  at  all  aware 
of  the  advantage  he  had  obtained  in  thus  turning  their  whole 
position  with  his  formidable  horse — the  best  arm  in  his  service — 
nor  did  Pausanias  at  first  discover  the  peril  to  which  he  was 
exposed  Ijy  the  establishment  of  such  a  power  in  his  rear ;  at 
least  he  made  no  more  attempts  to  dislodge  it,  though  he  might 
have  been  conscious  of  inability  to  do  so,  than  did  his  antagonist 
to  avail  himself  of  it.  The  Persians  never  indeed  appear  to  have 
profited  at  all  by  the  superiority  of  their  numbers  or  of  their  caval- 
ry ;  as,  had  they  possessed  any  strategetical  ability,  they  might  in 
almost  every  instance  have  made  demonstrations  at  once,  on 
every  part  of  the  enemies'  fines,  any  or  all  of  which  might  have 
been  converted  into  true  attacks,  simultaneous  on  front,  flanks, 
and  rear.  Yet  they  always  appear  to  have  trusted  to  direct 
attacks  on  the  front ;  and  what  is  more  remarkable  rarely  with 
more  than  one  arm  at  once,  either  attacking  with  their  foot  and 
holding  their  cavalry  in  reserve,  or  vice  versa.  The  Greeks  had, 
it  would  seem,  no  option,  since  they  were  at  this  time  entirely 
destitute  of  cavalry,  not  having  even  a  squadron  to  protect  their 
convoys ;  and  their  light  troops  being  singularly  ineffective  as 
compared  with  the  admirable  quality  of  their  heavy  foot.     At 


PERSIANS     RESOLVE    TO     ATTACK.  ISY 

this  crisis  of  the  manoeuvres  it  is  evident  to  me  that  the  Greeks 
had  the  woi-st  of  it ;  as  is  shown  by  the  gi-eat  difficulty  they  had 
in  maintaining  a  strong  position  on  the  first  day  when  Masistios 
was  slain,  and  by  the  fact  that  that  accident  terminated  that  affair  ; 
and  I  am  inclined  to  believe  that,  if  on  that  occasion,  when  the 
Megarensians  wavered  before  the  horse  alone,  Mardonios  had 
ordered  an  immediate  advance  and  attacked  with  all  his  forces 
along  the  whole  line,  he  might  well  have  been  victorious ;  since 
the  Athenians  could  in  that  case  have  sent  no  reinforcement  to 
the  weak  point  of  their  centre  ;  and,  had  that  once  given  way, 
the  cavalry  would  have  at  once  cut  their  position  in  two,  and 
could  scarcely  have  failed  to  destroy  them.  At  this  juncture, 
Artabazos  and  the  Thebans  also,  since  they  too  were  falling  short 
of  supplies,  pressed  Mardonios  to  fall  back  on  the  fortified 
position  of  Thebes  ;  and  there  he  at  ease,  feeding  his  host  fi'om 
the  rich  plains  of  Thessaly  and  Macedonia,  contenting  himself 
with  straiteningk  the  Greeks  in  their  position,  whence  they  could 
scarce  retreat  with  his  troopers  in  their  rear,  and  trying  the 
effects  of  bribery,  added  to  their  natural  jealousies  and  to  their 
weariness  of  protracted  and  ineffective  w^arfare,  to  bring  about 
the  dissolution  of  the  confederacy.  This  w^as  sound  counsel, 
founded  on  sure  and  soldierly  principles  ;  for  so  long  as  his 
gi*eat  force  occupied  the  heart  of  Greece,  unbroken,  there  was 
nothing  to  be  gained  by  fighting,  and  the  scheme  of  Artabazos 
was  certain  of  ultimate  success.  But  Mardonios  was  too  arro- 
gant and  too  confident  of  his  numbers  to  brook  the  idea  of 
retreat,  and  being  aware  that  want  of  supplies  must  compel  a 
movement  of  some  kind,  he  determined  to  neglect  the  omens  of 
the  Greek  soothsayers,  and,  abiding  by  the  Pei-sian  customs,  to 
cross  the  Asopos,  and  delivei  battle  on  the  plain.  It  was  on  the 
tenth  day  from  the  death  of  Masistios,  that  Mardonios  took  this 
determination,  and  on  that  same  night  Alexander  I.,  of  Macedon 
— who  must  not  be  confounded  with  Alexander  the  Great — 


168  PAUSANIAS. 

ca^ne  alone  on  horseback  to  the  outposts  of  the  Athenians,  on 
the  extreme  left,  and  informed  them  of  the  design  of  the  Per- 
sians. These  at  once  communicated  the  intelligence  to  the 
Spartans,  when  it  was  resolved  to  fight ;  but  Pausanias  requested 
the  Athenians,  on  the  passing  of  the  watchword  at  daybreak, 
to  countermarch  from  the  left  to  the  right  wing,  thus  changing 
places  with  the  Spartans  ;  in  order  that,  being  accustomed  since 
Marathon  to  the  Oriental  mode  of  fighting,  they  might  be 
opposed  to  the  Persian  Immortals,  the  Medes  and  Sakians,  while 
the  Lakedaimonians  should  meet  the  Greeks  in  the  tug  of  war. 
It  is  stated*  that,  at  this  juncture,  the  other  Attic  generals 
objected  to  being  ordered  hither  and  thither  by  the  Spartans,  as 
though  they  were  Helots ;  but  that  they  were  reconciled  to  it 
by  Aristides,  who  showed  them  that  when  contending  for  the 
post  of  honor  they  had  been  contented  ^vith  the  left  vdng ;  and, 
that  it  was  now  scarcely  consistent  to  refuse  the  right,  when 
offered  to  them  voluntarily.  * 

As  soon  as  the  day  broke,  this  manoeuvre  was  executed,  by 
the  rear  of  the  centre,  and  was  first  discovered  by  the  Medizing 
Boiotians,  who  were  posted  opposite  to  the  Athenians,  as  these 
were  advanced  more  closely  on  the  Asopos,  than  the  centre  and 
right ;  for,  when  the  Greeks  broke  up  from  their  position  at 
Erythrai,  the  Pereians  had  quitted  their  entrenched  camp,  and 
followed  along  the  right  bank  of  the  river,  which  divided  the 
outposts  of  the  two  armies.  They  at  once  communicated  the 
fact  to  Mardonios,  who  forthwith  executed  a  similar  movement, 
bringing  his  Orientals  again  to  face  the  Lakedaimonians  ;  and, 
thereupon,  Pausanias  again  countermarched,  returning  to  his  old 
post  on  the  right.  Mardonios  again  followed  him  ;  and,  as  they 
once  more  stood  as  in  the  first  instance,  sent  a  Herald  to  the 
Spartans  with  an  insulting  message,  challenging  them  to  do 
battle  with  the  Persians,  in  equal  numbers  man  to  man,  and  so 
*  Herod.  XL,  46.     Plutarch,  Aristides,  XVL 


PERSIANS    RESOLVE    TO    ATTACK.  159 

to  decide  the  quarrel  in  behalf  of  all  Hellas.  No  reply  was  made 
to  this  defiance,  and  Mardonios  was  greatly  elated,  as  if  he  had 
gained  a  bloodless  victory.  This  narrative  is  remarkable,  as  it 
distinctly  proves  that  the  terror  of  the  Medes  and  Pei*sians,  which 
Herodotus  describes  as  universal  before  the  battle  of  Marathon, 
had  not  yet  subsided,  in  spite  of  their  several  defeats  ;  and  that 
they  were  still  regarded  as  more  dangerous  antagonists  than  their 
Greek  allies,  both  by  those  allies  and  by  their  enemies. 

What  is  more  singular,  is  this,  that  the  Athenians  were  evi- 
dently held  in  greater  awe,  not  only  by  the  Orientals — as  would 
be  natural,  since  they  had  repeatedly  beaten  them — but  by  the 
Hellenic  auxiliaries  also,  although  the  right  wing  in  battle  and 
the  commandei*ship  of  the  fleet  was  given  to  the  Spartans  with- 
out dispute  on  the  part  of  Attica,  as  if  in  acknowledgment  of 
theii*  superiority.  Yet  there  is  no  other  way  of  explaining  the 
reluctance  of  both  nations  to  sustain  the  attack  of  the  Athenians, 
especially  after  the  Spartans  h^d  shown  their  unwillingness  to 
engage  the  Persians. 

But  now  Mardonios  delayed  no  longer,  but  launched  all  his 
cavalry  against  them,  still  without  any  infantry  supports,  and 
harassed  them  dreadfully,  for  many  of  his  cavalry  were  hoi-se- 
archei*s,  Persians,  Sakians,  and  Parthians ;  all  of  them,  but  the 
latter  especially,  the  best  bowmen  in  the  world,  and  the  rest 
strong  and  skilful  javehneei-s,  to  whom  the  Greeks  had  no  arm 
which  to  oppose,  nor  any  means  of  repaying  them  the  injuries 
which  they  inflicted.  They  kept  their  ranks  indeed,  unbroken, 
and  lost  no  ground,  though  they  wore  ravaged  by  the  fierce  hail 
of  missiles,  which  wounded  many  and  killed  not  a  few  ;  but  all 
the  left  and  centre  of  the  army  was  deprived  of  the  means  of 
watering,  for  they  were  cut  oft"  from  tlie  Asopus  by  the  interven- 
ing cavaliy ;  and,  to  make  aflfairs  darker  and  more  hopeless,  the 
horse  had  taken  possession  of  and  blocked  up  the  fountain  of 
Gargaphia  in  the  rear  of  the  extreme  Lakedaimonian  right.    By 


160  PAUSANIAS. 

what  forces  this  was  accompHshed,  it  is  not  stated  ;  nor  is  it  easy 
to  discover  how  or  by  whom  it  was  effected,  unless  it  were  by 
the  horse  detached  for  the  blockade  of  the  Dryoscephalai,  which 
pass  lay  little  more  than  a  mile  to  the  south  of  the  fountain, 
with  no  covering  force  between.  It  is  clear,  on  the  other  hand, 
by  all  the  accounts,  that  the  Oriental  cavalry  did  not  penetrate 
and  break  through  the  Greek  position ;  nor  can  it  be  easily 
believed  that  they  turned  both  flanks,  or  either  of  them ;  since 
to  do  so  a  detour  of  five  or  six  miles  would  be  necessary  ;  and, 
if  such  a  manoeuvre  had  been  effected,  as  it  must  probably  have 
been  by  the  Athenian  left,*  the  Greeks  would  have  been  so 
completely  surrounded,  that  the  dullest  enemy  must  have  per- 
ceived the  certain  success  of  a  simultaneous  attack ;  nor  even, 
if  that  were  not  attempted,  could  the- manoeuvres  which  ensued 
have  been  possible  to  the  Greeks.  In  any  event,  whether  we 
believe  that  the  troops  blockading  the  Oak-heads  came  down 
direct  on  the  Spartan  rear,  and  took  possession  in  undeniable 
force  of  the  spring,  within  half  a  mile  of  their  right  and  directly 
behind  it,  or  that  the  Persian  right  turned  the  Athenian  left, 
and  traversed  the  whole  length  of  their  position  to  the  extreme 
right,  with  the  same  result,  the  fatuity  is  inconceivable,  which 
could  have  induced  them  there  to  remain  idle  and  inactive  when 
a  few  vigorous  charges  must  have  obliged  the  Greeks  to  form  a 
fresh  front  to  the  rear  in  order  to  oppose  them,  and  must,  if 
seconded  by  their  inftintry  from  the  Asopos,  have  taken  them 
between  two  fires,  and  could  have  hardly  failed  to  annihilate 
them. 

It  is  remarkable  that  Diodorus  Siculus  makes  no  mention  of 
this  second  equestrian  action,  noi  of  the  subsequent  retreat  of  the 

*  According  to  Cob  Leake's  plan  of  the  Plataiis,  horse  could  scarcely 
have  forced  their  way  between  the  Spartan  right,  drawn  up  on  steep 
hillocks,  and  the  large  tributary  of  the  Asopos,  as  they  must  have 
done  to  turn  the  Greek  right. 


I 


THE  GREEKS  RETREAT.  161 

Greeks,  but  represents  the  latter  as  attacking,  and  on  ground 
which  compelled  the  Persians  to  fight  in  serried  order,  thus 
"depri\ang  them  of  the  advantage  of  their  superior  numbers.* 
No  authorit}^  of  this  writer  can  however  invalidate  that  of  Hero- 
dotus, who  wrote  within  twenty  years  of  the  event ;  besides 
which,  examination  of  the  ground  and  other  circumstances 
confirm  his  description  of  the  afiair. 

It  is  eA-ident,  therefore,  that  the  attack  not  only  occurred,  but 
that  the  Greeks  were  very  severely  pressed,  and  looked  forward 
with  dismal  forebodings  to  the  giving  of  the  signal  for  general 
action,  at  tliis  moment,  by  Mardonios.  Wliy  he  did  not  give  it, 
can  never  now  be  known  ;  but  that  he  should  have  done  so, 
according  to  every  principle  of  military  science,  is  undoubted ; 
nor  can  I  imagine,  even  with  all  allowance  for  the  superiority  of 
the  Hellenes  in  discij^line  and  armature,  how  in  that  case  he 
could  have  failed  oC  victory.  It  was  at  this  juncture,  while  the 
skirmish  was  still  raging  all  along  their  front  and  in  the  rear  of 
their  right,  that  a  council  of  war  was  held  in  the  quarters  of  Pau- 
sanias  ;  when  it  was  determined,  that  should  the  Persians  defer 
the  attack  to  the  next  day,  they  would  retreat  to  the  island,  as  it 
is  called,  immediately  below  the  steep  slope  from  the  walls  of 
Plataia,  where  they  could  neither  be  cut  off  from  the  water,  nor  be 
taken  in  flank,  fi'om  the  nature  of  the  ground ;  while  they  would 
present  a  much  smaller  fi-ont  to  the  enemy.  This  new,  or  third 
position,!  lay  ten  stadiaj  to  the  west  of  the  Lakedaimonian  posi- 
tion and  the  fountain  of  Gargaphia,  and  about  twice  as  far  from 
the  x\thenians  on  the  left ;  and,  in  order  to  reach  it,  the  Greeks 
should  have  marched  by  converging  fines,  the  Athenians  almost 
due  south  by  the  westernmost  road  from  Thebes,  the  confederates 
of  the  centre  south-westward,  and  the  Spartans  almost  due  west ; 
since  their  second  position  occupied  ground,  though  its  faces  were 

*  Diod  Sic.  XI.  30.  31.  f  Herod.  IX.,  51. 

J  Ten  stadia,  an  English  mile  and  a  quarter. 
8 


162  PAUSANIAS. 

angular,  in  the  form  of  an  irregular  arc,  the  centre  of  which  lay 
in  the  island.* 

During  that  whole  day,  the  Greeks  had  unabating  toil  and 
distress,  the  attacks  of  the  horse  never  being  for  a  moment  inter- 
mitted ;  and  with  such  eyes  of  eagerness,  as  the  Duke  of  Wel- 
lington is  reported  to  have  watched  for  night  or  the  Prussians, 
rejoicing,  as  hour  after  hour  lagged  away,  and  still  his  weary 
squares  held  out  impregnable  against  the  thundering,  charges  of 
Milhaud's  iron  cuirassiers,  at  Waterloo,  must  the  outnumbered 
Greeks  have  watched  for  night,  and  exulted,  as  hour  after  hour 
passed  away,  and  signal  was  not  given  for  a  general  assault.  In 
several  respects,  indeed,  this  battle  of  Plataia  was  not  dissimilar  to 
that  of  Waterloo ;  for  in  like  manner  as  the  Anglo  allies,  so  did 
the  Greeks  hold  a  semi-circular  position,  with  its  front  to  the 
enemy ;  in  hke  manner,  as  Napoleon  sacrificed  and  wore  out  his 
inimitable  cavalry,  against  infantry  on  which  he  never  made  the 
least  impression,  so  did  Mardonios  launch  his  unsupported  horse- 
men against  the  Hellenic  pikes ;  and,  in  like  manner,  were  both 
battles  won  by  a  general  charge  of  foot,  and  converted  into  unex- 
ampled routs  by  the  want  of  cavalry  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the 
broken  armies.  Pausanias  and  Wellington  both  fought  the 
waiting  fight,  and  when  the  time  at  length  arrived  struck  the 
decisive  blow,  which  there  was  nothing  left  to  parry.  At  night- 
fall, when  it  came,  and  when  darkness  set  in  thick  and  moonless, 
the  confederates  of  the  centre  broke  up,  instantly,  glad  to  get  out 
of  reach  of  the  terrible  horse — who,  by  the  way,  must  ha\'e 
again  fallen  back,  either  to  the  Oak-heads  or  to  the  camp  beyond 
the  Asopos;  since,  had  they  still  held  Gargaphia,  they  must 
have  perceived  and  prevented  any  movement — and  marched,  at 
their  best  speed,  across  the  island,  not  halting  according  to  order, 
but  ascending  the  heights  to  the  Heraion  or  temple  of  Here, 

*  Leake's  Plan  of  the  Plataiis ;  Travels  in  N.  W.  Greece,  vol.  ii.     He- 
rod. IX.,  51. 


THE  RETREAT.  163 

beyond  Plataia,  and  to  the  eastward  of  it,  where  they  piled  their 
arms,  weary  and  hungry — for  theii-  supphes  by  the  Dryoscepha- 
lai  had  been  cut  off — and  had  no  share  in  the  business  of  the 
morrow.  Pausanias,  seeing  that  the  centre  had  marched, 
ordered  his  own  troops  to  take  up  their  arms  and  follow ;  but 
Amompharetos,  the  leader  of  the  Pitanatean  lochos,  resolutely 
refused  to  move,  insisting  that  it  was  disgraceful  and  infamous 
in  Spartans  to  retreat  before  an  enemy,  and  declaring  that  he 
and  his  lochos  would  stand  their  ground  and  die,  although  all 
the  rest  should  desert  them.  Meantime,  a  messenger  came  over 
from  the  Athenians,  who  had  not  yet  moved  until  they  should 
know  what  the  Lakedaimonians  were  about ;  for  they  had  no 
great  confidence  in  their  adhering  to  their  word,*  and  found 
them  halted,  in  some  confusion,  their  leaders  wrangling  one  with 
another ;  when  Pausanias  bade  the  herald  to  go  tell  the  Athe- 
nians what  was  passing,  and  request  them  to  join  him  there,  and 
co-operate  with  him  in  the  retreat.  But  while  they  were  debating 
day  broke  ;  and  then  Pausanias  concluding  that,  when  it  came 
to  the  crisis,  Amompharetos  would  follow  the  rest  of  the  army, 
led  the  remainder,  with  the  Tegeatans,  by  his  own  right,  among 
the  hillocks  and  on  the  lower  spurs  of  the  Kithairon,  toward  the 
position  he  had  chosen,  occupied  a  line  of  heights  on  a  plateau 
called  the  Argiopion,  having  a  temple  of  the  Eleusinian  Deraeter 
in  his  front,  and  the  fountain  of  Artemis,  at  the  modern  village  of 
Vergutiam,  the  scene  of  Actaion's  misadventure  with  the  god- 
dess, at  his  extreme  right ;  and  here  Amompharetos  soon 
rejoined  him,  but  not  until  he  w;\s  closely  pressed  by  the  Persian 
horse,  who  seeing  the  retreat,  rode  hard  upon  his  traces.  In  the 
meanwhile  the  Athenians,  who  had  nearly  twice  as  far  to  march 
as  the  Lakedaimonians,  in  order  to  gain  their  post,  fell  back  across 
the  open  plain,  there  being  no  elevations  in  that  quarter  of  the 
field,  except  a  high,  solitary  mound,  on  which  stands  the  modern 
*  Herod.  IX.,  55.     Plut.  Arist.  J  7. 


184  PAUSANIAS. 

\dllage  of  Platani,  concealing  them  both  from  the  Persians 
beyond  the  Asopos,  and  from  their  own  aUies  on  the  Argiopion  5 
but  before  reaching  their  proper  station,  they  were  overtaken 
and  obliged  to  form  in  the  low  grounds,  and  prepare  to  resist 
the  Medizing  Greeks,  who  were  marching  upon  them,  near  fifty 
thousand  strong. 

Mavdonios,  seeing  the  position  of  the  Greeks  vacant  when  the 
day  broke,  and  supposing  that  all  the  Hellenes  had  lost  heart 
and  were  in  full  flight,  immediately  crossed  the  Asopos  at  all 
points,  and  pursued  with  all  his  host,  shouting  as  if  already  vic- 
torious, in  loose  and  disorderly  array ;  leading  the  chase  himself 
on  his  conspicuous  wliite  hoi"se  of  the  Nisaian  breed,  at  the  head 
of  the  thousand  chosen  Pei'sian  cuircossiei-s  of  the  Immortals,  who 
bore  gold  balls  on  the  revei-se  of  iheii  lances — whence  their  name 
of  apple-bearei-s,  //^^o^^pos — and  who  were  the  best  and  most 
perfectly  armed  of  all  the  Oriental  troops.  "With  these  he  made 
so  terrible  an  onslaught  on  the  Lakedaimouians  and  Tegeatans, 
w^ho  fought  with  them,  numbering  eleven  thousand  five  hundred 
shields  of  heavy  foot,  with  forty-one  thousand  five  hundred  light 
armed  troops,  that  Pausanias  sent  a  mounted  oflicer  to  gallop  for 
life  to  the  Athenians,  and  entreat  them  to  reinforce  him  with 
their  Archery.  This  shows  that  little  or  no  service  was  to  be 
expected  in  action  from  the  Helots,  whom  the  Spartans  were  in 
ordinary  times  afraid  to  trust  with  arms,  and  who  had  neither 
discipline  nor  skill  in  the  use  of  weapons.  The  Athenian  hght 
troops,  on  the  contrary,  were  citizens  of  the  poorer  classes  ;  but  it 
is,  I  imagine,  the  Thespian  skirmishers,  who  composed  the  whole 
contingent  of  that  city,  and  were,  therefore,  probably  of  a  very 
superior  character  to  the  ordinary  light  armed  men,  that  did  such 
good  service  on  the  first  day  against  Masistios,  and  were  now 
looked  for  by  Pausanias,  to  repeat  the  duty  of  repulsing  that 
terrible  hoi-se. 

Ai*istides  at  once  gave  ordei"s  to  his  whole  force,  consisting  of 


THK    THEEANS    CHARGE    ON    THE    LEFT.  165 

about  seventeen  thousand  men — for  the  Plataians  had  joined  them 
fi-om  the  left  centre,  too  brave  to  fly  with  the  confederates — to 
march  at  once  at  double  quick  time  to  the  relief  of  the  Spartans. 
The  Medizing  Greeks,  on  seeing  this,  advanced  on  them,  in  a 
force  traditionally  stated,  for  they  were  never  numbered,  at  fifty 
thousand,  including  a  considerable  body  of  Theban  cavalry. 
Aristides  thereupon,*  stood  forth  beyond  the  lines,  shouting  to 
them  vehemently,  and  calling  all  the  Hellenic  gods  to  witness, 
that  they  should  give  way,  nor  hinder  those  w^ho  would  peril 
their  lives  for  Hellas. 

But  when  this  availed  nothing,  but  they  still  came  on  in 
array  of  battle,  he  lowered  his  pikes  and  charged  in  close 
column,  compelled  to  give  up  his  design  of  reheving  the  right 
wing.  As  he  charged,  the  Lokrian,  Phokian,  and  other  Medizing 
Greeks  gave  way,  as  unwilling  to  encounter  their  countrymen  in 
bebalf  of  the  barbarian  ;  but  the  Boiotians,  and  Thebans  more 
especially,  volunteer  traitors,  instigated  by  hatred  of  Athens, 
shouted  and  charged  home,  shield  to  shield  ;  and  the  tug  of  war 
was  for  a  time  difficult  and  desperate  between  them. 

At  this  time  the  Lakedaimonians,  on  whom  the  brunt  of  this 
bloody  battle  fell,  were  suffering  severely — for  their  sacrifices  were 
ominous  of  ill,  and  forbade  their  fighting  on  pain  of  total  defeat. 
They  stood,  therefore,  immovable,  covering  themselves  as  best 
they  might,  kneeling  under  shelter  of  their  great  shields,  while 
the  Persian  cavalry  wheeled  round  and  round  them,  pouring  in 
their  deadly  hail  of  missiles,  till  many  fell  dead  in  their  lines,  and 
few  but  were  wounded.  Encouraged,  too,  by  the  inactivity  of 
the  Greeks,  which  they  could  not  comprehend,  the  Persian 
infantry  came  up  to  within  half  bow^-shot,  and,  piling  their 
square  wicker  bucklers  in  an  extemporaneous  breastwork,  shot 
from  behind  it  their  volleyed  an'ows  with  terrible  precision  and 
fatal  execution.     Again  victims  were  slain,  and  again  the  signs 

*  Plut.  Aristid.,  18. 


166  PAUSANIAS. 

were  unfavorable  ;  until  Pausanias,  turning  his  head  to  the  tem- 
ple of  Here,  on  the  heights  above  his  left,  which  he  could  see 
over  the  ruined  ramparts  of  Plataia,  burned  the  preceding  year 
by  Xerxes,  implored  the  aid  of  the  goddess  with  outstretched 
arms  and  flowing  tears.  Then,  it  is  said,  the  sacrifices  at  once 
became  propitious ;  and  then,  with  the  deep  and  solemn  concla- 
mation  of  their  paeans,  at  length  released  from  their  unwilling 
inactivity,  down  from  the  upper  ground,  down,  came  the  Spar- 
tans with  their  stout  alhes,  in  serried  phalanx,  eight  shields  deep ; 
and  forth  to  meet  them,  casting  aside  their  bows,  rushed  man- 
fully the  Persians ;  and  about  the  rampart  of  bucklers,  and  on 
the  consecrated  ground  of  Ceres,  the  conflict  was  severe  and 
stubborn  ;  nor  were  the  Orientals  inferior  to  the  Greeks  in  spirit 
or  in  strength,  but  in  their  light  harness,  and  short  weapons, 
they  were  as  naked*  men  against  men  clad  in  proof.  But  the 
Greeks  keeping  their  order  of  linked  shields,  spiaspismos,  beat 
down  the  wall  of  bucklers,  and  thrusting  their  long  pikes  into 
the  faces  and  chests  of  the  Persians,  bore  them  down  by  sheer 
force,  but  not  without  spirited  resistance  ;  for  they  strove  hard  to 
break  the  pikes  with  their  bare  hands,  and  did  break  many ;  and 
came  in,  hand  to  hand,  with  scymetar  and  dagger,  and  tearing 
away  the  shields  of  the  Hoplitai,  held  the  fight  dubious  for  a 
long  time  and  the  victory  in  suspense.  Then,  as  they  began  to 
give  way  and  scatter  before  the  irresistible  pikes,  Mardonios  with 
the  horse  of  the  Immortals  once  again  charged  home,  and  was 
already  making  some  impression,  as  he  had  done  all  day, 
wherever  he  charged  in  person,  and  the  infantry  rallied  fast, 
favored  by  his  diversion,  when  the  Spartan  Acimnestos,  like 
Aias  and  Aineias,  and  other  heroes  of  the  epic  ages,  seized  fe 
huge  stone,  and  hurled  it  with  such  violence  and  precision,  that 
striking  him  in  his  face,  it  slew  that  gallant  chief  outright;  and 
as  all  beheld  him  fall  in  the  first  ranks,  disorderly  flight  and  a 
*  Herod.  IX.,  67.  f  Plut.  Aristides  18. 


DEATH  OF  MARDONIOS.  167 

total  rout  ensued.  For  Artabazos,  who  had  fought  reluctantly 
from  the  first,  and  with  disaffection  to  Mardonios,  being  now 
chief  in  command,  made  no  effort  to  rally  the  men  or  retrieve 
the  day ;  made  no  effort  to  defend  the  fortified  camp,  or  even 
the  Theban  wall,  but  gallopped  off  the  field  with  forty  thousand 
fresh  horse — all  that  were  left  of  the  gigantic  cavalry,  which  had 
commenced  the  action  with  such  a  clang  and  clatter,  and  were 
still  sufficient,  if  well  led,  to  have  trampled  the  Greek  army  into 
dust,  and  taking  the  road  west  of  Platai,  by  Leuctra,  Thespiai, 
and  the  edge  of  lake  Kephisis,  over  the  plain  of  Chaironeia, 
made  good  his  escape  into  Phokis,  and  thence  by  Thessaly  and 
Thrace  to  the  Hellespont. 

In  the  meantime,  the  Athenians,  in  spite  of  the  superior  num- 
bers and  hard-fighting  of  the  Thebans,  had  broken  them,  with 
considerable  loss,  killing  three  hundred  of  their  best  men,  and 
were  driving  them  off  the  field  by  the  direct  road  to  Thebes 
though  held  somewhat  in  check  by  their  horse,  when  a  messen- 
ger came  up  from  Pausanias,  informing  them  of  the  decisive  vic- 
tory he  had  gained  on  his  wing,  and  requhing  their  aid,  if  they 
could  give  it,  in  storming  the  entrenched  camp  ;  for  the  Athe- 
nians were  the  most  skilful  of  all  the  Hellenes  at  wall- fighting, 
and  the  storming  of  fortified  places. 

The  Boiotians  had  by  this  time  been  beaten  to  their  hearts' 
content,  and  as  they  showed  no  signs  of  rallying,  as  the  Athe- 
nians relaxed  their  pm-suit,  but  were  already  over  the  Asopos  in 
full  flight,  Aristides  led  his  forces  over  the  site  of  the  last  night's 
position  of  Mardonios,  down  the  right  bank  of  the  Asopos,  and 
reached  the  encampment,  just  as  the  Lakedaimonians  and  Tege- 
atans  were  in  check  and  wavering,  so  strenuous  was  the  defence 
of  the  walls  and  the  towel's. 

And  now  the  Boiotian  cavalry  was  retreating  across  the  field 
whereon  the  Athenians  had  repulsed  their  countrymen,  in  order 
to  rejoin  them  ;  when,  having  already  done  good  service,  in  pro- 


163  PAUSIXIAS, 

tecting*  the  routed  Persians,  they  fell  in  with  the  Megarensians 
and  Phliasians  in  the  plain — who,  not  having  struck  a  blow  in  the 
action,  now  seeing  the  victory  won,  were  rushing  down  disorderly 
to  share  the  spoil — and  charging  them  pell-mell,  cut  them  to 
pieces,  killing  above  six  hundred ;  and,  after  chasing  the  rest  to 
Kithairon,  made  good  their  own  retreat  to  Thebes.  Then,  by 
the  fierceness  and  alacrity  of  the  Athenians  the  walls  were  forced 
and  a  great  breach  made,  by  which  the  whole  Greek  force  bui-st  in, 
and  such  a  slaughter  follow^ed,  as  history  nowhere  else  records ; 
for,  their  walls  once  forced,  the  miserable  Persians  thought  no 
more  of  resistance  ;  and  the  Greeks,  if  they  felt  compassion,  dared 
not  display  it,  so  much  did  the  vanquished  enemy  still  outnum- 
ber their  whole  army.  So  they  butchered  them,  literally,  hke 
sheep  ;  and  it  is  confidently  asserted  that,  of  three  hundred  thou- 
sand Orientals,  to  speak  in  round  numbers,  only  the  forty 
thousand  who  fled  early  in  the  day  with  Ai-tabazos,  and  three 
thousand  who  escaped  from  the  camp,  and  were  subsequently 
slain  by  Perdikkas  in  Makedonia,  got  off"  with  their  lives  from 
that  truly  disastrous  day. 

Of  the  Lakedaimonians,  who  confessedly  did  the  best  that  day, 
although  the  Athenians  and  Tegeatans  fought  undeniably,  ninety- 
one  fell  ;  of  the  Tegeatans  sixteen ;  of  the  Athenians  fifty-two — 
so  small  was  their  loss,  owing  to  their  unbroken  ranks  and  per- 
fect panoply.*  Plutarch  complains  of  the  silence  of  Herodotusf 
as  to  the  other  Greeks,  and  charges  him  with  unfairness  ;  as  he 
alleges  that  of  the  Greeks,  in  all,  there  fell  one  thousand  and 
thirty-six.  But  it  must  be  remembered  that  Plutarch  was 
a  Boiotian,  hostile  both  to  Sparta  and  Athens  ;  that  he  did  not 
write  until  the  fourth  century  after  the  battle,  and  that  he  states 
the  dead  of  the  Lakedaimonians,  Tegeatans  and  Athenians, 
at  the  same  number  with  his  predecessor.  The  frankness, 
moreover,  with  which  Herodotos,  who  was  an  Ionian,  and  no 
*  Herod.  IX.  70.  f  Plut.  Aristides,  19. 


HIS    SOLDIERSHIP.  169 

admirer  in  general  of  the  Lakedaimonians,  ascribes  the 
glory  of  the  day  to  them  and  to  Pausanias,  amply  confirms 
his  veracity,  if  confirmation  were  required.  But  the  charge  is 
false ;  for  he  does  mention  the  fall  of  six  hundred  Megarensians 
and  Phthiasians,  though  not  in  the  battle  ;  and  it  is  notorious  that 
the  ancients  never  were  wont  to  enumerate  the  loss  of  any, 
except  hophtai ;  wherefore,  if  it  be  a  fact  that  a  thousand  and 
thirty-six  Greeks  fell,  the  number  either  includes  all  who  fell  in 
all  the  three  days'  fighting,  or  the  light  armed  and  Helots  of  the 
Jast  day. 

Thus  terminated  this  most  memorable  and  most  important 
day.*  Most  memorable,  because  no  equally  well  authenticated 
battle  even  approximates  it  in  carnage,  and  because  on  it  the 
Persian  fleet  and  ai'my  at  Mykale  was  utterly  destroyed  almost  at 
the  same  hour.  Most  important,  for  it  turned  the  whole  tide 
of  battle,  and  changed  the  scene  of  the  Persian  ware  from 
European  to  Asiatic  soil,  so  that  when  we  ag'ain  find  Hellenes  and 
Orientals  in  action,  we  shall  see  the  former  as  invaders,  and 
the  latter  struggling  in  vain  to  defend  their  soil  against  the 
western  spear. 

The  conduct  of  Pausanias  was,  indeed,  admirable  throuo^hout 
those  three  most  trying  and  most  desperate  days ;  his  resources  are 
shown  to  have  been  extraordinary ;  his  coup  cVceil  prodigious ; 
and  the  manner  in  which  he  manceuvred  infantry  over  open 
country,  in  the  teeth  of  a  vast  and  admirable  cavalry,  without 
losing  a  man,  or  having  a  rank  broken  ;  and  kept  them  together 
under  circumstances  almost  hopeless ;  and  steady,  under  harass- 
ing attacks  to  which  they  could  make  no  reply,  reflect  the  hio-h- 
est  lustre  on  bis  generalship,  and  on  the  immovable  steadiness 
of  the  men  he  commanded.     On  two  occasions — when  the  Per- 

*  According  to  Plutarch,  it  was  the  16th  of  the  Attic  month  Maimac- 
terion,  corresponding  to  the  end  of  November  and  beginning  of  Decem- 
ber, 2d  year,  of  7.5th  0!ym.,  479  B.  C. 
8 


1 70  PAUSANIA8. 

si  an  horse  were  established  in  his  rear  on  the  second  day,  and 
when  the  cowardly  withdrawal  of  his  centre,  in  the  last  and  deci- 
sive action,  left  his  two  wings  separated  by  a  gap  of  nearly  a 
mile,  by  pouring  their  whole  army  into  which,  and  so  cutting 
his  position  in  two,  the  Persians  might  have  attacked  him  in 
detail — he  ought  to  have  been  beaten,  and  that  by  no  possible 
fault  of  his  own  ;  while  it  was  by  his  own  constancy  and  conduct, 
only,  that  he  turned  even  disasters  to  his  own  advantage,  and 
won  a  battle  unequalled  perhaps  in  any  age  of  recoi'ded  history. 

The  spoil  taken  was  enormous ;  the  brazen  manger  of  Mardo- 
nios  was  seized  by  the  Tegeatans ;  his  dagger,  or  acinaces,*  and 
silver-footed  throne,  by  the  Athenians ;  the  whole  army  was 
enriched  with  booty,  and  for  yeai*s  afterwards  Persian  Daric^  of 
gold  became  the  ordinary  currency  of  Greece.  Of  all  the  spoil, 
women,  horses,  coined  and  uncoined  gold,  furniture,  dress, 
camels,  all,  one-tenth  was  given  to  Pausanias — and,  alas  !  proved 
his  ruin. 

For,  like  Miltiades,  hke  Themistokles,  hke  so  many  other  great 
and  gallant  Greeks,  the  luxury  and  wealth,  added  to  his 
unbounded  vanity  and  ambition,  corrupted  him,  even  to  the 
degree  of  assuming  the  manners  and  dress  of  the  Persians,  and 
of  traitorously  corresponding  with  the  king.  At  length,  this 
splendid  soldier,  this  superb  commander,  the  greatest  benefactor 
of  his  countrymen,  who  might  have  reigned  immortal  in  the 
hearts  of  his  fellow  citizens,  coidd  he  but  have  limited  his  over- 
weening pi"ide  and  vaulting  ambition  to  the  first  magistracy  of  a 
frugal  and  poor  republic — convicted  of  manifest  treason — died 
miserably,  a  dishonest,  and  deplorable,  if  undeplored,  death. 
Taking  sanctuary  in  the  temple  of  Athene,  "of  the  brazen 
house,"  from  which  the  awful  religion  of  the  spot  prevented  his 
removal,  the  door  was  walled  up — his  own  mother  laying  the 
first  stone — the  roof  torn  ofi^,  and  guards,  stationed  around ;  till 

*  Pausanias.  Attica,  27. 


HIS  TREASON.  171 

the  most  famous  soldier  and  wealthiest  man  of  all  Hellas,  died 
wretchedly,  on  the  bare  earth,  of  cold  and  famine. 

It  is  not  a  picture  to  be  dwelt  upon  ;  for,  though  it  has  a  sad 
moral  of  the  inconstancy  of  human  things,  even  of  human  virtue 
it  is  one  of  so  constant  occurrence  in  the  early  republics  of  Hel- 
las, that  we  are  half  induced  to  suspect  some  natural  ill  inherent 
to  their  constitutions,  which  rendered  inevitable,  if  it  might  not 
palhate,  these  constantly  recurring  instances  of  the  noblest  patriot- 
ism, polluted  by  the  basest  treason,  in  the  pei*son  of  a  single  indi- 
vidual. Heaven  be  praised,  if  such  acts  of  devotion  are  rare  of 
occurrence  in  these  latter  days — such  treasons  are  impossible 


V. 

XENOPHON, 


HIS  RETREAT  OF  THE  TEN  THOUSAND  ;    HIS  CAMPAIGNS,  CHARAC- 
TER, AND  CONDUCT. 

Born  an  Athenian,  in  the  borough  of  Ei-cheia,  of  the  tribe 
Aigeis,  this  distinguished  man  came  upon  the  stage  of  hfe  at  a 
busy  and  eventful  period,  both  for  his  native  city,  and  for  the 
world  at  large — for  it  was  in  the  second  year  of  the  eighty -third 
Olympiad,  corresponding  to  four  hundred  and  forty-five  B.C., 
in  the  Archonship  of  Timarchides — the  same  year  in  which, 
after  all  the  district  of  Attika  had  been  devastated  by  the  Lake- 
daimonians,  and  the  city  of  Chaironeia  fruitlessly  captured  by 
their  own  general  Tolmides,  who  was  afterwards  defeated  with 
the  loss  of  his  whole  army,  and  himself  slain  at  Koroneia,  the 
Athenians  were  compelled  to  liberate  all  the  cities  they  had 
gained  in  Boiotia,  in  order  to  procure  the  release  of  their  own 
prisoners  from  the  hands  of  the  Thebans — that  he  first  saw  the 
light.  His  father's  name  was  Gryllos ;  but  little  is  known  either 
of  his  family,  or  of  his  early  years ;  beyond  this,  that  while  a 
very  young  man  his  personal  beauty  recommended  him  to  So- 
crates, of  whom  he  became  perhaps  the  most  favorite  and 
distinguished  pupil,  certainly  one  of  the  very  few,  who  neither 


HIS  EARLY  YEARS.  l73 

disgi'aced  tiie  name  and  tenets  of  their  preceptor  by  tlie  grossness 
and  immorality  of  their  private  lives,  nor  turned  the  profession 
of  philosophy  into  sordid  money-making  charlatanry  ;  for  he, 
at  least,  used  it  rather  as  the  daily  guide  and  measure  of  an 
honorable,  upright,  and  useful  life,  than  as  the  means  of  dishonest 
profit,  or  the  badge  of  vanity  and  arrogance. 

A  truce  of  thirty  yeai*s  was  signed,  on  the  year  of  Xenophon's 
birth,  between  the  Athenians  and  Lakedaimonians  ;  and  so  much 
were  the  former  depressed  by  the  results  of  the  battle  of 
Koroneia,  that  they  moved  but  httle  in  the  pubhc  affairs  of 
Greece  for  a  considerable  space  of  time  ;  until,  in  the  fii-st  year 
of  the  eighty-seventh  Olympiad,*  they  became  involved  in  a 
quarrel  between  the  Korinthians  and  Kerkuraians,  in  the  course 
of  which  they  soon  came  to  actual  hostilities  with  the  former 
people,  at  the  siege  of  Potidaia,  an  Attik  dependency  which  had 
been  seduced  from  its  allegiance  by  the  joint  influence  of  Koriuth 
and  Perdikkas  of  Makedonia,  who  was  at  this  period  actively 
revolutionizing  all  the  Athenian  colonies  and  conquests  in  Chal- 
kidike. 

Their  blockade  of  Potidaia,  by  that  able  leader  Phormion,  was 
instantly  seized  as  a  pretext  against  Athens,  by  the  Spartans  and 
other  Peloponnesians,  who  were  anxiously  seeking  cause  of  war ; 
and,  after  a  mock  examination  at  the  isthmus,  and  the  farce  of 
sending  evidently  untenable  demands  and  inadmissible  proposi- 
tions, they  declared  the  truce  to  be  broken  by  the  Athenians, 
and  so  declared  war  upon  them.  In  the  following  year,  the 
Thebaus  commenced  hostilities  by  the  seizure  of  Plataia,  the 
devastation  of  its  territories,  and  the  wholesale  cainage  of  its 
rural  population.  This  led  to  retahation,  and  thence  to  the 
Peloponnesian  war,  which  raged  for  twenty-se\en  years  through 
every  part  of  Greece,  and  at  its  close  left  Athens  stripped  of 

*  Diod.  Sic.  XII.  37.     In  the  Archonship  of  Pythodoros,  and  the  ad- 
ministration of  Perikles. 


174  XEXOPHON. 

power  and  almost  of  independence ;  and  all  the  other  states  of 
southern  Hellas,  so  thoroughly  divided  and  exhausted,  that  they 
fell  at  once  under  the  control  of  the  absolute  tyrannies  of  Epiros, 
Makedonia,  and  Thessaly ;  and  ultimately  sunk  an  easy  prey  to 
Rome,  the  very  calmness  of  whose  equable  but  iron  despotism 
was  received  as  a  boon,  and  regarded  almost  as  liberty  and 
peace,  by  states  worn  out  with  the  excitement  of  incessant  war- 
fare, wearied  by  the  continuous  succession  of  victory  and  defeat 
alike  unavaihng,  and  washing  above  all  things  for  repose,  even  if 
it  were  the  repose  of  national  and  political  annihilation.  At  this 
period  Xenophon  was  in  his  fifteenth  year,  and  from  the  early 
age  at  which  the  Greeks  were  wont  to  enter  upon  political  life, 
as  also  from  the  energy  and  actinty  of  his  subsequent  career,  we 
should  expect  soon  after  this  to  hear  of  him  in  public  ;  but  it  is 
not  till  eight  yeare  later,  at  the  defeat  of  the  Athenians  by  the 
Boiotians,  under  Pagondas,  before  the  walls  of  Dehon,  that  we 
find  any  mention  of  him,  and  that  only  in  the  shape  of  a  vague 
and  un authenticated  rumor,  that  fighting  desperately  he  w^as 
struck  down  and  would  have  been  slain,  but  for  the  prompt 
rescue  of  his  preceptor  Sokrates.  The  same  story  is  also  told, 
however,  with  the  name  of  Alkibiades  introduced  for  that  of 
Xenophon,  in  relation  to  the  same  battle,  so  that  little  rehance 
can  be  placed  upon  it;  though  there  is  something  more  of 
probabihty  in  another  tradition  of  his  being  captured  not  long 
afterward  in  another  battle,  the  name  of  which  has  not,  nor 
indeed  any  other  traces  of  it,  been  preserved  in  history ;  and  of 
his  being  long  detained  a  captive  in  Thebes,  where  he  is  said,  by 
Philostratos,  in  his  fife  of  Sokrates,*  to  have  studied  philosophy 
with  Prodikos  of  Kos,  and  where  he  perhaps  formed  that 
intimacy  with  Proxenos  the  Buiotian,  which  induced  him  to  join 
in  the  expedition  of  Kyros  against  Artoxerxes.  It  is,  indeed,  not 
a  little  remarkable  that,  with  the  exception  of  these  two  uneer- 
*  Anthon'b  Bibliotheca  Classica;  art.,  Xenophon. 


OBSCURITY    OF    HIS    EARLY     i'EARS.  iTo 

tain  notices,  both  of  which  in  some  degree  lack  confirmation, 
nothing  definite  or  certain  should  be  known  of  the  way  in  which 
the  youth  and  early  manhood  were  spent  of  one,  who  was 
destined  afterward,  when  his  maturity  had  somewhat  passed  its 
prime,  to  come  forth  as  it  were  self-made,  and  blaze  up  at  once, 
without  visible  experience,  a  thorough  and  consummate  general. 
For  seven  and  twenty  years,  as  I  have  already  stated,  beginning 
when  he  had  aheady  completed  his  fifteenth  year,  war,  con- 
tinuous and  unmitigated,  raged  through  the  Peloponnesos, 
through  Attika,  Boiotia,  through  all  the  seas  circumadjacent, 
through  many  of  the  neighboring  isles  of  Greece,  Sicily,  the 
richest  and  the  most  remote,  not  excluded  ;  his  native  country 
was  devastated  five  times,  far  and  near,  by  Peloponnesian  armies, 
the  flames  kindled  by  whom  could  be  seen  fi-om  the  very  walls 
of  Athens ;  was  decimated  by  the  most  fearful  pestilence  record- 
ed, unless  it  be  perhaps  the  great  plague  of  London ;  under- 
went all  ^dcissitudes  from  the  most  splendid  glory,  to  the  most 
abject  gloom;  and  was,  in  the  first  year  of  the  ninety-fourth 
Olympiad,*  compelled  to  surrender  to  the  Spartans,  under  Ly- 
sander,  who  razed  her  long  walls  to  the  earth  and  put  an  end 
to  her  supremacy  for  ever.  Of  the  fii-st  twenty  years  of  this  war, 
we  have,  complete  to  this  day,  the  finest  specimen  of  contempo- 
raneous history  that  ever  flowed  from  a  \igorous,  eloquent,  and 
impartial  pen ;  I  mean  of  course  that  of  Thukydides — of  the 
remainder,  Xenophon  himself  has  left  us  the  narrative  ;  but  in 
neither  of  these  works,  nor  in  that  of  Diodoros,  is  there  the 
slightest  allusion  to  any  military  services,  or  any  exploit  of 
Xenophon  himself.  That  a  man  of  his  parts,  energy,  intellect 
and  courage  could  possibly  have  been  engaged  in  warlike  duties 
for  twenty  years,  without  attaining  any  command,  or  performing 
anything  worthy  even  of  a  passing  notice,  would  indeed  seem 
impossible  ;  and  it  is  not  to  be  imagined  that  he  would  have 
*  404  B.C. 


176  XENOPHON. 

remained,  even  had  he  been  permitted  to  do  so,  quiet  and  inac- 
tive, while  it  was  debated  in  the  most  desperate  strife  whether  his 
own  country  was  "  to  be  or  not  to  be,"  and  ahnost  decided  in 
the  negative.  Nor  does  he  again  appear  in  history,  until  he 
joined  the  expedition  against  Persia,  in  the  year  after  his  return, 
commanded  with  so  much  ability  by  his  friend  Agesilaos.  Even 
in  this,  we  know  not  what  part  he  played  or  w  hat  rank  he  bore ; 
and  in  the  like  obscurity  rests  his  conduct  at  Coroneia,  although 
the  fact  that  he  served  there,  and  by  that  service  lost  the  favor 
of  his  countrymen,  is  patent. 

It  avails  nothing,  however,  to  inquire  or  examine,  where  and 
how  Xenophon  acquired  that  military  skill,  which  he  afterward 
displayed  in  so  eminent  a  degree.  How  he  became  so  much 
attached  to  the  polity,  and  such  an  admirer  of  the  character  of 
the  Spartans — how  such  an  intimate  with  Agesilaos,  an  active 
enemy  of  Athens,  must  ever  remain  an  insoluble  mystery  :  and  we 
can  only  marvel  w^here  the  military  wisdom  had  its  school,  which 
conducted  the  most  remarkable  retreat,  and  in  its  line  the  great- 
est military  achievement,  recorded  on  any  page  of  any  history. 

To  return,  however,  a  little,  in  order  to  throw  some  hght  on 
the  state  of  affaii-s  in  Persia,  which  led  to  the  expedition  of  Kyros, 
in  the  last  year  of  the  eighty-eighth  Olympiad,  corresponding  to 
four  hundred  and  twenty-five,  B.  C,  died  Artoxerxes,  surnamcd 
Longimanus,  the  son  of  Xerxes,  and  to  him  succeeded  Xerxes  11, ; 
who  was  murdered  within  a  few.months  by  his  own  natural  brother, 
Sogdianos.  He  in  his  turn  was  again  deposed  and  put  to  death 
by  a  third  illegitimate  brother,  Darios  H.,  who  had  previouj^ly 
been  known  as  Ochos,  the  two  reigns  falling  wuthin  the  space  of 
a  little  over  a  single  year.  Darios  H.  reigned  nineteen  yeai-s, 
during  which  there  was  but  little  stir  in  the  affairs  of  Asia,  with 
the  exception  of  some  unimportant  victories  gained  by  Kyros,  his 
younger  son.  He  dying  in  the  year  four  hundred  and  four,  the 
same  which  saw  the  termination  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  was 


AFFAIRS  OF  PERSIA.  l77 

succeeded  by  his  eldest  son  Artoxerxes  IL,  ^ho  had  previously 
been  named  Ai-sakes,  being-  born  before  his  father's  accession  to 
the  throne,  and  at  a  time  when  that  event  seemed  wholly  improb- 
able ;  but  Darios  left  a  younger  son  also,  Kyros,  who  had 
already  obtained  not  a  httle  mihtary  distinction,  and  who  was  full 
of  ambitious  aspirations  himself  to  assume  the  imperial  tiara, 
Nor  was  he  entirely  without  some  sort  of  pretext  for  aspiring  to 
it ;  since,  although  the  usages  of  Persia  favored  pnmogeniture,  it 
was  well  known  that  Xerxes  L,  son  of  Darios  Hystaspes,  had 
been  preferred  to  his  elder  brother  Artabanos,  partly  through  the 
influence  of  his  mother  Atossa,  partly  on  the  same  plea  that 
Artabanos,  born  while  his  father  was  a  pi-ivate  individual,  was 
not  the  son  of  a  king,  nor  heir  to  the  kingly  title.  Such  a 
quibble  would  really  appear  almost  too  transparent ;  but  con- 
scious that  he  had  his  mother  Parysatis,  whose  favorite  he  was, 
on  his  side,  Kyros,  even  before  his  father's  death,  had  entei-tained 
hopes  of  obtaining  the  succession  by  his  father's  bequest.  Nor 
is  it  altogether  improbable  that  he  would  have  obtained  it,  had 
he  been  on  the  spot  in  time.  For,  when  he  felt  himself  to  be  on 
his  death-bed,  Darios  summoned  Kyros,  Ai'toxerxes  the  elder 
being  present,  to  come  up  from  his  satrapy  of  Asia  Minor,  which 
he  had  bestowed  on  him  with  the  command  of  all  the  Greek 
and  other  forces  assembled  in  the  plain  of  Kastolos ;  and  though 
he  came  up  with  all  speed,  cariying  with  him  as  his  near  friend, 
Tissaphernes,  and  escorted  by  three  hundi-ed  Greek  hoplitai, 
commanded  by  Xenias  the  Parrhasian,  he  arrived  only  to  find 
his  father  in  the  death  agony,  and  to  be  a  witness  of  his  brother's 
inauguration.  At  this  juncture,  Tissaphernes,  who,  whenever  he 
appeai-s  on  the  page  of  Xenophon's  most  interesting  narrative,  is 
marked  with  somfe  peculiar  brand  of  falsehood,  ti-eachery  and 
cowardice,  accused  Kyros  to  his  bi'other  of  compassing  his  death ; 
on  which  the  prince  was  arrested,  condemned  to  death,  and  only 
not  executed,  owing  to  his  mother's  teai-s  and  obsecrations,  which 


173  XENOPHOX. 

prevailed  not  only  to  obtain  his  pardon,  but  to  preserve  to  him 
his  satrapy,*  whithei'  he  was  commanded  forthwith  to  retire. 

The  fuller  particulars  state  that  it  was  the  usage  for  Persian 
monarchs,  at  their  investitui-e,  to  visit  the  temple  of  the  goddess 
of  war,  corresponding  to  the  Greek  Athene,  and  having  there 
partaken  of  a  solemn  repast,  consisting  of  a  kind  of  marmalade 
of  fig's,  preserved  nuts  of  the  terebinth,  and  sour  milk,  to  assume 
the  royal  garb,  and  with  it  the  authority  of  king.  While  Arto- 
xerxes  was  making  ready,  with  his  brother,  for  this  ceremonial,  Tis- 
saphernes  introduced  one  of  the  inferior  priests  of  the  temple  who 
had  given  information  of  an  ambush,  which  Kyros,  he  said,  had 
prepared  for  the  king,  in  order  to  slay  him  so  soon  as  he  should 
put  on  the  robe  of  state.f  Some  insinuation  has  been  made  to 
the  effect  that  the  priest  was  suborned ;  but  the  probability  is 
the  other  way.  The  affections  among  relatives,  born  in  the  pre- 
cincts of  the  harem,  are  to  a  proverb  as  frail  and  transitory,  as 
their  jealousies  and  animosities  are  vindictive  and  enduring ;  nor 
are  brothers,  in  oriental  dynasties,  even  to  this  day,  particularly 
scrupulous  in  th?  use  of  the  drugged  bowl  or  the  assassin's  knife, 
for  the  removal  of  a  tenant  of  the  throne. 

The  subsequent  conduct  of  Kyros,  especially  in  the  battle  of 
Kynaxa,  shows  something  more  than  the  unscrupulous  intent 
to  wade  even  through  fratricide  to  empire,  for  it  was  marked  by 
a  savage  animosity,  and  a  sanguinary  determination  to  slay  with 
his  own  hand.  The  shrewdness  and  sagacity,  moreover,  with 
which  he  had  long  courted  the  Spartans  in  preference  to  the 
Athenians,  as  always  the  more  ready  to  traffic  with  the  barba- 
rian ;  and  the  secresy  with  which  he  had  been  collecting  and 
maintaining  small  bodies  of  Peloponnesian  mercenaries  at  varioiK 
points  under  the  pretext  of  an  intended  exjjedition  against  the 
barbarians  of  Pisidia,  so  that  when  he  required  it  he  was  at  the 
head  of  a  Hellenic  power  at  a  moment's  notice,  all  go  to  prove 
*  Xen.  Anab.  1.  f  Plut.  Vit.  Artox.  4. 


KYROS  AND  ARTOXERXES.  l79 

that  he  was  resolved,  long  before  these  events,  to  throw  for 
empire  at  the  risk  of  life.  There  is  little  reason,  therefore,  to 
doubt  the  willingness  of  Kyros  to  have  recourse  to  stratagem 
and  a  single  dagger's  stroke,  instead  of  trying  the  chances  of 
war,  and  affronting  the  proverbial  fickleness  of  military  fortune. 
And  this  the  rather  that,  in  Asia,  there  was  no  such  sanctity  in 
the  bond  of  brotherhood,  as  to  render  the  crime  of  frati-icide  the 
most  appalling  of  atrocities,  or  the  intermarriage  with  a  sister 
the  most  shocking  of  incests  ;  both  being  matters  of  every  day 
occurrence,  and  the  former — the  latter  being  the  rule,  rather  than 
the  exception — being  regarded  pretty  much  as  the  taking  off 
any  other  dangerous,  political  antagonist,  or  formidable  ]'ival. 

Both  these  young  princes  appear  to  have  been  naturally 
amiable,  rather  than  the  reverse ;  and  the  younger  unquestion- 
ably possessed  in  a  very  high  degree  that  most  princely  power 
of  conciliating  all  affections,  and  of  fascinating  all  who  came 
within  his  sphere. 

He  had  by  far  the  greater  talents  also,  for  he  was  not  only 
generally  accomphshed  and  a  rare  proficient  in  the  use  of  arms, 
but  was  a  general,  not  unjustly,  of  considerable  pretensions. 

Artoxerxes,  on  the  contrary,  was  weak,  wavering  and  unde- 
cided, in  his  character,  though  not  deficient  in  personal  courage  ; 
and  lacked  the  practical  commonplace  wisdom,  which  should 
have  induced  him  either  to  conciliate  his  brother  by  a  total 
avoidance  of  all  show  of  suspicion,  and  a  complete  and  generous 
confidence  founded  on  oblivion  of  the  past ;  or  by  strong  mea- 
sures and  deprivation  of  all  power  political,  and  military 
authority,  to  have  rendered  him  for  the  future  incapable  of  open 
rebellion,  if  not  of  secret  sedition.  Instead  of  doing  this,  while 
he  so  far  pardoned  him  as  to  dismiss  him  unhurt  and  with  an 
almost  independent  command,  to  his  own  satrapy,  he  yet  treated 
him  with  such  coolness,  and  with  marks  of  displeasure  and 
suspicion  so  strong,  that  it  was  natural  enough  for  Kyros  to 


1 80  XENOPHOX. 

deem  himself  one  marked  out  for  future  jealousies,  perhaps 
destined  for  present  destruction — since  then  as  now,  in  the  East, 
it  was  an  usual  method  when  kings  apprehended  the  disloyal- 
ty, or  dreaded  the  exuberant  power,  of  their  most  puissant 
satellites,  rather  to  let  them  be  taken  off  while  on  the  route  to 
their  distant  provinces — a  casualty  which  might  well  be  ascribed 
to  chance  indisposition — than  to  summon  them  to  open  trial ;  and 
so  give  them  an  opportunity  of  resorting  to  open  resistance. 

Whether  Artoxerxes  entertained  such  designs  or  no,  cannot 
now  be  discovered,  but  that  Kyros  was  filled  with  doubt,  dismay 
and  animosity  combined,  was  stung  almost  to  madness  by  the 
sense  of  merited  or  unmerited  disgrace,  and  was  now  if  not 
earlier,  resolved  on  striking  for  empire,  is  evident  from  the  pre- 
parations which  he  began  at  once  to  make  with  equal  energy  of 
purpose,  and  shrewdness  in  avoiding  suspicion. 

We  find,  for  instance,  that,  in  order  doubtless  to  lull  his 
brother's  suspicions  to  sleep,  he  condescended  to  solicit  favoi-s  at 
his  hands  through  the  intercession  of  his  mother  Parysatis,  and 
succeeded  in  obtaining  the  government  of  several  wealthy  cities 
in  Asia  Minor,  for  which  his  old  enemy  Tissaphernes  was  a  rival 
applicant ;  while  at  the  same  time,  he  was  diligently  collecting 
the  materials  for  an  auxiliary  force  of  Hellenic  mercenaries,  whom 
he  levied,  maintained,  and  employed  in  various  places  and  under 
various  leaders,  apparently  unconnected  with  himself  and  with 
each  other — until  the  time  should  arise  for  exhibitmg  himself 
m  his  true  colors,  and  taking  the  initiative  in  ofiensive  operations. 

He  was  moreover  in  secret  treaty  with  the  Lakedaimonians, 
whose  ephori  had  promised  him  active  aid,  so  soon  as  he  should 
be  ready  to  strike,  a  promise  which  they  fi\iled  not  to  keep ;  since 
it  was  their  constant  and  true  policy  to  hold  the  hands  of  the 
Persian  monarchs  full  at  home,  whereby  to  deprive  them  of 
leisure  for  intermeddling  in  the  affairs  of  Greece ;  nor  were  they 
at  all  so  scrupulous  as  to  be  troubled  about  the  morahty  or 


HIS    MERCENARIES.  181 

justice  of  any  expedition  which  should  subdivide  the  power  of 
the  king,  and  disturb  the  integrity  of  his  dominion. 

The  fii-st  pretext  of  Kyros  was  the  quasi  war  with  Tissu- 
phernes,  which  ensued  on  the  king  making  over  to  his  brother 
the  Ionian  cities  of  the  coast,  which  had  formerly  belonged  to 
that  satrap,  and  in  which  he  had  been  for  some  time  exciting 
revolutionary  movements  to  the  detriment  of  the  prince's  author- 
ity. As  if  to  counteract  these  movements,  he  now  collected  a 
force  of  Hellenic  mercenaries,  and  at  once  laid  siege  to  Miletos, 
being  careful  to  pay  over  regularly  to  the  king  the  tributes  of  all 
those  disputed  cities  ;  so  that,  until  his  plans  were  entirely  matur- 
ed, no  suspicions  of  his  motive  seem  to  have  arisen. 

Besides  this  force  he  had  already  a  considerable  power  of 
Peloponnesian  mercenaries  on  foot,  under  the  command  of  Kle- 
archos,  a  political  exile  from  Sparta,  and  Aristippos  of  Thessalia, 
to  whom  he  had  advanced  payment  for  the  levy  and  mainte- 
nance of  four  thousand  men  for  six  months,  who  were  under 
arms  across  the  straits  in  the  Thrakian  Chersonesos,  as  if  warring 
on  their  own  account,  there  and  in  Thessaly.  Now,  moreover,  he 
summoned  Proxenos  of  Boiotia,  to  levy  Greeks,  as  if  for  the  sub- 
jugation of  the  Pisidians,  a  semi -barbarous  tribe  in  the  mountains 
toward  Upper  Asia,  while  he  employed  Sophainetos  the  Stympha- 
lian,  and  Sokrates  the  Achaian,  in  besieging  Miletos,  which  was 
occupied  by  the  allies  of  Tissaphernes, 

It  would  appear  that  some  three  yeai-s  were  consumed  in  the 
preparation  of  these  forces,  and  in  other  pi-ehminaiy  arrange- 
ments ;  for  it  was  not  until  the  4th  year  of  the  94th  Olympiad, 
in  the  archonship  of  Exainetos,  and  the  military  tribuneship  of 
Pubhus  Cornelius,  Caius  Fabius,  Spurius  Nautius,  Caius  Valerius, 
Manlius  Sergius,  and  Junius  Lycurgus,  corresponding  to  B.  C. 
401,*  that  the  expedition  actually  commenced. 

For  this  end,  in  the  spring  of  that  year,  Kyi-os  marched  from 
*  Diod.  Sic.  XIV.,  19.     Arnold's  Rome,  vol.  I..  346. 


182  xExorHox. 

Sardis,  the  capital  of  his  Satrapy,  with  Xenias  the  Arkadian, 
commanding  four  thousand  shields  of  heavy  foot,  the  garrisons 
of  the  maritime  cities ;  Proxenos  the  Boiotian,  with  whom  came 
Xenophon — not  as  a  general,  nor  captain  of  a  band,  nor  pri- 
vate*— at  the  head  of  fifteen  hundred  shields  and  five  hundred 
light  infantry;  Sophainetos  of  Stymphalos,f  at  the  head  of  a 
thousand  shields;  Sokrates  the  Achaian,  having  five  hundred 
shields  ;  and  Pasion  of  Megara,  leading  three  hundred  hoplitai 
and  five  hundred  targeteers,  a  new  arm  of  the  service,  interme- 
diate between  the  heavy  infantry  and  the  gijmnetcd,  recently 
introduced  by  Iphikrates  of  Athens,  and  used  by  him  with  effect 
and  execution. 

At  the  end  of  four  days'  march  he  arrived  at  Kolossoi,  a 
large  city  of  Lydia,  where  he  halted  seven  days,  and  was  joined 
there  by  Menon  the  Thessalian,  leading  a  thousand  shields  of 
heavy  foot  and  five  hundred  Ainianian,  Dolopian,  and  Olynthian 
targeteei-s.  Thence  he  marched  three  days'  journey  further  to 
Kelainai,  a  city  on  the  junction  of  the  Maiander  and  Maj'syas 
rivers,  where  he  abode  thirty  days,  awaiting  Klearchos,  M'ho 
came  up  here,  together  with  Sosis  the  Achaian,  and  Sophainetos 
the  Arkadian,  leading  in  all  two  thousand  three  hundred  heavy 
infantry,  eight  hundred  Thrakian  targeteers,  and  two  hundred 
Kretan  bowmen.  And  this  completed  the  whole  of  his  Greek 
contingents  which  he  reviewed  here,  and  found  them  to  amount 
in  all  to  eleven  thousand  shields  of  heavy  foot,  and  about  two 
thousand  targeteers  and  archers.J;  The  actual  forces,  as  enu- 
merated above,  amount  to  ten  thousand  six  hundred  shields,  and 
two  thousand  three  hundred  light  troops,  part  of  whom  wero 

*  Xen.  Anab.  IIT.,  1,  4. 

t  This  chief  must  not  be  confounded  with  Sophainetos  the  Arkadian, 
mentioned  hereafter ;  for  Stymphalos,  though  an  Arcadian  city,  seems  at 
this  time  to  have  belonged  to  ArgoHs. 
t  Xen.  Anab.  I.  11,  9. 


NUMBER    OF    THE    GREEKS.  183 

probably  equipped  as  hoplitai  during  the  march,  in  order  to 
equalize  the  numbers  of  the  phalanx.  There  is,  however,  some 
discrepancy  in  the  numbers,  throughout ;  for  although  Kyros  was 
farther  strengthened  by  the  junction  of  Cheirisophos  the  Lake- 
daimonian,  at  Issos,  within  the  Kilikian  gates,  bringing  up  seven 
hundred*  Spartan  infantry  sent  by  the  Ephori,  we  find  that  in 
the  battle  of  Kynaxa,  the  shields  were  but  ten  thousandf  four 
hundred,  w^hile  the  targeteers  amounted  to  twenty-five  hundred 
— the  only  loss  recorded  being  that  of  two  lochi  of  Menon's 
men;];,  who  were  either  cut  to  pieces  while  plundering,  or  deserted, 
to  the  number  of  a  hundred  shields.  The  march  into  Upper 
Asia  occupied,  it  seems,"  above  six  months  ;  and  it  is  not  impro- 
bable that  o^'er  and  above  the  ordinary  casualties  of  so  long  an 
expedition,  many  of  the  Greeks  were  corrupted  by  the  luxui-ies 
of  the  Oriental  cities  in  which  they  halted,  and  so  became  lost  to 
the  army.  Even  for  ordinar}^  losses,  however,  the  difference  is 
not  excessive,  amounting  only  to  six  hundred  deaths,  or  deser- 
tions, over  and  above  the  recorded  loss  of  Menon's  men,  in  a 
march  of  ninety-three  days,  halts  not  included,  and  of  two  thou- 
sand|;  miles. 

When  they  reached  Tai-sos,  at  the  pass  between  the  mountains 
and  the  sea  into  Upper  Asia,  Kyi-os  was  again  compelled  to  halt 
for  twenty  days,  since  the  Hellenic  bands  began  to  be  refractory, 
and  showed  much  disinclination  to  proceed  farther  into  the 
country,  suspecting  that  they  were  to  be  employed  against  the 
king.  At  the  end  of  these  days,  however,  they  were  brought 
over  by  Klearchos,  who  was  the  only  leader  fully  in  the  confi- 
dence of  Kyros,  and  by  the  representations  of  the  prince  himself, 
that  he  was  only  about  to  march  against  Abrokomas,  a  personal 
enemy  of  his  own,  who  lay  on  the  Euphrates,  some  twelve 
marches  distant.     Persuaded  by  these  considerations,  and  by  an 

*  Xen.  Anab.  I.,  iv.  3.         f  Anab.  L,  vii- 10.         J  Anab-  L,  ii-  25- 
X  Anab.  II.,  ii.  6. 


184  XENOPHOX. 

increase  of  pay,  they  marclied  onward  five  days  farther  to  Issos, 
where,  as  above  stated,  the  army  was  joined  by  Cheirisophos, 
sent  thither  with  the  Spartan  fleet.  And  here  Xenias  the  Arka- 
dian,  and  Pasion  of  Megara,  took  ship  and  deserted,  through 
resentment  at  the  defection  of  many  of  their  men  to  Klearchos, 
during  the  last  halt ;  but  it  does  not  appear  that  any,  beyond 
their  personal  attendants,  if  even  these,  joined  them  in  their  dis- 
affection. From  this  point  they  marched  quietly  to  the  rich  city 
of  Thapsakos,  twelve  days  farther — no  one  positively  aware,  even 
yet,  what  was  the  object  of  the  expedition,  says  Xerfophon  ;*  yet 
it  is  scarcely  possible  to  doubt,  especially  when  we  perceive  how 
immediately  all  their  scruples  vanished  before  the  exhibition  of 
increased  pay,  that  not  only  the  generals,  but  the  soldiers  of  all 
ranks,  must  have  been  absolutely  certain,  if  only  fi-om  the  secresy 
with  which  it  was  conducted,  what  was  the  real  object  of  their 
march.  At  Thapsakos,  however,  all  their  doubts,  if  they  enter- 
tained any,  must  have  terminated ;  for  here  Kyros  himself 
explained  all  his  purpose  to  the  leaders,  and  they,  calling  an 
assembly  of  the  army,  to  the  soldiers.  But  these  affected  great 
indignation  at  their  own  ofRcei-s,  as  if  they  had  been  deceived  by 
them ;  but  on  recei\nng  the  promise  of  a  bonus  of  five  silver 
minae— equal  to  about '  twenty  pounds  sterling,  or  a  hundred 
dollars,  to  speak  in  round  numbei-s — to  eveiy  man,  in  addition 
to  his  full  pay,  from  their  departure  until  their  return  into  Ionia, 
so  soon  as  they  should  amve  at  Babylon,  they  relented  as  usual, 
and  proceeded  without  further  hesitation,  across  the  Euphrates, 
and  along  its  eastern  bank,  to  the  city  of  Karmanda.  There  they 
fell  in  with  the  first  signs  of  the  enemy,  in  the  trail  of  about  two 
thousand  hoi-se,  preceding  them  and  devastating  the  countiy ; 
there,  too,  Orontes,  one  of  Kyros's  most  trusty  chiefs,  was  con- 
victed of  manifest  treason,  in  endeavoring  to  carry  the  cavalry 
over  to  the  king,  and  was  led  away  as  if  to  execution ;  from 
^  Xen.  Anab.  1.  iii.  16. 


DISAPPEARANCK    OF    OP.ONTES.  185 

■which  time,  alive  or  dead,  he  was  never  seen  of  men,  nor  the 
place  of  his  sepulture.     Thence  entering  Babylonia,  they  marched 
yet  three  days,  when  at  midnight  Kjros  reviewed  his  whole  force 
on  the  plain,  and  arranged  his  order  of  battle ;  for  he  expected 
his  brother  to  dehver  battle  on  the  morrow ;  and  to  Klearchos 
he  gave  the  leading  of  the  right  wing ;  to  Menon  that  of  the 
Greek  left,  and  to  himself  he  reserved  the  command  of  his 
Orientals,  one  hundred  thousand  strong,  with  all  his  cavahy, 
which  appears  to  have  been  unusually  feeble,  and  twenty  scythed 
chariot's.     But  while  the  review  was  yet  in  process,  desertei-s 
from  the  king  arrived,  announcing  the  approach   of  the  royal 
army,  rated  at  one  million  and  two  hundred  thousand  combat- 
ants, besides  six  thousand  cuirassiei-s  of  the  Immortals,  led  by 
Artagei*ses,  and  two  hundred  scythe-armed  chariot«5.     Of  these, 
however,  but  nine  hundred  thousand  were  present  under  arms, 
being  three  out  of  the  four  equal  divisions,  each  three  hundred 
thousand  strong,  commanded  by  Tissaphernes,  Gobryas,  Arbakes, 
and  Abrokomas — the  last  of  whom  did  not  come  up  until  the 
fifth  day  after  the  decision  of  the  campaign  by  the  battle  of 
Kynaka.*     All  that  day  the  army  marched  in  battle  order,  until 
they  arrived  at  a  vast  recent  trench,  five  fathoms  wide  and  three 
deep,  running  twelve  parasangs,  or  nearly  fifty  English  miles  up 
the  country,  till  it  reached  the  Median  wall,  where  it  met  all  the 
canals,  four  in  number,  about  four  miles  apart,  and  a  hundred  feet 
in  width,  well  bridged,  which  were  constructed  for  the  passage  of 
the  corn-ships  from  the  Tigris  into  the  Euphrates.     The  trench 
could  be  passed  at  one  point  only,  on  a  causeway,  twenty  feet 
widp,  along  the  bank  of  the  Euphrates  ;  and  it  was  so  evident 
that  the  king  had  originally  intended  to  fight  here,  but  that  his 
heart  had  failed  him,  that,  having  thus  far  advanced  in 'array  of 
battle,  no  sooner  had  they  entered  this  formidable  line  of  defences, 
than  the  army  relaxed  its  discipline ;  Kyros  himself  riding  in  his 
*Xen.  Anab.  ].,  vii.  11,  12. 


186  XEXOPIION. 

chariot,  and  the  Greek  hoplitai  advancing  in  loose  order,  with 
their  shields  borne  for  the  most  part  in  the  baggage  wagons,  or 
on  the  backs  of  the  boasts  of  burthen. 

Thus  they  continued  all  the  next  day;  but  on  the  third, 
Pateguas,  a  Persian,  confidant  of  Kyros,  came  panting  in  from 
the  van,  announcing  the  royal  army  close  at  hand.  This  was 
about  the  hour  of  full  market,  or  from  nine  to  eleven  o'clock, 
A.M. ;  and  then  all  was  bustle.  Kyros  leaped  from  his  car,  and 
armed  himself^  with  his  javelins  in  his  hand,  and  mounting  his 
charger  ordered  his  people  hastily.  To  the  Greeks  he  gave  the 
right  wing  of  the  whole  army  ;  to  Ariaios,  with  the  Lydians  and 
Phrygians,  and  a  thousand  horse,  the  left ;  and  to  himself,  as 
before,  he  reserved  the  centre  with  ten  thousand  Pei-sian  infantiy, 
and  six  hundred  chosen  horsemen,  armed  cap-a-pie  with  cors- 
lets, casques  and  thigh-pieces  and  Grecian  sabres,  and  riding 
horses  accoutred  with  chafrons  on  their  heads  and  poitrels  on 
their  chests,  whom  he  led  in  person,  armed  like  the  rest,  but 
wearing  on  his  head  a  tiara  only,  as  seems  to  have  been  the 
usage  with  the  Pereian  kings. 

Of  the  Greek  right  wing,  which  he  rightly  esteemed  the 
flower  of  his  whole  force,  and  to  which  he  looked  for  the  best 
service,  Klearchos  had  the  extreme  right,  along  the  river  bank, 
which  he  occupied  with  all  the  targeteers,  and  a  thousand  Paph- 
lagonian  cavah-y  attached  to  his  command  by  Kyros.  Next  to 
Klearchos,  fought  Proxenos  the  Boiotian,  with  whom  served 
Xenophon  as  a  volunteer  ;  then  the  rest  of  the  Hellenic  infantry, 
and  on  the  left,  next  to  the  barbaric  centre,  !Menon  the  Thessa- 
lian,  with  his  men.*  And  it  was  now  mid-day,  but  no  enemy 
w^cre  yet  in  sight. 

It  is  remarkable  that,  up  to  this  time,  Xenophon,  the  able 
narrator  of  this  expedition,  and  afterward  its  main  stay,  has  not 

*  Xen.  Anab.  I.  viii.  1-6.  Diod.  Sic.  XIX.  21-22.  Plut.  Vit.  Artox. 
IX. 


CONDUCT  OF  KYROS.  18*7 

made  his  appearance  on  the  scene  ;  and  it  is  only  by  one 
casual  expression  of  his  own  that  we  learn  whether  he  bore  any 
part  at  all  in  the  action,  in  which  he  seems  to  have  acted  as  a 
sort  of  aid-de-camp  to  his  friend  Proxenos,  serving  on  hoi-seback. 
It  was  already  afternoon,  when  "  there  appeared  dust  like  a 
white  cloud,  and  not  long  afterward  black  shadowy  masf^os 
covering  the  whole  plain.  But  when  they  were  come  nigher  the 
flashes  of  the  polished  bronze  were  visible ;  and  then  the  lines  of 
speai*s  and  the  ranks  came  into  sight.  And  there  were,  on  the 
enemy's  left  horse,  with  white  corslets,  said  to  be  Tissaphornes' 
men ;  and  next  to  these  Persians  with  wicker  targets  ;  and  next 
to  these,  again,  heavy  foot  with  wooden  shields  covering  them 
to  the  feet — and  it  w^as  said  that  these  were  ^Egyptians ;  and 
beyond  these  other  horse  again,  and  again  other  archers,  and  in 
front  of  all  a  continuous  line  of  war-chariots  vdth  scythes  project- 
ing from  the  naves  and  underneath  the  axles.  Kyros,  indeed, 
when  he  had  previously  harangued  the  Greeks,  told  them  that 
they  must  endure  the  shouts  and  wild  war  cries  of  the  barba- 
rians, but  he  erred  in  this,  for  they  came  not  on  with  a  shout,  but 
as  silently  and  quietly  as  possible,  at  a  slow  pace,  and  with  an 
even  front.  But  now  Kyros  gallopped  along  the  front  with 
Pigres  the  interpreter,  and  three  or  four  others,  and  shouted  to 
Klearchos  that  he  should  oblique  to  the  left,  and  charge,  with  his 
whole  force  of  Greeks,  full  on  the  enemy's  centre,  for  that  the 
king  fought  there  ;  '  and  if,'  he  cried,  '  we  may  conquer  there, 
we  shall  have  conquered  everywhere.' "  But  when  Klearchos 
observed  the  density  of  the  Pei-sian  centre,  and  learned  that  the 
left  wing  of  the  royal  army  overflanked  the  whole  Greek  power, 
while  the  extreme  left  of  Kyros'  entire  army  was  still  to  the 
nght  of  the  king's  centre,  he  did  not  deem  it  advisable  to  leave 
a  gap  between  his  own  right  and  the  river,  through  which  the 
masses  of  the  enemy's  left  could  have  broken  in  force  and  gained 
his  rear.     Wherefore  he  cont<Mited  him>plf  by  replying  that  he 


188  XENOPIION. 

would  aiTange  all  for  the  best.  And,  at  this  time,  the  army  was 
advancing  orderly  and  evenly,  when,  Kyi'os  careering  along  the 
front  surveyed  both  hosts,  of  his  friends  and  enemies,  whereupon, 
Xenophon,  the  Athenian,  gallopped  out  and  inquired  if  he  had 
any  orders ;  and  he  reining  up  desired  him  to  inform  all  men 
that  the  sacrifices  were  favorable  and  the  omens  propitious. 
While  he  was  yet  speaking,  a  great  clamor  ran  along  the 
Hellenic  ranks,  that  he  inquired  what  meant  the  clamor,  when 
Klearchos  replied  that  the  watchword  was  passing  now  the 
second  time  ;  and  he,  surprised  at  this,  asked  again  what  was 
the  watchword,  and  Klearchos  answered,  "  Zeus  the  Savior  and 
Victory."  Thereupon,  Kyros  replied,  '  I  accept  the  omen  and  so 
may  it  be,'  and  gallopped  away  to  his  own  station.  At  this 
time  the  armies  were  about  three  stadia  apart,  when  the  Greeks 
raised  the  Pseon,  and  levelling  their  pikes  to  the  charge,  rushed 
forward.  Then,  as  part  of  the  Phalanx  hurried  its  step  with 
overboiling  ardor,  so  that  the  front  was  a  little  shaken,  those  who 
were  left  behind  charged  on  at  double  quick  time  to  equalize 
their  advance,  and  catching  ardor  each  from  other,  and  influenced 
by  their  own  rapid  motion,  all  shouted  at  once  the  battle  cry  of 
Enyalios,  and  bore  down  with  a  fiery  rush,  clashing  their  spears 
against  their  brazen  shields  to  terrify  the  cavalry.  And,  long- 
before  they  were  within  bowshot,  the  Persians  broke  and  fled  in 
confusion,  the  Greeks  pui-suing  them  as  rapidly  as  they  could, 
without  breaking  their  own  ranks,  and  in  fact  chasing  them  too 
far  off  the  field  before  wheeling  on  the  rear  of  the  royal  centre. 
The  charge  of  the  scythed  chariots,  as  usual,  proved  fruitless,  for 
man^Mvere  driven  back  on  their  own  masses,  many  rushed  through 
the  Greek  ranks,  which  opened  to  give  them  passage,  empty 
and  overset,  without  harming  any  one  ;  '^nd  in  fact  thus  far  th. 
victory  was  bloodless,  for  of  all  the  Greeks,  one  man  fell  onlv, 
^••lot  with  an  arrow  in  the  left  wing.  Of  the  Persians,  Tissa- 
j.hrvnes  alone  did  not  fly,  but  charged  through  the  targeteers  and 


'illE  MELEE.  189 

Fai-hlagoniau  lioise,  along  the  river  bank  on  the  extreme  right 
of  the  Greek  lines,  and  gained  the  rear  where  he  united  with  the 
"ojal  right  which  had  wheeled  round  tlie  left  of  Kyros'  wholo 
array,  and  broke  into  the  camp  which  they  sacked  mercilessly, 
regardless  of  the  fortunes  of  the  main  battle.  None  of  the  tai- 
c^cteers  had  fallen  in  the  headlong  chai-ge  of  Tissaphernes,  for 
they  had  opened  their  lines  and  suffered  the  cavalry  to  ja,^ 
through,  galling  them  so  terribly  with  their  long  weapons  that 
they  had  no  inclination  to  renew  the  conflict,  but  swept  away 
uselessly  to  the  rear,  while  the  Greek  light  troops  hurried  on  and 
overtook  their  victorious  comrades.  At  this  moment  the  field 
was  in  utter  confusion.  Each  army  had  outflanked  and  turned 
one  wing  of  the  other,  and  gained  its  rear,  while  their  two 
centres  were  still  reeling  in  desperate  and  balanced  fight.  For 
Kyros,  when  he  saw  the  Greeks  victorious  and  in  full  pursuit  on 
his  right,  and  Ariaios  gradually  winning  his  way  with  the  left, 
esteemed  himself  victorious,  and  being  already  hailed  as  kino-, 
charged  headlong  on  the  Immortals  of  the  king's  centre,  with 
his  own  picked  horse,  killed  Artagerses  with  his  own  hand,  and 
by  that  single  onslaught  must  have  decided  the  whole  battle  had 
^e  kept  his  own  men  together,  or  had  the  victorious  Greeks 
'vheeled  to  their  own  left  in  due  season.  But  neither  of  these 
things  fell  out^ — the  Hellenic  alhes  were  in  full  chase ;  the 
prince's  body-guard  got  scattered  in  the  melee,  and  fouo-ht  in 
httle  knots  of  ten  or  twelve  wherever  they  could  overtake  a  flying 
foe  or  find  one  resisting ;  while  Kyros  himself,  riding  a  fiepy 
and  hard-mouthed  horee,  drove  pell-mell  through  the  broken 
enemy,  till  he  recognized  his  brother,  and  was  recognized  by  him 
simultaneously.  Then  they  both  charged,  spear  to  spear,  and 
Kyros  wounded  Artoxerxes  sorely  in  the  breast,  and  unhorsed 
hlni,  so  that  his  followers  believed  him  dead,  and,  taking  him  up 

*  Xenoph.  Anab.  I.  viii.  24-29.      Plut.  Vit.  Artox.  XII.      Diod.  Sic. 
XIV.  23. 


190  XENOPHON. 

severely  hurt,  bore  him  away  to  a  neighboring  hillock  where  he 
slowly  recovered  his  senses,  all  his  men  flying  hither  and  thither 
in  confusion.  Still  separated  from  his  own  people,  Kyros  rode  up 
and  down  exulting  in  liis  victory  and  saluted  king  by  many  of 
the  enemy,  even  by  some  of  the  king's  eunuchs,  till  at  last,  his 
tiara  falling  off,  he  was  wounded  near  the  eye  with  a  javelin  by 
one  Mithradates,  a  Persian  youth,  ignorant  of  his  person  ;  and 
a  stone  soon  afterward  striking  him  down,  he  was  killed  by  a 
spearthrust  at  the  hands  of  some  ignorant  camp  followers.  His 
body  was  at  last  casually  recognized  by  Artasuras,  called  the  king's 
eye,  and  carried  to  the  presence ;  whereon,  his  head  and  right 
hand  being  cut  off,  and  the  news  proclaimed,  the  royal  horse 
began  to  rally,  and  seventy  thousand  men  were  soon  collected 
about  the  person  of  Artoxerxes,  who  had  of  late  so  nearly  lost  both 
life  and  kingdom. 

By  this  time  Ariaios,  who  until  now  had  been  fighting  well, 
learned  the  death  of  the  prince,  and  drawing  off  his  own  troops 
by  a  route  far  to  the  left  of  the  camp  which  the  enemy  were 
plundering,  made  his  way  back  unpui-sued  to  the  post  which  he 
had  occupied  on  that  very  morning,  a  day's  march  in  the  rear. 
And  now  Klearchos  and  his  phalanx  returned  from  their  pur- 
suit, expecting  that  all  was  over ;  and  as  they  traversed  the 
ground  on  which  the  centre  and  left  of  the  king  had  stood,  until 
routed  by  their  own  charge  and  that  of  Kyros,  they  discovered  that 
their  camp  was  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  and  advanced  to 
recover  it.  But  Tissaphernes,  and  they  who  had  taken  it,  avoided 
an  engagement,  and  passing  to  the  Greek  left  along  the  ri\'er, 
over  the  ground  held  by  Klearchos  in  the  morning,  hurried  to 
the  hillock  occupied  by  the  king ;  where  they  again  showed  fro'.it 
as  if  to  receive  battle.  But  when  the  Greeks  once  more  cheered 
Bud  charged,  both  armies  being  now  in  the  same  relative  positions 
as  in  the  morning,  though  nearer  to  Babylon  than  in  the  first 
action,  the  Barbarians  again  fled,  and  the  hillock,  on  which  were 


VI. i CRY  OF  THE  GREEKS.  191 

the  Greeks  and  the  king's  banner,  with  a  golden  eagle  flying,  was 
deserted  by  the  enemy,  and  the  whole  plain  abandoned  to 
the  Greeks,  who  weary,  hungry  and  supperless,  for  their  encamp- 
ment had  been  thoroughly  sacked,  remained  masters  of  the  bloody 
field,  wondering  whither  the  prince  could  have  gone,  and 
anxiously  looking  for  his  return. 

The  battle  itself  was  ill-fought  on  both  sides,  and  displays 
nothing  but  the  indisputable  valor  of  the  Greeks,  and  their  great 
superiority  to  the  Orientals,  both  in  armature  and  discipHne. 
Plutarch  insists  that  it  was  lost  by  the  disobedience  of  Klearchos 
to  the  prince's  orders,  to  obhque  upon  the  enemy's  centre  ;  not 
by  the  rashness  of  K}tos  ;  and  on  that  text  bitterly  censures  the 
Lakedaimonian  leader.  Possibly,  had  Klearchos  so  charged,  he 
might  have  won  the  battle  ;  for  the  fall  of  the  king  and  the 
breaking  the  centre  often,  with  Oriental  armies,  decides  everything. 
Still  to  have  made  an  oblique  movement  to  such  a  length,  ex 
posing  his  own  column  to  a  flank  attack,  and  leaving  the  whole 
right  wing  of  the  army  open  and  unguarded,  in  the  teeth  of  an 
admirable  cavalry,  would  have  been  to  the  last  degree  an  un- 
soldierly  and  unscientific  movement ;  for  executing  which,  even  if 
successfully,  he  would  have  deserved  not  praise  but  censure. 
His  detenninatibn  to  cling  to  the  river  with  his  right  was  just 
and  sound,  and  his  charge  in  itself  masterly.  His  error,  and  it 
was  a  gross  one,  lay  in  chasing  to  the  rear,  instead  of  wheeling 
leftward  on  the  centre ;  which  could  have  decided  the  battle  in 
season  and  placed  the  crown  on  the  head  of  Kyros.  In  like 
manner,  had  that  prince,  on  the  fall  of  Artagerses,  and  the  dis- 
persal of  the  immortals,  rallied  his  body-guard  and  held  them 
in  hand ;  or  had  he  even  fallen  back  alone  on  Ariaios,  after  un- 
hoi-sing  the  king,  and  as  he  probably  believed  killing  him,  he 
would  have  been  found  master  of  the  field  by  Klearchos,  on  his 
return,  and  his  entire  success  would  have  been  the  consequence. 

The^  loss   of  the   battle — for   by  the  death  of  Kyros  it  was 


It"  2  XENOPHUN. 

virtually  lost — ought  then  to  be  ascribed  rather  to  the  want  of 
concert,  wliich  naturally  occurs  in  combined  armies,  acting  with- 
out unity  of  command,  than  to  any  lack  of  individual  judgment, 
courage,  or  conduct. 

On  the  following  morning  the  Greek  leaders  received  intelligence 
of  what  had  occurred,  and  of  his  own  whereabouts,  from  Ariaios, 
with  an  invitation  to  join  him,  and  retreat  together  by  a  different 
route  into  Ionia.  This  plan  at  fii'st  displeased  the  Hellenic 
troops,  who  regarding  themselves  as  victors  offered  the  crown  to 
Ariaios,  and  halted  where  they  were,  breakfasting,  as  best  they 
might,  on  the  beasts  of  burthen  which  they  slew,  cooked  on  the 
wooden  shields  and  missiles  of  the  enemy,  which  they  used  as 
fuel.  While  thus  engaged,  they  received  a  summons  from  the 
king  commanding  them  to  lay  down  their  arms,  when  in  the 
spirit  of  Leonidas  they  bade  him  "  come  and  take  them."  And 
shortly  after  the  dismissal  of  the  heralds,  the  reply  of  Ariaios 
reached  them,  declining  the  crown  and  urging  them  strenuously 
to  join  him  and  commence  their  retreat  forthwith.  This  they  did, 
entering  his  camp  on  that  same  night,  when  they  piled  their 
aims,  and,  the  generals  and  captains  of  bands  entering  in  to 
Ariaios,  a  treaty  was  sworn  between  the  Greeks  and  the  Bar- 
baric followers  of  Kyros,  that  they  should  be  true  friends  and 
allies,  neither  betraying  the  other,  and  the  Persians  promising 
farther,  that  they  would  guide  them  truly  home  into  Ionia. 
And  this  oath  they  ratified,  slaying  an  ox,  a  wolf,  a  boar,  and  a 
ram,  upon  a  shield,  and  dipping  into  the  blood,  the  Greeks,  their 
sword  blades,  and  the  Persians,  their  spear  heads  ;  a  ceremony 
so  solemn,  so  ancient,  and  supposed  of  such  awful  and  appalling 
sanctity,  that  Aischylos*  in  his  fine  tragedy  of  the  "  Seven  against 
Thebes"  has  ascribed  it  to  the  Argive  leaders,  in  vei-se  so  striking, 
and  terms  so  similar  to  the  above,  that  it  may  be  agreeable  to 

*   Aischylos.      'Eirra  im  Qr]0aii. 


THE    OAiH.  193 

my  readers  to  compare  it  with  this  passa^/e  of  history,  even 
through  the  imperfect  medium  of  an  Eno-Hsji  version. 

For  heroes  seven,  impetuous  champions  strons;, 

Bull-slaughtering  on  a  black-bound  brazen  shield, 

And  dipping  in  that  carnage-cup  their  hands, 

By  Mars,  Enyo,  and  blood-loving  Dread, 

Have  sworn,  these  ramparts  violently  ta'en, 

Either  to  sack  the  Kadmian  town  to  earth, 

Or  dying  here  to  glut  this  soil  with  gore. 

Then  for  their  parents  on  Adrastos'  car, 

With  those  same  hands  memorial  gifts  they  crowned. 

Weeping,  but  in  their  faces  ruth  was  not. 

For  like  to  lions  who  spy  the  front  of  Mars, 

Their  souls  were  iron,  hot  with  manly  rage. 

Such  was  the  nature,  and  such  the  fearful  obligation,  of  the 
oath  to  which  ^oth  the  Greeks  and  the  Asiatics  swore,  whom 
communit}^  of  friendship  for  the  dead  Kyros,  and  community  of 
past  toils,  and  present  perils,  should  have  linked  together,  with- 
out oaths,  in  permanent  and  true  alhance.  AVith  the  Barbarians 
however,  the  oaths  were  a  mere  pretext ;  and,  as  has  been  inva- 
riably the  case  in  all  compacts  between  men  of  European  and 
Oriental  origin,  wherever  it  was  for  the  interest  of  the  latter  to 
break  them,  the  Greeks  were  sacrificed,  blind  victims  to  their  own 
good  faith,  and  the  inveterate  treachery  of  the  Asiatics.  This 
treaty  concluded,  they  marched  together,  on  the  following  morn- 
ing, having  the  sun  on  their  right  hand,  in  the  hope  of  reaching 
the  Babylonian  villages  at  nightfall.  But  as  twilight  was 
closing  in,  they  saw  what  at  fii-st  they  took  to  be  cavalry,  which 
tu^-ned  out,  however,  to  be  herds  of  hoi"ses  grazing ;  and,  so  soon 
as  darkness  fell,  the  whole  was  explained,  for  the  villages  all 
around  were  full  of  watch-fires,  and  it  was  evident  that  they 
were  close  to  the  encampment  of  the  royal  army.  On  that  night 
there  was  a  panic  in  the  Greek  camp,  which  was  appeased  by 


194  XENOPHON. 

the  presence  of  mind  of  Klearchos ;  and  on  the  following  day 
messengei-s  came  from  the  king  with  proposals  for  a  treaty. 
After  this,  the  Greeks  and  their  Persian  allies  awaited  Tissa-^ 
phernes,  about  three-and-twenty  days,  while  nominally  he  was 
consulting  the  king  as  to  terms  and  conditions  ;  and  at  the  end 
of  this  period  Tissaphernes  returned,  with  Orontes — both  at  the 
head  of  their  contingents,  as  if  bound  homewards — when  a 
treaty  was  concluded,  and  regularly  sworn  to,  with  plighted 
hands  and  solemn  sacrifices,  that  the  Pei^sians  should  guide  and 
convoy  the  Greeks  in  safety  through  the  country,  furnishing  them 
with  an  open  market,  where  they  might  buy  supplies ;  but  that, 
the  market  failing,  the  Greeks  should  be  free  to  forage  for  them- 
selves ;  and  this  on  the  bare  condition  that  the  mercenaries 
should  travel  through  the  country  peacefully,  and  do  no  evil  to 
the  inhabitants,  or  injury  to  the  crops,  or  cattle  of  the  several 
districts.  The  Persians  of  the  king  also,  and  the  Pei^sians  who 
had  fought  with  Kyros  were  reconciled,  and  thenceforth  they 
encamped  with  Tissaphernes  and  Orontes,  by  themselves,  and 
the  Hellenes  by  themselves  also,  at  about  a  parasang  or  some- 
thing less  apart ;  both  mounting  guards,  each  against  the  other, 
and  both  apparently  suspecting  the  good  faith  of  the  other. 

From  this  simple  narrative,  as  well  as  from  what  follows — for 
Xenophon  states  distinctly,  that  from  this  day  forth  the  friendship 
of  Ariaios  declined  visibly — it  can  hardly  be  doubted  that  the  Per- 
sians, who  had  fought  side  by  side  with  them,  were  false  to  their 
late  allies  from  the  beginning ;  and  that  the  very  first  march, 
leading  them  into  the  very  camp  of  the  king  instead  of  away 
from  it,  was  the  first  step  of  a  treason,  w^iich  was  intended  tc 
involve  the  massacre  of  the  whole  force. 

Notwithstanding  these  suspicions,  however,  the  Greeks  marclicd 
nineteen  days'  journey — ninety-six  parasangs,  or  about  three  hun- 
dred and  sixty  miles — in  company  with  the  Pei-sians  of  Tissa- 
phernes and  Orontes,  until  they  reached  the  river  Zapatas,  where 


ORIENTAL    TKEACHERY.  195 

they  halted  throe  days.  And  at  this  place  the  mutual  distrust 
and  dissensions  became  so  alarming,  that  Klearchos  apprehended 
an  open  rupture  ;  whereupon  he  went  manfully,  and  in  good 
ftiith,  to  Tissaphernes,  hoping  to  obtain  an  explanation,  and  bring 
about  a  perfect  understanding.  Availing  himself  of  this,  the 
wily  Barbai-ian  induced  the  honest  Spartan  to  bring  the  leadei-s 
of  the  expedition,  and  the  captains  of  the  lochi,  to  his  tent  in  the 
morning,  promising  to  inform  them  who  it  was  that  had  belied 
the  Greeks  to  him,  and  to  surrender  the  person  to  their 
vengeance. 

Klearchos  doubting  nothing,  and  violently  suspecting  Menon 
the  Thessahan  of  ill-faith,  would  have  taken  all  the  generals  and 
captains  of  bands  with  him;  but  some  of  the  private  soldiers 
interposed,  and  insisted  that  all  their  officers  should  not  go,  as 
they  had  no  faith  in  the  barbarians. 

And  here  it  is  worthy  of  notice,  that  in  all  cases  where  Euro- 
pean officers  have  been  induced  to  capitulate,  trusting  in  the 
honor  of  Orientals,  the  privates  have  clearly  discerned  the  treason 
which  escaped  the  more  acuminated  vision  of  their  superiors,  and 
have  always  implored  them  to  put  trust  in  their  arms  only. 
Such  was  the  case  when  a  British  regiment  in  Ceylon  laid  down 
their  arms  to  the  Kandyan  savages,  and  were  massacred  to  a 
man.  Such,  when  in  the  fatal  campaign  of  Ghizni,  the  English 
officers  ^^■ere  induced  to  confer  with  the  Aftghan  leaders  in  their 
tent,  and  were  incontinently  murdered  by  the  hands  of  their 
hosts — and  such,  in  the  instance  now  before  me,  was  the  result. 

In  the  end,  Klearchos  prevailed  with  four  of  the  generals,  and 
twenty  of  the  captains  of  bands,  to  accompany  him ;  the  former 
being,  in  addition  to  himself,  Proxenos  the  Boiotian,  Menon  the 
Thessalian,  Agias  the  Arkadian,  and  Sokrates  the  Achaian  ;  and 
in  addition  to  these  about  two  hundred  of  the  soldiei-s  escorted 
them  to  the  Pei-sian  camp,  unarmed,  with  a  view  of  attending 
the  market.     The  generals  were  at  once  admitted  to  the  tent  of 


196  XENOPHON. 

Tissaphernes,  while  the  captains  were  detained  without ;  until,  on 
a  given  signal,  those  within  were  arrested,  and  those  at  the  doors 
cut  to  pieces ;  while  the  cavalry  made  a  wide  sw^eep  over  the 
plain,  after  killing  all  who  had  entered  the  camp,  and  cut  down 
eveiy  one  w^hom  they  encountered,  whether  slave  or  freeman. 
The  Greeks  looked  on,  at  first,  in  amazement,  not  imagining  what 
this  display  of  careering  cavalry  should  mean  ;  till  one  Nikar- 
chos,  an  Arkadian,  came  in  grievously  wounded  in  the  abdomen, 
and  carrying  his  bowels  in  his  hands.  Then  they  all  ran  tumult- 
uously  to  arms,  expecting  to  be  attacked  immediately  ;  but  in  a 
little  while  Mithradates,  Artaozos,  and  Ariaios,  all  late  friends  of 
Kyros,  rode  up,  and  once  more  endeavored  to  persuade  the 
Greeks  to  lay  down  then-  arms  ;  telling  them  that  Klearchos  had 
been  convicted  of  perjury  and  intent  to  break  the  treaties,  where- 
fore he  had  been  slain  ;  but  that  Proxenos,  Menon,  and  the  rest, 
were  in  high  favor  with  the  king.  This  device  was,  however,  too 
transparent  to  deceive,  and  was  answered  by  Xenophon — who 
received  the  delegates,  in  the  absence  of  Cheirisophos,  he  being 
out  with  a  foraging  party,  together  with  Kleanor  the  Orchome- 
niau,  and  Sophainetos  the  Stymphalian — by  a  demand  for  the 
instant  release  of  Proxenos  and  Menon — "  to  which,"  said  he, 
"  there  can  be  no  objection ;  since,  as  you  aver,  they  are  in  favor 
with  the  king." 

To  this,  there  was  no  reply ;  and  after  debating  long  among 
themselves,  the  treacherous  barbarians  rode  away,  frustrate  of 
theu"  end,  and  disappointed.  The  generals  had,  of  course,  ail 
perished — Klearchos,  Proxenos,  Agias,  and  Sokrates — beheaded 
as  overt  enemies  to  the  king ;  of  whom  Xenophon  has  left  elabo- 
rate characters,  and  many  interesting  anecdotes,  which  I  regret 
that  my  hmits  will  not  permit  me  to  extract.  They  were  all 
good  and  practised  soldiers  and  strategists,  "  whose  valor  and 
conduct  no  enemy  ever  laughed  at  in  battle,  no  friend  ever  found 


THE    GENERALS.  197 

insufficient  ;"*  but  Klearchos,  especially  was  a  soldier,  by  habit, 
by  choice,  and  by  profession  ;  seeking  out  every  opportunity  of 
active  service,  at  home  and  abroad ;  a  strict  disciplinarian,  an 
enthusiastic  lover  of  arms,  and  in  all  respects  a  great  captain  and 
an  honest,  though  stern  and  hard-visaged,  man.  Menon,  on  the 
contrary,  was  not  allowed  the  luxuiy  of  a  speedy  or  honorable 
death,  but  was  consumed  by  slow  tortures,  which  were  protracted 
through  the  space  of  a  whole  year ;  though  on  what  account  he 
was  punished  by  Artoxerxes,  it  is  somewhat  difficult  to  under- 
stand ;  since  Xenophon  more  than  hints  that  he  w^as  false  to  the 
Greeks  ;  and  if  false  to  them,  he  must,  at  least,  have  endeavored 
to  serve  the  king. 

That  night,  when  they  knew  that  their  leaders  were  taken  off, 
the  Greeks  were  in  the  greatest  consternation  and  despair,  nor 
that  without  good  cause  ;  "  considering  that  they  were  almost  at 
the  palace  doors  of  the  great  king,  with  numerous  nations  and 
cities  surrounding  them  on  every  side,  all  hostile,  with  no  one 
who  should  guide  them  on  their  way,  no  one  who  should  furnish 
them  with  a  market  of  supplies ;  and  they  above  ten  thousand 
stadia  distant  from  Greece,  with  many  vast  and  formidable  rivers 
between,  alone,  betrayed  by  the  barbarians  who  had  marched  up 
with  them  under  Kyros,  and  unprovided  with  cavalry,  so  that  if 
victorious  in  any  action,  they  would  be  unable  to  follow  up  the 
success,  if  beaten  they  must  needs  be  annihilated.  When  they 
thought  over  these  things  within  themselves,  they  were  utterly 
disheartened,  and  few  of  them  tasted  food  that  evening ;  and 
few  kindled  any  fires,  and  there  were  many  who  did  not  muster 
at  the  shields  that  night,  but  laid  them  down,  each  where  he 
chanced  to  be,  unable  to  sleep  from  grief  of  spirit,  and  desire  of 
their  countries,  their  parents,  their  wives,  their  children,  whom 
they  never  thought  to  look  upon  again. 

So  great  indeed  w;is  the  confusion  and  so  complete  the  dis- 
*  Xen.  Anab  II.,  vi.  30.     Diodorus  denie.s  his  death,  xiv.  21 . 


198  XENOPHON. 

organization  of  the  whole  Greek  army,  that  if  the  Persian  cavahy 
had  fallen  in  upon  them  there  and  then,  they  would  have  en- 
countered little  if  any  resistance,  and  must  have  cut  the  Greeks 
to  pieces.  Even  on  the  morrow,  they  would  have  gained  an 
easy  victory,  but  for  the  ready  wit,  stirring  eloquence,  and  exu- 
berant resource  of  one  man,  who  from  that  day  was  the  soul  of 
the  army,  and  who  approved  himself,  wherever  or  however  he 
learned  the  rudiments,  a  thorough  master  of  the  art  of  war  in  its 
most  difficult  details.  For  to  him  alone,  and  his  over-boiling 
bravery,  undaunted  decision,  and  never  flagging  spirit,  is  it  due 
that  the  bones  of  the  ten  thousand  did  not  whiten  the  deserts 
of  central  Asia.  That  man  was  Xenophon — having  fallen  at 
length,  like  his  comrades,  into  a  slumber  which  yet  was  not  sleep, 
so  great  w^as  the  perturbation  of  his  spirit,  he  was  startled  by  a 
strange,  and  as  he  imagined  supernatural  dream ;  and  so  soon  as 
he  was  awake,  musing  deejjly  on  their  affairs,  he  saw  that  their 
only  hope  lay  in  energy,  promptitude,  and  bold  reliance  on  their 
own  arms  and  valor ;  and  forthwith  rising  from  his  bed,  he 
called  up  the  captains  of  Proxenos'  division,  to  all  of  whom  he 
was  personally  knowni,  and  addressed  them  with  such  convincing 
power  of  truth  and  common  sense,  and  with  such  passionate 
soldierly  heat,  as  is  best  suited  to  persuade  soldiei-s.  And  when 
they  had  heard  him  out,  they  all  clamored  to  be  led  forward, 
except  one  ApoUonides,  who  spoke  the  broad  Boiotian  dialect, 
and  who  had  voted  at  the  first  to  give  up  their  arms  to  Arto- 
xcrxes.  Ilim  they  degraded  speedily,  from  the  captain  of  a  band 
to  be  a  baggage-bearer,  for  w4iile  Xenophon  was  displaying  some 
choice  powers  of  invective  at  his  expense,  the  soldiers  observed 
that  his  ears  were  bored  as  if  for  ear  rings,  and  hooted  him  from 
the  ranks  as  a  Medized  Greek.  And  this  little  incident,  which 
otherwise  I  should  scarce  have  recounted,  proves  what  a  change 
his  words  hud  produced,  and  how  new  and  keen  a  spirit  they 
*Xen.  A  nab.  II  [.  I.  1. 


CHOICE  OF  NEW  LEADERS.  199 

must  have  diffused  into  those  hearts  late  so  dejected,  that  they 
could  already  descend  to  notice  individual  eccentricities,  and  jest 
with  hearty  soldieiV  glee  at  such  a  moment. 

And  now  these  men — it  was 'by  this  time  about  the  middle  of 
the  night — went  through  the  ranks,  and  called  up  every  general, 
and  when  the  generals  were  slain,  then  every  second  in  com- 
mand, and  all  the  captains  of  the  bands,  to  council — and  all,  the 
generals  came,  and  captains  about  a  hundred.  And  Hieronymos 
of  Elis,  the  eldest  of  Proxenos'  -lochagoi,  addressed  them,  and 
told  them  wherefore  they  had  thus  assembled,  and  called  them 
to  co-operation,  and  then  bade  Xenophon,  ^'  Speak  thou  to  these, 
as  thou  hast  spoken  unto  us."  And  he  spoke  to  them  even  so ; 
and  so  convinced  them,  that  Cheirisophos  the  Lakedaimonian — 
and  Lakedaimonians  were  not  over  wont  to  give  even  due  credit 
to  Athenians — cried  out,  "  Hitherto,  O,  Xenophon,  I  have  known 
this  much  of  thee  only,  that  I  heard  thou  wert  an  Athenian  •* 
but  now  I  praise  thee  nmch  for  what  thou  hast  said,  and  done, 
and  I  would  that  there  were  more  hke  to  thee  ;  for  it  would  bo 
for  the  common  good."  And  he  proceeded  at  once  to  collect  all 
the  soldiers,  that  they  might  elect  leadei-s  in  place  of  those  who 
were  slain,  and  stand  at  once  to  their  arms.  Then  were  chosen 
in  the  place  of  Klearchos,  Timasion  the  Dardanian;  and  of 
Sokrates,  Xanthikles  the  Achaian  ;  and  of  Agias,  Kkap.or  the 
Arkadian  ;  and  of  Menon,  Philesios  the  Achaian ;  and  of  Proxe- 
nos, Xenophon  the  Athenian — and  this  latter  election  is  re- 
markable for  this,  that  in  almost  all  the  other  instances  a  chief 
was  chosen  of  the  same  nation  with  him  who  had  fallen,  or  with 
the  majority  of  the  troops  he  commanded.  But  Xenophon  was 
an  Athenian,  chosen  by  Boiotians,  who  of  all  men  were  most 
inveterately  hostile  to  Attika.  To  his  merits  only,  was  his 
election  to  be  attributed ;  and,  whether  there  was  need  of  action 
or  of  counsel,  he  still  proved  the  choice  to  be  wise  and  just, 
*  I  am  by  no  means  certain  that  this  was  not  inlendeJ  as  a  half  sneer. 


200  XENOPHON. 

which  had  fallen  on  him  ;  for,  in  truth,  he  was  thenceforth  the 
head  and  front  of  the  whole  campaign,  whether  strategetics  or 
tactics  were  the  question,  and  whether  the  vanguard  or  the  rear 
guard  was  assailed,  there  shall  we  find  Xenophon,  ever  detached 
to  meet  the  enemy. 

Then  Cheirisophos  fii-st  addressed  the  soldiers,  and  as  he  con- 
cluded, Xenophon  arose,  fall-armed  for  battle  and  decorated  in 
all  martial  braver}-,  and  spoke  to  them  words  of  tire,  lending 
them  cheer  and  courage ;  so  that  when  Cheirisophos  put  it  to 
the  vote,  all  shouted  unanimously  "  let  us  march — let  us  march 
without  delay."  On  Xenophon's  proposal,  therefore,  it  was 
I'esolved  to  proceed  in  an  oblong  hollow  square,  with  the  camp  fol- 
lower and  baggage  in  the  centre ;  and  to  Cheirisophos,  as  being  a 
Lakedaimonian,  he  attributed  the  leading  of  the  van,  two  of  the 
eldest  generals  commanding  the  flank  battalions  of  the  square, 
while,  with  Timasion,  he  took  to  himself,  as  they  the  youngest, 
the  rear  guard,  which  in  retreat  is  the  post  of  danger  as  it  is  of 
honor.  This  all  determined,  the  soldiers  burned  their  tents  and 
wagons,  and  all  the  superfluous  baggage  which  they  could  not 
conveniently  carry,  and  then  cooked  and  piled  their  arms  for 
breakfast.  While  they  were  thus  engaged  Mithridates  came  up 
with  about  thirty  horse,  pretending  good  will,  but  evidently  sent 
to  reconnoitre  and  gain  information.  To  him  Cheirisophos  replied 
once  for  all,  that  if  permitted  to  do  so,  it  was  their  intent  to 
mai-ch  quietly  through  the  country,  doing  no  wrong  to  any ;  but 
that,  if  hindered  on  the  w^ay,  they  would  fight  to  the  uttermost." 
As  soon  as  they  had  breakfasted,  they  stood  to  their  arms,  and, 
foi'ding  the  Zapatas,'*  marched  in  order,  with  their  baggage  and 
beasts  of  burthen  in  the  centre ;  not  far  had  Ihey  gone,  however, 

*  The  great  Zab,  a  large  river  of  Kardoiichia,  now  Kunlistan,  flowing 
in  a  great  semicircle  northerly,  westerly  and  then  almost  southerly, 
from  the  mountains  below  lake  Urmia,  now  Oroumi,  into  the  Tigris, 
about  forty  mi'es  below  Mosul. 


LOSSES  OF  THE  REAR  GUARD.  201 

before  Mithridates  again  made  his  appearance  with  about  two 
hundred  horse,  and  four  hundred  bowmen  and  slingei-s,  hghtly 
equipped,  active  and  fleet  runners.     At  first  they  approached  as 
fi-iends,  but,  so  soon  as  they  got  .near  enough,  both  horse  and  foot 
deployed  on  a  sudden,  and  began  to  shoot  and  sHng,  into  the 
closely  ordered  ranks  of  the  Hellenes,  with  terrible  execution. 
And  the  rear  guard  were  cruelly  cut  up  and  harassed,  and  very 
many  wounded,  for  the  Kretans  could  not  shoot  half  so  far  as  the 
Persians  ;  and  were  moreover  so  sHghtly  armed  that  they  were 
obhged  to  keep  wdthin  the  ranks  of  the  hoplitai ;  nor  could  the 
javeUneers  hurl  a  spear  so  far  as  to  hit  the  slingers,  who  whirled 
their  missiles  into  them  as  fast  and  furious  as  a  hail  storm,  thouo-h 
with  far  more  fiital  execution.      Then  perceiving  how  much  con- 
fidence the  enemy  gained,  and  how  severely  his  own  people  were 
suffering,  Xenophon  charged  with  a  portion  of  the  rear  guard, 
both  hoplitai  and   targeteers,  and   endeavored   to  pursue   the 
enemy,  who  did  not  attempt  to  resist  his  onset,  but  fled,  still 
shooting  and  shnging  as  they  retreated.     So  that,  after  a  time, 
having  slain  or  captured  no  one,  the  Greeks  were  compelled  to 
fall  back  in  turn,  and  fight  their  way,  not  without  loss  of  brave 
men,  and  much  difiBculty,  to  the  main  body  which  they  would 
hardly  have  accomphshed,  had  it  not  halted  until  they  regained 
their  station.     That  day  they  scarcely  made  three  miles  on  their 
way,  since  there  was  a  perpetual  skirmish  from  dawn  till  it  w^as 
dark ;  and  at  first  Cheirisophos  and  his  colleagues  were  inclined 
to  blame  Xenophon  for  his  charge,  as  if  he  had  rashly  risked 
himself  and  his  command  without  injui-ing  the  enemy  or  better- 
ing the  condition  of  the  army.      But  he  admitting  the  rashness 
of  his  zeal,  showed  them  clearly  that,  circumstanced  as  they 
were,  the  array  must  be  lost,  since  they  could  not  disperee  an 
enemy  superior  in  light-armed  troops,  nor  forage,  nor  even  cover 
their  own  retreat  if  broken ;  and  then,  with  sound  and  clear  capa- 
city, indicated  ^  remedy  in  the  creation  of  cavalry,  and  a  more 


202  XENOPHON. 

efficient  army  for  skirmialiing,  all  which  he  accomplished  satis- 
factorily from  so  small  means,  as  at  once  showed  the  quickness 
of  his  resource — one  of  the  greatest  qualities  of  a  leader.  His 
suo-o-estions  of  that  nio-ht  were  carried  out  on  the  next  day, 
during  which  they  halted,  by  drafting  all  the  Rhodians  who 
chanced  to  be  in  the  army,  to  the  number  of  two  hundred,  to 
form  a  band  of  slingers — for  the  Rhodians  at  this  time  were  what 
the  Balearic  islanders  were  in  the  latter  days,  all  shngers  from 
their  childhood  using  leaden  bullets  instead  of  ragged  and  clumsy 
pebbles — and  by  mounting  on  the  spare  chargers  of  the  officers, 
on  some  horses  left  by  Klearchos  at  liis  death,  and  some,  his  own 
private  property,  and  yet  others  which  had  been  taken  in  action 
and  were  now  used  as  beasts  of  burthen,  fifty  picked  men,  who 
were  equipped  with  breastplates,  buff-coats,  and  all  the  other 
harness  of  well-appointed  troopers,  and  to  whom  Lykios,  the  son 
of  Polystratos,  was  named  commander.  On  the  next  day,  they 
again  marched  early,  having  a  deep  and  difficult  ravine  to  pass, 
at  which  they  anticipated  an  attack  from  the  bowmen  and  cavalry 
of  the  Persians,  but  they  had  crossed  the  gorge,  and  were  about 
a  mile  distant  on  the  plain,  when  Mithridates  again  made  his 
appearanc3  with  a  thousand  horse  and  four  thousand  slingei-s — 
and  it  is  said,  that  he  had  promised  Tissaphernes  with  that 
power  to  compel  the  Greeks  to  surrender  on  that  very  day.  But 
he  found  the  Greeks  now  well  ordered  to  receive  him,  for  a 
certain  force  of  targeteers  had  been  ordered  to  follow  up  the 
shngei-s,  and  of  hoplitai  again  to  support  the  targeteers.  And,  so 
soon  as  Mithridates  deployed  in  their  rear  and  about  their  flanks, 
and  sling-shot  and  arrows  began  to  fall  in  the  ranks,  the  Hel- 
lenic trumpets  sounded,  the  Rhodians  wheeled  into  hue  and 
dispersed  the  archery  in  an  instant  with  their  deadly  missiles, 
the  cavalry  charged  home,  the  Pei'sian  horse  scattering  before 
their  unexpected  onset  and  flying  headlong  to  the  broken  bAnks 
of  the  ravine  for  safety  ;  but  fast  and  fierce  the  targe teei-s  fell  on, 


AFFAIR    OF    LIGHT    TROOPS.  203 

and  the  great  shields  of  the  heavy  infantry  came  on  hke  a  wall 
in  support;  and,  conlident  in  their  near  aid,  the  Rhodian 
slingers  ran  at  their  utmost  speed  and  slung  into  the  mass  of 
fugitives,  and  the  troopei-s  spurred  hard  upon  their  horse ;  and 
very  many  of  the  barbarian  foot  fell  unavenged  that  day,  and  in 
the  gulley  of  the  torrent  eighteen  of  their  cavalry  were  taken 
ahve  by  the  Greek  trooi)ers. 

That  was  a  memorable  skirmish,  though  the  gain  and  the  loss 
were  actually  but  small.  It  gave  the  prestige  of  a  first  success 
to  their  newly  levied  troops,  converted  in  one  night  from  heavy 
foot  into  cavalry  and  slingers,  which  they  never  lost  during  the 
retreat.  It  established  the  superiority  of  the  Hellenes  in  these, 
as  in  the  more  sohd  arms,  of  the  service.  It  taught  a  lesson. to 
the  enemy,  who  had  before  considered  their  light  troops,  and 
above  all  their  splendid  horse  almost  invincible,  fi-om  which  they 
never  entirely  recovered  ;  and  it  was,  so  far  as  we  know  from 
history,  the  first  display  of  Xenophon's  various  and  almost  un- 
rivalled resources  and  capacities  as  a  great  and  genuine  soldier. 
During  the  whole  of  that  day,  they  met  no  farther  annoyance 
from  the  enemy  ;  but  as  they  marched  onw^ard  they  found  that 
their  order  of  march  in  a  hollow  oblong  column  was  incon- 
venient, in  as  much  as  at  times  in  passing  bridges  or  defiles,  the 
hoplitai  were  so  closely  pressed  together  as  to  be  useless,  and 
ao-ain  at  times  when  the  wino-s  extended  the  centre  was  unduly 
weakened.  This  again  was  remedied  by  the  appointment  of  six" 
bands,  or  lochi,  of  a  hundred  each,  with  the  proper  officers,  who, 
when  the  column  was  pressed  together  on  the  march  fell  into 
the  rear,  and  again  marched  up  on  the  outside  the  wings ;  and 
on  the  other  hand,  when  the  wings  were  extended,  and  the  centre 
opened,  filled  up  the  spaces,  forming  a  front  of  single,  double  or 
quadruple  files  as  the  nature  of  the  case  d  *termined.  After 
marching  nearly  all  day  thus,  they  entered  some  broken  and 
hilly  ground,  when  the  enemy  again  showed  himself  in  force  in 


204  XENOPHON. 

the  rear,  and  as  the  Greeks  descended  from  the  summit  of  one 
knoll  into  the  hollow,  before  mounting  another,  the  hght  troops 
crowned  that  which  they  had  just  quitted,  and  galled  them  so 
severely  that  the  Peltasts  w^ere  again  rendered  useless  and  shut 
up  within  the  heavy  columns.  These  knolls  were,  it  seems,  tlie 
spurs  of  a  lofty  ridge  on  their  right  hand,  as  they  marched 
northerly,  with  the  Tigris  on  their  left,  running  down  to  that 
river ;  and  the  difficulty  was  soon  overcome  by  detacliing  all  the 
peltasts  from  the  right  flank  of  the  column  to  the  heiglits  above, 
by  which  means  the  enemy,  fearing  to  be  cut  off,  kept  at  a  pru- 
dent distance,  and  during  the  rest  of  that  day  the  column  march- 
ing over  the  hillocks,  and  the  hght  troops  moving  along  the 
mountain  side  on  their  right  and  a  little  in  their  rear,  they 
arrived  unmolested  at  certain  villages,  where  they  halted  several 
days  to  care  for  their  wounded,  of  w^hom  there  w^ere  very  many, 
and  to  recruit  their  men  and  horses  with  the  food  and  fodder 
prepared  for  the  royal  army.  From  this  time,  moreover,  they 
adopted  a  new  plan ;  for  so  soon  as  the  enemy  appeared  in  pur- 
suit, they  halted  at  the  first  convenient  village,  and  did  not 
attempt  to  fight  him  on  the  march  ;  but  keeping  a  sufficient  force 
under  arms  to  repulse  and  pursue  him,  should  he  attempt  to 
skumish,  passed  the  day  at  their  ease  with  refi-eshment ;  and 
then,  when  the  shades  of  night  began  to  fall,  while  the  enemy 
were  yet  hovering  about  them,  sounded  "  boot  and  saddle."  For 
experience  had  taught  them  that  the  enemy  dared  not  encamp 
nearer  to  them  than  six  or  seven  miles,  for  fear  of  a  night  attack ; 
since,  as  Xenophon  observes,  an  Oriental  army  is  of  all  others 
the  most  liable  to  a  panic,  and  to  what  is  worse,  that  peculiar 
sort  of  panic,  known  on  our  prairies  as  a  stampede,  affecting 
Iwbbled  or  tethei-ed  horses  ;  so  that  to  them  a  night-surprise  is 
almost  a  sure  defeat.  Then,  when  they  were  assured  that  they 
were  once  fairly  off,  they  yoked  their  baggage-cattle  and  marched 
so  far  forward  as  the  enemy  had  fallen  back ;  so  that  it  was  not 


STORM  OF  A  HILL-PASS.  205 

until  the  third  day  that  they  were  again  molested  by  them,  and 
then  but  slightly.  On  that  night,  however,  a  party  of  the  bar- 
barians slipped  past  them  in  the  dark,  and  occupied  a  very 
strong  rocky  hold  on  the  summit  of  a  mountain,  below  which 
their  road  lay.  But  in  the  morning,  when  Cheirisophos  in  full 
march  discovered  them,  he  halted  the  heads  of  the  column,  and 
ordered  up  Xenophon  with  his  targeteei-s  from  the  rear.  Xeno- 
phon  rode  up  at  once,  but  did  not  bring  up  the  troops,  since  the 
rear  was  also  threatened  by  all  the  horse  and  archery  of  Tissa- 
phernes,  who  led  them  in  person  ;  and  no  sooner  had  he  arrived 
than  he  perceived  not  only  the  evil  but  its  cure ;  for  there  was 
yet  another  and  loftier  height  above  that  occupied  by  the  enemy, 
which  taken,  they  would  be  forced  to  retire.  Hereupon,  Cheiri- 
sophos giving  him  his  choice,  whether  to  lead  the  van  to  the 
assault,  or  to  remain  with  the  main  body,  he  at  once  chose  the 
former,  and  was  supplied  with  a  thousand  targeteei-s  from  the 
van  and  centre,  since  his  own  men  could  not  be  spared  fi-om  the 
rear-guard,  and  with  three  hundred  more,  picked  soldiers  of 
Cheirisophos'  own  body  guard. 

Then,  at  once,  he  set  off  at  such  speed  as  he  was  assured  he 
could  maintain ;  and  the  barbarians  on  the  hills,  seeing  his 
object,  set  off  likewise  for  the  upper  summit,  hoping  to  anticipate 
him  ;  and  there  was  a  wild  and  panting  race,  up  those  dizzy 
heights,  between  them,  for  the  mastery — each  army  cheering  its 
own  detachment,  till  all  the  crags  re-echoed  with  the  stirnng 
clamor.  And  Xenophon,  gallopping  beside  his  men,  cheered 
them  to  breast  the  hill,  as  it  needs  a  soldier  to  cheer  soldiers. 
"  Men,"  he  cried,  "  Men,  remember  that  the  race  is  now  for  Hel- 
las, now  for  your  wives  and  children  I — that  striving  now  for  a 
short  space  stoutly,  we  shall  march  henceforth  at  our  ea.se  !" 
Then  one  Soterides  of  Sikyon,  made  answer,  "  We  are  not  on 
one  footing,  you  and  I,  0  Xenophon  ;  for  you  are  carried  ejisily 
on  your  charger,  I  toil  wearily  with  my  heavy  shield."     Then 


206  XENOPHON. 

Xenophon  sprang  from  his  horse,  and  pushed  him  from  the 
ranks,  snatching  his  shield  from  him,  and  led  faster  than  before, 
though  he  was  armed  in  heavy  horseman's  panoply,  so  that  he 
was  overburthened  by  the  shield — cheering  the  foremost  to  press 
on,  and  the  rear  to  close  up-;  so  that  it  was  hard  for  them  to 
follow.  Then  the  soldiei-s  abused  Sotcrides,  and  struck  and 
pelted  him,  till  they  forced  him  to  resume  his  shield  and  his 
place  in  the  ranks  ;  and  Xenophon,  mounting  again,  rode  so  far 
as  the  ground  would  admit  of  riding,  and  then  led  on  foot,  and 
of  course,  won  the  heights  ;  for  what  soldier  would  not  follow  so 
game  and  soldierly  a  leader.  The  winning  of  the  pass,  of 
need  won  the  passage  bloodlessly ;  for  the  barbarians  leaped 
down  the  rocks,  save  themselves  who  could !  and  Tissaphernes 
drew  off  his  men  in  the  rear,  and  the  Greeks  descended  into  the 
plain  near  the  Tigris,  which  was  full  of  rich  villages.  In  the 
evening,  the  horse  again  made  their  appearance  in  the  low 
grounds,  and  cutting  off  a  few  foragers,  began  to  fire  the  villages  ; 
but  the  Greeks,  seeing  that  the  villages  were  the  king's,  not  their 
own,  began  to  fire  them  likewise ;  so  that  the  Persians,  seeing 
themselves  the  losers  at  that  game,  desisted,  and  withdrew  for 
the  night. 

On  the  following  day  there  was  much  doubt  and  dismay  in 
the  host ;  for  in  front  their  way  was  barred  by  precipices  which 
they  could  not  scale,  and  on  their  right  was  the  Tigris — in  the 
hope  to  turn  which  they  had  journeyed  hither — unfordable,  nor 
to  be  sounded  by  their  longest  speai-s.  In  this  predicament, 
they  turned  back  toward  Babylonia,  ravaging  and  burning  the 
country  far  and  near,  while  the  enemy  looked  on  in  amazement, 
without  daring  to  attack  them.  Then,  after  questioning  their 
captives  concerning  the  nature  and  inhabitants  of  the  districts 
around  them,  they  learned  that  the  mountains  directly  to  their 
north  were  inhabited  by  various  Kardouchian  tribes,  savage, 
independent,  and,  though  often  assailed,  never  conquered  by  the 


SITUATION  OF  THE   GREEKS.  207 

king,  who  had  often  invaded  them  to  no  purpose,  a  hundred 
and  twenty  thousand  strong.  Beyond  these  again,  they  were 
informed,  lay  the  rich  and  fertile  plains  of  Armenia,  where  they 
might  either  turn  or  ford  the  sources  of  the  Tigris ;  and  yet  a 
little  farther  off  were  the  head-watei-s  Of  the  Euphi-ates,  in  like 
manner  passable  by  the  army. 

Now  it  must  be  remembered,  that  on  their  way  up  from  Sar- 
dis,  they  had  crossed  the  Euphrates  by  a  deep  ford  at  Tiiapsa- 
kos,  said,  and  probably  with  justice,  to  be  the  only  place  where 
it  was  fordable,  about  midway  between  their  point  of  departure 
and  the  termination  of  their  expedition  on  the  field  of  Kynaxa — 
that,  after  the  battle,  while  yet  friendly  to  Ariaios,  they  had  been 
informed — and  it  is  not  to  be  doubted,  again,  justly — that  the 
country  wasted  by  their  up-march  could,  by  no  possibility,  sup- 
port them  on  their  return  ;  and  that,  while  under  safe-conduct 
from  Tissaphernes,  they  had  crossed  the  Tigris  at  Sittake,  on  a 
bridge  of  thirty-six  boats,  to  the  right  or  eastern  bank,  by  which, 
they  had  been  led  to  believe,  lay  their  best  homeward  route. 
This,  doubtless,  was  a  piece  of  Pei-sian  treachery,  followed  up  by 
the  murder  of  the  Greek  generals  on  the  banks  of  the  great  Zab. 
After  this  event  it  was  that  the  Greeks  resolved  to  persevere  in 
their  noi'thern  route,  principally  induced  by  the  consideration 
that  they  had  no  means  of  crossing  those  two  great  rivers  in  the 
face  of  the  enemy ;  the  rather  that  the  country  afforded  no  tim- 
ber for  bridge  or  boat  building,  even  had  other  means  been 
abundant.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  generals  had  no 
choice  but  to  persevere,  since  the  Tigris  to  the  left  or  westward 
was  impassable,  while  to  return  southward  was  to  rush  back  into 
the  hon's  mouth,  at  Babylon  ;  and,  to  march  eastward,  to  turn 
their  backs  absolutely  on  their  own  country.  The  road  north- 
ward led  to  the  sources  of  the  rivei-s,  which  they  must  head, 
since  they  could  not  cross  them,  and  thence  with  victory  and 
safety  home. 


208  XENOrHON. 

I  have  thought  it  well  to  point  out  these  facts  here,  since  I 
have  recently  met  with  a  critique  on  this  retreat,  attributing  it  as 
a  fault  to  the  leadei-s,  that  they  held  their  course  too  directly 
northward,  and  attributed  to  the  Pontos  Euxeinos,  or  Black  Sea, 
a  situation  too  far  to  the  eastward.  Now  it  is 'clear,  first,  that 
they  could  not  march  further  west  of  the  north  than  they  did  at 
this  point;  and  secondly,  that  they  did  not  miscalculate  the 
bearings  of  the  Black  Sea,  since  they  struck  it  without  material 
deviation  from  their  line,  at  Trebizonde,  above  a  hundred  miles 
westward  of  its  eastern  extremity.  It  should  be  remembered 
also,  that  instruments,  maps,  compasses,  were  not  in  those  days ; 
that  the  Greeks  were  in  a  hostile  land,  where  no  European  foot 
had  ever  trod  ;  had  no  guides  but  captive  enemies,  no  pilots  but 
the  eternal  signs  of  heaven,  and  the  wonder  is  that  they  accom- 
plished at  all  a  retreat,  which  has  nothing  compai-able  to  it  in 
the  military  history  of  all  ages,  and  which  is  a  prouder  trophy 
of  true  generalship,  than  the  most  brilliant  campaign  ever  won  by 
mortal  genius.  They  plunged  at  once  into  the  rugged  Avilder- 
ness  of  craggy  rocks,  pathless  ravines,  and  torrent-beds,  unknown 
even  to  this  hour,  w^hich  forms  the  modern  district  of  Kurdistan, 
and  the  Turkish  Pachalic  of  Van,  to  the  south  of  the  great  lake 
of  the  same  name,  and  forced  their  way  through  it — having 
destroyed  all  their  superfluous  baggage  and  released  all  their 
captives,  with  the  exception  of  the  female  hetairai,  who  followed 
them  in  great  numbers — by  desperate  and  incessant  fighting,  m 
the  space  of  seven  days.  At  first  they  suffered  terribly,  for  the 
weather  was  dreadful,  and  the  inhabitants  had  all  fled  to  the  hill- 
tops, and  thence  galled  the  rear-guard  with  the  most  fearful 
archery  they  had  yet  encountered ;  for  they  fought  with  six-foot 
bows  and  cloth-yard  arrows,  which  no  casque  or  corslet  could 
withstand  ;  so  that  Xenophon  lost  two  of  his  best  hoplitai — Kle- 
onymus,  a  Lakedaimonian,  shot  clear  through  shield,  buff-coat, 
corslet  and  bodv  ;  and  Basias,  an  Arkadian,  through  the  head. 


TURNING  THE  RIGHT.  209 

This  was  in  some  sort  the  fault  of  Cheirisophos,  who,  deceived 
by  the  guide  into  the  behef  that  there  was  no  other  pass, 
attempted  to  make  his  way  forward  by  dint  of  sheer  fighting, 
and  left  his  rear-guard  to  shift  for  itself ;  so  that  the  march  of 
Xenophon  was,  in  his  own  words,  all  but  a  flight.  At  the  coun- 
cil which,  followed,  the  latter  chief,  who  well  knew  the  greatest 
secret  of  mountain  warfare,  that  there  is  no  position  which  may 
not  be  turned  somewhere — and  whose  constant  motto,  through 
this  fearful  time  of  trial,  was,  that  the  greatest  object  here  is  not 
to  win  with  the  greatest  glory,  but  to  come  off  with  the  least 
loss — insisted  on  this  plan  for  the  future  campaign.  Then  he 
extorted  from  one  of  two  captive  guides,  though  not  till  the  other 
was  slain  before  his  face,  the  admission  that  he  knew  a  higher 
defile,  as  is  ever  the  case  in  hill-fighting,  by  the  occupation  of 
which  the  position  of  the  defenders  would  be  rendered  at  once 
untenable,  and  the  passage  of  the  army  easy. 

Volunteers  were  detached  that  very  night  to  occupy  the  top- 
most hill  of  all,  taking  with  them  the  guide  in  chains,  with  ordei"S 
to  blow  their  trumpets  at  dawn,  should  they  succeed  in  their  mis- 
sion ;  while  Xenophon,  to  distract  the  attention  of  the  enemy, 
advanced  as  if  to  enter  the  usual  passes,  but  they  were  impreg- 
nable, the  enemy  rolling  down  rocks  upon  them  as  large  in 
diameter  as  wagon  wheels  ;  and  when  it  became  quite  dark  he 
drew  off  the  rear  guard  to  supper,  for  they  had  tasted  no  food 
that  day.  But  in  the  mean  time  the  volunteers,  favored  by  the 
darkness  and  a  timely  fog,  carried  the  height  unseen,  owing  to 
the  night,  and  at  daybreak  sounding  their  trumpets,  charged  and 
cleared  the  way.  Then  Cheirisophos  with  the  main-guard 
forced  the  regular  passes  without  difficulty,  and  Xenophon  with 
the  rear,  followed  the  new  path,  domineered  by  the  hill  which  the 
volunteers  had  taken.  He  soon,  however,  reached  another  peak, 
which  he  was  compelled  to  storm  in  deep  narrow  fronted  columns, 
sometimes,  I  believe,  in  Indian  file ;  having  carried  this,  and 
10 


210  XENoriioN. 

seeing  another  yet  in  front,  he  left  a  guaid  on  it,  lest  it  should  be 
retaken,  carried  the  second,  and  discovered  yet  beyond,  a  third 
peak,  loftier  than  that  forced  by  the  volunteers,  occupied  by  the 
enemy,  who  fled,  however,  on  the  instant,  leaving  it  to  be  taken 
by  Xenophon  in  person,  with  a  few  of  the  younger  men  only. 
For  he  had  ordered  the  rest  to  halt,  until  the  rear  should  rejoin 
them,  and  then  proceeding  down  the  slope,  to  pile  arms  in  the  plam 
at  the  bottom.  Before  this  could  be  done,  however,  the  savages 
had  overpowered  the  post  left  on  the  first  hill,  so  that  but 
few  escaped  leaping  headlong  down  the  rocks,  and  then  encour- 
aged by  this  success,  followed  up  so  closely,  that,  as  the  rest 
descended  the  last  hillock  into  the  level  land,  they  rolled  down 
rocks  upon  them,  and  did  some  damage.  In  the  plain,  at  the 
foot,  they  found  villages  with  comfoilable  dwellings,  and  good 
provision,  and  much  wine ;  but  in  order  to  recover  their  dead, 
which  was  a  point  of  the  most  awful  rehgion  with  the  Greeks, 
they  were  compelled  to  treat  with  the  Barbarians  and  to  release 
theh  guide.  The  next  day  they  marched  again,  with  no  one  to 
direct  them,  but  by  adopting  Xenophon's  plan,  they  gained 
more  ground  and  with  less  loss  either  of  time  or  hfe.  For  when 
the  way  of  Cheirisophos  with  the  win  was  obstructed  in  any 
defile,  Xenophon  turned  it  by  the  mountains,  and  so  cleared  the 
route ;  and  when  Xenophon's  men  thus  converted  into  the  van, 
were  brought  to  a  stand,  Cheirisophos  in  the  hke  manner  ma- 
noeuvred by  the  upper  ground  to  open  the  road  in  his  turn.  Still 
there  was  hard-fighting,  for  the  same  terrible  archers  met  them, 
who  drew  their  bowstrings  not  to  their  breasts  as  the  Greeks,  but 
bearing  their  weight  on  the  left  foot  pulled  the  cords  downward 
to  the  left  ear,  exactly  as  the  English  archery,  so  formidable  in 
the  middle  ages,  and  like  them  pierced  the  strongest  shields  and 
breastplates  out  of  ordinary  bow-shot.  The  whole  of  this  great 
passage  was  conducted  on  true  military  principles,  every  succes- 
sive post  of  the  enemy  being  carried  by  the  main  body  without 


DIRECTION   OF  RETREAT.  211 

lc3s,  after  being  turned  on  the  right,  whv.re  the  ground  was 
higher,  by  the  rear  guard.  Whether  the  whole  movement  might 
have  been  performed  more  easily  and  with  less  loss,  by  a  constant 
advance  with  the  right  wing  thrust  very  far  ahead,  so  as  to  turn 
all  the  positions  in  succession,  is  doubtful ;  but  probably,  con- 
sidering the  very  limited  range  of  ancient  missiles,  and  the  cor- 
responding diminution  in  value  of  doniinaut  heights,  wliich  could 
command  only  within  the  range  of  arrow-shot,  and  taking  into 
account  the  nature  of  the  enemy  who,  turned  or  not,  would 
have  fought  till  the  missiles  fell  among  them,  Xenophon's  pas- 
sage of  the  mountains  of  Kurdistan,  could  be  little  im])roved  u|)on, 
even  at  the  present  day ;  and,  as  in  the  late  desperate  battles  in 
Aftghanistan,  not  very  far  removed  from  the  same  scene  of  action, 
every  defile  must  have  been  forced,  or  turned  in  succession. 

At  length  they  descended  into  the  open  plains  on  the  bank  of  the 
Kentrites,  now  the  Khabour,  which  was  at  that  time  the  boundary 
between  Armenia,  the  king's  province,  and  the  independent 
tribes  of  Kardouchia.  It  would  appear  that  the  point  at  which 
they  left  the  Tigris  and  entered  the  hill  country  could  not  have 
been  far  from  the  modern  city  of  Mosul ;  as  ruins,  suj^posed  to 
be  those  of  Mespila,  described  in  the  Anabjisis,*  exist  there 
still ;  that  they  passed  near  the  site  of  the  present  Amadieh,  and 
came  down  on  the  upper  watei-s  of  the  Khaboui-,  to  the  eastward 
of  the  site  of  TigranocerUi,  now  Sered,  at  about  fifty  miles  distance 
west  of  the  southern  end  of  lake  Van  ;  for  it  is  quite  clear  that 
they  were  never  in  sight  of  that  great  sheet  of  water  which 
Xenophon,  so  singularly  exact  and  minute  in  his  details,  could 
not  have  failed  to  mention,  had  he  seen  or  even  heard  of  it ; 
while  it  is  even  more  certain  that  they  could  not  have  gone  east 
of  it,  since  in  that  case  they  would  have  crossed  neither  the 
Kentrites,  nor  the  Tigris,  if  they  did  cross  the  latter  at  all,  which 
I  hold  doubtful.  The  never  mentioning  of  this  Pal  us  Arsissa,  or 
*  Anab.  iii.  iv.  9. 


'212  XENOPIIOX. 

Lake  Van,  is  in  fact  one  of  the  most  remarkable  things  connected 
'svith  the  expedition,  as  it  is  probably  the  largest  lake  he  or  any- 
other  Greek  had  ever  seen,  being  about  sixty  miles  in  length  by 
half  the  breadth,  and  as  their  route  must  have  lain  for  several 
daj's  across  a  level  country,  within  a  few  miles  of  its  southern  and 
western  shores.  Here,  once  more,  they  beheld  their  old  enemy 
in  the  shape  of  the  showy  and  well-accoutred  cavalry  of  the  Per- 
sians ;  being  Armenian,  Chaldaian,  and  Mardonian  mercenaries, 
with  the  Satraps,  Orontes  and  Artouchos,  arrayed  in  all  the  pomp 
and  pride  of  oriental  war,  and  ready  to  prevent  their  passage  of 
the  river  ;  while  in  their  rear,  covering  the  slopes  and  sides  of  the 
craggy  hills  they  had  passed  so  laboriously,  swarmed  the  fierce 
hordes  of  the  Kardouchian  archei-s.  Never  were  the  Greeks  in  a 
worse  predicament,  as  it  appeared,  than  now  ;  for  the  only  ford 
they  had  discovered  was  more  than  breast  high,  and  the  stream 
ran  like  a  torrent  over  large  slippery  stones,  utterly  impassable 
to  men  carrying  arms,  especially  when  opposed  to  an  active 
enemy.  A  second  ford  was,  however,  accidentally  discovered 
above,  and  by  some  very  skilful  manceuvering,  Xenophon  kept 
the  Persians  on  the  farther  shore,  in  doubt  as  to  which  ford  they 
intended  to  use,  until  Cheirisophos  was  well  over  it ;  and  then, 
distracting  them  by  a  feint  of  crossing  below  and  surroundmg 
them,  put  them  to  flight  without  striking  a  blow.  Then  rapidly 
moving  up  to  the  practicable  ford,  he  formed  fi'ont  to  the  Kai- 
douchians,  who  had  come  down  into  the  plain,  and  covered  the 
passage  of  the  baggage  and  camp  followers,  until  these  were  well 
over  also.  That  accomplished  by  a  feigned  charge  with  poeans 
and  clash  of  spear  and  shield,  he  drove  the  Barbarians  back  to 
their  hills,  and  wheeling  at  a  preconcerted  signal  of  trumpets, 
which  lent  wings  to  the  terror  of  the  savages,  carried  all  his  rear 
guard  safely  over  without  the  loss  of  a  man,  a  few  only  who  had 
pursued  too  hastily  coming  in  wounded. 

There  is  no  finer  record  of  a  river  passed  by  a  coup  de  main— 


SOURCES    OF    THE    TIGRIS.  213 

and  all  through  excellent  manoeiivering,  \Wth  a  superior  force  of 
cavalry  in  front  defending  the  fords,  and  an  inveterate  pursuer, 
imminent,  and  intent  on  destroying  the  rear — than  this  of  the 
Kentrites ;  and  it  is  clear  that,  from  the  discovery  of  the  ford  by 
his  foragers,  to  his  own  passage,  almost  the  last  man,  the  merit  is 
all  Xenophon's  own.  To  increase  their  pleasure  Lykios,  with  his 
handful  of  cavalry,  had  overtaken  the  Persian  baggage-guard,  and 
gained  rich  booty  of  garments  and  gold  and  silver  plate.  Thence 
they  marched  twenty  miles  over  a  fair  and  level  plain — for  there 
were  no  hamlets  nearer  the  river  through  dread  of  the  Kardou- 
chians — and  passed  the  night  at  their  ease,  billeted  in  convenient 
dwellings,  at  a  large  \illage  near  the  Satrap's  palace,  where  they 
had  all  necessaries  in  abundance.  Some  sixty  miles  thence  they 
thought  they  crossed  the  sources  of  the  Tigris,  but  the  true 
sources  lie  considerably  to  the  west  of  their  route,  although  two 
or  three  considerable  tributaries  of  that  river  do  in  fact  arise  in 
the  plains  to  the  west  of  Lake  Van,  which  the  Greeks  were 
probably  led  to  beheve  the  true  head-watei-s  of  that  river.  This 
was  in  the  district  of  western  Armenia,*  and  in  the  Satrapy  of 
Tiribazos — now  the  southern  verge  of  the  Pachalic  of  Erzeroum 
— who  now  approached  them  with  a  splendid  array  of  horse,  and 
sent  interpreters,  offering  them  a  safe  passage,  and  liberty  to 
forage,  so  they  would  abstain  from  plundering.  And  the 
generals  agTeed,  and  a  truce  was  concluded  and  ratified  by  liba- 
tions. As  seems  to  be  the  fate,  however,  of  all  such  truces,  this 
also  was  immediately  broken  by  the  Barbarians;  for  on  the 
third  or  fourth  night  thereafter,  during  a  fearful  snow  storm 
which  drove  the  men  to  cover  in  some  hamlets  near  their 
bivouac,  an  alarm  arose  that  fires  were  seen  burning  on  the  hills 
as  of  a  great  army  ;  so  that  the  leaders  withdrew  the  soldiers 
from  their  comfortable  quarters  into  the  open  air  again.  The 
snow,  however,  fell  to  such  a  depth,  and  the  cold  became  so 
*Xen.Anab.  IV.  4.4. 


214  XENOPHON. 

terrible  that  they  were  forced  to  seek  shelter  a  second  time,  when 
they  sent  out  Democrates  of  Temenis,  who  had  at  various  times 
before  approved  himself  an  active  and  trustworthy  scout,  with 
men  under  his  orders,  to  examine  the  hilts  where  the  tires  were 
reported  to  be  seen  ;  and,  on  his  return,  he  stated  that  he  found 
no  fii'es ;  but  he  brought  in  a  prisoner,  armed  with  a  Persian 
bow  and  arrows,  and  an  Amazonian  battle-axe,  who  admitted 
himself  to  be  one  of  Tiribazos'  army,  which  he  said  lay  in  the 
mountains,  at  the  only  defiles  by  which  the  Greeks  could  pass, 
and  consisted  of  the  Satrap's  regular  power,  besides  Chalybian 
and  Tnochian  mercenaries,  levied  of  very  purpose  to  set  on  them 
in  the  gorges.  As  soon  as  it  was  light,  therefore,  the  generals 
marched  with  their  best  troops,  intending  to  anticipate  the 
Persians,  and  occupy  the  pass,  leaving  Sophainetos  the  Stym- 
phahan  in  command  at  the  camp,  and  taking  their  prisoner  with 
them  as  a  guide.  Then,  when  the  targeteers  had  crossed  the 
mountains,  they  perceived  the  barbarian  camp  below  them  on 
the  other  side,  and  without  awaiting  the  arrival  of  the  hophtai 
charged  down  at  once  with  their  battle-cry,  the  enemy  flying  on 
all  sides  without  a  blow,  though  some  of  their  men  were  slain, 
and  twenty  horses  taken  in  the  pursuit.  The  camp  afforded  rich 
booty,  and  Tiribazos'  own  tent  was  captm-ed,  with  his  silver 
footed  couches  and  golden  goblets,  and  his  cup  bearers  and 
carvers,  proving  the  truth  of  their  captive's  narrative.  Notwith- 
standing this  brilliant  success,  however,  they  tarried  not  to  enjoy 
their  spoils,  but  marched  back  that  same  day,  to  their  own 
people,  determined  to  break  up  at  once,  and  pass  the  defiles 
without  giving  the  enemy  time  to  collect  his  forces.  And  on  the 
next  day  they  did  so  with  success,  halted  for  the  night  in  the 
deserted  camp  of  Tiribazos,  and  after  marching  three  days'  jour- 
ney over  a  desert  country,  forded  the  Euphrates,  waist-deep,  its 
sources  being  reported  to  them  as  not  far  distant.  The  mountains 
here  spoken  of  are  evidently  those  running  due  west  from  the 


LOSSES  IN    THE  SNOW.  215 

north-western  extremity  of  Lake  Van,  which'  divide  the  head 
waters  of  the  Tigris  from  those  of  the  Euphrates ;  the  former 
rising  in  their  own  western  slope,  the  latter  from  the  southern 
spurs  of  Mount  Ararat,  two  hundred  miles  to  the  north-eastward. 
The  river,  which  the  Greeks  here  forded,  as  the  Euphrates,  is  the 
Arsanias,  now  called  the  Morad,  its  greatest  southern  branch, 
and  as  I  should  judge  the  true  river,  though  the  sources  of  that 
noble  stream  are  usually  ascribed  to  the  northern  branch  rising- 
near  Arze,  the  modern  Erzeroum  in  the  Pachalic  of  that  name. 
It  is  remarkable  that  both  of  this  and  its  sister  river  the  Tigris, 
Xenophon  names  the  south-eastern  branches  as  the  true  streams ; 
and,  to  judge  from  the  comparative  size  on  the  maps,  his  nomen- 
clature, at  least  in  the  former  case,  appears  to  be  more  correct. 

Up  to  this  moment,  the  general  direction  of  the  retreat  is  as 
true  as  if  it  had  been  made  by  compass  for  Trebizonde,  then 
Trapezos,  a  Greek  colony  on  the  Black  Sea ;  and  had  that  direc- 
tion been  produced  it  would  have  passed  through  Arze,  even  then 
a  considerable  towm,  on  the  true  Tigris,  and  W'Ould  have  struck 
the  Euxine  wdthin  a  few  miles  of  their  mark.  From  this  point, 
however,  for  some  reason  which  we  cannot  decide,  they  bore 
away  to  the  north-eastward,  and — having  suffered  dreadful 
extremities  from  cold,  losing  more  men  in  those  vast  marshy 
plains,  now  covered  five  feet  deep  with  snow,  than  in  all 
their  previous  skirmishes  and  marches,  and  being  saved  from 
total  destruction  only  by  the  energ}^  of  Xenophon,  w^ho  stayed 
by  the  sufferers,  protected  them,  and  brought  them  safely 
in,  when  Cheirisophos,  with  the  van,  had  hurried  forw\ard  reck- 
lessly, leaving  the  men  to  iiiU  asleep  and  die  w^here  they  fell, 
as  in  the  disastrous  retreat  of  Moscow — at  length  struck  a 
stream,  w^hich  Xenophon  calls  the  Phcisis,  as  he  does  the  tribes 
dwelling  on  it,  the  Phasians ;  but  which  is  in  foct  the  ancient 
Araxes,  or  modern  Aras,  a  principal  tributary  of  the  great  river 
Kur,  which  falls  into  the  Caspian  Sea,  south  of  the  Volga.     It 


216  '  XENOPHON. 

would  be  agreeable  here  to  pause  and  consider  the  details  of 
their  long  and  hospitable  entertainment  by  the  Armenians,  who. 
alone  of  the  nations  and  tribes,  through  whom  they  mai-ched, 
entreated  them  with  kindness ;  but  neither  these  nor  any  of  the 
truly  interesting  accounts  of  the  countries  through  which  the 
ten  thousand  passed,  their  natural  products,  curiosities  or  inhabi- 
tants, will  the  design  or  limits  of  this  little  work  admit ;  and  for 
all  such  I  must  refer  my  reader  to  the  admirable  work  of  Xeno- 
phon,  a  work  abounding  with  all  the  interest  of  the  wildest 
romance,  the  fascination  of  the  most  graphic  travels,  and  the  truth 
of  the  gravest  contemporary  history,  the  whole  clothed  in  a  style 
never  surpassed  for  ease,  elegance^  simplicity  or  grace. 

Soon  after  crossing  the  Aras,  on  coming  to  the  ascent  of  the 
mountains  from  the  plain — here  they  must  have  discovered  the 
error  of  their  course  in  hanng  too  much  northing,  and  turned 
short  westward,  for  no  where  else  do  the  hills  approach  so 
nearly  to  the  course  of  the  Araxes — they  found  the  slopes  occu- 
pied by  a  hostile  array  of  Chalybes,  Taochoi,  and  Phasianoi,  who 
offered  a  desperate  resistance.  Here  again  the  passage  was 
forced  by  the  same  manoeuvre  as  before,  turning  the  enemy's 
position  by  night,  and  gaining  the  upper  ground  ;  and  by  the 
same  captains  Aristonymos  of  Methydra  and  Agasias  the  Stym- 
phalian  ;  but  in  this  case,  there  was  some  hard  fighting  on  the 
upper  liill,  and  it  was  necessary  for  the  Targeteere  to  charge, 
supported  by  the  heavy  foot,  before  they  could  clear  their  way. 
Soon  afterward  they  fell  short  of  food,  for  the  Taochoi  retreated 
with  their  wives  and  children  and  all  their  supplies,  to  inaccessible 
hill  fastnesses,  a  few  of  which  were  carried  rather  by  desperate 
personal  valor  and  emulation  among  the  captains  of  Loehi, 
e8[)ecially  those  named  above,  than  by  much  skill  or  science. 
Still  it  appears  that  Xenophon  again  suggested  the  movement  by 
which  the  most  difficult  was  taken.  The  desperate  character  of 
*  Anab.  IV.  v  24-36. 


THE    SEA,    THE    SEA.  217 

these  people  was  evinced  by  their  casting  down  their  wives  and 
children,  and  leaping  themselves  headlong  from  the  rocks  when 
they  saw  their  hill  forts  carried — as  did  the  Chimariots  when 
Suli  was  stormed  by  Ali  Pacha — rather  than  submit  to  enemies, 
who,  to  their  eternal  honor  be  it  spoken,  never  had  recourse  to  a 
single  act  of  cruelty  or  wanton  devastation  during  this  long  and 
desperate  retreat,  when  provoked  to  the  utmost  by  the  treachery 
of  the  unrelenting  foe,  who  appeared  set  on  hunting  them  to  de- 
struction. Thence,  they  entered  the  Chalybian  countiy,  the  men 
being  very  bold  and  hardy,  fighting  with  the  Greeks  hand  to 
hand,  armed  with  pikes  twenty  feet  in  length,  and  cutlasses  like 
the  Lakonian  swords,  and  wearing  linen  corslets,  with  head 
pieces  and  greaves.  From  these  people  they  could  win  no  food 
or  forage,  but  were  supported  by  what  they  had  taken  from  the 
Taochoi,  until,  reaching  the  Skythinian  district,  they  halted  for 
three  days  and  foraged  unmolested.  The  next  tribe,  occupying 
a  large,  populous  and  w^ealthy  city,  sent  a  guide  who  promised  to 
bring  them  within  five  days,  through  an  enemy's  country  which 
he  beo-o-ed  them  to  burn  and  devastate,  to  a  mountain  from 
which  they  should  perceive  the  sea,  and  that  he  was  willing  to 
die  in  case  of  failure.  And  on  the  fifth  day,  he  brought  them  to 
the  hill,  which  is  called  Theke,*  according  to  Xenophon,  while 
Diodorus  makes  it  Chenion.f 

I  am  not  aware  that  this  hill  has  ever  been  identified  by  per- 
sonal observation,  but  it  is  clearly  one  of  the  northern  spurs  of 
the  ridge  of  mountains  in  which  the  Euphrates  rises,  and  which 
StraboJ;  designates  as  the  northern  branch  of  the  Taurus ;  and 
it  is  not  a  httle  remarkable  that  at  the  foot  of  such  a  spur,  im- 
mediately above  Trebizonde,  and  on  the  stream  which  forms  the 
harltor  of  that  once  famous  city,  there  is  to  this  day  a  village  of 

»f  Anab.  IV.  vii  21.  f  Diod.  Sic.  XIV.  29. 

t  Anthon's  Class  Diet.  Art.  Euphrates. 


10 


218  XEXOPHON. 

Tekeli  which  may  well  retain  a  vestige  of  Xenophon's  appella- 
tion Theke. 

On  reaching  this  point,  the  rapture  of  these  men,  home-sick, 
travel-worn,  and  heart-weary,  can  be  imagined  better  than  de- 
scribed, but  of  all  descriptions,  his  must  needs  be  the  best,  who 
saw  the  welcome  sight,  and  shared  the  rapture  which  he 
witnessed.  "  When  the  fii-st  men,"  he  says,  "  reached  the  sum- 
mit and  beheld  the  sea,  a  great  shout  arose ;  and  when  Xenophon 
and  the  rear-guard  heard  it,  they  supposed  that  a  fresh  enemy 
had  attacked  the  head  of  the  column  ;  for  at  this  time  they 
were  pursued  hotly  by  men  from  the  country  they  had 
wasted ;  and  the  rear-guard  had  killed  some  and  taken  others 
alive,  of  the  enemy,  in  an  ambush,  besides  capturing  about 
twenty  shaggy  bucklers  of  raw  bull-hide.  But  when  the  clamor 
constantly  increased  and  became  nigher,  and  when  all  who  ap- 
proached rushed  up  the  hill  at  full  speed,  and  joined  those  who 
were  still  shouting,  and  swelled  the  shout  themselves,  till  it  waxed 
very  mighty,  Xenophon  conceived  that  it  was  something  of 
greater  import ;  and  mounting  his  charger  he  galloped  up,  lead- 
ing Lykios  and  the  cavalry,  as  if  to  the  rescue ;  and  soon  they 
heard  the  soldiers  shouting  "  The  sea  !  The  sea  !"  and  plighting 
their  vows  to  heaven.  Then  all  the  rear-guard  rushed  up  the 
hill,  and  the  cavalry  in  full  career,  and  even  the  beasts  of  burthen. 
And  when  all  were  at  the  summit,  they  embraced  one  another, 
and  their  generals,  and  the  captains  of  their  bands,  weeping  and 
speechless  ;  and  suddenly,  as  if  to  perform  the  vow  of  some  one, 
the  soldiers  brought  together  stones  and  built  a  vast  column,  and 
hung  upon  it  bull-hides,  and  their  staves,  and  the  shields  of  the 
enemy,  v/hich  they  had  taken."* 

How  could  any  scene  have  been  more  striking  or  at  the  same 
time  more  affecting ;  indeed,  so  enthusiastic  and  contagious  were 
their  transports,  that  the  barbarian  guide,  whom  they  afterward 

*   Anab.  IV  vii.  21.  and  26. 


A  ncTuiiii;.  21-9 

dismissed  splendidly  rewarded,  partook  their  joy,  and  himself 
helped  to  erect  the  trophy,  and  cut  the  shields,  and  called  upon 
the  others  to  do  likewise. 

Never,  I  think,  to  borrow  the  noble  words  of  Aiskylos,*  was — 

''  The  land  seen  of  men 
Shipwrecked  and  hopeless  on  the  deep,  the  morn 
Breaking  resplendent  from  a  night  of  storms, 
The  crystal  fountain  in  a  burning  waste 
To  the  lone  wayfarer," 

a  spectacle  so  blessed  and  joyous  as  that  fiir  glimpse  of  those 
^\■\\d  and  inhospitable  waters,  heaving  to  the  blasts  of  the  fierce 
north  wind  which  had  dealt  with  them  heretofore  so  roughly, 
but  which  they  were  now  ready  to  adore,  since  every  sw^eeping 
gust  should  bear  them  back  to  happiness,  to  home,  to 
Ilcllas. 

To  me  that  simple  and  brief  narrative  of  Xenophon,  with  that 
electric  and  electrifying  shout  "  the  sea !  the  sea !"  has  been,  as 
Chevy  Chase  was  to  Sir  Philip  Sydney,  such,  that  I  might  say 
with  him,  "  I  never  heard  it,  that  I  found  not  my  heart  moved 
more  than  with  a  trumpet ;"  and  at  this  day  a  picture  of  the 
scene,  which  I  saw  years  ago,  when  I  was  a  mere  boy — I  think, 
by  Etty — is  distinct  before  my  eyes,  with  every  detail,  as  when 
I  saw  it.  The  artist  had  chosen  the  moment  when  Xenophon 
ronehes  the  summit,  on  his  panting  hoi-se,  and  the  whole  scene  is 
before  him,  the  whole  tale  told  at  a  glance.  Some  shouting,  w^eep- 
ing,  clas2:>ing  hands,  embracing,  vowing — but  all  straining  their 
eyes,  all  pointing  their  arms  to  that  far  blue  misty  line,  which 
instinct  rather  than  eyesight  told  them  was  the  sea !  The  painter, 
too,  had  caught  one  incident,  which  the  great  penman  has  for- 
gotten to  insert — for  it  must  have  happened,  since  there  were 
many  hetairai  in  camp  ;  some  who  had  followed,  doubtless,  from 
unforgotten  Greece;  some  captives  only,  but  all  now  loved  by 
*  Agamemnon,  983;  Herbert's  Translation. 


220  XENOPTION. 

their  lords,  if  only  from  community  of  hopes  and  fears,  and  pains 
and  perils — a  soldier,  the  most  prominent  figure  in  the  piece, 
lifting  his  mistress  high  in  the  ah',  that  she  too  might  behold  the 
Sea !  the  Sea  !  and  catch  from  it  one  inspiration  from  loved  and 
lovely  Hellas.     To  each  one  of  them  all,  that  sea  was* 

"  As  a  friendly  hand 
Stretched  out  from  his  native  land, 
Filling  his  heart  with  wiemories  sweet  and  endless." 

To  each  one  -of  them  all  it  seemed,  doubtless,  that  all  his  toils 
were  ended,  all  his  perils  over,  the  port  already  gained,  the  home 
of  his  youth  before  him — for  Xenophon  tells  us  elsewhere  that 
these  men  were  not  mere  hirehng  soldiers,  but  men  of  character, 
with  property,  homes,  chilch-en,  parents,  wives ;  men  who  had 
followed  Kyros  partly  from  admiration  of  his  great  renown, 
partly  from  love  of  glory,  partly  from  \oxe  of  adventure,  least  of 
all  from  love  of  lucre  ;  and  the  truth  of  what  he  tells  is  evident 
by  the  fury  with  which  they  turned  on  their  leaders,  whenever 
they  suspected  them  of  an  intent  to  detain  them  in  Asia — and 
yet  how  few  of  them  ever  saw  home  or  country — how  few 
ever  filled  a  Grecian  grave,  which  pei'haps  above  all  things  all 
desired. 

But  not  to  anticipate — although  their  way  was  now  not  long 
to  Trapezos,  there  were  still  difficulties  to  be  surmounted ;  for 
after  the  Makrones  had  given  them  a  free  passage — owing  to  the 
curious  fact  that  one  of  Xenophon's  targeteers,  who  had  been  a 
slave  at  Athens,  was  originally  a  captive  from  that  tribe,  and 
still  spoke  their  language — the  Kolchians  defended  their  hills 
with  desperation,  and  were  only  conquered,  after  some  sharp 
fighting,  by  Xenophon's  favorite  movement,  of  dividing  the 
phalanx  into  columns  of  the  several  lochi,  each  a  hundred  strong, 

*  Longfellow — Building  of  the  Ship. 


ARRIVAL  AT  THE  GREEK  COLONIES.  221 

with  a  front  probably  of  four  shields,  and  a  depth  of  twenty -four, 
as  more  flexible  and  less  liable  to  be  broken  and  clubbed  by  dif- 
ficulties of  broken  ground.  In  eight  days  they  reached  the  sea 
near  Trapezos,  now  Trebizonde,  a  Greek  city,  the  easternmost  on 
the  Black  Sea,  and  a  colony  of  Sinope,  the  most  powerful  place 
and  indeed  the  metropolis  of  all  the  Hellenic  colonies  on  the 
Euxine.  Here  they  were  hospitably  received,  and  rested  awhile 
fi-om  their  toils,  and  celebrated  their  return  in  safety,  to  what 
doubtless  appeared  to  them  Greece,  by  sacred  games  and 
festivals. 

Thence  Cheirisophos  took  ship  for  Herakleia,  where  he  hoped 
to  find  vessels  whereby  to  transport  all  the  men  home  together ; 
and  the  rest,  meanwhile,  were  compelled  by  necessity  to  sell 
their  swords  to  the  colonists  against  their  barbarous  enemies,  on 
whom  they  foraged,  having  neither  markets  sufficient  to  supply 
food  for  so  many,  nor  means  to  purchase,  had  there  been  mar- 
kets. And  here  they  had  some  desperate  fighting  with  the  Kol- 
chian  enemies  of  the  Trapezuntians,  and  lost  many  good  men, 
but  won  much  booty,  which  they  sold  to  their  entertainers,  and 
fi'om  the  profits  furnished  themselves  with  supphes,  and  with 
shipping  for  the  sick  and  the  soldiers,  above  forty  yeare,  the 
women,  the  children,  and  the  baggage,  whom  they  sent  by  sea, 
under  the  command  of  Sophainetos  and  Philesios,  the  oldest  of 
the  generals,  to  Kerasous,  now  Kerezoun,  a  sister  colony  from 
Sinope — whither  the  remainder  of  the  army  marched  by  land. 
Here  they  halted  three  days,  and  numbered  the  troops  at  a 
review  under  arms,  when  they  were  found  to  be  eight  thout^-and 
six  hundred  men — survivoi-s,  as  Xenophon  states,  fi-om  about  ten 
thousand — the  rest  having  perished  by  the  hands  of  the  enemy, 
and  in  the  snow,  and  some  few  by  disease.  In  this  enumeration 
there  is  clearly  some  confusion,  since  at  the  midnight  re\iew 
before  Kjnaxa,  in  which  battle  only  one  man  fell,  the  number 
of  hoplitai  alone  amounted  to  ten  thousand  four  hundred  shields 


222  XEN-OPHON. 

of  heavy  foot,  and  twenty-five  hundi-ed  light  troops  in  addi- 
tion; and  again,  at  a  much  later  period  of  the  retreat,  after 
hea\y  fighting  with  the  Mosynoikians,  when  the  army  broke  into 
three  divisions,  it  is  stated  to  have  consisted  of  eight  thousand 
six  hundred  and  forty  men.  It  is  possible  that  in  this  place 
hoplitai  alone  are  intended ;  but  T  consider  it  more  probable  that 
Xenophon  has  anticipated,  and  stated  here  the  full  force  which 
passed  over  the  Bosphorus,  all  losses  included.  Another  diffi- 
culty is  in  this,  that  on  the  heavy  infantry — ^better  defended  and 
less  exposed,  in  hill-fighting,  than  the  targeteers — the  heaviest 
actual  loss  fell ;  they  having  lost  three  thousand  men,  for  fifteen 
hundred  of  the  others ;  but  this  may  probably  be  explained  by 
their  greater  sufferings  in  the  snow.  These  discrepancies  can- 
not, however,  be  explained — many,  perhaps,  are  owing  to  errors 
in  transcription  of  the  manuscripts ;  and  in  no  point  of  these  do 
more  mistakes  occur,  even  in  this  age  of  printing,  than  in  the 
articles ;  nor  in  any  other  are  authors,  especially  the  ancients, 
more  careless ;  sometimes  stating  round  numbers  generally,  as  if 
they  were  intend(Kl  to  be  accurate,  and  again  exact  numbei-s  so 
loosely  that  they  are  taken  to  mean  round  ones. 

The  whole  distance  of  their  march  from  Babylonia  and  the 
battle-ground  to  Kotyora,  their  next  halting  place  after  Kerasous, 
he  states  at  one  hundred  and  twenty-two  posts,  or  days'  march — 
six  hundred  and  twenty  parasangs — eighteen  thousand  six  hun- 
dred stadia ;  these  distances  by  various  measures  agreeing  nearly 
enough  to  prove  their  correctness,  since  eight  stadia  are  a  little 
more  than  one  mile  English,  and  one  parasang  a  little  less 
than  four.     The  time  consumed  was  eiirht  months. 

And  here  practically,  and  in  a  military  point  of  view,  this 
grand  retreat  may  be  said  to  have  terminated — and  that  in 
safety  and  success. 

With  the  miserable  dissensions  which  followed,  tlie  ambition 
and  troachory  of  tlie  leaders,  the  basp  terijivei-sation  of  the  Lake- 


STRIFE    AND    DISSEXSIONS.  223 

daimonian  admiral,  the  jealousies  of  tlie  Greek  colonies  of  the- 
Black  Sea,  Xenophon  had  nothing  to  do,  save  that  he  nearly- 
fell  a  victim  to  them  ;  nor  do  they  properly  belong  to  the  history 
of  the  retreat,  which  was  in  truth  ended,  so  soon  as  the  ten 
thousand  had  fought  their  way  through  all  their  barbarous 
enemies,  had  reached  their  countrymen  of  the  Greek  colonies, 
and  the  sea  by  which  they  might  have  obtained  transportation  to 
their  native  shores. 

Still  it  may  be  well  to  trace  his  connection  with  the  ten 
thousand  to  its  close,  for  we  find  him  in  many  and  strange  vicis- 
situdes, owing  to  that  connection.  We  find  him  arraigned  before 
his  own  soldiei-s  and  acquitted  honorably  and  by  acclamation ; 
we  find  him  implored  to  accept  the  sole  command,  and  resolutely 
declining  it ;  Ave  find  him  deposed  from  the  station  he  had  held 
since  the  death  of  Proxenos ;  reduced  to  his  own  small  separate 
command ;  rescuing  the  very  men  who  had  depo'iod  him  ;  raised 
to  the  sole  command  involuntarily  ;  carrying  the  army  over  the 
Bosphoros  in  safety,  quitting  them  when  all  seemed  well  with 
them,  returning  to  them  when  in  distress ;  at  one  time  well 
nigh  stoned  to  death,  because  he  desired  to  found  a  colony  at 
Kalpe  in  Bithynia ;  at  another  offered  the  supreme  government 
of  Byzantium  and  declining  it ;  but  always  playing  the  part  of 
a  good  soldier,  a  good  general,  a  good  man,  and  what  is  more 
an  honest,  religious,  conscientious,  and  consistent  man,  if  ever 
there  lived  one  in  ancient  or  modern  history. 

In  the  end,  he  delivered  over  his  men  to  Thibron,  the  Spartan 
General  in  Asia  Minor ;  and  they  were  amalgamated  with  the 
Greek  force  fighting  against  Tissaphernes  and  Pharnabazos, 
under  his  ordeiv,  from  which  time  forth  thoy  had  no  sej^arate 
existence,  as  an  army. 

Xenophon  himself  returned  in  the  following  year  to  Asia  Avith 
liis  friend  Agesilaos,  but  of  what  he  did  or  what  station  he  held 
we  know  nothing.      Subsequently  he  was  engaged  in  Greece, 


224  xENonioN. 

under  tlie  same  general,  against  the  Boiotlans  at  the  battle  of 
Coroneia  ;  and  this  so  displeased  his  countrymen,  the  Athenians, 
that  they  banished  him  ;  but  to  be  banished  was  to  any  Athenian 
a  matter  of  too  common  occurrence  to  be  much  dreaded  or  de- 
plored ;  and  to  one  who  had  been  so  great  a  wanderer  surely  no 
extreme  punishment.  Still  he  appears  ever  to  have  felt  kindly  to 
to  his  country,  and  to  have  rejoiced  and  gloried  in  the  name 
Athenian,  though  he  was  indebted  to  the  Lakedaimonians  for  his 
beautiful  home,  and  rich  estates  at  Skilluns,  in  Elis,  where  he 
hved  the  remainder  of  his  days,  happy  and  peaceful,  in  the 
practice  of  philosophy  and  piety,  in  the  possession  of  easy  afflu- 
ence and  literary  leisure,  in  the  society  of  his  sons  and  his  wife 
Phitesia,  up  to  the  advanced  age  of  ninety- three  years  ;  when  he 
died  as  calmly  as  though  half  his  life  had  not  been  spent  in  the 
most  tumultuous  of  tempests — that  of  human  warfare.  Were  I 
asked  to  sum  up  his  character  in  a  few  words,  I  should  say  that 
so  far  as  we  know  or  can  learn  of  him,  he  lacked  no  quality 
which  a  soldier,  general,  or  man  should  have,  nor  possessed  any 
which  they  should  not  have.  As  a  general  I  should  rate  him  not 
lower  than  the  third  of  all  the  old  world  ever  saw ;  Hannibal 
being  first  beyond  compare,  and  perhaps  Epaminondas  second, 
though  between  Xenophon  and  him  I  doubt.  If  it  be  objected, 
that  he  did  little  by  which  to  hold  so  high  a  place  in  arms,  I 
would  reply  that  there  was  much,  if  not  all  of  strategy,  in  that 
little ;  that  it  is  qualities,  not  opportunities,  which  make  the 
general ;  and  that,  judging  from  all  that  he  did,  I  can  conceive 
nothing  which  he  could  not  have  done. 

As  a  philosopher  he  is  the  only  Greek,  unless  it  be,  perhaps, 
Plato,  for  whom  I  have  any  considerable  degree  of  respect ;  most 
of  their  private  Uves  were  filthy,  infamous  and  odious  ;  most  of 
their  pretensions  to  philosophy  were  mere  cant,  mere  dogmatism, 
and  mere  humbug — most  of  themselves — might  I  not  say  all  ?  so 
tain'tpd,  not  excluding  Socrates  himself,  tvith  quackery,  butfoonery, 


HIS    CHARACTER.  225 

and  charlatanry,  that  we  scarce  know  whether  to  loathe  them  as 
TartufFe,  laugh  at  them  as  Grimaldi,  or  scoi-n  them  as  any  one  of 
fifty  humbug's  of  our  own  day. 

In  one  word,  and  to  conclude,  I  fear  that  as  a  man  in  moral 
duties,  and — so  far  as  light  was  vouchsafed  to  him — in  pious  faith 
and  practice,  also,  many  a  .professed  Christian  might  look  for  an 
example  in  the  heathen  Xenophon. 


VI. 

EPAMINONDAS, 

THE   TIIEBAN. 

HIS    CAMPAIGNS,    BATTLES    OF    LEUKTRA    AND    MANTINEIA, 
CHARACTER,    AND    CONDUCT. 

With  the  life  and  career  of  no  one  man,  in  the  ages  of  authen- 
tic history,  were  the  prosperity  and  pre-eminence  of  his  native 
city  ever  so  exactly  contemporary  and  co-existent,  as  those 
of  Thebes  with  those  of  her  best  and  greatest  son,  Epaminon- 
das.  For,  previous  to  his  coming  upon  the  stage,  and  taking 
the  lead  in  the  administration  of  her  afRiirs,  she  had  never 
aspived  to  more  than  a  secondary  position  among  the  inde- 
pendent states  of  Hellas,  httle  indeed,  if  at  all,  superior  to  that 
of  Korinth,  Arkadia,  and  Argohs,  nor  dreamed  of  contesting  the 
supremacy  with  Attika,  or  Lakedaimon.  Yet,  so  soon  as  this 
great  man  rose  to  the  head  of  her  affaii-s,  she  sprang  at  once  to 
the  leading  and- mastery  of  the  Greek  states,  which  she  wrested 
from  the  iron  hands  of  Sparta,  then  at  her  loftiest  pitch  of  power ; 
and  still  maintained  it,  sometimes  at  the  head  of  her  allies, 
oftener  single-handed,  so  long  as  his  political  wisdom  and  mode 
ration  ruled  her  councils ;  so  long  as  his  military  science  fought 
her  battles. 

In  what  year  he  was  born  does  not  appear  distinctly,  but  wo 
know  that,  with  his  friend  and  brother  in  arms,  Pelopidas,  ho 
was  of  one  amone:  the  noblest  of  the  Boiotian  families.     It  is 


HIS    YOUTH.  227 

to  be  regretted,  that  of  this  highly  interesting  period,  and  this 
its  most  interesting  personage,  we  possess  fewer  and  far  less 
authentic  documents  than  of  the  events  and  characters  imme- 
diately preceding  and  succeeding  it.  Of  Plutarch's  hves,  Epa- 
minondas  is  one  of  the  missing ;  and.  as  the  biographer  was  a 
fellow  countryman  of  the  general,  and  himself  by  no  means  des- 
titute of  patriotic  and  party  spirit,  it  is  not  to  be  doubted  that  he 
had  laid  himself  out  on  the  career  and  cKoi'ncter  of  this,  the 
greatest  soldier  and  statesman  of  his  nation.  We  may  therefore 
esteem  this  a  real  loss  ;  although,  in  general,  Plutarch's  lives  ai-e 
to  be  regarded  rather  as  gossipping  collections  of  stray  anecdotes, 
and  pleasant  compilations,  than  as  authentic  histories.  And  it 
is  to  be  regretted,  the  rather,  because  the  magniticent  and  most 
veracious  history  of  Thukydides  closes  before  his  career  began, 
unless  it  was  in  the  first  fight  at  Mantineia  that  he  drew  his 
maiden  sword ;  and  because  Xenophon,  who  continued  that  great 
work  in  his  Hellenika,  has,  from  partiality  to  his  friend  Agesilaos, 
described  the  campaigns  and  battles  of  his  rival  with  a  brevity 
and  lack  of  appreciation  so  different  from  the  minute  and  graphic 
details,  the  energy  and  life,  which  we  meet  in  every  page  of  the 
Anabasis,  that  we  recognize  neither  the  author,  nor  the  glorious 
actor,  whom  he  deals  with,  I  regret  to  say,  almost  in  a  spirit  of 
detraction. 

It  was  in  the  second  year  of  the  ninetieth  Olympiad,  B.  C. 
419,*  if  we  may  believe  Plutarch,  that  the  Thebans,  being  then 

*  Plut.  Pelopid.  IV.  Such  is  the  narrative  of  Plutarch.  I  must, 
however,  regard  it  as  apocryphal  ;  since  this  battle  of  Mantineia 
being  fought  B-  C.  419,  that  of  Leuctra  in  37i,  and  the  second  battle  of 
Mantineia.  when  Epaminondas  fell,  in  363,  allowing  the  friends  to  have 
been  but  fifteen,  at  this  period,  Epaminondas,  at  his  death,  must  have  been 
at  least  seventy-one  years  old ;'  whereas  there  is  no  hint  to  be  found  in 
history  that  he  was  at  all  advanced  in  years  ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  a  gen- 
eral report,  that  he  was  young  at  Leuktra,  and  that  he  died,  cut  off  in 
his  mid  career. 


228  EPAMINONDAS. 

in  close  alliance  with  the  Lakedaimonians,  and  sending  an  aux- 
iliary force  to  serve  with  them,  Epaminondas  and  Pelopidas 
fought  side  by  side  in  that  first  fierce  battle  of  Mantineia,  in 
which  Agesipohs  defeated,  with  so  terrible  a  slaughter,  the  com- 
bined forces  of  the  Argives,  Mantineians,  Arkadians  and  Athe- 
nians. In  the  shock  of  that  dreadful  encounter,  the  chosen  band 
of  Argive  youths  a  thousand  strong,  broke  the  left  wing,  in 
which  the  Thebans  fought,  and  drove  a  large  portion  of  it  clear 
off  the  field ;  but  the  two  friends,  as  he  asserts,  with  some  com- 
rades, linking  their  shields,  resisted  desperately,  when  all  around 
them  were  in  full  flight ;  and,  when  Pelopidas  fell,  with  seven 
wounds  all  in  front,  Epaminondas  stood  over  him,  though  he 
believed  him  to  be  dead,  defending  him  and  his  armor,  until  he 
too  had  received  a  spear-thrust  in  the  breast  and  a  sword-cut  in 
the  ai-ra,  when  they  were  rescued,  timely,  by  the  arrival  of  Age- 
sipolis  from  the  right,  where  he  had  carried  all  before  him,  who 
now  came  up,  restored,  and  won  the  battle.  From  this  time 
forth,  we  are  told,  the  young  men  were  inseparable  friends  ;  for 
they  both  recovered  from  their  wounds,  to  do  their  country  bet- 
ter service ;  although  it  was  not  until  after  the  lapse  of  several 
years  that  we  find  them  again  acting  together,  as  it  were,  v-nth 
one  hand  and  a  single  spirit. 

This  I  have  inserted  as  a  pleasing  story,  illustrative  both  of  the 
times  and  of  the  character  of  the  men  of  whom  it  is  narrated ; 
as  popular  traditions,  if  they  are  apt  to  err,  like  this,  in  preserv- 
ing exact  synchronism,  are  wont  to  adhere  very  closely  to  the  veri 
similitude  of  things  and  the  individuality  of  characters  ;  and  this 
it  is,  which  renders  it  at  times  difficult  to  discriminate  between 
them  and  authentic  history. 

In  the  fii-st  year  of  the  ninety-fourth  Olympiad,  B.  C,  404,  tho 
Peloponnesian  war,  which  for  the  space  of  twenty-seven  years 
had  raged  incessant  throughout  Greece,  was  closed  by  the  sm-- 
«ender  of  Athens  at  discretion,  the  demohtion  of  lier  walls,  and 


CIIAXGES    OF    GREEK    POLICY.  229 

the  sub\'ersion  of  her  constitution  by  Lysander — thirty  tyrants 
and  an  oligarchical  form  of  government  being  imposed  on  her, 
in  lieu  of  her  fierce,  untamed  democracy.  From  that  day  her 
supremacy  in  pohtics  was  at  an  end — although  she  recovered  her 
independence — and  Sparta  was,  in  her  stead,  the  dominant  power 
of  Hellas. 

From  this  time,  for  several  years,  the  changes  of  polity  and 
intermutations  of  alliances  are  intricate  and  incessant,  so  as 
almost  to  defy  unravelling,  among  the  Hellenic  states  ;  for,  within 
a  year  or  two,  the  Thebans  assisted  Thrasybulus  and  the  Athe- 
nians in  banishing  the  thirty,  and  re-establishing  their  ancient 
government ;  so  that  when  the  Boiotic  war  arose,  between  Thebes 
and  Phokis — Sparta  taking  part  with  the  former — Athens  and 
the  Argives  espoused  the  cause  of  the  Thebans,  and  the  tide  of 
war  began  again  to  turn;  the  walls  of  Athens  hanng  been 
rebuilt  by  Konon,  then  serving  as  Persian  Admiral  for  Teribazos, 
with  the  aid  of  the  Boiotians.  Thus  matters  continued,  with 
continuous  versatility,  continuous  war  and  slaughter,  for  seven 
and  twenty  years,  though  with  no  decisive  effect  nor  any  unity 
of  purpose,  except  on  the  pan  of  Sparta ;  which  persisted  in 
winning  her  way  steadfestly,  and  in  spite  of  all  opposition,  to 
universal  dominion— so  far,  at  least,  as  Greece  was  concerned — 
the  other  states  offering  no  concerted  resistance  to  her  ambitious 
plans,  but  fighting  now  for  her,  now  against  her,  as  the  whim  of 
the  hour  might  dictate.  But  at  the  end  of  this  period,  in  the 
third  year  of  the  ninety-eighth  Olympiad,  B.C.  386,  Phoibidas 
the  Lakedaimonian  general,  while  marching  through  the  Boio- 
tian  territory,  then  at  peace  with  it,  treacherously  surprised  the 
Kadmeia,  or  citadel  of  Thebes,  which  he  occupied  with  an  armed 
garrison,  and  banished  about  three  hundred  of  the  most  eminent 
citizens  of  the  democratic  and  patnotic  party,  who  found  hospi- 
tality and  protection  in  Athens.  So  ill  was  this  act  of  treache- 
rous aggression  taken  by  Greece  at  large,  that  Lakedaimon,  not 


230  EPAMINONDAS. 

60  completely  absolute  but  that  she  had  some  fear  of  popular 
opinion,  went  through  the  fai-ce  of  fining  Phoibidas  in  a  large 
sum  of  money,  for  his  conduct ;  while  they  by  no  means  forgot 
to  retain  the  Kadmeia  with  a  powerful  Spartan  detachment,  and 
to  enforce  the  edict  of  banishment  against  all  the  patriots. 

Among  these  was  Pelopidas,  but  Epaminondas  was  suffered 
to  remain  in  the  place — for  in  some  sort  they  despised  him,  as  a 
philosopher,  and  yet  more,  they  regarded  him  as  powerless,  from 
his  want  of  means.  Plutarch  records  this  capture  of  the  Kad- 
meia, and  banishment  of  Pelopidas,  as  immediately  consecutive 
to  the  first  battle  of  Mantineia  ;  yet  thirty-three  years  had  inter- 
vened ;  so  that  had  these  men  then  distinguished  themselves,  as 
he  relates,  they  must  have  now  been  between  fifty  and  sixty 
years  of  age,  wjien  the  whole  context  of  the  narrative  points 
to  them  as  young,  active,  and  enthusiastic  men ;  and  when, 
to  complete  the  absurdity,  Plutarch  names  Epaminondas  as 
among  the  youngest  of  the  exiles.  During  this  time,  mindful  of 
the  countenance  which  the  Boiotians  had  shown  them  during 
their  own  time  of  trouble  with  the  thirty  tyrants,  Athens  refused 
resolutely,  in  answer  to  all  the  expostulations  of  Sparta,  either  to 
expel  or  injure  the  exiles  ;  and  when,  after  awaiting  their  oppor- 
tunity, they  at  length  determined  on  striking  a  blow,  they  aided 
them  with  arms,  and  sent  tliem  forth  with  their  good  wishes, 
-promising  armed  assistance,  should  their  stratagem  prove  suc- 
cessful. 

It  was  in  the  fourth  year  after  the  capture  of  the  Kadmeia, 
that  Pelopidas,  with  twelve'  confederates,  entered  the  gates  of 
Thebes  by  night  with  hounds,  and  hunting  nets,  and  boar-speai-s ; 
and,  having  contrived  to  remain  in  the  city  all  the  next  day, 
undiscovered— partly  by  means  of  their  disguises,  and  partly 
under  favor  of  a  wild  gale  and  snow-storm — the  next  evening 
broke  in  upon  the  tyrants  Arohias,  Leontidas,  Hyphates,  and 
Philippos,  while  they  were  feasting,  with  song  and  dance,  clad 


i 
RE-CAPTUKE  OF  THE  KAUMEIA.  231 

in  feminine  attire,  and  slew  them  without  mercy.  As  soon  as 
the  deed  was  done,  Epaminondas  and  Gorgidas,  who  had  been 
mustering  the  youth  of  Thebes,  came  to  their  support  with  a 
considerable  power  ;  and,  as  soon  as  the  news  of  it  could  reach 
them,  the  main  body  of  che  confederates,  who  had  awaited  the 
result  of  the  conspiracy  in  the  Thriasian  plain,  on  the  confines  of 
Attika  and  Boiotia,  marched  into  the  gates  in  full  armor,  and 
summoned  the  people  to  assemble,  which  they  did,  wdth  shouts 
of  joy  and  triumph  ;  receiving  the  men  as  their  benefactors  and 
deliverers.  Thereupon  Pelopidas  being  elected  one  of  the  Boio- 
tarehai,*  with  Mellon  and  Charon,  proceeded  at  once  to  raise 
counterworks  against  the  citadel,  and  to  threaten  it  w^ith  assault ; 
on  seeing  which  the  Lakedaimonian  garrison,  no  less  than  fifteen 
hundred  strong,  surrendered,  on  condition  of  being  allowed  to 
march  out  with  their  arms  and  with  mihiary  honors.  This  was 
a  wise  and  well-judged  act  of  moderation  on  the  part  of  the  con- 
federates, on  the  principle  of  building  a  bridge  of  gold  for  a  flying 
enemy  ;  for,  although  they  knew  it  not,  there  was  already  a  great 
])0wer  afoot  under  the  command  of  Kleombrotos,  the  Spartan 
king,  marching  upon  Thebes,  and  so  near  as  the  frontiers  of 
Attika  and  the  Megaris.  Had  they.refused  terms  to  the  garri- 
son of  the  Kadmeia,  it  is  probable,  at  least,  that  they  would  have 
stood  a  long  siege,  and  supported  themselves  until  the  arrival  of 
reinforcements ;  so  at  least  argued  the  Lakedaimonians,  for  they 
put  to  death  two  out  of  the  three  harmostai,  or  colonial  govern- 
ors, who  wTre  in  the  citadel,  Herippidas  and  Arkesos,  and  ban- 
ished Lysanoridas,  the  third,  from  the  Peloponnesus,  after  making 
him  pay  a  heavy  fine. 

That  was  a  bold  and  dashing  exploit  of  Pelopidas  and  his 
friends  ;  and,  although  it  may  be  thought  to  verge  too  narrowly 

*  The  military  leaders  of  all  the  independent  confederated  states  of 
Boiotia,  one  elected  by  each  subordinate  city,  two  or  three  by  Thebes, 
were  called  Boiotarchai. 


232  EPAMINOXDAS. 

upon  individual  assassination,  to  meet  the  unqualified  praise  of 
this  more  enhghtened  age,  yet  the  slaughter  of  the  tyrants  was 
so  immediately  connected  with  an  armed  mihtary  expedition,  and 
that  was  again  so  enthusiastically  hailed  by  a  unanimous  and 
universal  popular  rising  against  the  foreign  force  which  alone 
opposed  it,  that  the  ii-regularity  of  the  proceedings  may  be  over- 
looked in  consideration  of  the  obvious  necessity  of  the  case,  and 
unequivocal  absence  of  any  private  animosities  against  the  per- 
sons sacrificed  to  the  common  weal.  It  is  said,  that  Epaminon- 
das,  with  a  sense  of  dehcacy  and  perception  of  true  right  and 
^vronG:  almost  too  nice  and  too  correct  for  that  ao-e,  refused  abso- 
lutely  to  be  a  participator  in  the  bloodshedding  of  fellow  citizens, 
however  great  their  political  error,  however  flagrant  their  crimi- 
nality against  the  state ;  but  that  he  willingly  took  up  arms 
against  the  foreign  oppressor,  who  held  their  power  by  no  right, 
except  that  of  might.  But  this  I  believe  to  be  one  of  those  rhe- 
torical inventions  with  which  such  writers  as  Nepos  and  Plutarch 
abound,  and  to  which  less  credit  is  due  than  even  to  those  tradi- 
tional anachronisms  of  which  I  have  spoken  above,  since  they, 
unlike  the  former,  are  inconsistent  with  the  spirit  of  the  times, 
and  therefore,  not  with  the  veracity  only,  but  ^vith  the  verisimili- 
tude of  history.  What  is  perfectly  true,  however,  of  this  daring 
and  successful  enterprise,  is  the  fact,  -that  from  that  night  for- 
ward Sparta  began  to  decline ;  that  the  prestige  of  her  moral 
superiority  was  counteracted ;  and  that  her  ascendency  was  never 
again  perfectly  established  as  the  ruler  both  by  sea  and  land ; 
but  that  she  gradually  sunk  into  a  secondary  state,  while  Thebes 
grew  up  in  her  stead  to  be  the  arbiter  of  Greece,  until  all  the 
nations  fell  at  once  into  the  shadow  of  one  vast  and  consohdated 
power,  which  could  be  resisted  by  no  casual  combination,  but 
only  by  a  unity  of  force  equal  to  its  own. 

This  truth  was  proved  without  delay,  by  the  defection  of  many 
of  the  Spartan  allies,  as  the  Chians,  Byzantines,  and  Rhodians, 


PASSES  OF  THE  KITHAIRON.  233 

and  their  instituting  a  senate  at  Athens,  to  act  in  behalf  of  all 
the  confederates  ;*  nor  was  the  matter  allowed  to  rest  long  in 
words  and  councils  only,  for  •  Sphodriades,  the  Spartan  admiral, 
at  the  suggestion  of  Kleombrotos,  making  an  attempt  on  the  Pei- 
raios,  at  the  head  of  ten  thousand  men,  which  was  repulsed,  and 
being  subsequently  acquitted,  the  Athenians  declared  the  truce 
with  Sparta  broken,  and  at  once  selected  their  three  best  men, 
Timotheos,  Iphikrates,  and  Chabrias,  generals,  with  a  force  of 
twenty  thousand  foot,  five  hundi-ed  horse  and  two  hundi-ed 
wai'-ships. 

The  Spartans,  however,  were  determined  not  to  yield  without 
a  blow,  but  sent  Kleombrotos,  with  a  considerable  force,  to  sup- 
port their  interests  in  Boiotia,  although  it  was  in  the  depth  of  w  in- 
ter ;  intending  to  cross  the  ridge  of  Kithairon  by  the  pass  of  Eleu- 
therai,  which  was  occupied  strongly  by  Chabrias,  with  the  Athe- 
nian targeteei-s.  On  perceiving  this,  Kleombrotos  made  his  way 
by  Aigosthena,  between  the  sea  and  the  w^estern  slope  of  Mount 
Elateia,  across  the  river  Oeroe,  near  Kreusis,  and  thence  by  Plataia 
to  Thespiai,  and  thence  to  Kynoskephalai,  where  he  encamped 
within  a  mile  of  Thebes,  and  remained  there  sixteen  days,  expect- 
ing, probably,  that  there  would  be  some  rising  of  the  oligarchical 
party  in  Boiotia,  of  which  he  might  take  advantage.  Nothing, 
however,  of  the  kind  occurring,  he  fell  back  again  to  Thespiai, 
where  he  left  Sphodrias  at  the  head  of  a  third  part  of  the  allied 
forces — with  instructions  to  raise  mercenaries,  and  prosecute  the 
war — and  then  retreated  by  the  road  he  had  come,  by  way  of 
Kreusis  and  the  western  passes  of  the  Kithairon,  where  he  lost 
some  of  his  men  and  many  of  his  baggage-train,  by  a  storm  so 
terrible  that  it  blew  the  shieldsf  out  of  the  soldiers'  hands,  and 
cast  the  loaded  animals  headlong  from  the  precipices.  But 
shortly  afterward  Agesilaos  was  sent  from  Sparta  to  replace  Kle- 
ombrotos ;  and,  entering  by  the  same  pass  of  Kithairon  as  his 

*  Diod.  Sic.  XV.  28.  f  Xenophon,  Hellenika,  V.  iv-  18. 

11 


234  Ei'AMINOXDAS. 

predecessor,  advanced  to  Thespiai,  where  he  found  all  the  plain 
fortified  with  field  works,  mounds,  palisades,  and  trenches,  with 
narrow  openings,  from  which  the  Theban  light  troops  and  cav- 
alry sallied  out  and  galled  him  not  a  Httle ;  on  his  attempting 
to  bring  on  a  general  action,  Chabrias  thwarted  him,  it  is  said, 
by  a  new  arrangement  of  his  men,  whom  he  caused  to  kneel 
with  their  shields  grounded  and  pikes  presented,  much,  it  is  to 
be  presumed,  as  modern  infantry  receive  cavalry  in  square  ;  but, 
in  spite  of  all  this,  Agesilaos  forced  them  in  the  end  to  evacuate 
their  positions  and  devastated  the  country  up  to  the  veiy  walls 
of  Thebes.  Notwithstanding  this  success,  however,  the  royal 
leader  was  able  to  produce  no  great  or  permanent  result,  but 
retired,  loaded  with  booty,  into  the  Megaiis ;  where  he  dismissed 
his  ai-my  to  its  respective  countries. 

The  details  of  a  w^arfare  so  petty  and  unprofitable  as  this  are 
tedious  and  uninteresting  alike  to  the  writer  and  the  reader ;  yet 
it  is  in  such  small  fields  that  the  first  exercise  is  often  passed, 
and  the  fii-st  experience  gained,  by  which  are  made  great 
generals.  Such  is  not  often  the  case  in  modern  times,  or  as 
relates  to  modern  armies  ;  for  at  the  present  day  the  art  of  war  is 
too  perfectly  and  purely  a  science,  that  any  man  without  patient 
study  and  stern  discipHne  can  become  a  great  strategist — once  a 
partizan  always  a  partizan,  would  seem  to  be  an  inevitable  law 
now-a-days,  yet  such  was  far  from  being  the  case  in  the  times 
of  which  I  write,  and  there  is  the  strongest  reason  to  beheve  that 
it  was  in  this  paltry  skirmishing  that  the  first  ideas  of  general- 
ship, the  fii-st  rudiments  of  military  science  dawned  upon  the 
youthful  genius*  of  Epaminondas.  No  sooner  had  Agesilaos 
and  his  great  army — the  second  great  army  which  had  invaded 
the  Thebais  in  the  course  of  a  single  year — retired  inetFectual, 
than  the  Theban  leaders,  choosing  their  time,  fell  upon  Phoibidas' 
out-posts,  and  cut  off  two  hundred  of  them,  when  that  chief, 
*  Plut.  Vit.  Pelop. 


THIRD    INVASION.  235 

rushing  out  of  Thespiai,  where  lie  had  a  good  garrison,  attacked 
the  enemy  on  his  return,  who,  turning  on  him  suddenly, 
destroyed  no  less  than  five  hundred  of  his  men,  himself  falling* 
gallantly  as  he  fought  hand  to  hand  with  the  foe,  perhaps 
unwilling  to  survive  the  defeat  he  had  undergone  ;  the  rather 
that  he  had  experienced  already  the  justice  of  the  Lakedai- 
monians,  being  condemned  to  pay  a  fine  as  the  reward  of  his 
success  in  capturing  the  Kadmea.  On  the  news  of  this  disaster 
reaching  Lakedaimon,  Agesilaos  was  again  put  at  the  head  of  a 
sufficient  force,  and  for  the  third  time  in  that  one  year  the 
Spartans  invaded  Boiotia,  for  though  it  was  early  in  the  following 
spring,  twelve  months  had  not  fully  elapsed  since  the  first 
irruption  of  Kleombrotos.  At  fii^st  the  Spartan  king  manoeuvred 
as  if  he  would  have  entered  the  Thebais  fi-om  the  Plataiis  by 
way  of  Thespiai,  as  before,  but  so  soon  as  he  perceived  that  the 
enemy  were  concentrating  their  forces  on  the  Southern  passes  of 
Kithairon,  he  countermarched  suddenly  in  the  opposite  direction, 
by  Erythrai,  making  two  days'  marches  in  one,  passed  the 
entrenchment  which  had  been  thrown  up  before  Skolos,  without 
giving  the  enemy  time  to  occupy  it,  and  devastated  all  the 
eastern  part  of  the  Thebais,  so  far  as  to  the  frontiers  of  Tanagra, 
which  was  at  this  time  occupied  by  his  friends.  Thence  he 
marched  upon  Thebes,  which,  however,  he  did  not  attempt,  but 
passed  it  to  the  northward,  having  the  walls  on  liis  left  hand, 
and  thence  proceeded  up  the  valley  of  the  Schoinos,  now  the 
Kanavari,  to  a  difficult  position  called  the  Graias-stethos,  or  the 
old  woman's  breast,  which  the  Thebans  had  fortified  with  a 
trench  and  palisade  as  if  against  an  enemy  descending  the  same 
valley  from  Thespiai.  In  front  of  this  position  they  were  now  so 
strongly  posted  that  Agesilaos  did  not  judge  it  wise  to  assail 
j:hem,  but  alarmed  them  by  a  clever  movement  by  his  left  flank 
towai'ds  the  city,  which,  it  seems^  had  been  left  defenceless,  so 
*  Diod.  Sic  XV.  34- 


236  EPAMINOXDAS. 

that  they  quitted  their  position,  and  hurried  at  their  utmost 
speed  along  the  road  through  Potniai  to  Thebes,  closely  pressed 
in  the  rear  by  the  cavalry,  and  Skiritai,  or  royal  body  guard  of 
the  Spartans.  There  was  some  sharp  but  indecisive  skirmishing 
along  this  hne,  in  the  course  of  which  one  of  the  Spartan 
Polemarchs  was  slain  by  the  Theban  javelineei's,  and  afterward 
some  few  of  the  Theban  reai-  were  cut  up  by  the  enemy's  horee. 
As  the  former,  however,  faced  about  and  offered  battle  under 
their  walls,  while  the  Skiritai  retreated  at  double-quick  time, 
they  claimed  the  victory  and  erected  a  trophy,  though  it  should 
seem  with  but  little  reason  ;  since,  in  fact,  Agesilaos  had  suc- 
ceeded in  his  object,  having  dislodged  the  enemy's  force,. in  the 
presence  of  which  he  did  not  dare  to  scatter  his  troops  on  their 
work  of  devastation,  and  shut  it  up  in  the  city.  On  the  follow- 
ing night  he  occupied  the  camp  at  Graias-stethos,  which  they 
had  evacuated,  and  thence  retreating  at  his  leisure,  laying  waste 
the  country  as  he  went,  upon  Thespiai,  he  returned  through  the 
passes  of  the  Kithairon  upon  Megara,  where  he  dismissed  the 
allies,  leading  the  native  force  back  to  Sparta.  These  three  con- 
secutive expeditions  appear  to  have  been  singularly  ineffective 
and  unworthy  of  the  reputation  of  Agesilaos  as  a  great  warrior ; 
for  it  would  certainly  appear  from  the  context  that  he  had  a  fair 
opportunity  of  carrying  Thebes  itself  by  a  coup  de  main  in  the 
absence  of  its  defenders,  and  thus  terminating  the  war  at  a  blow. 
But  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  Lakedaimonians  were  never 
either  very  skilful  or  very  successful  in  the  attack  of  walled 
places ;  and  this  is  probably  the  true  cause  of  their  not  attacking 
a  town  when  unprovided  with  defendei-s  and  unprepared  for 
defence,  which  had  so  little  real  strength  of  fortifications  which 
to  defend,  that  Alexander,  a  few  years  later,  carried  the  walls  by 
assault,  and  then  stormed  the  citadel,  within  the  space. of  a  few 
hours  only,  although  he  was  met  by  a  stern  and  vigorous 
resistance.     Agesilaos,  however,  thouu;h  rash  to  a  fault  in  the 


ERROR    OF    AGESILAOS.  237 

councils  which  preceded  and  often  induced  the  hazards  of  a 
dano-erous  and  destructive  war,  appears  to  me,  on  a  careful 
review  of  his  principal  campaigns,  to  have  been  a  cautious,  wary, 
and  perhaps  slow  general  in  the  field,  preferring  long  and  certain 
operations  with  distant  results,  and  a  cold  and  dilatory  policy,  to 
sudden  and  decisive  blows.  Such  was  the  whole  hne  of  his 
clever  and  successful  campaigns  in  Asia,  in  the  course  of  which, 
without  delivering  any  general  battle,  or  fighting  anv  one 
remarkable  action,  he  separated  nearly  the  whole  of  Asia  Minor 
from  the  Archipelago  up  to  the  Kilikian  Gates  from  the  empire 
of  the  king,  and  reduced  it  to  the  condition  of  a  Hellenik  province. 
In  the  present  instance,  though  he  missed  the  opportunity  of 
planting  a  fatal  and  decisive  blow,  he  reduced  the  Thebans  to 
very  serious  straits  fi'om  the  scarcity  of  grain  and  provision,  their 
whole  district  having  been  twice  ravaged  with  fire  and  steel  in 
the  coui-se  of  a  single  twelvemonth,  and  two  seed-times  and 
harvests  thus  rendered  absolutely  fi-uitless.  This  last  time,  indeed, 
the  work  of  havoc  had  been  most  systematically  and  thoroughly 
performed  throughout  all  her  confines,  from  the  bordei*s  of  the 
Tanagrice  on  the  north  and  east,  to  that  of  the  Plataiis  and 
Megaris  to  the  westward  and  southward ;  so  that,  had  the 
Spartans  tarried  in  the  Thebais,  it  appears  to  me  that  the 
Thebans  must  have  come  out  and  delivered  battle  in  the  open 
plain,  which  the  Spartans  at  this  time,  confident  m  theh  as  yet 
unconquered  infantry,  most  desired. 

So  far  as  these  campaigns  are  concerned,  it  is  clear  that  the 
generalship  of  the  Theban  leadere  was  on  the  whole  superior  to 
that  of  the  Spartan  king,  since  by  gaining  time  they  were  exer- 
cising and  disciplining  theu'  raw  levies  into  soldiers,  and  were  pre- 
paring their  state  for  the  glorious  career  of  \ictories  which  it  was 
shortly  destined  to  enter  upon ;  while  he  by  neglecting  to  strike 
'when  he  might  have  crushed — as  I  hold  it  certain  that  he 
might — gave  them  the  opportunity  to  prolong  the  war  and  re- 


238  EPAMINOXDAS. 

trieve  its  fortunes,  as  they  did  disastrously  for  Lakedaimon  on 
the  terrible  fields  of  Leuktra  and  Mantinnia. 

In  the  following  spring  a  Peloponnesian  army  marched  as  be- 
fore ;  but  Agesilaos,  who  was  lame  of  one  leg  from  his  birth,  was 
suddenly  afflicted  with  a  severe  aneurism  in  the  other,  while  as- 
cending from  the  temple  of  Aphrodite  to  the  council  chamber  in 
Megara,  whither  he  had  advanced  with  the  power  under  his 
command.  The  swelling  became  inordinately  great,  and  the 
pain  intolerable,  whereupon  a  Syrakusan  surgeon  opened  the 
artery  near  the  ancle  and  he  all  but  bled  to  death,  after  which 
he  continued  ill  during  all  the  summer,  and  far  into  the  ^^^nter. 
In  his  lieu,  therefore,  Kleombrotos  was  again  sent  out,  and  at- 
tempting, as  before,  to  cross  the  Kithairon,  with  his  targeteei-s  in 
the  van,  was  repulsed,  with  the  loss  of  about  forty  men,  by  the 
Thebans  and  Athenians,  who  had  anticipated  them,  and  occupied 
the  summits  in  advance.  Upon  this  he  gave  up  the  attempt  in 
despair,  and  dismissed  the  alUed  contingents,  retreating  home- 
ward, as  if  the  passage  of  the  Kithairon  was  impracticable  against 
defendei*s.  These  clumsy  and  insufficient  proceedings  created 
considerable  indignation  among  the  allies,  when  it  w^as  deteraiined 
to  blockade  the  port  of  Athens,  and  having  compelled  her  by 
famine  to  surrender,  to  transport  their  forces  into  the  Thebais 
either  through  the  Phokian  country  or  by  way  of  Kreusis,  the 
harbor  of  Thespiai.  This  plan,  however,  though  it  was  tried, 
proved  abortive,  since  the  Athenians  under  Chabrias  defeated 
Pollis  the  Lakedaimonian,  with  his  sixty  blockading  galleys, 
opened  the  port,  and  brought  in  their  corn-ships  safely ;  after 
which,  w^hen  the  enemy  would  have  attempted  the  Theban  coast, 
they  sent  so  powerful  a  squadron  around  i\yi  coasts  of  the  Pelo- 
ponnesos,  as  succeeded  in  capturing  the  large  island  of  Kerkyra, 
now  Corfu,  and  eflfectually  prevented  the  Spartans  from  attempt- 
ing anything  beyond  the  isthmus. 

In  the  autumn  of  that  year,  which  was  the  second  after  the 


VAIN  ATTEMPTS  AT  A  GENERAL  PEACE.  239 

accident  of  Agesilaos,  Timotheos  again  beat  the  Lakedaimbnian 
fleet  under  Nikolochos,  and  set  up  a  trophy  for  the  victory  ;  and 
in  the  meantime  the  Thebans,*  having  been  free  from  internal 
troubles,  had  conquered  and  reduced  all  the  neighboring  cities  of 
Boiotia,  which  had  been  held  by  Spartan  garrisons,  as  Thespiai, 
Plataia,  and  the  wealthy  city  of  Orchomenos,  and  were  now  as 
strong  in  territorial  power,  and  stronger  in  moral  and  physical 
military  strength  than  at  any  previous  period  of  the  war. 
During  this  time,  several  efforts  had  been  made  by  Artoxerxes, 
king  of  Persia,  to  bring  about  a  reconciliation  and  general  f>eace 
among  the  Greek  states;  for  he  was  now  busily  occupied  in 
making  war  on  Egypt,  which  had  revolted  from  his  authority, 
and  thought  to  prosecute  it  -with  greater  effect,  by  emplo3ring 
Greek  mercenaries,  whom  he  hoped  to  attract  to  his  standards  in 
great  force,  should  universal  peace  be  proclaimed  throughout 
Greece. 

Many  of  the  states  were  well  enough  disposed  to  this  end,  for, 
of  the  leading  powei-s,  Sparta  was  disgusted  by  her  continued 
want  of  success,  and  her  really  serious  losses  ;  and  Athens  was 
discontented  with  the  conduct  of  her  Theban  allies,  between 
whom  and  herself  no  true  cordiality  ever  existed,  and  who  were 
now  elated  by  their  unwonted  victories  over  the  armies  of  Lake- 
daimon,  hitherto  deemed  invincible.  But  for  a  time  circumstances 
rendered  such  a  reconciliation  impossible ;  for  in  the  fii-st 
place  the  pride  of  Agesilaos  and  the  Spartans  induced  them  to 
insist  on  the  restoration  of  independence  to  all  the  Boiotian  cities 
by  Thebes,  as  a  condition  of  peace,  while  naturally  the  Thebans 
felt  that  being  victorious  it  was  for  them  to  dictate  conditions 
rather  than  submit  to  them ;  and  in  the  second  an  accidental 
collision  between  the  fleets  caused  the  Spartans  to  suspect  Athens 
of  foul  play,  and  in  consequence,  the  war  was  further  protracted. 

Two  yeai's  more  of  disasters  and  naval  defeats  on  the  part  of 
*  Xen.  Hellenika,V.  4.  66. 


240  EPAMINONDAS. 

Lakedaimon,  and  of  increasing  disgusts  on  that  of  Athens,  to 
whom  her  old  and  steady  aUies  of  Thespiai  and  Plataia  had  ap- 
pealed for  aid  against  the  vengeance  of  Thebes,  put  an  end  to 
such  difficulties,  and  peace  was  concluded,  ambassadors  from  all 
the  states  being  assembled  at  Sparta.  Here,  Epaminondas  ap- 
peared on  the  behalf  of  Thebes — a  man,  says  Plutarch,*  of  gi-eat 
philosophy  and  learning,  but  one  who  had  as  yet  displayed  no 
militaiy  genius — for  it  appeal's  that  hitherto  the  confederated 
forces  had  been  commanded  in  chief  by  an  '  Athenian,  either 
Iphikrates  or  Chabrias,  the  Boiotian  leaders  holding  subordinate 
rank  onl}^  Of  him  Agesilaos,  it  seems,  inquired  whether  he 
esteemed  it  right  and  just  that  the  cities  of  Boiotia  should  be  free 
and  independent — in  reply  to  which  he  asked  quickly  and  boldly, 
while  all  the  other  ambassadors  cowed  before  the  haughty 
Spartan,  whether  ho  esteemed  it  right  that  the  Lakonian  cities 
should  be  free  and  independent.  Hereupon  Agesilaos  leaped  up 
in  a  rage  and  demanded  a  categorical  answer,  would  he  declare 
Boiotia  independent  ?  and  Epaminondas  rephed  as  curtly  and 
as  haughtily,  "  If  you  will  declare  Lakonia  independent,  aye !" 
This  terminated  the  conferences,  for  a  general  peace  was  at  once 
ratified,  Thebes  alone  being  excluded  trom  its  operation,  and  all 
her  allies  at  once  deserting  her,  either  to  join  in  open  hostilities 
against  her,  or  at  best  to  maintain  a  doubtful  and  suspicious 
neutrality. 

At  this  period  there  was  a  Peloponnesian  army  in  Phokis 
on  the  bordei-s  of  Boiotia  under  f  Kleombrotos  which  had  been 
sent  thither,  the  preceding  year,  to  check  the  invasion  of  that 
country  by  the  Thebans,  who  had  Mien  back  before  it  and  con- 
tented themselves  with  guarding  the  avenues  to  their  own 
country.  To  this  army  oi'dcrs  were  now  sent  to  invade  Boiotia 
at  once,  and  compel  the  Thebans  to  declare  all  the  Boiotian 
cities  independent  and  restore  Thespiai  and  Plataia,  which  tl:  ey  had 

*  Plut-  Vita  Agesilai,  xxvii.  f  Xen.  Hellen.  VI.  iv.  '2. 


WAR    RENEWED.  241 

destroyed  ;  and  when  the  Thebans-  positively  refused  to  listen  to 
any  such  terras,  it  marched  with  ten*  thousand  shields  of  heavy 
infantry  and  a  thousand  horsef  to  Koroneia,  a  town  of  Boiotia 
situated  between  the  streams  of  Phalaros  and  Kyralios  to  the 
southward  of  the  lake  Kephissis,  just  where  the  northernmost 
spurs  of  Mt.  Hehkon  subside  into  the  plain.  Two  gorges];  open 
from  the  hills  below  the  city  sending  down  each  a  torrent  to 
unite  and  form  the  the  Kyralios,  the  one  running  southeasterly, 
and  g"iving  direct  access  to  the  plain  of  Thebes  through  Zagara, 
Askra,  and  Thespiai ;  the  other  trending  due  south,  tlirough  the 
heart  of  the  Helikonian  ridge,  to  Thisbe,  and  thence  to  Kreusis  the 
port  of  Thespiai  on  the  Oeroe,  from  which  there  was  a  direct  road 
by  Plataia  into  the  Thebais.  This  city  was  already  famous  to 
the  Lakedaimonians  and  consequently  inftimous  to  the  Boiotians, 
for  the  single  victory  which  Agesilaos  had  there  gained  over  the 
confederates,  by  which  indeed  the  pride  of  Thebes  had  been  for 
many  years  humbled  and  her  power  broken. 

This  fact,  perhaps,  tended  to  increase  the  dismay  wdiich  seems 
at  this  time  to  have  prevailed  in  that  city,  which  was  now  entu'ely 
deserted  by  her  allies,  and  pitted  single-handed  against  the  most 
puissant  of  all  the  Hellenik  states.  They  did  not  quail,  however, 
in  the  emergency,  but  electing  Epaminondas  as  their  Boiotarches, 
and  giving  him  five  othei"s  as  councilloi*s  and  subordinates,  be- 
sides Pelopidas,  the  captain  of  the  sacred  band,  sent  him  out 
with  about  six  thousand  heavy  infantry,  and  a  cavalry  greatly 
superior  inquahty  and  composition,  if  not  in  numbei-s,  to  that  of  § 
the  allies.  As  they  passed  the  gates  of  Thebes,  the  army  en- 
countered a  herald  bringing  in  a  Wind  man,  a  ||fugitive  either 
from  servitude  or  from  justice,  which  for  some  reason  or  other 

*  Pint.  Vit.  Pelopid.  xx.     f  Diod.  Sic.  xv.  52. 
t  Leake's  Northern  Greece,  Maps,  vol.  I.  &  II. 
§  Xeu.  HeUen.  VI.  vi.  10.     ||  Died.  Sic.  XV.  53. 
11 


242  EPAMINONDAS. 

•was  esteemed  as  an  omen  of  most  evil  import ;  so  that  the  veterans 
all  cried  out  that  it  portended  ill  to  the  expedition,  while  the 
younger  men  fearing  that  such  words  on  their  part  would  be  con- 
stmed  into  signs  of  cowardice,  held  their  peace ;  and  then  it  was 
that  Epaminondas  shewed  himself  nobly  superior  to  the  super- 
stitions and  prejudices  of  his  day,  for  he  cried  out  in  a  loud  voice, 
borrowing  the  noble  sentiment  asci-ibed  by  Homer  to  the  patriotic 
Hector — ^Ig  oiovbg  dpiOTog  diivveoOai  tteqI  Trdrprjg — 

The  fairest  omen  is  your  country  to  defend. 

He  led  on,  undeterred  by  that,  or  the  more  calamitous  auguries 
which  succeeded  to  it,  and  took  post  in  an  exceeding  strong 
position  within  the  mouth  of  the  gorge  leading  from  Koroneia 
by  way  of  Askra  to  the  city,  through  which  it  was  expected  that 
Kleombrotos  would  advance  into  the  Thebais. 

Kleombrotos,  it  would  seem,  was  at  this  juncture  almost  com- 
pelled to  give  battle,  for  he  had  been  suspected — not  of  what 
might  have  been  fitly  laid  to  his  charge,  want  of  moral  courage, 
energy,  and  that  decision  wliich  strengthens  men  to  meet  the 
risk  of  responsibility — but  of  a  treasonable  inclination  to  favor 
the  Boiotians,*  because  in  the  year  of  his  fii-st  invasion  he  had 
not  devastated  the  Thebais,  when  encamped  at  Kynoskephalai, 
and  because  subsequently  he  had  retreated  from  the  passes  of 
the  Kithairon  after  a  very  slight  check  of  his  vanguard  by  the 
targeteers  of  Chabrias. 

On  this  account  he  felt,  probably,  that  not  to  fight  at  all,  and 
to  fail  in  fighting,  would  be  to  him  nearly  equal — the  preference, 
if  any,  pointing  to  the  latter  alternative.  This  consideration  it 
must  have  been  which  caused  him  to  hurry  his  movements,  and 
to  deliver  battle,  without  awaiting  the  arrival  of  Archidamos,  the 
son  of  Agesilaos,  who  was  already  on   his  way  to  join  him. 

*  Xen.  Hellen.  VI.  iv.  5. 


THE    LEUKTRIDAI.  243 

with  reinforcements  so  powerful  as  to  have  rendered  victory 
almost  certain  *  It  was  necessarily  the  object  of  the  Tliebans  to 
anticipate  the  comiwg  of  these  succors,  and  as  they  had  no  allies 
whom  to  expect,  a  victory  only  could  prevent  an  armed  coahtion 
against  them.  Both  armies,  therefore,  desired  battle,  and  yet, 
owing  to  the  great  natural  strength  of  the  Theban  position, 
which  they  did  not  choose,  and  that  very  wisely,  to  quit,  in  order 
to  attack  or  offer  battle  in  the  plain,  the  engagement  was  yet 
farther  deferred.  For  Kleombrotos,  not  daring  to  engage  him- 
self in  the  passes  so  formidably  defended,  broke  up  from  his  post 
at  Koroneia,  and  making  a  series  of  forced  countermarches 
through  the  gorges  of  Mount  Helikon,  upon  Thisbe,  surprised  the 
harbor  of  Kreusis,  now  Livadhostro,  near  the  mouth  of  the  Oeroe, 
on  the  gulf  of  Korinth,  and  took  twelve  Theban  ti-iremes,  with  their 
crews.  Thence,  wheeling  short  to  his  own  left,  he  ascended  the 
course  of  the  Olmeios,  and  entering  the  plain  of  Thebes  above  the 
head  waters  of  the  Asopos,  now  the  Vurienda,  found  the  Boiotian 
force,  which  had  made  a  corresponding  movement  to  frustrate 
his  manoeuvre,  encamped  on  the  heights  of  Leuktra,  still  between 
himself  and  the  city,  where  there  was  a  monument  to  the  daugh- 
ters of  Skedasos,  who  were  known  throughout  this  region  as  the 
Leuktridai.  These  it  is  said  were  certain  damsels  of  the  countryj 
to  whom  violenc-^.  had  been  offered  by  Spartan  envoys,!  very 
long  ago,  probably  in  the  heroic  ages,  who  had  refused  to  survive 
their  dishonor,  and  on  whose  tomb,  in  this  place,  their  father  fail- 
ing to  obtain  justice  at  Sparta,  had  slain  himself,  with  awful  im- 
precations on  the  country  of  the  violators.     From  this   cause 

=*Xen.  Hellen.  VI.  iv.  26.  Diodorus  Siculus  states — xv.  54 — that 
Archidamos  had  come  up  with  succors  previously  to  the  action,  and  that 
his  arrival  caused  Kleombrotos  to  break  a  treaty,  made  vrith  the  The- 
bans,  at  the  suggestion  of  Jason  of  Thessaly.  Xenophon,  however,  was 
a  cotemporary,  and  I  prefer  his  account. 

t  Plut.  Pelop.  XX.     Diod.  Sic.  XV.,  54. 


244  EPAMINONDAS. 

tliere  had  been  given  forth  to  the  Spartans  an  oracle,  awful  from 
remote  antiquity,  that  they  should  beware  the  divine  wrath  at 
Leuktra ;  but  the  meaning  of  this  oracle  had  escaped  the  Lake- 
daimonians,  since  there  were  two  other  places  of  the  same  name, 
one  a  Lakonian  fortress  on  the  sea-shore,  and  the  other  in  Arka- 
dia,  near  Megalopohs ;  the  Boiotians,  however,  had  kept  the 
religion  of  the  spot,  and  now  crowned  the  monument  with 
wreaths.  A  further  tale  concerning  this  tomb  is  recited  by  Plu- 
tarch, to  which  I  give  place,  as  singularly  characteristic  of  the 
times,  and  as  showing  the  alacrity  with  which  the  leaders  caught 
at  anything  that  might  avert  the  evil  omens  which  had  accom- 
panied their  march  from  the  city,  and  the  pains  they  took  to 
cheer  the  spirits  of  their  soldiers,  shaken  by  such  disastrous 
auspices. 

Pelopidas,  thus  runs  the  story,  while  sleeping  in  his  tent,  with 
the  enemy  before  him,  dreamed  that  he  saw  the  girls,  weeping 
and  uttering  imprecations  on  the  Spartans,  and  Skedasos  com- 
manding him  to  sacrifice  a  yellow-haired  virgin,  upon  the  tomb 
of  the  damsels,  if  they  would  conquer  the  Spartans.  And  eon- 
ceiTiing  this  dream  a  great  strife  arose ;  for  although  the  custom 
of  human  sacrifices  had  in  a  great  degree  fallen  into  disuse,  yet 
instances  were  not  wanting  of  such  horroi-s,  even  in  recent  time  ; 
and  the  ill-success  o^  Agesilaos  was  attributed  by  many  to  his 
disobedience  in  not  sacrificing  his  daughter,  as  Agamemnon  had 
done  in  the  heroic  ages,  to  the  goddess  Artemis.  The  priests, 
therefore,  were  urgent  that  the  dream  should  be  followed  to  the 
letter ;  and  the  chiefs  were  discussing  the  question  eagerly,  and 
Pelopidas  was  gi-eatly  troubled,  when  suddenly  a  beautiful  bay 
filly  foal  came  careering  up  from  a  herd  of  hoi-scs  in  the  vicinity, 
and  galiopping  through  the  hues,  halted  as  if  she  had  reached 
her  goal ;  and  all  were  struck  by  the  peculiar  and  brilliant  ght- 
ter  of  her  glossy  yellow  coat,  and  the  pride  of  all  her  motions, 
find  the  bold  tones  of  her  voice  ;  and  on  seeing  her,  Theokritos 


THE  YELLOW  HATRED  VIRGIN.  245 

the  seer  cried  out  to  Pelopidas,  "  Fortunate  man,  your  \ictim 
has  arrived,  wherefore  let  us  await  no  other  virgin,  but  thank- 
fully receive  the  omen  and  the  offering  which  the  gods  have  given 
you."  Then  they  crowned  the  filly  -with  sacrificial  wreaths,  and 
leading  her  to  the  tomb  of  the  virgins,  slew  her,  with  votive 
prayere,  rejoicingly.  And  the  news  of  Pelopidas,  his  vision,  and 
his  offering,  went  abroad  through  the  army  ;  and  in  the  breasts 
of  all  the  men  was  enkindled  a  confidence  that  they  should  gain 
that  day  a  mighty  victory,  by  the  giving  of  the  gods.  And 
what  such  confidence  avails  an  ai-my  on  the  day  of  battle,  when 
it  is  not  blindly  shared  by  the  generals,  to  the  neglect  of  disci- 
phne  or  strategetics,  every  soldier  knows.  It  was  this  confidence 
which  rendered  the  followers  of  Mahomet  invincible,  while  tlie 
creed  was  yet  young,  and  the  only  choice  vouchsafed  to  their 
enemies  that  between  the  Koran  and  the  sword.  It  was  this, 
more  than  their  coats  of  plate,  that  rendered  Cromwell's  iron- 
sides impregnable  to  the  charge  of  the  high-couraged  cavaliers. 
It  was  this  that  carried  the  veterans  of  Napoleon  unscathed  over 
half  the  world,  earnest  believers  in  the  doctrine  of  the  soldier's 
star,  "  the  sun  of  Austerhtz."  And  this  confidence  it  was,  in  no 
small  degree,  which  conduced  to  this  great  -victory,  one  of  the 
most  fatal  that  ever  was  won  from  the  Lakedaimonians — one  of 
the  most  bloody  ever  gained  by  Hellenes  from  Hellenes,  in  all 
the  histoiy  of  Greece. 

The  field  of  Leuktra  is  well  marked  to  the  present  day,  "  by  a 
tiuTiulus  and  some  artificial  ground  on  the  summit  of  the  rido-e 
which  borders  the  southern  side  of  the  valley  of  Thespiai ;  this 
position  being  exactly  in  the  hne  between  Thespiai  and  Plataia, 
as  Strabo  intimates  Leuktra  to  have  been."*  This  isolated  ridge 
was,  beyond  doubt,  the  position  of  Kleombrotos,  and  the  barrow 
or  tumulus  on  its  brow  is  the  Polyandrion,  or  general  sepulchre 
of  the  Lakedaimonians  who  fell  in  the  action.  The  height,  on 
*  Strabo,  p.  414,  quoted  by  Leake,  Northern  Greece,  XIX. 


246  EPAMINONDAS. 

which  the  Thebans  were  encamped,  was  evidently  a  spur  of  the 
ridge  of  hills  forming  the  southern  wall  of  the  valley  of  the  Schoi- 
Tios,  or  Kanavari  river,  which  it  separates  from  the  plain  of  Leuk- 
tra,  on  which  the  battle  was  fought,  and  containing,  some  four 
miles  to  the  northward,  between  itself  and  the  river,  the  strong 
position  of  Graias-stethos,  already  mentioned.  On  the  southern 
dechvity  of  this  slope,  and  to  the  eastward,  probably,  of  Kleom- 
brotos'  camp,  as  so  interposmg  between  him  and  Thebes,  lay 
Epaminondas,  awaiting  eagerly  an  opportunity  to  deliver  battle. 
The  plain  between  these  ridges  does  not  exceed  a  mile  in  width 
from  north  to  south,  except  at  the  eastern  end,  where  there  occurs  a 
gap  between  the  ridge  of  Leuktra  and  the  foot  of  the  downs,  on 
the  summit  of  which  stands  the  city  of  Thebes,  by  which  it 
extends  southerly  nearly  thrice  that  distance,  to  the  upper  watei*s 
of  the  Asopos,  or  Vurienda  ;  and  by  these  alone  it  is  di^dded  from 
the  Plataiis — the  scene  of  that  other  yet  more  memorable  battle, 
of  Plataia,  whereby  Pausanias  decided,  for  the  last  time  on  the 
soil  of  Greece,  the  question  of  Hellenik  or  Persian  superiority  in 
arms — from  east  to  west  it  runs  nearly  five  miles,  and  is  an 
admirably  chosen  spot  for  a  pitched  battle,  since  the  face  of  the 
country  is  perfectly  open,  without  rock,  wood,  or  water,  to 
impede  the  shock  of  combatants,  and  the  hills  are  wide  sheep- 
walks  to  the  top,  of  no  very  great  altitude — that  of  Leuktra  more 
especially — and  perfectly  adapted  to  military  movements,  though 
perhaps  scarcely  accessible  to  charging  cavalry. 

So  soon,  therefore,  as  Epaminondas  saw  Kleombrotos  prepa- 
ring to  descend  into  the  plain,  as  if  to  offer  battle,  he  advanced 
with  alacrity,  and  met  him  half  way,  confident  in  the  spirit  of 
his  men,  and  relying  much  on  the  undeniable  superiority  of  his 
Theban  and  Thessalian  horse. 

Epaminondas,  however,  was  not  the  man  to  rest  content  with 
such  advantage,  or  to  neglect  any  precaution  which  might 
ensure  the  victory  against  an  enemy  so  formidable  as  a  Lake- 


THE  OBLIQUE  FORMATION.  247 

daimonian  army,  numbering  in  their  ranks  no  less  than  seven 
hundred  Spartans  ;  he  therefore  devised  a  new  and  excellent 
scheme  of  tactics,*  says  Diodoros,  and  won  through  his  own 
peculiar  strategy  that  very  famous  battle.  This  scheme  of 
tactics,  which  is  no  other  than  the  celebrated  oblique  formation, 
of  which,  before  this  day,  no  trace  is  to  be  discovered  in  history,  • 
was  unquestionably  the  invention  of  Epaminondas;  that  un- 
rivalled Greek  commander,  whom  Plutarch  from  some  favoritism, 
the  cause  of  which  has  escaped  us,  describes  as  second  in  military 
genius  to  Pelopidas,  at  best  but  a  brilhant  and  daring  subaltern, 
and  whose  splendid  achievements  Xenophon  in  his  affection  for 
Agesilaos,  and  his  admiration  of  the  Spartans,  has  related  with 
such  brevity  and  lack  of  detail,  that  in  his  conqueror  of  Leuktra 
and  Mantineia,  we  recognise  anything  rather  than  the  originator 
of  a  new  military  system,  which  has  endured  to  this  day  still 
unaltered  and  unimproved,  to  which  one  of  the  greatest  judges 
of  the  art  of  modern  warfare,  Frederick  the  Great  of  Prussia, 
was  so  much  attached  that  he  considered  it  irresistible,  being 
wont  to  say,  after  his  splendid  victories,  that  he  had  only  been 
fighting  over  again  Epaminondas'  battle  of  Leuktra ;  a  system 
w^hich,  if  adhered  to  by  the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  as  he  at  fii-st 
intended,  would  almost  certainly  have  converted  the  doubtful 
cannonade  of  Valmy  into  a  French  disaster  ;  which,  if  adopted 
on  the  heights  of  Landgraefenberg,  might  have  given  a  diflPerent 
result,  despite  the  colossal  genius  iind  wonderful  resources  of 
Napoleon,  to  the  dreadful  field  of  Jena. 

On  the  fifth  day  of  the  month  Hecatomboion,  in  the  second 
year  of  the  one  hundred  and  second  Olympiad,  corresponding 
nearly  to  the  twentieth  of  July,  B.  C.  Sll,  Kleombrotos 
descended  into  the  plain  with  his  cavalry  in  front  of  his  hoplitai, 
who  were  di*awn  up  in  line,  each  enomoty  having  three  shields 

♦  Diod.  Sic.  XV.  55. 


248  ErAMINOXDAS. 

in  rank  and  twelve  in  file,  the  king  himself  having  command 
with  the  Spartans  about  his  pei-son,  on  the  right  wing. 

Percei\ing  this  disposition,  and  knowing,  from  the  immovable 
valor  and  perduracy  of  a  Lakedaimonian  army,  that  a  general 
attack  along  the  fi"ont  would  only  lead  to  a  measuring  of  per- 
sonal strength  between  the  files  opposed  to  each  other,  and 
would  probably  result  in  the  defeat  of  his  own  men  as  numerical- 
ly much  the  inferior  body,  Epaminondas  formed  his  men  on  an 
entirely  new  principle.  Selecting  all  his  best  warrioi*s,  and  espe- 
cially his  best  file-leaders,  he  drew  them  to  the  extreme  left, 
where  he  arranged  them — considerably  in  advance  of  the  centre 
and  right,  which  he  purposely  withdrew — under  his  own  com- 
mand, no  less  than  fifty  shields  in  depth,  intending  by  this  extra- 
ordinary weight  of  his  column,  to  bear  down  and  cut  in  two  the 
Lakedaimonian  right,  and  to  crush  at  a  blow  tlie  king  himself 
and  his  hitherto  unconquerable  body-guard  of  Spartans.  His 
own  right  and  centre  w^ere  drawn  up  in  much  shallower  order, 
probably  not  exceeding  the  usual  depth  of  eight  shields,  for  it 
was  his  object,  if  possible,  to  induce  the  enemy  to  extend  their 
own  left  unduly,  and  being  actually  inferior  in  numbei-s,  while 
he  had  reduced  his  general  strength  yet  farther  by  the  extra- 
ordinary concentration  of  his  masses  on  the  left,  he  was  obliged 
to  make  his  right  shallow,  even  t9  feebleness,  in  order  to  keep  up 
the  semblance  of  an  even  front.  The  details  which  have  come 
down  to  us  of  this  action  are,  as  I  have  observed,  but  brief  and 
indistinct,  yet  it  appears  from  Plutarch's  statement,  who  gives 
the  whole  glory  of  this  battle  to  Pelopidas,  even  while  he  ascribes 
the  oblique  formation,  the  value  of  which  he  did  not  comprehend, 
to  Epaminondas,  that  the  general  had  strengthened  his  centre,  so 
as  in  some  degree  to  compensate  for  its  numerical  weakness,  by 
the  three  hundred  known  as  the  sacred  band,  who  were  never 
beaten  until  they  fell  to  a  man  with  all  their  wounds  in  front 
*  Plut.  Vit.  Pelop.  23. 


THE  SACRED  BAND.  249 

"  on  that  dishonest  field  of  Chaironeia,  fatal  to  liberty,"  and  lay 
as  they  fell 

"  With  their  backs  to  the  field  and  their  feet  to  the  foe, 
And  leaving  in  battle  no  blot  on  their  name, 
Looked  proudly  to  heaven  from  the  death-bed  of  fame." 

But  that  day  of  disaster  had  not  yet  arrived ;  and  in  this 
furious  hand  to  hand  encounter,  they  with  their  gallant  leader 
did  their  duty  well,  and  merited  so  much  of  the  honors  of  the 
victory  as  belongs  of  right  to  those  who  are  intrusted  with  an 
office  of  the  highest  faith  and  moment,  and  who  do  not  dis- 
appoint the  trust  reposed  in  them — they  weie,  in  fact,  as  the 
strong  hands  which  execute  that  which  the  A\-iser  head  has 
planned  ;  and,  although  they  have  every  right  to  share,  have 
none  to  claim,  much  less  to  monopohze,  the  honors  of  a  victory, 
which,  but  for  the  strange  and  new  formation  in  which  they 
fought,  must  almost  to  a  certainty  have  been  a  terrible  defeat. 
From  that  day  forth,  this  obhque  method  was  the  constant,  and 
almost  constantly  successful  array  and  order  of  the  Thebans, 
imtil  at  Chaironeia  it  was  turned  against  themselves  by  Philip 
of  Makedon  to  their  total  discomfitm-e,  and  thenceforward  was 
one  of  the  favorite  manoeuvres  of  his  heroic  son  Alexander, 

To  return  to  the  battle  before  us,  however ;  no  sooner  were 
the  two  armies  in  the  plain,  the  Thebans  with  their  left  advanced 
so  as  almost  to  feel  the  enemy's  right,  while  their  own  right  was 
so  far  retired  as  to  be  very  distant  from  the  Lakedaimonian  left 
the  cavalry  trumpets  sounded,  and  the  horse  on  both  sides 
encountered  betw^een  the  main  bodies  in  full  career. 

At  this  period  the  Theban  cavalry  was  in  admirable  condition, 
on  account  of  the  w^ars  which  they  had  been  so  long  carrying  on 
against  Thespiai  and  Orchomenos,  as  well  as  the  auxiliary  Thes- 
safian  hoi-se  of  Jason,  which  were  the  most  celebrated  of  all  the 
Greek  cavahers.     The  Lakedaimonians  were  at  this  time,  and 


250  ETAMINONDAS. 

indeed  generally,  if  not  always,  miserably  deficient  in  this  arm 
of  the  service ;  for  none  but  the  richest  men  of  the  state  kept 
horses,  and  these  did  not  serve  on  horseback,  but  when  the 
troops  were  called  out,  a  certain  number  were  allotted  to  this 
service,  and  arms  and  horses  were  assigned  to  them ;  so  that 
neither  the  riders  were  accustomed  to  their  chargei-s,  nor  the 
chargers  to  their  riders,  which  is  of  all  things  the  sine  qua 
non  to  the  efficiency  of  a  cavalry  force ;  while  the  possibility 
of  drill  or  discipline  was  entirely  out  of  the  question,  if  indeed 
these  were  ever  insisted  upon,  which  appears  to  me  very  doubt- 
ful, by  the  Hellenic  nations,  among  whom — previously,  at  least, 
to  the  age  of  Alexander  and  Pliilopoimen,  both  of  whom  made 
great  use  of  their  cavalry — this  arm  was  exceedingly  weak  and 
inefficient.  In  addition  to  all  these  disadvantages,  it  may  be 
added,  that  in  the  Lakedaimonian  armies,  the  choicest  of  the 
levies  being  reserved  for  the  ranks  of  the  hoplitai,  the  weakest 
and  least  spirited  of  the  soldieiy  were  mounted  on  those  chance- 
selected  hoi*ses,  and  served  as  troopers.*  The  consequence  of 
this  difference  in  the  nature  of  their  cavalry  services,  was  the 
almost  instantaneous  defeat  and  scatteiing  of  the  Lakedaimonian 
horse  before  the  Thebans,  and  their  falling  back  into  the  lines  of 
their  own  hoplitai,  which  they  threw  somewhat  into  disorder 
before  the  encounter  of  the  main  battles.  This  must  have 
occurred,  I  imagine,  toward  the  Theban  right,  where  the  inter- 
val was  the  widest  between  the  opposing  armies,  and  the  space 
between  the  hills  the  narrowest.  For  since  the  signal  for  the 
onset  of  the  infantry  seems  to  have  been  given  as  soon  as  the 
cavalry  were  no  longer  interposed,  if  the  Spartan  right,  which 
first  came  into  contact  with  the  Boiotians,  had  been  much 
shaken — as  they  must  have  been,  had  their  broken  horse  disor- 
dered them  in  that  quarter — they  could  never  have  made  such 
a  resistance  as  they  did  to  the  terrible  onset  of  Epaminondas, 
*  Xen.  Hellen.  VI.,  iv.  11. 


AFFAIR    OF    CAVALRY.  251 

with  his  cohimn  of  fifty  shields.  The  cavahy  on  both  sides, 
therefore,  of  which  we  hear  no  more  during  the  action — as  is  by  no 
means  unusual  in  narratives  of  ancient  battles — must  have  swept 
away,  I  conjecture,  the  Lakedaimonians  in  full  flight,  and  the 
Hiebans  in  reckless  and  inconsiderate  pursuit,  down  tlie  plain 
toward  Thespiai  eastward,  and  no  portion  of  either,  it  is  proba- 
ble, re-appeared  on  the  field  until  the  victory  was  decided. 

In  no  respect,  indeed,  do  the  ancients  appear  to  have  been  so 
far  inferior  to  the  moderns — nay,  but  even  the  Greeks  to  the 
Orientals — as  in  their  ignorance  of  the  true  use  of  cavalry  and 
of  its  proper  tactics.  In  nine  cases  out  of  ten,  there  were  in 
every  general  battle  two  several  independent  actions — one  of  the 
horse,  which  had  for  the  most  part  no  influence  on  the  result  of 
the  whole,  and  one  of  the  infantry,  which  was  decisive.  The 
battle  of  Dehon  was  indeed  won  by  Pagondas,  who  brought  up 
reserves  of  cavalry  which  deterred  the  Athenians  from  prosecuting 
a  half-won  ^dctory,  and  ultimately  converted  it  into  a  defeat ; 
but  even  this  appears  to  have  been  the  result  of  chance  rather 
than  of  design,  and  it  has  scarcely  a  parallel  in  the  annals  of 
ancient  warfare,  until  the  days  of  Alexander  in  Greece  and  Han- 
nibal in  Italy,  with  both  of  whom  horse  was  a  favorite  and  effect- 
ive arm. 

The  holding  a  reserve  of  horse  in  hand,  whether  to  complete 
an  impression  made  on  an  enemy's  battle,  to  turn  his  undefended 
flank,  to  surround  and  charge  his  rear,  or  to  cover  the  retreat  of 
its  own  infantry,  was  a  thing,  it  would  seem,  never  thought  of. 
Horse,  indeed,  rarely  charged  home  at  all,  merely  skirmishing  as 
javelineei-s  ;*  and  it  is  very  doubtful  to  me,  w^hether  they  were 
ever  trained  to  come  in  all  abreast  with  an  even  front ;  whether 
they  had  any  regular  number  of  files  or  order  of  working ;  and 
whether  they  were  aware  of  the  most  ob\nous  rules  of  cavalry 
exercise,  such  as  the  leading  of  the  charge  at  the  pace  of  the 
*  Xen.  de  Re  Equestri,  passim. 


252  EPAMIN0NDA8. 

slowest  horse,  the  never  sufFenng  themselves  to  be  charged 
except  in  the  act  of  charging,  and  the  like — now  axioms  under- 
stood by  the  dullest  subaltern  of  the  worst  hoi-se  service  in  the 
world.  At  least  it'is  certain  that  Xenophon  in  his  elaborate  treat- 
ises on  hoi*seraanship  and  cavalry  service,  hints  at  nothing  of  the 
kind,  but  directs  all  his  precepts  toward  the  making  of  individual 
or  partizan  troopers. 

To  compensate  for  this,  their  infantry  tactics  were  almost  per- 
fect— perhaps,  as  regards  troops  fighting  entirely  with  the  stand- 
ing pike  and  sword,  and  using  no  missiles  except  as  a  distinct 
arm  of  service  never  employed  in  the  actual  crisis — actually  so. 
Nor  was  this  ever  more  distinctly  shown  than  in  the  present 
instance,  for  the  Lak^daimonians  exceeded  the  Thebans  by  nearly 
one  half  in  numbers,  and  I  presume  nearly  as  much  in  individual 
strength  and  prowess ;  for  their  very  best  men  fought  here,  and 
man  to  man,  Spartans  appear  to  the  last  to  have  been  all  but 
invincible. 

So  soon  as  the  trumpets  sounded,  the  Lakedaimonians  led 
forth  at  charging  pace  along  the  whole  front ;  their  left  hurrying 
their  advance,  in  order  to  close  with  the  Theban  right,  which 
rather  fell  back  than  advanced,  though  still  preserving  their  con- 
nection with  the  left,  which  met  the  Spartan  right  with  levelled 
pikes  and  their  battle  cry,  at  a  full  run.  There  the  battle  raged 
fiercely,  hand  to  hand,  and  was  for  a  long  time  stationary,  since 
there  Epaminondas  met  the  chosen  Spartans,  with  Deinon,  Spho- 
drias,  and  Kleombrotos  their  king,  who  would  not  yield  a  step, 
nor  turn,  but  sustained  the  shock  of  his  deep  column  with  their 
ST/nasjnsmos  of  linked  shields,  until  their  sjiears  were  broken, 
and  it  came  to  the  closest  single  combat,  with  their  short  stab- 
bing swords.  In  the  meantime  their  left,  which  had  been  disor- 
dered somewhat  by  its  own  fl}nng  horse,  and  shaken  by  the 
rapidity  of  its  own  advance,  endeavored  to  extend  still  farther  to 
the  left,  in  order  to  outflank  and  surround  the  Theban  right, 


INFANTRY    FIGHT    AT    LEUKTRA.  253 

with  which  it  was  not  yet  fairly  engaged.  All  manoeuvring  with 
so  heavy  and  unwieldy  a  body  as  the  phalanx,  in  the  hce  of  an 
enemy,  was  difficult ;  and  if  attacked  when  in  the  act  of  deploy- 
ing or  changing  its  front,  that  array,  at  other  times  so  formida- 
ble, was  the  most  defenceless  and  helpless  of  masses ;  and  at  pre- 
cisely such  a  moment,  and  in  the  middle  of  such  a  movement, 
Pelopidas  rushed  headlong  with  his  three  hundred  of  the  sacred 
band,  sen-ied  in  the  closest  combination,  upon  their  centre,  giving 
them  time  neither  to  extend  as  they  desired,  nor  to  contract  their 
files  in  oi-der  to  meet  his  shock,  so  that  they  wavered  visibly, 
and  though  they  still  fought  stoutly,  were  momentarily  falling 
into  confusion. 

By  this  time,  however,  the  extraordinary  depth,  and  conse- 
quent weight  and  impetus,  of  the  terrible  column  of  Epaminon- 
das  began  to  tell ;  the  pressure  of  the  rearmost  files  bearing  the 
foremost  bodily  onward,  and  if  the  front  men  fell,  others  succeed- 
ing to  their  places,  almost  as  it  seemed  ad  infinitum.  And  now 
Sphodrias  was  down,  and  Deinon  ;  and  Kleombrotos  had  fallen, 
fighting  worthily  of  his  Herakleidan  blood,  and  alt  the  adjutants 
and  four  hundred  of  the  seven  hundred  Spartans  ;  and  as  the  head 
of  the  assaihng  column  met  lesS  resistance,  it  fell  in  ^\ith  wilder 
shouts  and  a  more  fiery  impetus,  and  broke  the  Spartan  right 
into  shattered  and  defenceless  fragments,  outflanking  it,  more- 
over, and  thereby  turning  the  right  of  the  whole  array.  But  no 
sooner  did  the  Lakedaimonian  centre,  already  shaken,  and  their 
left,  which  had  scarcely  felt  the  enemy,  see  the  defeat  of  then* 
right  wing,  than  they  turned  also ;  and  the  forces  02:)posed  to 
them  assuming  the  offensive,  no  time  was  given  them  to  rally, 
and  the  confusion  and  route  became  general  along  the  whole 
front ;  except  where  in  a  knot  the  surviving  Spartans  fought  so 
desperately  around  the  body  of  their  king,  that  Epaminond;is 
judged  it  ^\^ser  to  suffer  them  to  withdraw  it,  as  their  point  of 
honor,  than  to  risk  a  renewal  of  the  action  with  an  enemy  ever 


254  EPAMINONDAS. 

forniiLlable,  now  rendered  desperate.  The  loss  of  the  Lakedai- 
monians  was  prodigious,  considering  that  there  was  no  long 
flight,  or  fierce  pureuit,  with  execution  of  the  flying — no  onslauglit 
of  hoi-se,  plying  them  with  their  bloody  sabres,  but  only  a  short 
stern  retreat,  uj)  the  heiglit  on  which  they  had  encamped,  until 
they  had  crossed  the  ditch  which  guarded  their  camp,  when  they 
faced  about  with  presented  arms  and  serried  shields  ;  and  even 
held  debate  among  themselves,  whether  they  should  not  rather 
risk  a  second  conflict  than  sufter  the  Thebans  to  erect  a  trophy, 
so  high  and  valorous  were  their  yet  unbroken  spirits. 

Prudent  councils,  however,  prevailed ;  for  above  a  thousand 
Lakedaimonians,  four  hundred  of  whom  were  Sj^artans,*  lay  dead 
on  the  plain  below  them,  without  enumerating  the  slain  of  the 
hght  troops,  who  were  not  included  in  the  order  of  battle,  or 
those,  I  presume,  of  the  allies,  who  are  said  to  have  been  greatly 
dispirited  by  the  action.  Diodoros  states  the  whole  loss  of  the  La- 
kedaimonians at  four  thousand,  and  that  of  the  Boiotians  at  about 
three  hundred ;  but  these  numbers  cannot  be  exactly  relied  on, 
although  if  the  hght-armed  Helots  and  the  allies  be  included,  the 
number  cannot  be  regarded  as  excessive  as  compared  to  the  loss 
of  the  native  hoplitai.  At  all  events,  it  was  the  severest  defeat 
ever  as  yet  inflicted  by  one  Hellenic  nation  on  another,  and 
the  most  notable  victory  won  by  Greeks  from  Greeks.  The 
Thebans  restored  the  Lakedaimonian  dead  under  treaty,  who 
were  buried  in  the  polyandrion  mentioned  above,  as  still  visible 
on  the  heights  of  Leuktra,  and  permitted  them  to  retire  peace- 
fully homeward.  But  they,  trusting  to  secrecy  and  promptitude, 
rather  than  to  the  faith  of  treaties,  for  their  safety,  marched  that 
same  night  through  the  passes  of  the  Kithairon  to  Kreusis,  and 
thence  to  the  fortress  of  Aigosthena,  in  the  Megaris,  along  the 

*  I  am  clear  that  this  is  the  meaning  of  the  text — Xen.  Hellen.  VI.,  iv. 
1') — ahhough  Mitford  understands  it  to  mean  a  thousand  and  four  hun- 
dred ;  Plutarch  agrees  with  this  view.     Vit.  Ages.  XXVII. 


RETREAT  OF  THE  SPARTANS.  255 

same  wild  and  perilous  path  over  tlie  southern  cliflfs  of  Mount 
Elateia,  above  the  Korinthian  Gulf,  in  which  Kleombrotos  had 
suftered  so  severely  from  a  tempest  seven  years  before  the  battle 
which  put  an  end  to  his  career.     His  death  was  that  of  a  hero, 
and  sufficiently  disproved  the  charges  which  had  been  unjustly 
brought  against  him  of  pei*sonal  cowardice,  or  of  disaflfection  to 
his  country.     It  was  moral  decision,  not  individual  valor,  that  he 
lacked ;  and  if  he  foiled  in  generalship  against  Epaminondas,  it 
were  a  reproach  to  few  tacticians  who  have  ever  lived,  to  say  of  any 
one  of  them  that,  so  matched,  he  was*  impar  congressus  Achilli. 
Immediately  after  the  battle,  a  herald  was  sent  crowned  with 
bays  to  x\thens,  to  demand  the  aid  of  the  people  and  announce 
the  result  of  the  action,  but  he  was  very  coldly  received  and  dis- 
missed without  a  reply,  in  regard  to  the  assistance  requested,  so 
that  it  was  evident  that  they  had  no  friendship  to  expect  in  that 
quarter.     The  Lakedaimonians  having  escaped  unmolested  into 
the   Megaris    encountered   there  the    powerful    reinforcements 
sent  from  Sparta,  under  Archidamos  the  son  of  Agesilaos ;  but 
not  feeling  themselves  equal  to  any  farther  operations,  re-entered 
the  isthmus,  dismissed  their  allies,  and  returned  to  Sparta,  never 
again  to  recover  from  the  moral  consequences  of  that  overwhelm- 
ing defeat,  or  to  recover  their  station  among  the  Hellenic  nations, 
although  they  still  made  a  stout  struggle  for  pre-eminence,  and 
long  maintained  their  independence.    Without  losing  a  moment's 
time  or  suffering  the  prestige  of  victory  to  pass  into  oblivion,  the 
Thebans  took  possession  of  Orchomenos,  the  inhabitants  of  which 
tbey  were  half  disposed  to  sell  as  slaves  until  persuaded  to  milder 
counsels  by  Epaminondas,  and  made  preparations  to  prosecute  the 
war  within  the  isthmus,  having  been  joined  by  the  Pbokians, 
Aitolians  and  Arkadians,  who  had  recently  defeated  the  Spartans 
under  the  walls  of  the  Mantineian  Orchomenos.    In  the  followinir 

*  A  proverbial  phrase  of  any  one  overmatched,  taken  from  the  com 
bat  of  Hector  with  Achilles,  in  the  Iliad. 


256  EPAMINONDAS. 

year,  Epaminondas  entered  tlie  isthmus  with  no  less  than  fifty 
thousand  men,  and  burst  into  the  Peloponnesos  in  four  several 
columns  of  attack,  devastating  the  country  of  their  enemies  in  all 
directions,  having  appointed  a  general  rendezvous  at  Sellasia  a 
city  of  Lakonia,  northeast  of  Sparta,'*  situate  in  a  valley  between 
two  hills,  known  as  Euas  and  Olympos,  commanding  the  road 
down  the  valley  of  the  Oinous,  running  direct  to  Sparta.  At 
this  town  they  all  arrived  in  due  season,  having  met  with  little 
opposition  except  that  ofFei-ed  to  the  division  of  Arkadians  by 
Ischolas,  who  rather  chose  to  die  hke  a  second  Leonidas  in  de- 
fence of  the  post  entrusted  to  him,  than  to  return  dishonored 
home.  Thence  they  entered  Lakonia,  cutting  down  all  the  fi-uit- 
trees,  burning  the  country  far  and  wide,  driving  the  cattle  and 
destroying  the  crops  up  to  the  very  suburbs  of  Sparta,  whose 
boast  it  had  always  been  that  her  women  had  never  seen  the  smoke 
of  a  hostile  fire,  and  that  no  enemy  had  ever  been  beaten  back 
from  her  unwalled  and  unfortified  metropolis.  Now,  however, 
her  boast  stood  as  nought,  for  not  only  were  the  flames  of  con- 
flagration seen  reddening  the  horizon  in  every  quarter,  but  the 
enemy  with  Epaminondas  at  their  head  were  in  full  view  en- 
deavoring to  ford  the  snow-swollen  torrent  of  the  Eurotas ;  and 
they  came  so  near  to  taking  the  city,  that  a  revolution  was  at- 
tempted within  the  place  itself,  and  the  cries  of  frantic  women 
and  all  the  tumult  and  terror  prevailed,  which  is  wont  to  occur  in 
a  town  won  by  storm.  In  the  end,  however,  the  allies  were 
roughly  repulsed,  and  did  not  judge  it  expedient  to  renew  the 
attack,  but  retired  leisurely  with  an  enormous  booty  into  Arka- 
dia,  where  Epaminondas  restored  the  state  and  city  of  Messenia, 
w  Inch  had  been  destroyed,  and  its  people  dispersed  by  the  Lake- 
daimonians  above  two  centuries  before — a  stroke  of  masterly 
policy  by  which  he  planted  a  perpetual  thorn  in  the  side  of 
Sparta,  thus  establishing  a  domestic  enemy,  as  it  were,  close  to 
*  Polyb.  Cellum  Cleom.  II.  65-8. 


THE    PELOPOXNESES    AGAIN    INVADED.  257 

her  very  confines — this  restoration  occurred  in  the  fourth  year  of 
the  one  hundred  and  second  Olympiad  B.  C,  and  was  celebrated 
with  great  solemnity,  and  the  performance  of  sacred  games. 
This  done  Epaminondas  drew  off  his  forces  and  returned  into 
Boiotia,  having  inflicted  the  severest  blow  on  Sparta  that  had 
ever  yet  befallen  her ;  and  having  been  brought  to  trial  for  re- 
taining his  rank  of  Boiotarch,  in  defiance  of  the  law,  beyond  the 
expiration  of  the  year  to  which  his  rank  and  military  command 
were  limited,  was  unanimously  acquitted  in  consideration  of  his 
great  services  and  the  ob^'ious  necessity  of  the  case. 

In  the  mean  time  an  alHance  oflfensive  and  defensive  having 
been  entered  into  by  the  Athenians  and  Lakedaimonians,  to  the 
detriment  of  Elis,  Argos  and  Arkadia,  those  nations  soHcited  the 
aid  of  the  Boiotians,  who  again  took  the  field,  when  they  found 
the  isthmus  fortified  by  a  great  trench  and  palisade  from  Ken- 
chreai  on  the  Gulf  of  Eghina,  to  Lechaion  on  the  Gulf  of  Korinth, 
and  defended  by  three  times  their  own  force  of  Peloponnesians, 
with  their  Attic  and  insular  alhes.  In  spite  of  this,  after  recon- 
noitering  the  works  carefully,  Epaminondas  assailed  the  Lakedai- 
monian  defences,  which  were  the  weakest,  cut  their  guards  to 
pieces,  and,  breaking  through  the  lines,  again  entered  the  Pelo- 
ponnesos,  having  thus  accomplished  an  exploit  inferior  to  none 
of  his  previous  victories.  On  this  occasion  he  was  not,  however, 
so  successful  as  before ;  for,  although  he  took  Sikyon  and  Phlius, 
he  suffered  a  heavy  repulse  fi-om  the  walls  of  Korinth,  at  the 
hands  of  Chabrias,  who  defended  it  masterly  with  a  garrison  of 
Athenians ;  and  a  peace  being  again  negociated  by  Artoxerxesto 
be  general  through  all  the  states  of  Greece,  except  the  Thebans 
only,  he  again  returned  home  as  rich  as  ever  in  military  glory, 
but  with  no  trophies  or  spoils  of  \ictory  to  display  before  his 
countrymen. 

In  consequence  of  this  he  fell,  incomparable  soldier  as  he  was, 
unsurpassed  by  any  then  aUve,  into  disgrace  with  his  fellow- 
12 


258  EPAMINONDAS. 

citizens,  was  deposed  from  his  command  and  sentenced  to  serve 
as  a  private  soldier,  under  Pelopidas  and  Ismenias  his  colleague, 
in  an  expedition  into  Thessaly  against  Alexander  of  Pherai,  and 
well  for  them  it  was  that  he  served  in  any  capacity.  For  the 
army  being  forced  to  retreat,  and  reduced  to  the  greatest  ex- 
tremities by  the  superior  cavalry  of  the  Thessalians,  he  was  re- 
instated in  his  command  by  the  unanimous  voice  of  his  soldiers, 
and  reconstructing  his  rear  guard,  beat  back  the  pursuere  with 
loss,  and  brought  off  his  own  power  scatheless. 

His  return  was  followed  by  his  immediate  reappointment  to 
command,  and  the  infliction  of  a  heavy  fine  on  the  other  Boio- 
tarchai,  so  entirely  futile  are  all  Plutarch's  efforts  to  make  him 
out  inferior  to  Pelopidas,  who,  however  excellent  an  officer  he 
might  be  as  second  in  command,  never  evinced  any  genius  as  a 
leader,  which  should  constitute  him  even  a  general  of  the  second 
or  third  order :  while  Epaminondas  is  allowed  by  such  critics  as 
Frederick  the  Great  and  Napoleon,  to  have  been  a  genius  of  fii-sl- 
rate  splendor,  and  surpassed  by  no  one,  perhaps  of  any  day,  in 
— what  both  those  giants  in  military  science  esteemed  the 
greatest  principle  of  war — the  concentration  of  the  greatest 
possible  force,  on  a  single  point,  in  the  smallest  possible  available 
compass. 

Not  long  after  tbis,  in  the  third  year  of  the  one  hundred  and 
thii-d  Olympiad,  in  the  Archonship  of  Kephisodoro-,  peace  was 
at  length  established  between  Thebes  and  Sparta  through  the 
intervention,  now  for  the  third  time  of  the  Persian  Artoxerxes ; 
and  a  general  peace  prevailed  for  a  few  montlis  throughout  all 
Greece,  from  North  to  South,  and  from  sea  to  sea,  until  in  the 
course  of  the  year  next  succeeding  difficulties  arising  between 
Elis  and  Arkadia,  paved  the  way  for  a  fresh  war  in  Greece.  In 
the  following  summer  worse  troubles  broke  out  between  Elis  and 
Pisa,  concerning  the  Olympian  games.  Thebes,  at  the  instigation 
of  Epaminondas,  turned  her  attention  to  gaining  predominance 


FORTUNE  IN  WAR.  259 

by  sea  as  well  as  by  land,  inflicted  severe  chastisement  on  the 
city  of  Orchomeuos,  which  had  rebeUed  from  her  authority,  and 
utterly  defeated  Alexander,  the  tyrant  of  Phcrai,  though  with 
the  heavy  loss  of  a  good  patriot  and  gallant  soldier,  Pelopidas, 
who  died  in  the  arms  of  ^'ictory. 

But  now  the  difficulty  between  Ehs  and  Pisa  inflamed  all  the 
elements  of  hostility,  and  involved  Greece  anew  in  a  general  and 
destructive  war ;  for  all  sides  armed  at  once,  the  people  of  Tegea 
and  those  of  Mantineia,  both  Arkadian  cities,  acting  as  principals, 
the  Boiotians  assuming  the  alliance  of  the  former,  and  the  Lake- 
daimonians  and  Athenians  of  the  latter  city.  Agesilaos  with  the 
Spartans  being  nearest  to  the  scene  of  action,  was  necessai-ily  the 
iii-st  in  the  field,  and  marching  without  a  moment's  delay,  was 
engaged  in  the  devastation  of  the  territories  of  Tegea,  when  Epa- 
minondas  entering  the  isthmus  with  the  whole  available  force  of 
the  Boiotians  and  many  Euboian  and  Thessahan  auxiliaiies  rallied 
to  his  standard,  met  within  the  Peloponnesos,  the  Argive,  Messeni- 
an,  and  Arkadian  allies  of  the  Tegeatans.  Here  he  learned  that 
the  Athenians  had  decided  to  send  no  troops  overland,  but  by 
sea  to  Lakedaimon,  and  thence  to  send  succor  to  the  Arkadians, 
and  that  Agesilaos  was  in  force  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Mantineia;  and  on  this  intelligence  he  caused  his  men  to  rest  in 
their  camps  under  the  walls  of  Tegea*  and  then  led  directly,  by 
forced  marches,  upon  Sparta.  And  here  it  is  seen  at  once,  how 
much  fortune  has  to  do  at  all  times  in  the  affaii-s  of  war,  and  how 
little  without  her  can  be  effected  by  the  most  consummate  skill, 
prudence,  and  valor.  Napier  observes  in  his  great  work  on  the 
Peninsular  war,  the  finest  military  history  in  existence,  that  the 
discovery  of  an  unsuspected  ditch,  ten  feet  in  width,  has  been 
known  to  prostrate  the  most  scientific  combinations,  and  over- 
throw the  most  perfect  calculations  ;  and  in  this  instance  the  casual 
speed  of  a  Ki*etan  hcmerodromos^  or  all-day  runner,  saved 
*Xen.  Hellen.  vii.  v. 


260  EPAMINONDAS. 

Sparta ;  for  Agesilaos  waraed  the  citizens  by  a  hoi*se-courier,  that 
they  should  stand  resolutely  to  their  arms,  for  he  would  be  with 
them  not  long  behind  the  Thebans.  And  in  fact  he  entered  the 
city  almost  at  the  same  instant  from  one  quarter,  that  Epaminon- 
das  forded  the  Eurotas,  and  assaulted  it  on  the  other.  The 
6ght  in  the  avenues  and  about  the  suburbs  of  the  town  was  long 
and  desperate  ;  but  the  Spartans  were  doing  battle  for  all  that  is 
dear  to  man,  within  the  sight  of  their  women  and  theu*  children, 
around  the  hearths  where  even  themselves  had  played  when 
babes,  among  the  graves  of  their  fathei*s,  before  the  temples  of 
the  Gods,  and  they  were  invincible.  The  feats  of  Archidamos, 
and  of  Isadas*  the  son  of  Phoibidas,  who  rushing  from  the  baths 
with  a  spear  suddenly  caught  up  in  one  hand,  and  a  sword  in 
the  other,  fought  in  the  front  ranks,  naked  as  he  was,  until  the 
enemy  retired,  wounding  and  slaying  many,  but  himself  un- 
wounded — must  be  read  elsewhere,  for  my  hmits  forbid  that  I 
should  dwell  on  them. 

After  a  furious  conflict  Epaminondas  drew  off  his  troops, 
leaving  it  to  Agesilaos  to  erect  a  trophy,  for  it  was  not  in  his 
fortune  or  his  fate  to  carry  Sparta  with  the  sword,  though  to  him 
alone  of  living  men  it  had  been  given  twice  to  devastate  Lakonia 
up  to  the  very  suburbs,  twice  to  pass  the  Eurotas,  and  hsten  to 
the  panic-stricken  women,  wailing  through  the  city.  It  was  his 
fortune  alone  that  failed  him  ;  for  even  Xenophon,  who  gives  him 
no  undeserved  or  lavish  praise,  admits  that,  but  for  the  speed  of 
the  Kretan  runner,  which  was  so  extraordinary,  that  he  ascribes 
it  to  divine  intervention,  he  must  have  taken  Sparta  like  a  young 
bird  in  its  nest,  deserted  of  all  who  could  defend  it. 

In  no  wise  daunted,  however,  or  disheartened  by  the  fjiiluro 

of  operations  on  which  he  had,  and  that  of  right,  counted  as 

almost  certain,  he  retraced  his  steps  with  a  celerity  and  decision 

so  marvellous,  that  they  remind  us  of  the  prodigious  marches  and 

*  Plutarch,  Agesilaos,  42. 


BATTLE  OF  MANTINEIA.  261 

countermarches,  and  thunderstrokes  dealt  in  every  direction, 
of  Napoleon  during  his  Dresden  campaign,  and  that  final  strug- 
gle in  the  heart  of  France.  Fixing  his  head-quarters  once  more 
at  Tegea  he  at  once  launched  his  cavalry  against  Mantineia, 
which  he  calculated  on  finding,  iis  it  indeed  was,  deserted  by  it^> 
defenders,  who  had  marched  with  every  man  that  they  could 
mfister  to  the  rescue  of  Sparta.  This  blow  again  like  the  last 
appeared  certain  ;  and  like  that  was  defeated  by  an  accident,  for 
the  Athenian  horse  had  just  come  up  from  the  isthmus  as  the 
Thebans  entered  the  plain  of  Mantineia,  and  charging  instantly 
preserved  the  territory  of  their  allies  from  devastation,  if  not 
their  city  itself  from  capture.  The  loss  was  great  on  both  sides, 
for  they  fought  sharply  hand  to  hand,  and  in  so  close  a  melee 
that  there  was  no  weapon  so  short  that  it  was  not  used  on  either 
side.  And  the  Athenians  lost  none  of  their  own  dead,  but  per- 
mitted the  burial  of  the  enemy's  under  a  flag  of  truce. 

But  Epaminondas  angry  at  the  two  repulses  he  had  met  re- 
solved to  deliver  battle  ;  and,  having  enrolled  a  thousand  Arka- 
dian  clubmen  he  caused  his  cavalry  to  burnish  their  helmets,  and 
all  to  grind  their  spear  heads  and  sword  blades,  and  furbish  up 
their  shields  in  readiness  for  instant  action. 

The  scene  was  a  plain  at  about  thirty  stadia,  or  four  English 
miles'  distance  from  Mantineia. 

The  action  as  usual  commenced  by  a  charge  of  the  cavalry  on 
each  side,  which  was  mutually  arrayed  on  either  wing  of  the 
hosts,  the  Thebans  as  usual  holding  the  left  wing  of  their  own 
army  opposite  the  Mantineians  on  the  enemy's  right  supported 
by  the  Lakedaimonians,  Eleans  and  Argives,  with  the  Athenians 
on  then*  extreme  left. 

In  the  cavahy  skirmish,  the  Theban  horse,  who  were  mixed 
with  a  powerful  body  of  Thessalian  slingers  and  engineers,  easily 
broke  the  Athenians,  who  all  fled  together  to  the  loft  of  their 
own  infantry,  without  disordering  it ;  but  speedily  rallying,  fell 


2C2  EPAMINONDAS. 

\'iolently  on  the  Euboians,  who  had  been  sent  with  a  body  of 
mercenaries  to  occupy  certain  heights  in  that  direction,  and  cut 
them  off  to  a  man.  The  victorious  Thebans  did  not  pursue  the 
fugitives,  but  charged  home  on  the  flank  of  the  Athenian  foot, 
striving  desperately  to  break  into  their  phalanx,  and  had  already 
thrown  them  into  confusion,  w^hen  the  commander  of  the  Elean 
horse,  who  had  been  placed  in  reserve  with  the  rear-guard, 
charged  in  turn,  and  repulsing  the  Boiotians,  restored  the  battle 
in  this  quarter. 

And  this,  in  my  judgment,  is  the  best,  or  rather  the  only  good 
cavalry  fighting  that  occurred  during  the  Peloponnesian  war ; 
for  in  this  instance  they  had  evidently  the  true  aim  and  object 
of*\var  in  view,  beyond  the  mere  breaking  and  chasing  off  the 
ground  the  horse  directly  opposed  to  them. 

On  the  left  wing  the  action  was  more  decisive,  for  the  superi- 
ority of  the  Theban  and  Thessalian  squadrons  was  so  manifest, 
that  the  Mantineian  troopers  were  driven  almost  immediately, 
for  shelter,  to  the  rear  of  their  phalanx.  Then,  with  a  mighty 
shout,  the  two  main  bodies  charged  along  the  whole  front,  and 
never,  says  Diodoros,*  where  Greeks  met  Greeks,  were  there  such 
equal  numbers  opposed  face  to  face  on  one  field ;  nor  ever  were  such 
leadei-s  mated  in  renown  and  worth  ;  nor  ever  W'Cre  such  soldiei's 
set  together.  And  w^here  the  Lakedaimonians  and  Boiotians  came 
together,  no  man  spared  his  own  life,  so  he  might  take  his  ene- 
my's ;  and  first  they  thrust  and  strove  at  push  of  pike  till  then* 
shafts  w^ere  broken,  and  then  fought  it  out  with  their  swords  and 
cutlasses,  until  their  bodies  were  exhausted  with  wounds  and 
loss  of  blood,  but  their  spirits  were  inexhaustible.  The  battle 
long  hung  balanced  thus,  the  whole  air  ringing  with  the  clash 
and  clang  of  blades  on  shield  and  helmet,  for  the  combatants 
lacked  breath  to  shout  withal ;  when,  seeing  that  the  moment  had 
arrived,  Epaminondas,  with  his  favorite  tactic,  obhqued  from  the 
*  Diod.  Sic.  XV.,  86 


DEATH  OF  EPAMINONDAS.  2G3 

left  wing  in  deep  and  serried  column,  full  upon  the  Lakedaimo- 
nian  centre,  and  cut  the  phalanx  in  two  on  the  instant ;  for  even 
the  Spartans  could  not  endure  the  weight  of  that  tremendous 
concentrated  charge,  but  retreated  in  confusion,  with  the  Boio- 
tians  pressing  on  then-  rear,  and  slaughtering  them  in  heaps. 
At  this  moment  a  rush  was  made  against  Epaminondas  by  some 
of  the  bravest  of  the  Spartans,  who  rallied  and  set  upon  him  all 
at  once ;  so  that  after  a  vigorous  and  heroical  defence,  one 
against  many,  he  was  struck  down  with  a  mortal  lance-thrust 
through  his  corslet,  from  the  hand,  it  is  said,  of  Gryllos,  the  son 
of  Xenophon,  though  it  is  by  no  means  evident  what  he  should 
be  doing  in  the  ranks  of  the  Spartans,  when  his  own  countrymen 
were  engaged  in  a  different  part  of  the  field.  Over  his  body  ^ae 
conflict  again  raged  fierce  and  furious,  but  the  Thebans,  at  length 
and  with  difficulty,  prevailed,  by  dint  of  bodily  strength  alone, 
and  having  chased  them  a  little  way,  returned  sad  and  tearful, 
from  their  disastrous  victory,  to  tend  the  body  of  their  illustrious 
dead.  The  victory  was  in  itself  complete,  yet  it  was  unimproved, 
and  followed  up  neither  with  carnage  of  the  enemy  nor  advan- 
tage to  themselves — for  they  had  no  general  left  who  could 
pursue  it,  as  he  would  have  done,  who  had  fallen  in  the  arms  of 
immortal  glory. 

He  had  fallen  childless,  it  is  true,  as  his  weeping  comrades 
exclaimed  in  their  sorrow,  but  leaving  behind  him,  as  he  cried 
himself,  with  his  parting  breath,  two  daughters  to  immortahze 
his  memory — his  twin  victories  at  Leuktra  and  Mantineia. 

And  they  did  immortalize  him,  for  to  this  day  they  survive, 
two  of  the  most  purely  scientific  battles  ever  won,  and  won  by 
superior  tactics  only. 

His  greatest  praise  rests  on  the  facts,  that  tne  state,  Lakedai- 
monia,  against  which  his  greatest  efforts  were  directed,  never 
recovered  the  pride  of  place  from  which  he  struck  her  down, 
when  at  her  topmost  pitch ;  and  that  his  native  country,  which, 


264  EPAMINONDAS. 

with  his  rise,  rose  from  obscurity,  sunk  into  it  again  at  his 
decease,  never  to  shine  again  among  nations.  To  add  weight  to 
the  judgment  of  the  critics  I  have  quoted  on  his  strategy  or  tac- 
tics, were  impertinent  as  absurd ;  but  were  I  to  assign  a  place  to 
Epaminondas  among  generals,  it  would  be — as  to  an  originator 
of  a  great  system,  ever  opposed  to  the  best  troops  in  the  then 
known  world,  and  never  beaten  by  them  in  the  field — above 
Pausanias,  above  Alexander,  above  Scipio,  above  Julius  Caesar, 
above  even  Xenophon,  and  inferior  only,  of  all  masters  in  the  art 
of  war,  to  Hannibal,  Wellington,  and  Napoleon,  who  are  in  my 
estimation  the  first  men  of  the  first  class,  unapproached,  if  not 
unapproachable. 

As  a  man  and  as  a  patriot  he  was  not  to  be  excelled ;  for  in 
either  quahty  his  character  was  as  pure,  as  disinterested,  and  as 
spotless,  as  that  of  Washington  himself. 

Happy  the  state  which  can  boast  the  production  of  an  Epa- 
minondas ;  and  the  possession  of  such  a  general  as  he,  such  a 
poet  as  Pindar,  may  well  compensate  for"  greater  dulness  of 
intellect  than  their  enemies  were  wont  to  attribute  to  the  breathers 
of  the  fat  atmasphere  of  Boiotia. 


VII. 

ALEXANDEE   OF  MAKEDON. 

HIS  BATTLES  OF  THE  GRANIKOS,  ISSOS,  AND  ARBELA  ;    HIS  CAM- 
PAIGNS, CHARACTER,  AND  CONDUCT. 

Three  years  only,  after  the  battle  of  Mantineia,  which  put  an 
end  for  ever  to  the  supremacy  of  Sparta,  and  left  Thebes  the 
principal  of  the  Hellenic  cities,  Philip,  the  son  of  Amyntas, 
succeeded  to  the  throne  of  Makedonia,  a  vast  district  in  the 
northern  part  of  Greece,  beyond  the  mountain  chain  of  Oita, 
which,  up  to  this  period,  had  hardly  been  admitted  by  the  pure 
Hellenes  to  be  a  Hellenic  state,  but  had  rather  been  considered, 
with  the  adjoining  countries  of  Thessalia,  Aitolia,  Epiros,  and 
more  particularly  Thrake,  as  semi-barbarous. 

The  kings  of  Makedonia,  however,  had,  from  the  beginning, 
claimed  descent  from  the  heroic  princes  of  the  purest  Hellenic 
blood ;  had  been  acknowledged  as  heirs  of  the  Peleidan  branch 
of  the  great  Aiakidai,  through  Neoptolemos,  the  son  of  Achilles ; 
and,  till  a  very  late  day,  they  retained  in  their  family  the  ances- 
tral names  of  their  race.  From  time  almost  immemorial,  these 
princes  had  ruled  with  nearly  absolute  sway  over  the  pastoral 
and  hunter  tribes  who  peopled  their  extensive  plains,  and  who, 
to  the  days  of  which  I  write,  bad  learned  none  of  those  demo- 
cratic ideas,  had  acquired  none  of  that  thirst  for  freedom  and 
jealousy  of  individual  authority,  which  were  the  most  striking 
12 


266  ALEXANDER   THE    GREAT. 

characteristics  of  the  southern  Greeks.  They  maintained  their 
coui^s  with  a  sort  of  semi-barbarous  pomp,  not  differing  much, 
except  that  the  heroic  simphcity  was  gone,  from  the  style  of 
which  we  read  in  Homer ;  their  government  and  many  of  their 
habits,  that  of  polygamy  especially,  still  savored  strongly  of  patri- 
archal times,  and  were  preserved  long  after  they  came  to  be  con- 
sidered pure  Greeks,  and  were  indeed  the  only  independent 
sovereigns  left  in  Hellas. 

Hitherto  they  and  their  neighbors  had  meddled  httle  with  the 
affairs  of  southern  or  republican  Greece ;  by  whom,  indeed,  they 
were  so  nearly  ignored,  that,  until  the  latter  years  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  war,  we  scarcely  find  them  mentioned  in  the  page  of 
history.  • 

The  time  had  now  arrived,  and  the  man,  when  and  by  whom 
they  were  to  be  brought  into  notice,  and,  in  an  incredibly  short 
space  of  time — with  little  warfare,  little  bloodshedding,  and  one 
great  battle  only — to  be  placed  at  the  helm  of  affairs  in  Greece  ; 
110  part  of  which  should  ever  be  again,  save  nominally,  indepen- 
dent. Of  a  truth,  he  was  a  very  great  man,  this  semi-barbarous 
I^hilip,  son  of  Amyntas  ;  a  greater  man  by  far,  in  my  estimation, 
than  his  more  famous  son  Alexander,  and  worthy  of  a  place  in 
this  work,  except  that,  hke  several  others  similarly  omitted,  I 
regard  him  rather  as  a  statesman  than  a  general ;  and  in  that 
light  shall  pi'obably  treat  of  him  hereafter.  He  was  a  very  great 
man,  I  say,  and,  with  some  vicious  habits,  which  point  particu- 
larly to  the  barbarian,  and  which  Alexander  shared  with  hin],  I 
allude  chiefly  to  habitual  excess  in  wine  and  fierce  orgies  of 
drunkenness — never  a  Greek,  or  indeed  a  southern,  vice — he  pos- 
sessed many  great  qualities,  fjir  less  apparent  in  the  more  showy 
but  less  solid  character  of  his  son  ;  such  as  natural  love  of  justice, 
constitutional  dislike  to  bloodshedding,  and  willingness  to  hear 
even  unpalatable  truths,  which,  when  added  to  his  extraordinary 
political    sagacity    and    gi-eat    military    shrewdness,    eminently 


HIS    YOUTH.  26  r 

adapted  him  for  tlie  part  he  was  destined  to  play,  as  the  consoU- 
dator  of  an  empire,  and  the  pacificator  of  all  Greece. 

In  the  first  year  of  the  one  hundred  and  fourth  Olympiad, 
B.  C.  360,  he  ascended  the  throne  of  Makedon  ;  and,  in  four 
years  afterward,  there  was  born  to  him  at  the  city  of  Pella  in 
Thessaly — already  femous  as  the  birth-place  of  Achilles — of 
Olympias,  his  first  wife,  and  daughter  of  Neoptolemos  king  of 
Epiros,  Alexander,  thereafter  called  the  Great. 

Of  his  youth  and  childhood  I  shall  say  nothing,  as  my  portion 
of  him  is  his  military  conduct  and  career ;  and  as  I  never  have 
believed  that  prodigious  children  necessarily  make  great  men,  or 
that  great  men  were  of  necessity  once  prodigious  children  ;  but 
for  those  who  adhere  to  such  time-honored  rubbish  with  the 
reverence  ever  attributed  to  nursery  tales,  I  w^ll  indicate  his  life 
by  good  gossipping  old  Plutarch,  who  will  sup  them  to  satiety 
on  anecdotes  of  his  precocious  gi'owth  and  premature  devel- 
opment. 

All  that  it  imports  us  to  know,  is,  that  he  gi*ew  up  much  as 
any  absolute  young  prince,  under  the  care  of  an  arrogant,  mas- 
culine, imperious  mother,  and  the  tuition  of  an  obsequious,  adu- 
lating pedagogue,  indulged  in  every  whim,  and  taught  all  things 
save  obedience,  either  to  God  or  man,  would  naturally  gi-ow  up ; 
imperious,  arrogant,  self-willed,  capricious,  vain;  impotent  to 
restrain  his  passions,  yet  full  of  a  fickle  nobleness  and  fantastic 
generosity.  Brave  and  high-spirited,  he  was  by  nature,  even  to 
excess  ;  good-natured  and  merciful,  when  not  crossed — for  then 
he  was  a  madman — and  always  liable  to  ingenuous  and  noble 
impulses,  which  never,  unfortunately  for  his  friends  and  himself, 
hardened  into  permanent  impressions. 

All  that  was  good  in  him  came  of  God's  giving ;  all  that  was 
bad,  of  man's  teaching.  For  it  is  probable  that  he  never  was 
instructed  to  question  one  impulse,  to  curb  one  emotion,  to  refrain 
from  one  action ;  and  I  seriouslv  c"  lubt  whether,  from  the  fii-st 


268  ALEXANDER    THE    GREAT. 

day  of  his  public  career  to  the  last  of  his  life,  he  ever  controlled 
one  passion,  resisted  one  temptation,  considered  the  consequences 
of  one  action,  or  withheld  his  hand  from  the  doing  of  one  deed, 
once  meditated,  how  bitterly  soever  he  afterward  might  rue  the 
doing  of  it. 

When  he  was  eighteen  years  of  age,  he  first  appears  on  the 
stage  of  public  life  at  the  battle  of  Chaironeia — three  years  older 
than  Edward  the  Black  Prince,  w^hen  he  won  his  spurs  at  Cressy ; 
three  younger  than  Wilham  Pitt,  when  he  accepted  the  reins  of 
government  as  prime  minister  of  England.  Nothing  as  yet, 
one  may  say,  wonderful  or  premature ;  but  not  say  so  long ; 
for  thenceforth  he  blazed  out  into  a  sudden  and  splendid 
manhood. 

Previously  to  this  celebrated  action,  by  a  rare  union  of  diplo- 
matic sagacity  and  craft,  with  civil  audacity  and  military  skill, 
Philip  had  made  himself  master  of  Epiros,  Thessaly,  and  all 
Thrake  up  to  the  Hellespont,  as  a  tributary  province  ;  by  min- 
gling himself  adroitly  with  the  sacred  war,  he  had  annexed  Pho- 
kis  to  his  government,  and  had  procured  himself  to  be  nominated 
general-in-chief  of  the  Greeks,  in  the  war  undertaken  to  avenge 
the  spohation  of  Delphoi.  This  conflict  having  terminated  in  a 
general  Hellenic  peace,  Philip  suddenly  broke  it  by  declaring 
war  on  the  Athenians,  with  scarce  a  pretext  beyond  the  mani- 
fest cravings  of  his  ambition  for  universal  Greek  dominion,  which 
Athens  had  constantly  and  consistently  resisted.  Athens  called 
upon  Thebes  for  aid ;  and,  once  more  for  the  last  time,  the  tw^o 
ancient  enemies  stood  in  the  field,  not  now  front  to  front,  but 
shoulder  to  shoulder ;  contending  not  now  for  powder  or  pride  of 
dominion,  but  for  their  common  liberty  and  independence  stood 
as  alUes  on  the  field  of  Chaironeia.  But  Iphikrates  was  no 
more,  nor  Chabrias,  nor  Timotheos ;  and  only  Chares  the  Athe- 
nian*  was  alive,  superior  in  no  respect  of  strategetic  energy  or 
*Diod.Sic.XVI.,  85. 


CHAIRONEIA.  269 

counsel,  to  any  of  the  private  soldiers  he  commanded ;  atid  he 
led  them — to  slaughter. 

Of  Epaminondas,  the  great  name  alone  survived  ;  the  tactics, 
by  which  he  had  so  often  conquered,  had  fallen  into  disuse,  or, 
worse  yet !  had  been  adopted  by  the  enemy ;  the  veterans,  whom 
he  had  taught  to  regard  battle  and  victory  as  the  same,  slept  with 
him  the  last  cold  sleep  of  oblivion.  Of  Pelopidas  remained  the 
memory — remained  the  Sacred  Band,  which  he  had  instituted, 
and  which  alone  did  its  duty  on  the  day  of  "that  dishonest 
victory." 

In  everything  Philip  was  the  superior,  in  strategy,  in  numbers, 
in  the  quality  of  his  troops,  and  in  the  confidence,  which,  most  of 
all  things,  tends  to  victory.  In  the  action  which  ensued,  he  gave 
the  command  of  one  wing  of  his  army  to  Alexander,  whom  he 
fortified  with  his  best  and  oldest  generals  ;  and  it  is  said  that  the 
crisis  of  the  battle  was  his  charge  upon  the  sacred  band  of  the 
Thebans,  every  one  of  whom  lay  dead  where  he  fell,  with  his 
wounds  all  in  front,  worthy  to  the  last  of  the  name  they  had 
won  under  abler  leaders  ;  and  in  the  days  of  Plutarch* — about 
66  A.D.,  or  three  hundred  yeare  later — the  oak-tree  was  shown 
on  the  banks  of  the  Kephisos,  beneath  which  his  tent  was  pitched 
and  hard  by  it,  the  2^ol2/andrion,  or  general  tomb  of  the  Make- 
donians,  who  fell  in  the  engagement. 

The  details  of  this  battle  are  nowhere  very  clearly  stated,  and 
even  Plutarch  gives  the  facts  in  relation  to  his  hero  as  a  rumoi 
only ;  but  the  results  prove  how  decisive  was  the  victory,  and 
that  Alexander  did  here  achieve  high  distinction,  may  be  received 
as  a  historic  truth. 

In  the  following  year  all  Greece  having  sunk  into  apathy  and 

\irtually  submitted  itself  to  his  authority  after  the  battle,  Philip 

met  the  assembled  delegates  of  all  the  Hellenic  states  at  the 

isthmus,  where  he  easily  prevailed  on  them  to  declare  war  on  Pei-s.a 

*  Plut.  Vit.  ix. 


270  ALEXANDER   THE    GREAT. 

under  the  old  pretext  of  revenging  the  desecration  of  the  temples 
of  Greece  by  the  elder  Darios,  and  was  forthwith  elected  the 
autocratic  general  of  the  forces,  in  behalf  of  all  Hellas.  After 
this  he  set  on  foot  great  preparations  for  the  invasion  of  Pei*sia ; 
appointed  to  every  state  the  contingent  which  it  should  send ; 
and  returned  to  his  own  court  to  complete  his  armament. 

There,  suiTounded  by  the  din  of  martial  preparation,  and  by 
grand  pomps,  processions,  and  games,  in  honor  of  the  Gods  who 
had  given  him  what,  though  really  indefinite  and  susceptible  of 
two  meanings,  he  chose  to  accept  as  a*  favorable  response  from 
Delphoi,  having  already  sent  forward  his  lieutenants,  Attains  and 
Parmenion,  with  part  of  his  forces,  to  liberate  the  Ionian  cities 
of  Asia  Minor,  he  was  murdered  by  one  Pausanias,  as  he 
went  into  the  theatre  ;  as  some  believed  at  the  instigation  of  his 
repudiated  wife,  Olympias ;  and  not,  it  is  also  hinted,  without 
the  connivance  of  Alexander. 

It  is  pleasant,  however,  to  be  able  at  once  to  acquit  the  young 
man,  and  probably  his  mother  also,  of  all  participation  in  an  act, 
so  atrocious,  which  may  be  attributed,  on  the  concurrence  of  all 
trustworthy  authorities,  to  private  and  personal  motives  on  the 
part  of  the  murderer,  who  was  slain  on  the  spot  by  some  of  the 
king's  body-guard. 

It  was  toward  the  latter  end,  therefore,  of  the  first  year  of  the 
hundred  and  first  Olympiad,  B.  C,  336,  that  Alexander  as 
cended  the  throne  of  his  father ;  but  his  accession  was  surround 
ed  wth  troubles  and  difficulties,  and  his  throne  was  shared  by  a 
hateful  participant — Attalos,  the  brother  of  Kloiopatra,  the  young 
wife  of  Philip,  in  behalf  of  whom  he  had  repudiated  Oljnupias, 
and  who,  either  a  few  days  before,  or  a  few  days  after,  the  king's 
death — for  authorities  differ  on  the  point — had  borne  him  a  son  ; 
so  that,  his  own  mother  being  repudiated,  it  was  not  unlikely  that 
his  succession  would  be  disputed. 

*  Diod.  Sic.  XVI.  91. 


STATE  OF  GREECE.  27 1 

Attalos,  moreover,  was  in  command  of  the  veteran  army  sent 
into  Ionia  by  the  late  king ;  and  it  soon  became  certain  that  he 
had  shaken  the  allegiance  of  the  troops,  and  was  treating  with  the 
Athenians  for  the  restoration  of  Greek  independence — probably 
with  a  view  only  to  his  own  interest  and  ambition.  In  other 
parts  of  Greece,  a  spirit  of  revolt  was  clearly  manifest,  the  states 
believing  themselves  able  to  vindicate  their  liberty  against  a  mere 
youth,  new  in  office,  and  unskilled  in  judgment,  and  the  arts  of 
government. 

The  youth  speedily  undeceived  them.  In  the  second  year  both 
of  that  Olympiad  and  of  his  own  reign,  having  taken  vengeance 
of  his  father's  murderers,  he  sent  one  Hekataios,  his  own  con- 
fidential friend,  with  a  few  trusty  soldiers  to  Asia,  with  orders 
either  to  bring  Attalos,  without  delay,  ahve  to  Makedonia,  or  to 
take  him  off  privately — the  latter  of  which  designs  was  speedily 
performed — and  the  army  brought  back  to  loyalty. 

That  was  a  bloody  and  a  bad  commencement  of  a  reign.  The 
act  was  a  murder,  and  the  manner  of  it  scarce  less  excep- 
tionable than  the  act.  Yet  it  must  be  observed,  in  justice  to 
Alexander,  that  in  semi-barbarous  royal  famihes  hke  his,  tainted 
with  all  the  corruptions  of  polygamous  unions,  and  haremlike 
concubinage,  and  the  co-ordinate  curse  of  spurious  relationships 
and  kindred  animosities,  fraud  and  e^en  murder  apf)ear  almost 
of  necessity  to  prevail ;  and  that  not  to  kill  is  in  most  cases  to 
be  killed  by  the  heir  apparent  to  the  throne.  More,  therefore,  of 
this  his  first  crime  may  be  ascribed  to  the  morals,  the  mannei"s,  the 
necessities  indeed,  of  his  tribe,  country,  and  station,  than  to  any  de- 
fect in  his  own  temper  or  character.  And  it  is  very  probable,  that 
neither  by  himself  nor  by  any  one  of  his  confederates  was  this 
deed  ever  regarded  as  a  crime,  but  as  an  act  of  self-defence,  and  a 
legitimate  assertion  of  just  authority.  And  thus  it  is,  to  maintain 
true  historic  justice,  that  the  characters  of  men  must  be  meted, 
weighed,  and  judged  of,  by  the  measures,  with  the  balance,  ac- 


2*72  ALEXANDER    THE    GREAT. 

cording  to  the  lights,  which  they  had  and  used,  not  with  others 
that  they  knew  not  of.  Thus,  therefore,  T,  in  this  case,  would 
judge  Alexander — almost  innocent. 

In  the  meantime  the  Athenians  had  heard  of  Philip's  death 
with  joy,  and  invited  by  their  great  orator  and  patriot  Demos- 
thenes, were  ready  to  deny  that  they  had  ever  yielded  the 
supremacy  of  Greece  to  Makedon  ;  the  Aitolians  passed  a  decree 
to  recall  the  exiles  of  Philip  from  Akarnania ;  the  Ambrakiots 
had  cast  out  the  Makedonian  garrison ;  the  Thebans  had  A'oted 
to  expel  Philip's  guards  from  the  Kadmeia  ;  the  Arkadians  had 
never  submitted  to  Philip,  nor  now  submitted  to  his  son ;  and  of 
the  other  Peloponnesians,  the  Ai'gives,  the  Eleans,  and  the  Lake- 
daimonians  were  all  bent  on  the  recovery  of  their  independence, 
now  that  fortune  appeared  to  favor  an  effort. 

Then,  at  once,  Alexander  showed  both  of  what  race  he  came, 
and  of  what  stuff  he  was  made ;  for,  without  giving  the  revolu- 
tionists time  to  mature  their  plans,  he  speedily  effected  a  recon- 
ciliation with  the  Thessalians  and  Ambrakiots  ;  and  then,  march- 
ing down  with  his  Makedonian  troops  in  full  array  of  battle,  en- 
tered the  pass  of  Thermopylai,  and  persuaded  the  Amphictyonik 
council,  there  in  session,  to  confer  on  him  the  leading  of  the 
Greeks  by  a  unanimous  vote.  Thence  he  entered  Boiotia,  and 
encamping* close  to  the  Kadmeia,  held  the  city  of  Thebes  in 
immediate  terror  of  an  assault,  until  the  Athenians,  perceiving 
that  their  opinion  of  this  young  man  was  entirely  contradicted 
by  the  decision,  energy,  and  rapid  enterprise,  which  they  now 
perceived  to  be  his  characteristics,  repented  of  their  inconsiderate 
haste,  and  atoned  for  it  by  decreeing  him  General-in-Chief,  and 
empowering  him  to  make  war  on  the  Persians  until  they  should 
have  made  atonement  to  Greece,  for  all  the  wrong  they  had  done 
her.  Content  with  this,  he  led  back  his  power  into  Makedonia, 
and  striking  without  notice  or  delay  at  the  Thrakian  malcontents, 
he  reduced  with    unheard    of  celerity  the    revolted    tribes   of 


ATTACKS    THEBES.  273 

Paionians,  Illyrians,  and  other  barbarians  conterminous  with 
them,  to  obedience  ;  and,  this  scarcely  accomplished,  hearing 
that  the  Thebans  were  again  mutinous  and  in  arms,  he  bestirred 
himself  vnth  such  rapidity  that  he  actually  sat  down  before  the 
city,  while  the  inhabitants  were  beleaguering  the  Makedonian 
garrison  in  the  citadel,  or  Kadmeia,  and  before  they  were  aware 
that  he  had  a  force  on  foot  within  the  defiles  of  Thermopylai. 
Some  of  those  who  had  instigated  the  revolt  insisted  for  a  while 
that  the  Makedonian  army  had  come  with  Antipater,  insisting 
that  Alexander  was  dead  ;  or,  that,  if  any  Alexander  were  pre- 
sent, it  was  the  son  of  Aeropos,  and  not  the  king  of  Makedon. 

On  the  day  following  his  sudden  appearance  on  the  heights 
above  Onchestos,  near  the  Copaic  lake,  he  descended  to  the 
sacred  territory  of  lolaos,  where  he  again  encamped,  willing  to 
give  time  to  the  Thebans  to  repent  of  their  misdeeds ;  but  so 
httle  desirous  were  they  of  conciliating,  or  even  accepting  his 
clemency,  that  they  salhed  with  their  light  troops  and  cavalry, 
and  advancing  to  his  outposts,  skirmished  w^th  them  sharply 
and  killed  several  of  the  Makedonians,  until  Alexander  detached 
some  targeteers  and  archery,  who  easily  drove  them  back  to  their 
gates.  Still,  however,  he  would  not  attack  them  hastily,  for  he 
preferred  conciUating  to  destroying  them;  and  proceeded  lei- 
surely to  encamp,  a  third  time,  close  before  the  gates  leading  by 
Eleutherai  to  Athens,  in  order  to  be  at  hand  to  reinforce  the 
garrison  of  the  Kadmeia,  which  was  blockaded  by  the  Thebans 
with  double  lines  of  circum  and  contra  vallation.  But,  in  spite 
of  the  advice  of  their  wisest  and  best  citizens,  the  refugees  and 
others,  who  believed  that  no  mercy  was  to  be  had  at  the  hands 
of  Alexander,  induced  the  Thebans  to  march  out  and  offer  bat- 
tle. .  And  even  then  Alexander  would  not  attack  the  city  ;  but, 
according  to  Ptolemy*  the  son  of  Lagos,  Perdikkas,  who  com- 

*  Arrian.  Anab.  I.  viii.     Quoted  by  Arrian,  I-  viii- 


274  ALEXANDER   THE    GREAT. 

manded  the  advanced  guard  of  the  army,  not  far  from  the  pah- 
sades  around  the  Kadmeia,  assaulted  and  tore  them  up  without 
awaiting  oi-deis,  and  fell  upon  the  blockading  force  of  the  The- 
bans  ;  being  at  once  suppoi'tod  by  Amyntas,  the  son  of  Andro- 
menes,  who  was  associated  with  him  in  the  command  of  the  out- 
posts. Seeing  this,  Alexander  led  out  his  army  to  prevent  their 
being  cut  off,  and  ordered  the  archery  and  Agrianians  to  charge 
and  force  their  way  into  the  pahsades ;  but  held  the  phalanx  of 
hi/paspistai,  who  T^'ere  afterward  called  argyraspides  or  silver 
shields,  and  the  foot  life-guards,  in  hand  ^vithout  the  works. 
Perdikkas,  in  endeavoring  to  force  the  second  palisade,  fell  des- 
perately wounded,  and  was  carried  to  the  rear;  but  his  men 
together  with  the  archers  forced  the  Thebans  into  a  hollow  way 
leading  to  the  Hei-akleion,  and  drove  them  up  it,  in  confusion,  to 
the  temple ;  there,  however,  they  rallied,  and  facing  round  with 
a  great  shout,  broke  the  Makedonians  in  turn,  killing  Eury- 
botas,  the  captain  of  the  Kretan  archers,  and  about  seventy  of 
his  men,  and  drove  them  back  upon  the  lifeguards  and  the  royal 
hypaspistai.  In  following  up  their  advantage,  however,  they 
pursued  too  far,  and  disordered  their  own  ranks,  when  Alexander 
seizing  the  occasion,  charged  with  his  phalanx,  bore  the  enemy 
bodily  back  into  the  gates,  which  they  had  not  time  to  close, 
and  entering  pell-mell  with  the  fugitives,  made  himself  master 
of  the  Kadmeia  at  a  blow.  The  rest  of  the  army  perceiving 
that  the  ramparts  were  scantily  defended,  owing  to  the  descent 
of  their  forces  into  the  plain,  scaled  them  at  all  points,  and 
>ushed  in  from  all  quartei-s  toward  the  market-place ;  while  the 
garrison  of  the  Kadmeia  breaking  out  at  the  same  mom  ent  by 
an  unguarded  postern,  after  a  short  resistance  at  the  Arapheion, 
completed  the  confusion  of  the  enemy  and  the  capture  of  the 
city.  The  Theban  cavalry  made  their  escape  into  the  plain  how 
best  thoy  might,  and  such  of  the  infantry  as  could  follow  their 
example  did  so ;  but  on  all  the  rest,  without  regai-d  to  age,  sex, 


DESTRUCTION  OF    THEBES.  275 

or  condition,  resistance  or  submission,  execution  was  done  merci- 
lessly ;  not  so  much  by  the  Makedonian  soldiery  of  Alexander,  as 
by  the  Phokians,  Plataians,  and  the  other  Boiotians,  who  had  the 
fury  of  civil  hatred  and  private  vengeance  to  excite  them.  All  per- 
ished by  the  sword's  edge,  whom  on  that  day  they  encountered. 

The  terror  and  consternation  spread  abroad  with  the  tidings 
of  that  terrible  disaster  and  retribution,  exceeds  all  description. 
Never  before,  within  the  memory  of  man,  within  the  range  of 
recorded  history,  had  such  a  catastrophe,  such  an  overwhelm- 
ing destruction,  befallen  any  Hellenic  city.  For  the  calamities 
of  the  Athenians  at  Syracuse  and  at  Aigospotamos  had  befallen 
their  armies  only,  but  had  left  them  a  "people,  a  city,  and  a 
state.  The  crushing  defeats  of  the  Lakedaimonians  at  Leuktra 
and  Mantineia  had  deprived  them  of  no  foot  of  soil,  nor  robbed 
them  of  one  political  right ;  and,  if  the  destruction  of  Plataia  had 
been  total  during  the  Peloponnesian  war,  the  smallness  of  the 
city  and  the  scant  numbers  of  the  sufferers  detracted  from  the 
magnitude  of  the  occurrence  and  the  horror  it  excited. 

But  here  was  a  city,  second  to  none  in  all  Hellas,  but  rather 
the  mistress  and  most  powerful  of  them  all — which  alone,  but  the 
other  day,  as  it  were,  had  braved  the  united  war  of  Attika  and 
the  Peloponnese ;  which,  alone,  had  carried  fire  and  sword  to  the 
banks  of  Eurotas  and  the  inviolate  gates  of  Sparta — on  which 
destruction  had  descended  like  a  thunderbolt,  almost  or  ere  the 
offence  was  committed,  which  had  been  expiated  by  so  terrible  a 
vengeance. 

At  dawn  of  day  Thebes  was  a  fair  city,  with  green  groves  and 
verdant  gardens,  and  fair  sloping  meadows,  the  greenest  and  the 
grassiest  of  all  Greece,  watered  by  sacred  rivers,  pure  and  peren- 
nial, Dirke,  and  Knopos,  and  Ismenos,  crowned  with  cloud- 
capped  towel's  and  solemn  temples,  filled  with  glad  homes  and 
happy  hearths.  At  dawn  of  day  she  was  a  powerful  and  inde- 
pendent state ;    she  had  a  numerous  and  gallant  array,  that 


276  ALEXANDER    THE    GREAT. 

deemed  itself  invincible  ;  she  had  a  large  and  prosperous  popula- 
tion, linked  together  by  all  fond  ties  of  kindred,  love,  and  coun- 
tiy  ;  and  when  the  sun  set  she  was — nothing. 

The  green  fields  scathed  by  the  torch,  the  green  groves  felled 
by  the  axe,  of  the  pitiless  avenger ;  the  pure  waters  of  the  sacred 
rivers  crimsoned  with  the  gore,  and  choked  with  the  corpses,  of 
a  nation.  Her  state  pohtical  dissolved  for  ever,  her  army  slaugh- 
tered or  dispersed  never  to  be  present  under  arms  again  as  The- 
bans;  her  population  butchered  in  their  streets,  about  their 
hearths,  in  the  secresy  of  their  chambers,  before  the  sanctity  of 
their  altars.  Nothing  had  availed  them,  why  they  should  not 
perish.  And  the  dread  decree  of  the  auxiharies  had  gone  forth — 
for  to  them  had  the  king  committed  the  fate  of  Thebes — that  the 
city  should  be  razed  to  the  very  earth,  and  the  territories  di\'ided 
among  the  confederates ;  that  all  the  survivoi-s  of  the  inhabit- 
ants— men,  women  and  children — all,  should  be  sold  as  slaves, 
save  the  pi-iests  and  priestesses  of  the  Gods ;  and  that,  from  the 
spoils  of  Thebes,  Plataia  and  Orchomenos  should  be  restored 
and  fortified.  The  men  of  Plataia  had  not  forgotten  their  ow^n 
fate  fifty  years  before  ;  nor  those  of  Orchomenos  their  own  more 
recent,  if  less  barbarous  overthrow. 

Terrible  was  the  decree,  but  more  terrible  the  execution,  for  it 
was  carried  out  to  the  utmost  letter ;  except  only  that 

"  The  Great  ^mathian  conqueror  bade  spare 
The  house  of  Pindarus,  when  town  and  tower 
Went  to  the  ground" — 

and  that  the  relatives  of  the  poet  were  exempted  from  the  sen- 
tence which  delivered  over  all  their  countrymen  to  hopeless 
servitude.* 

The  shifting  of  this  deed  of  cold  political  vengeance — for  it 

♦  Arrian  I.,  ix. 


FATE    OF    THEBES.  277 

was  in  fact  nothing  more ;  performed  merely  to  intimidate 
Athens  and  the  Peloponnesian  cities — from  his  own  hands  to 
that  of  the 'Confederated  Boiotians,  who,  he  was  well  assured, 
would  be  ruthless,  as  the  once  persecuted  enemies  of  the  fallen 
city,  was  but  an  empty  and  unsuccessful  attempt  to  shift  the 
responsibility  from  his  own  head  also.  But  the  awful  eyes  even 
of  human  justice  will  not  be  cheated ;  and  the  reproach,  as  the 
guilt,  of  this  wholesale  massacre  and  ruin,  has  clung  ever,  hke  a 
blight,  to  the  renown  of  the  great  conqueror,  not  to  be  redeemed 
by  fifty  such  capricious  and  pei-sonal  shows  of  sympathy  and 
tenderness,  as  the  honors  he  paid  to  the  captive  ladies  of  Darios' 
house, *or  the  tears  he  shed,  too  late,  over  the  bleeding  corpse  of 
his  royal  victim. 

To  my  mind,  this  extermination  of  the  Thebans,  and  annihi- 
lation of  their  city,  is  the  worst,  and  least  to  be  palliated  of  all 
his  evil  actions — it  was  not  a  violent  act  of  overboiling  passion ; 
it  was  not  even  an  outrage  suggested  by  fierce  fanaticism,  a  cru- 
elty prompted  by  the  stinging  sense  of  pei-sonal  injury  or  the 
thirst  of  vengeance.  The  crime  of  the  unhappy  Thebans  was  a 
slight,  was  a  most  natural  one,  if  indeed — which  Americans  will 
be  little  apt  to  grant — it  were  one  at  all.  They  had  been 
recently  conquered,  deprived  of  independence,  bitted  with  a 
foreign  garrison  in  their  own  citadel ;  and,  when  the  opportimity 
offered,  they  endeavored  to  liberate  themselves  from  a  yoke 
which  it  does  not  seem  that  they  ever  accepted.  They  were 
alarmed  once  into  the  relinquishment  of  their  project,  though  it 
is  not  recorded  that  any  treaties  were  exchanged  or  promises 
made  for  the  future  ;  occasion  again  offered,  and  again  they 
accepted  the  occasion  ;  yet  even  then  they  had  scarcely  pro- 
ceeded beyond  the  premeditation  and  inception  of  an  enterprise, 
which,  if  successful,  must  have  been  deemed  proud  and  meri- 
torious. 

Time  had  not  rendered  her  dependence  prescriptive,  nor  had 


278  ALEXAN'DER    THE    GREAT. 

she  kissed  the  rod  which  smote  her,  or  once  accepted  her  sub 
jugation  to  the  yoke  of  Makedon.  It  is  not  even  clear  that,  in 
her  attempt  to  vindicate  her  nghts,  she  had  spilled  the  blood  of  a 
aingle  Makedonian. 

No  more  can  be  said  of  it,  than  this,  that  an  independent  city, 
for  asserting  her  own  independence,  Thebes  suffered  at  the  hands 
of  a  fellow  Greek,  what  no  Greek  city  had  ever  before  suffered, 
even  at  the  hands  of  the  Barbarian.  The  deed  has,  to  my 
memory,  but  one  parallel  in  history,  and  that  parallel  is  the 
deepest  blot  upon  the  memory  of  a  very  great,  and  otherwise  not 
cruel  or  unscrupulous  man.  I  mean  the  massacre  which  follow- 
ed the  storming  of  Drogheda  by  Cromwell — hke  this,  an  act  of 
accurst  cold-blooded  policy — not  an  act  of  punishment — not  an 
act  of  vengeance — but  an  act,  deeply  calculated  and  done  of 
malice  aforethought,  of  pure  intimidation. 

Cromwell  massacred  the  population,  and  hung  the  priests  of 
Drogheda,  in  order  to  prevent  the  other  Catholic  cities  of  Ire 
land  from  resisting,  and  costing  him  men,  time,  and  money. 
Alexander  razed  Thebes  to  the  plough-share,  in  order  that 
Athens,  and  Sparta  and  all  the  Peloponnesian  cities  might  fear 
to  raise  the  standard  of  revolt ;  which  had  they  done  in  unison, 
not  all  his  splendid  military  genius,  not  all  the  forces  he  could 
possibly  command,  could  have  compelled  them  to  submission  ; 
but  he  must  have  returned  to  the  semi-barbaric,  semi-patriai-chal 
pomp  of  his  native  kingdom,  and  given  up  for  ever  his  ambitious 
dreams  of  Oriental  conquest. 

In  this  terrible  affair  the  number  of  the  Thebans  slaughtei'ed 
was  not  less  than  six  thousand,  w^hile  those  sold  into  servitude 
exceeded  thirty  thousand  persons  ;  the  plunder  taken  was  im- 
mense, and  more  Makedonians  fell  than  in  any  one  of  his 
great  battles  against  Darios  in  after  days,*  for  he  buried  no 

*  Diod.  Sic.  xvii.  14. 


TO  THE  HELLESPONT.  2*79 

less  than  five  hundi-ed  in  the  poli/andrion,  which  was  still  to  be 
seen  in  Pausanias'  time,  before  the  gates  of  the  city  called 
Electrai.     - 

After  this  awful  example,  the  Athenians  tendered  the  most 
abject  submission,  and  by  the  intervention  of  Democles  were  per- 
mitted to  retain  the  Theban  fugitives  whom  they  had  admitted, 
and  whom  the  kins:  had  demanded  of  them  ;  as  well  as  the  ten 
orators  and  statesmen,  including  Demosthenes,  whom  he  had 
required  to  be  delivered  up  as  guilty  of  the  rising  before  Chai- 
roneia,  and  of  the  late  revolt  of  Thebes ;  with  the  exception  of 
Charidemos  on  whose  banishment  he  insisted.  The  other  states 
which  had  risen,  as  the  Arkadians,  Eleans  and  Aitohans,  vied 
with  each  other  in  humihating  themselves  before  him ;  and 
Sparta  alone  standing  sullenly  aloof,  all  Greece  now  joined  in 
the  expedition  against  Persia,  so  that  Alexander  was  at  liberty 
to  return  to  Makedonia,  where  he  made  all  preparations  for  his 
departure. 

In  the  spring  of  the  third  year  of  the  one  hundred  and  eleventh 
Olympiad,  in  the  Archonship  of  Ktesikles  and  the  consulship  of 
Caius  Sulpicius  and  Lucius  Papirius,  B.C.,  334,*  having  left 
Antipater  regent  of  Lakedaimonia,  and  governor  of  Greece  in  his 
absence,  he  set  forth  on  the  great  expedition  which,  from  that 
time  forth,  for  above  eight  centuries,  settled  the  question  of 
Oriental  invasion,  much  more,  subjugation  of  Europe. 

He  marched  by  land  over  Thrake,  crossing  the  Strymon  and 
Pangaion  hill,  to  Abdera  and  Maroneia,  Greek  colonies  on  the 
sea-shore,  the  latter  of  which  still  exists  under  the  name  of 
Marogna  ;f  thence  eastward  across  the  Heros,  now  the  Maritza, 
and  the  Melas,  or  modern  Kavatza,  at  the  head  of  the  deep 
gulf  of  Saros,  into  what  was  then  called  the  Thrakian  Chersonese, 
where  he  took  ship  from  Sestos  to  Abydos,  near  the  entrance 
of  (lie  Propontis,  or  sea  of  Marmora,  and  transported  his  whole 
=*  Diod.  Sic.  xvii.  17-  f  Arrian.  I.  xi. 


280  ALEXANDER   THE    GREAT. 

armament  without  loss  or  opposition  to  Asia  Minor,  although 
the  Persian  Satraps  were  at  that  very  moment  in  command  of  a 
superior  squadron  in  those  waters.  But  the  celerity  of  hia 
motions  had  in  fact  taken  them  by  surprise,  and  they  were  but 
now  awakening,  as  if  from  a  stupid  sleep,  to  the  sense  of  present 
danger.  From  Abydos  he  marched  without  delay  southerly  to 
the  plain  of  Troy,  where  he  performed  funeral  games  in  honor 
of  his  ancestor  Achilles,  and  sacrifices  to  Priam,  which  should 
avert  his  wrath  against  the  descendant  of  his  slayer,  Neoptolemos ; 
as  well  as  to  the  indigenous  Gods  of  the  place,  Athene  of  the 
Ilias,  and  Zeus  Herkeios,  or  the  defender  of  walled  cities.  And 
here  he  made  a  muster  and  enumeration  of  the  forces,  w  ith  which 
he  had  come  to  attack  a  mighty  empire,  and  a  king,  who,  it  was 
well  known,  could  bring  into  the  field  above  a  million  of  men  at 
a  time  Of  Makedonian  infantry,  the  flower  of  his  whole  army, 
these  were  found  to  be  twelve  thousand,  of  allies  seven,  and  of 
Greek  mercenaries  five  thousand ;  with  five  thousand  Odrysian, 
Triballian  and  Illyrian  targeteers  and  skirmishers,  and  one 
thousand  Agrianian  bow^-men ;  of  horse  there  were  fifteen 
hundred  Makedonians,  led  by  Philotas,  son  of  Parmenion,  as 
many  more  Thessalians  under  Kalas  the  son  of  Hanpalos,  six 
hundred  other  Hellenic  cavalry,  under  Erigyios,  and  a  corps  of 
nine  hundred  Thrakian  and  Paionian  guides  commanded  by 
Kassander.  Besides  these  there  were  left  in  Europe  with  Anti- 
pater  twelve  thousand  infantry,  and  eleven  thousand  five  hundred 
horse.*  I  have  chosen  this  enumeration,  as  it  appears  to  be  the 
most  precise  and  elaborate,  though  the  authorities  differ  but 
little ;  Arrian  stating  the  forces  at  not  much  mo  re  than  thirty 
thousand  foot,  and  above  four  thousand  horse  ;t  while  Plutarch 
says  that  the  largest  account^  makes  them  thirty-four  thousand 
foot  and  four  thousand  horse,  the  lowest  thirty  and  five  thousand. 

*  Diod.  Sic- xvii.  17.  f  Arrian,  xi.  xii. 

t  Plut.  Vit.  Alex.  XV. 


THROUGH  ASIA  MINOR.  281 

So  little  discrepancy  is  rarely  found  among  ancient  authors, 
especially  in  regard  of  numbers,  concerning  wliich  they  are  for 
the  most  part  loose  and  incorrect. 

With  this  apparently  trivial  force,  he  marched  at  once 
through  an  enemy's  country,  having  few  or  no  supplies  on  which 
to  depend,  and  of  course  making  war  support  war,  except  in  so 
for  as  he  was  assisted  by  the  Ionian  cities,  which  would  not  seem 
to  have  been  to  any  great  extent,  inasmuch  as  we  do  not  hear 
of  his  being  joined  by  any  auxiliaries  until  after  the  battle  of  the 
Granikos.  Their  allegiance,  however,  appears  to  have  sat  very 
lightly  on  the  provincial  subjects  of  the  Persian  king,  since  we 
never  hear  of  any  resistance  offered  to  any  one  of  the  various 
Greek  invaders  of  the  empire,  unless  by  the  organized  forces  of 
the  different  Satrapies ;  and  if  they  lent  no  aid,  at  least  they 
offered  no  opposition  to  an  advance,  or  obstruction  to  a  retreat. 
From  the  plain  of  Troy  he  now  proceeded  northward  to  Arisba, 
and  thence  to  Percote,  now  Bergaz,  on  the  Dardanelles  ;  at  the 
former  of  which  places,  according  to  Arrian,  his  army  had  been 
encamped  during  his  visit  to  the  Ilias  ;  and  it  certainly  seems  far 
more  probable  that  such  should  be  the  case,  than  that  he  should 
have  marched  thirty-five  thousand  men,  a  distance  of  over 
fifty  miles,  only  to  march  them  back  again.  With  all  the 
splendor  of  genius,  however,  Alexander  possessed  at  least  all  its 
eccentricity  ;  and  it  is  by  no  means  inconsistent  with  the  known 
diaracter,  and  subsequent  pranks  of  the  man,  such  as  his  march 
to  the  Oasis  of  Amnion,  that  he  should  have  resolved  to  make 
hifi  whole  army  participators  in  his  sacrifices  to  the  names  of  the 
ancestor  whom  it  was  his  rage  to  imitate.  No  question,  how- 
ever, is  involved  unless  it  be  whether  the  muster  of  the  men  vfas 
held  at  Arisba,  or  on  the  plain  of  Troy — a  matter  of  no  earthly 
import.  From  Percote  he  proceeded,  still  northward,  to  Lamj> 
sakos,  at  the  issue  of  the  Dardanelles  from  the  sea  of  Marmora ; 
and  thence  easterly  along  the  sea-shore  to  the  town  of  Kolonai, 
13 


282  ALEXANDER    THE    GREAT. 

and  the  river  Hermotas,  near  which  he  had  learned  that  the 
Pei-sians  were  encamped,  and  here  he  sent  out  a  scouting  party, 
consisting  of  the  Apollonian  squadron  of  the  Royal  companions, 
or  hoi*se  life-guard,  whose  captain  was  Sokrates  the  son  of 
Sathon,  and  four  troops  of  the  guides,  the  whole  under  the  com- 
mand of  Amyntas,  the  son  of  Arrhabaios.  From  these  he  soon 
learned  that  the  Persian  generals,  Rheoraithres  and  Petines,  and 
Niphates,  and  with  them  Spithridates  Satrap  of  Lydia  and  Ionia, 
and  Arsites  governor  of  Phrygia  on  the  Hellespont,  lay  encamped 
with  all  the  Persian  cavelry,  and  the  Hellenic  mercenaries,  at 
the  city  of  Zeleia,  of  which  no  traces  have  survived. 

Here,  it  is  said,  when  they  held  council  what  it  was  best  to  do 
— the  arrival  of  Alexander  being  known — Memnon  the  Rhodian 
advised  them  to  incur  no  danger  in  fighting  there  since  the 
enemy  w^ere  vastly  superior  in  infantry,  and  animated  by  the 
presence  of  their  king,  while  Darios  was  absent  from  his  araiy — 
but,  to  devastate  the  country  and  retire,  burning  all  the  cities 
before  the  enemy  ;  or,  as  Diodoros  says — to  take  ship  at  once, 
embark  all  the  troops,  and  transfer  the  war  at  once  into  Makedo- 
nia.  Either  counsel  was  sound  and  soldierly,  but  the  latter — if, 
which  I  confess  I  doubt,  it  was  ever  given — would  stamp  Mem- 
non the  Rhodian  as  one  of  the  first  strategists  of  any  day,  as  it 
would  have  been  a  diversion  of  the  very  highest  order.  Still  I 
do  not  beheve,  according  to  my  estimate  of  Alexander's  charac- 
ter, that  it  would  have  produced  the  desired  efiect ;  since  Anti- 
pater  had  a  great  power  afoot,  and  it  is  certain  that  a  renewal 
of  Pei-sian  invasion  would  have  produced  a  general  Hellenik 
rising  to  the  rescue. 

It  is  almost  to  be  regretted  that  it  was  not  attempted,  for  we 
should  then  have  had  more  certain  proof,  than  we  even  now  pos- 
sess, of  the  real  claims  of  Alexander  to  be  considered,  not  only  a 
great  conqueror,  but  one  of  the  w^orld's  greatest  generals. 

Whatever  his  advice  was,  at  all  events  it  was  not  taken ;  for. 


PREPARES  FOR  ACTION.  283 

deeming  it  unworthy  of  Persians  to  retreat  before  an  enemy,  the 
chiefs  determined  to  risk  a  battle  in  defence  of  the  fords  of  the 
Granikos,  a  mountain  torrent  rising  in  the  chain  of  Ida,  and  run- 
ning across  the  Adrastean  plain  to  the  Propontis,  into  which  it 
falls  northward  of  Ryzikos.  Anthon  decides,  on  the  authority 
of  Chishull's  travels  in  Turkey,  that  the  Granikos  is  the  modern 
Demotiko^  and  not,  as  is  generally  supposed,  the  larger  river 
known  as  the  Ousvola. 

On  hearing  these  tidings,  Alexander  drew  up  his  infantry  in  a 
double  phalanx,  with  his  horse  on  his  flanks  and  his  baggage  in 
the  rear,  detaching  Hegelochos  with  a  reconnoitering  party  in 
the  van  consisting  of  the  horse  called  sarissophoroi,  and  five 
hundred  light  infantry.  The  armature  of  the  sarissophoroi  is 
not  described  anywhere  that  I  can  discover ;  but  the  sarissa  was 
the  famous  pike  of  the  Makedonian  phalanx,  from  eighteen 
to  twenty-four  feet  in  length  ;  a  weapon  which  assuredly  could 
not  be  hurled  as  a  javelin ,  whence  I  conclude,  that  the  cavalry 
armed  with  these  must  have  charged  them  in  rest  like  the  men 
at  arms  of  the  middle  ages,  and  have  so  ridden  bodily  in  upon 
the  enemy.  These  men  soon  gallopped  back,  reporting  that  the 
enemy  were  in  force  on  the  farther  bank  of  the  river,  and  appa- 
rently resolute  to  defend  it ;  when  Parmenion  proposed  to 
encamp  at  once,  without  attempting  to  force  the  passage,  since, 
he  said,  and  probably  with  truth,  a  Persian  army  would  never 
dare  to  pass  the  night  so  near  to  a  Gi-eek  encampment ;  proving, 
by  his  advice,  that  he  was  acquainted  with  the  events  of  Xeno- 
phon's  retreat,  and  had  profited  by  the  knowledge.  But  Alex- 
ander replied,  that  he  had  not  crossed  the  Hellespont  to  be  stop- 
ped by  a  paltry  stream  like  the  Granikos^  and  forthwith  set  his 
troops  in  battle  order.  And  he  did  rightly  in  so  doing ;  for  his 
all  was  set  upon  a  cast,  and  he  well  knew  that  he  must  carry 
every  thing  before  him  at  a  rush,  or  fail  altogether.  The  pres- 
tige of  a  first  victory  was  absolutely  necessary  to  him,  both  for 


284  ALEXANDER    THE    GREAT. 

the  confidence  of  his  own  men  and  the  intimidation  of  the 
enemy.  The  least  hesitancy  on  his  part  would  have  reversed 
the  effect.  There  are  cases  in  which  seeming  rashness  is  the 
surest  prudence,  and  this  was  one  of  them. 

The  leadings  of  the  left  he  gave  to  Parmenion  ;  retaining  the 
right  himself,  in  front*  of  which  he  set  Philotas  the  son  of  Par- 
menion, with  the  royal  companions  of  the  life-guard,  the  archei*s, 
and  the  Agrianian  javelineers  ;  and  to  these  he  attached  Amyn- 
tas  with  the  sarissophoroi,  or  lancers,  and  the  Paionian  guides, 
>vith  Socrates'  squadron  of  the  life-guard — all  these  on  his 
extreme  right,  somewhat  in  advance.  Next  to  these  were 
ordered  the  Hypaspistai  of  the  foot-guard,  led  by  Nikanor  son 
of  Parmenion ;  and  after  these  in  regular  succession,  the  pha- 
lanxes of  Perdikkas  son  of  Orontes,  of  Koinos  son  of  Polemo- 
krates,  of  Krateros  son  of  Alexandros,  of  Amyntas  son  of  Andro- 
menes,  and  of  Philip  son  of  Amyntas.  The  first  of  the  left 
wing,  to  the  leftward,  were  the  Thessalian  horse,  led  by  Kalas 
son  of  Harpalos  ;  then  the  allied  cavalry,  under  Philip  son  of 
Menelaos  ;  and  the  Thrakians,  whose  leader  was  Agathon  ;  and 
after  these  the  infantry  of  Krateros,  ISIeleager,  and  Philip,  in 
phalanx,  extending  to  the  centre  of  the  whole  array. 

The  cavalry  of  the  Persians  were  twenty  thousand  strong,  and 
the  Greek  mercenaries  httle  short  of  the  same  number;  the 
former  drawn  up  in  front  in  a  long  phalanx  upon  the  river  banks, 
with  the  others  in  the  rear ;  for  the  ground  rose  steep  and  com- 
manding from  the  bank.  But  when  they  perceived  Alexander — 
whom  they  easily  recognized  by  the  splendor  of  his  arms,  and 
the  attention  of  those  about  him — advancing  against  their  left, 
they  strengthened  that  part  of  their  line  with  many  squadrons 
of  horse.  But  when  they  were  face  to  face  on  the  advei-se 
banks,  the  two  armies  stood  still  for  a  little  space,  in  the  awe  and 
apprehension  of  that  which  was  to  follow  ;  and  there  was  solemn 
*  Anthon,  Class.  Die,  Art.  Granicus.     X  Arrian,  I.,  xiv. 


PASSAGE    OF    TIIR    GRAXIKOS.  28o 

silence  on  both  sides.  For  the  Pereians  awaited  the  descent  of 
the  Makedonians  into  the  river,  that  they  might  attack  them  aa 
they  issued  from  it  on  the  further  verge.  Then  Alexander 
leaped  upon  his  horse,  and  calling  to  those  about  his  person  to 
follow,  and  show  themselves  good  men  that  day,  he  desired 
Amyntas  son  of  Arrhabaios  to  lead  into  the  river  with  the 
guides  and  Paionians  and  one  division  of  foot;  and  yet  in 
advance  of  these  Ptolemy  the  son  of  Philip,  with  Sokrates' 
squadron  of  the  royal  companions,  to  whose  fortune  it  fell  to 
lead  all  the  cavalry  on  that  day.  Then  himself,  at  the  head  of 
the  right  wing,  he  plunged  into  the  Stream,  amid  the  blare  of 
trumpets  and  the  shout  alale  for  Enyalios,  obliquing  continually 
down  the  coui-se  of  the  river,  that  is  to  say  toward  the  left ;  for 
marching  from  the  west  eastward,  the  Greek  right  was  toward 
the  mountains,  whence  the  stream  flows  northerly  to  the  sea — 
so  that  the  Persians  should  not  have  it  in  their  power  to  attack 
him  in  flank,  as  he  ascended  on  the  farther  side,  but  that  he 
might  close  as  speedily  as  possible  with  their  phalanx. 

There  is  some  difficulty  in  this  passage,  which  is  rendered 
almost  word  for  word,  with  the  exception  of  the  parenthesis, 
from  the  Greek  of  Arrian ;  since,  presuming  the  coui"se  of  the 
river  to  be  from  south  northwardly,  as  its  general  direction  lies, 
and  that  of  the  Greek  army  from  west  eastwardly,  and  that  the 
two  armies  stood  face  to  face,  as  we  are  expressly  told  they  did, 
to  oblique  from  the  right,  down  stream,  or  to  the  left,  would  be 
to  do  precisely  what  Arrian  states  the  movement  was  intended 
to  avoid.  From  this  dilemma  there  is  no  escape,  unless  we 
understand  the  phrase  "  so  that  the  Persians,"  (tc,  to  have  refer- 
ence to  the  whole  previous  description,  and  not  to  the  last  clause 
relative  to  the  obliquity  of  Alexander's  own  course. 

The  meaning  would  then  be  that  he  caused  Ptolemy,  with 
the  hfe-guard,  and  Amyntas  with  the  guides  and  others,  who 
*  Arrian  I.,  xv. 


286  ALEXANDER    THE    GREAT. 

were  in  the  advance,  to  charge  jDerpendicularly  on  the  Persian 
left,  while  he  in  person  obliqued  from  their  rear  upon  the 
centre,  so  that  the  attack  of  his  van  should  cover  his  own  flank, 
while  crossing  the  torrent.  This  reading  is  also  confirmed  by 
what  follows,  since  it  is  evident  that  Amyntas  and  Sokrates  were 
in  action  long  before  the  rest ;  the  whole  constituting  a  very 
fine  specimen  of  an  attack  by  the  oblique  method  to  the  left ; 
which,  as  I  have  previously  observed,  was  first  invented  by 
Epaminondas,  though  in  both  his  grand  victories  he  operated 
contrariwise,  or  from  the  left  to  the  right. 

As  Amyntas  and  Sokrates  approached  the  bank,  a  great 
shower  of  javehns  fell  among  them  from  the  Persians  above ; 
and  as  they  scaled  it  a  fierce  crush  and  concourse  of  horses  fol- 
lowed, these  forcing  their  way  up,  those  pressing  them  bodily 
backward;  and  still  the  Persian  missiles  pelted  them  with 
arrowy  hail,  while  the  Greeks  fought  with  charged  lances.  At 
first  the  Greeks  suffered  sev^erely,  for  they  were  much  inferior  in 
numbers,  and  were  fighting  from  lower  ground,  and  the  slippery 
river  bed,  and  the  whirling  current ;  and,  moreover,  the  best  of 
the  enemy  were  mustered  there,  Memnon  himself,  with  his  sons 
and  followers.  And  the  first  of  the  Greeks  who  came  hand  to 
hand  with  the  Persians,  were  cut  to  pieces,  fighting  gallantly, 
all  but  a  few  who  fell  back  on  Alexander. 

For  he  was  now  close  at  hand,  with  the  whole  right  wing, 
itxid  he  dashed,  himself  foremost  of  all,  into  the  thick  of  the 
enemy's  horse,  where  all  their  leaders  fought,  and  the  melee 
around  him  raged  fast  and  furious  ;  while  one  by  one  the  other 
divisions  of  the  Makedonians  passed  over  with  no  further  diffi- 
culty. It  was  now  a  cavalry  action  altogether,  and  yet  it  resem- 
bled rather  the  shock  of  infantry.  For  it  was  a  complete  melee, 
horses  and  men  all  closely  wedged  together,  with  room  to  strike 
and  stab,  but  scant  room  to  parry,  the  Greeks  still  bearing  up  to 
win  the  plain,  the  Pei-sians  sti'uggling  hard  to  force  them  down 


PASSAGE  OF  THE   GRANIlvOS.  28Y 

into  the  torrent.  Great  feats  of  arms  were  done  that  day,  and 
the  affair  inore  resembled  a  passage  of  arms  in  the  fourteenth 
century  than  a  Greek  cavahy  affair ;  even  as  Alexander  himself, 
in  many  respects,  partook  more  of  the  character  of  a  Norman 
Paladin  than  of  a  Hellenic  general. 

But  still  the  Greeks  won  their  way  foot  by  foot,  owing  to  their 
greater  personal  strength,  and  to  their  fighting  with  lances  of 
cornel  wood  instead  of  javelins.  Here  it  fell  out  that  Alexan- 
der's spear  was  splintered  to  the  grasp,  and  he  called  on  Aretis, 
the  royal  equerry,  to  give  him  another,  but  his  spear  was 
shivered  also  and  he  was  lighting  brilliantly  with  the  truncheon, 
which  he  held  aloft,  and  bade  the  king  ask  another,  when 
Demarates,  a  Korinthian,  one  of  the  Companions,  lent  him  his 
own.  With  this,  seeing  Mithridates,  Darios'  son-in-law,  fighting 
in  the  front,  he  rode  at  him,  and  striking  him  in  the  face 
unhorsed  him.  At  the  same  instant  Rhoisakes  cut  Alexander 
through  the  crest  of  his  helmet,  shearing  away  one  of  his  long 
Avhite  plumes,  quite  down  to  the  hair  with  his  scymetar,  but 
without  injuring  his  head ;  him  too,  the  king  rode  down,  charg- 
ing him  with  his  lance  through  the  coi'slet  into  the  breastbone ; 
but,  as  he  did  so,  Spithridates  was  behind  him  with  his  scymetar 
uplifted  to  strike  him  through  the  broken  casque,  when  Kleitos, 
the  son  of  Dropidas,  surnamed  the  Black,  anticipated  the  blow, 
smiting  the  Persian  on  the  shoulder  with  such  a  swordsweep, 
that  his  right  arm  fell  to  the  earth,  hewn  asunder,  with  the  hilt 
still  grasped  in  the  quivering  fingers. 

But  other  horsemen  now  came  up  apace,  and  the  strife  was 
equalized ;  and,  as  the  cavahy  was  intermingled  with  hght 
infimtry  which  galled  the  Pereians  very  severely,  finding  them- 
selves unable  to  bear  the  brunt  of  the  western  lances,  they  gave 
way  in  the  centre,  where  Alexander  fought  in  person,  and  fled 
at  speed,  followed  by  both  their  wings.  About  a  thousand  of 
the  horse  fell,  for  Alexander  would  not  pursue  them  far ;  but 


288  ALEXANDER    TUE    GREAT. 

wheeled  upon  the  phalanx  of  the  Greek  mercenaries,  who  had 
not  moved  from  the  place  where  they  stood,  rather  through 
wonder  at  the  fiuy  of  the  onslaught,  than  from  any  resolute 
determination.  x\nd  against  these  he  brought  up  his  own 
phalanx,  and,  at  the  same  time,  charging  them  with  his  cavalry 
c>n  all  points  at  once,  cut  them  in  two,  as  nearly  as  possible,  in 
the  centre,  so  that  not  a  man  of  them  escaped,  unless  it  was  one 
by  chance  who  lay  concealed  among  the  slain ;  and  of  them 
there  were  taken  but  two  thousand.  Of  the  generals  fell  Nip- 
hates  and  Petines,  and  Spithridates,  Satrap  of  Lydia,  and  the 
governor  of  Kappadokia,  Mithrobarzanes,  and  Mithridates, 
Darios'  son-in-law,  and  Arboupales,  son  of  Darios,  son  of  Artox- 
erxes,  and  Pharnakes,  brother  of  Darios'  wife,  and  Omares,  leader 
of  the  mercenaries.  But  Ai-sites  escaped  from  the  melee,  and 
fled  into  Phrygia,  where  he  died  by  his  own  hand,  fancying  him- 
self to  be  the  cause  of  the  overthrow  of  the  Persian  army.  The 
Makedonians  lost  in  all  about  one  hundred  and  twenty  men,  of 
whom  twenty-live  were  royal  companions  slain  in  the  first  onset, 
and  sixty  of  the  others  cavalry,  the  infantry  having  been  but 
j.artially  engaged,  and  that  only  at  the  close  of  the  action. 

In  this  battle  there  are  several  things  worthy  of  note ;  first — that 
it  is  the  earliest  battle  on  record,  which  was  decided  by  cavahy, 
and  more  particularly  by  Greek  cavalry,  which  were  in  general 
nearly  as  inefficient  an  arm  of  service  as  the  Roman  horse ;  and 
secondly — which  is  not  generally  understood  in  considering  Alex- 
ander's victories,  that  beside  the  Persian  cavalry  he  w^as  opposed 
by  a  Greek  force,  unquestionably  Peloponnesians,  for  they 
furnished  nine-tenths  of  the  mercenaries,  nearly  equal  to  the  whole 
of  his  own  infantry  in  number  and  not  much  inferior  in  quality, 
yet  so  ill  were  they  led  that  tlieir  resistance  was  scarce  worthy  of 
notice.  • 

But  the  fact  is  simply  this  that  now,  for  the  first  time,  war 
had  so  far  advanced  as  to  be,  among  the  Greeks  at  least,  a 


CONSTITUTION   OF    ARMIES.  289 

science  ;  among  the  Romans  it  scarcely  became  one  two  centuries 
later.  To  be  the  bravest  of  the  brave  was  no  longer  sufficient, 
nor  to  set  men  face  to  face  in  the  field,  and  see  who  would  bear 
the  brunt  the  longest,  the  general  aspiring  only  to  be  the  hardest 
hitter,  the  height  of  strategy.  Among  the  Greeks,  as  is  the  case 
in  all  free  nations,  every  man  was  brave,  and  when  the  tug  of 
war  came  between  them,  leading  was  everything. 

In  consequence  of  this,  armies  were  properly  constituted,  and 
with  a  due  proportion  of  cavalry  to  infantr}'-,  a  point  which  never 
before  had  been  attended  to  in  Greece,  and  never  was  in  Rome 
to  the  latest  day  of  her  existence.  The  army  with  which  Alex- 
ander entered  Persia  w\as  in  fact  formed  nearly  on  the  same 
principles  and  in  the  same  proportions  with  Napoleon's  divisions 
or  rather  corps  c?'  armee^  each  of  which,  complete  in  every  arm 
of  the  service,  consisted  as  nearl}^  as  possible  of  twenty  thousand 
foot  to  four  thousand  horse,  being  in  the  rates  of  one  mounted 
trooper  to  every  five  infantry  soldiers,  while  in  the  legions  even 
of  the  best  period  of  Rome  under  Marius,  Sylla,  and  Caesar,  there 
were  but  three  hundred  horse  to  six  thousand  foot,  or  in  the 
ratio  of  one  to  twenty. 

Under  Alexander,  also,  artillery  first  came  into  general  use, 
borrowed  as  it  would  seem  from  the  Sicilian  Greeks,  who  in  that 
arm  were  never  surpassed  or  even  equalled.  Sieges  were  no 
longer  carried  on  by  the  slow  and  hngering  operations  of  block- 
ade, with  walls  of  countervallation  and  circumvallation,  but  the 
ramparts  were  shaken  by  the  ram,  Avhich  operating  on  the 
principle,  not  of  direct  force,  but  of  continuous  vibration,  produced 
effects  almost  equal  to  that  of  cannon  shot ;  the  parapets  were 
demolished  by  stones  of  several  tons  weight,  hurled  from  the 
potent  machines,  and  the  defenders  swept  from  the  battle- 
ments, by  greater  javelins  than  could  be  sent  from  any  human 
arm,  slung  from  the  mighty  catapults.  A  few  years  later  than 
this  field  artillery  was  first  employed  by  Machanidas,  the  tyrant 
13 


290  ALEXANDER    THE    GREAT. 

of  Sparta,  in  his  battle  against  Philopoimen,  but  it  was  then 
proved  unsuccessful,  and  never  came  into  general  use. 

It  is  worthy  of  remark  here  that  Alexander,  like  Hannibal 
and  Napoleon,  placed  the  greatest  reliance  in  his  horse,  the 
former  leading  his  own  in  person  against  horse  or  foot  indiscrim- 
inately, contrary  to  the  usual  custom  of  his  times,  and  both  the 
latter  almost  invariably  deciding  the  crisis  of  every  action  by  a 
crushing  charge  of  cuirassiers.  The  last  and  greatest  of  the 
three  never  hesitated  to  ex|»r<iss  his  conviction  that  equal 
numbers  of  horse,  equally  well  led,  must  overpower  infantry,  and 
certainly  his  splendid  cavalry  as  led  by  Excelmans,  Milhaud,  and 
first  in  excellence  though  last  in  place,  Murat,  went  far  to  justify 
the  assertion  ;  and  the  battle  of  Fere  Champenoise,  in  which 
twenty  thousand  Russian  horse,  with  horse  artillery,  annihilated 
an  equal  force  of  veteran  French  infjintry  duly  provided  with 
heavy  guns,  seems  to  place  his  opinion  almost  beyond  dispute. 
The  contrary  idea,  which  has  so  generally  prevailed  since  the 
origin  of  fire-arms  and  the  decline  of  chivalry,  seems  to  arise  from 
the  fact  that  the  expense  of  keeping  up  large  cavalry  forces  is  so 
enormous  that  none  but  Nomadic  tribes,  the  whole  population 
of  which  are  cavaliers  from  their  cradle,  or  despotic  governments 
can  sustain  it.  The  more  democratic  the  governments,  and  the 
more  impatient  of  taxation,  the  less  powerful  are  they  in  cavalry  ; 
and  to  this  reason  is  it  that  England  and  the  United  States,  the 
people  of  both  which  countries  are  unquestionably  and  immeasur- 
ably superior  as  individual  horsemen,  to  tlie  French,  have  never 
been  famous  for  this  arm  of  service,  and  probably  never  will  be 
so.  During  the  whole  peninsular  war  the  Bi-itish  army  accom- 
pHshed  httle  witli  their  horse,  and  what  they  did  chiefly  by  the 
Hanoverixins  of  the  King  s  German  legion  ;  and  though  at  Water- 
loo the  splendid  exploit  of  Ponsonby's  division  which  destroyed 
a  column  of  five  thousand  foot  and  rendei-ed  eighty  guns  un- 
serviceable for  the  day,  and  the  splendid  final  charge  of  the  heavy 


CAVALRY    SERVICE.  291 

horse  of  the  household  brigade,  are  worthily  distinguished  among 
great  cavalry  affairs,  still  they  are  the  exceptions  to  the  rule 
which  centuries  have  proved  true  from  the  days  of  Ci'essi  and 
roictiei"S  to  those  of  Alliwal  and  Sobraon,  that  it  is  on  the 
infantry  of  England  that  her  militaiy  power  principally  rests. 
To  this  it  is  that  the  true  cause  must  be  attributed  of  the  small 
use  made  by  Lord  Wellington  of  this  arm,  which  lias  led  to  the 
belief  that  he  undervalues  its  utility  and  disHkes  it  in  action — 
that  he  never  possessed  it  in  sufficient  number  to  launch  it 
effectually  against  the  overwhelming  superiority  of  his  enemy  ; 
and  precisely  the  same  is  the  case  with  the  United  States,  the 
dragoons  of  which  alone  of  their  troops,  with  the  single  exception 
of  May's  charge  at  Resaca  de  la  Palma,  achieved  little  distinc- 
tion, simply  because  they  had  no  opportunity  of  doing  so,  in  con- 
sequence of  their  being  so  cruelly  outnumbered  ;  and  even  now, 
when  it  is  obvious  to  t'very  military  eye,  that  one  horse  regiment 
on  the  frontiers  of  Mexico,  and  in  the  newly  conquered  provinces, 
is  equal  for  real  action,  duty  and  utility,  to  three  of  foot,  and  that 
the  equestrian  Indians  can  never  be  put  down  effectually,  without 
mounted  rifles,  and  probably  lancers  also,  so  great  is  the  senseless 
and  absurd  jealousy  of  expense  in  this  vital  matter,  that  instead 
of  augmenting  this  valuable  arm  the  recent  legislatures  have 
diminished  it ;  and  for  a  chmax  of  absurdity  have  dismounted 
the  superb  horse-artillery,  which  was  second  to  that  of  no  other 
country,  and  which  really  won  every  pitched  battle  in  Mexico, 
with  the  exception  perhaps  of  Cherubusco. 

After  burying  his  own  dead,  to  return  to  the  field  of  the 
Granikos,  with  the  most  distinguished  honors,  and  granting  the 
rites  of  sepulture  even  to  the  bodies  of  the  mercenary  Greeks, 
whose  prisoners  were  sent  in  chains,  to  be  kept  at  hard  labor  in 
Makedonia,  as  traitoi-s  to  the  cause  and  name  of  Greeks,  Alex- 
ander showed  equal  prudence  and  sagacity  in  his  conduct  both 
to  the   conquered  country  and  to  th(^  indrpendr'nt  nations  «.if 


292  ALEXANDER    THE    GREAT. 

Greece,  treating  the  former  with  singidar  lenity  and  grace,  and 
paying  the  greatest  attention  to  those  of  the  latter,  whom  he  the 
most  suspected  of  disatiection.  For  he  did  not  attempt  to  alter 
the  forms  of  their  ancient  polity,  or  even  the  time-honored  names 
of  their  governmental  officers,  but  contented  himself  merely  with 
appointing  friends  of  his  own,  in  raany^  instances  native  Asiatics, 
to  the  vacant  Satrapies,  and  causing  the  same  amount  of  tiibute 
formerly  paid  to  Darios  to  be  paid  into  his  ow^n  treasury.  To 
this  it  is  to  be  ascribed  that  in  no  instance  was  he  troubled  with 
anything  hke  guerilla  warfare,  and  that  he  never  to  the  end 
of  his  career  met  any  considerable  inconvenience  or  detriment 
from  the  insubordination  or  rising  of  the  provinces  which  had 
readily  submitted  to  his  arms,  and  w^iich  accustomed  to  be  slaves, 
cared  httle  whether  they  were  called  the  slaves  of  Alexander  or 
of  Darios,  no  personal  penalty  or  suffering  being  attached  to 
either  condition.  In  this  respect  he  showed  himself  much  wiser 
and  more  pohtic  than  his  great  successor,  and  only  equal  in  the 
extent  of  conquest — Napoleon,  concerning  whom  it  has  been 
justly  observed  that,  the  intolerable  insolence  and  overbearing  of 
the  French  prefects  and  officials  w^ho  made  every  individual 
personally  feel  the  degradation  of  his  people,  did  more  to 
alienate  the  minds  of  the  conquered,  especially  of  the  Spaniards 
and  Germans,  than  all  the  real  grievances  he  inflicted  on  their 
countries,  than  all  the  deprivation  of  liberty  and  independence. 
To  the  Athenians  he  sent  three  hundred  Persian  Panophes, 
which  he  directed  to  be  offered  to  Athene  in  the  Akropolis,  with 
the  inscription,  "Alexander  and  the  other  Greeks,  the  Lake- 
daimonians  excepted,  these  from  the  barbarians  who  dwell  in 
Asia." 

These  things  ordered,  he  marched  southerly  to  Sardis,  which 
being  deUvered  to  him  on  conditions,  he  suffered  to  retain  its 
independence,  though  he  garrisoned  its  Acropolis,  which  was  a 
very  strong  place,  and  on  wliieh  he  erected  a  temple  to  Zeus 


SIEGE  OF  HALIKARNASSOS.  293 

OlymjDios,  with  Makedonians,  under  Pausanias,  one  of  the  royal 
companions.  The  people  of  Magnesia  and  Tralles  voluntarily 
surrendered  their  cities,  and  after  sending  out  Parmenion  and 
Antimachos  the  son  of  Agathocles,  to  reduce  the  Aioliun  and 
Ionian  cities,  which  were  still  subject  to  the  Persians,  under 
orders  to  subvert  the  oligarchies  and  establish  democracies,  under 
their  own  laws,  and  with  the  same  tribute  to  himself  which  they 
had  formerly  paid  to  the  Persians,  he  marched  himself,  by  way 
of  Ephesus,  on  the  town  of  Miletos,  now  I^alatska,  which  he 
took  after  a  sharp  resistance,  enlisting  the  Greek  mercenaries  who 
had  defended  it,  in  his  own  army,  and  restoiing  their  liberty  to 
all  the  citizens  who  had  not  fallen  in  the  storming  of  the  city. 
There  he  disbanded  his  naval  forces,  and  destroyed  his  ships, 
finding  them  overmatched  by  the  Persian  fleet,  which  he  now 
resolved  to  put  down  by  occupying  all  their  maritime  cities,  so 
that  they  should  have  no  place  whence  to  draw  theh  supphes  or 
to  procure  sailors  ;  and  with  this  intent  he  marched  through 
Karia  to  Halikarnassos,  now  Boudroun,  on  the  gulf  of  Stanca, 
where  he  had  learned  that  a  large  force  of  Persians  and  merce- 
naries was  collected,  taking  all  the  cities  on  his  route,  and  then 
laid  siege  to  that  important  fortress  and  seaport.  During  the 
siege  he  attempted  the  neighboring  stronghold  of  Myndos  by  a 
forced  night  march  and  sudden  onslaught,  but  was  repulsed ; 
whereupon  he  resolved  to  waste  no  time  on  it,  but  turning  on 
Halikarnassos,  sat  down  in  form  before  it.  The  defence  was  very 
long  and  i-esolute ;  for  the  garrison  made  constant  and  daring  sor- 
ties, in  oi'der  to  destroy  the  works  and  machines  of  the  enemy, 
and  several  times  pai'tially  succeeded ;  and  wherever  the  walls 
and  tow^ers  vy-ere  shaken  by  the  rams,  they  built  up  stone  curtains 
Hvithin,  before  the  outer  defences  fell  or  tlie  breaches  became 
passable.  Once  they  sallied  in  force  at  several  points  at  once, 
and  kindled  such  a  blaze  among  the  machinery  as  compelled 
Alexander  to  charge  in  person,  when  a   terrible  slaughter  fol- 


294  ALEXANDER    THE    GREAT. 

lowed,  and  they  were  at  length  dri »eu  in,  the  drawbridge  break- 
ing down  under  the  weight  of  the  combatants,  and  the  gates 
being  all  but  carried  by  the  Makedonians,  who  would  have 
entered  pell-mell  with  the  fugitives,  had  not  the  portals  been 
closed  prematurely,  to  the  exclusion  of  many  of  the  men,  who 
were  slaughtered  under  the  walls  in  great  numbers.  It  appears 
that  the  city  might  have  been  carried  at  this  time  had  not  Alex- 
ander called  off  his  army,  not  desiring  to  take  it  by  storm,  could 
he  gnin  possession  of  it  on  conditions.  But  Orondobates  and 
Meranon,  the  Persian  leaders,  finding  that  they  could  in  no  sort 
hold  out  much  longer,  fired  the  city  and  fell  back  into  the  cita- 
del, when  the  Makedonians  entered  through  the  breaches  made 
by  the  flames,  cut  the  incendiaries  to  pieces,  and  took  those  to 
quarter  whom  they  found  in  their  own  houses.  Not  choosing 
to  waste  time  in  reducing  the  heights,  Alexander  now  razed  the 
city  to  the  ground,  and  passed  onward,  leaving  Ptolemais,  with 
three  tliousand  foot  and  two  thousand  horse,  all  mercenaries,  to 
keep  Phrygia  in  subjection  ;  and  appointed  Ada,  the  daughter  of 
Hekatomnos  and  the  widow  of  Hydrieus,  who  had  given  up  to 
him  her  town  of  Ahnda,  and  named  her  son  Alexander  after 
him,  to  rule  over  the  whole  satrapy  of  Karia.  From  Halikar- 
nassos  he  sent  home  all  the  newly  married  men  of  the  Make- 
donians, to  winter  with  their  wives  in  their  own  country,  under 
the  command  of  officers  who  were  themselves  in  the  same  condi- 
tion, whom  he  entrusted  with  the  charge  of  bringing  back  the 
men,  and  of  levying  a  fresh  force  both  of  horse  and  foot,  as  large 
as  they  should  find  it  possible,  in  that  region.  Thence  he 
proceeded  in  person  through  Lydia  and  Pamphylia ;  taking  all 
the  seaport  towns,  so  as  to  render  the  navy  of  the  Persians  use- 
less. On  reaching  Phaselis,-  where  he  lay  encamped  for  a  few 
days,  he  discovered  a  conspiracy  against  himself,  at  the  head  of 
which  was  Alexandros  the  commander  of  the  Thes -alian  horse, 
who  was  brother  of  H(M-amen;'S  and  Anhabaios,  who  had  been 


HIS    MAT;  CUES    IX     ASIA    MINOR.  205 

participants  in  thi  murder  of  Philip,  which  was  speedily  sup- 
pressed, when  he  proceeded,  by  way  of  Perge,  a  short  distance 
inland  to  Side,  on  the  coast,  and  thence  up  the  Eurymedon  to 
Aspendos,  a  city  the  ruins  of  which  have  never  been  identified, 
though  the  river  is  well  known  as  the  Kapri  Sou.  From  Aspen- 
dos he  countermarched  inland  through  the  province  of  Pisidia 
and  the  passes  of  Mount  Tauros  to  the  city  of  Kelainai,  on  the 
Marsyas,  a  tributary  of  the  Maiander,  where  stood  of  old  the 
pahce  of  the  younger  Kyros,  encountering  a  stout  resistance  and 
some  sharp  fighting  from  the  barbarian  mountain,  so  far  north 
as  Gordion,  a  town  on  the  river  Sangaris,  now  Sakaria,  flowing 
through  Bithynia  into  the  Black  Sea,  which  stood  probably  not 
very  far  from  the  modern  city  of  Eskiebeclier,  within  sixty  miles 
of  the  northern  coast.  Here  he  solved  the  oracle  by  cutting  the 
famous  Gordian  knot,  and  met  the  men  who  had  been  absent  on 
furlough,  and  who  now  returned,  true  to  their  time,  with  rein- 
forcements of  three  thousand  Makedonian  foot,  and  seven  hun- 
dred and  fifty  horse,  of  Makedon,  Thessaly  and  Elis.  While  at 
this  place  he  also  received  an  Athenian  embassy,  praying  for  the 
liberation  of  the  Athenian  mercenaries  captured  at  the  Granikos  ; 
but  though  he  treated  the  envoys  with  great  courtesy,  he  denied 
their  request,  judging  it  imprudent,  while  the  war  with  Persia 
was  still  at  its  height,  to  pardon  Hellenes  taken  in  arms  against 
Hellas.*  Thus  ended  the  first  year  of  the  war  ;  and  immedi- 
ately on  the  opening  of  spring,  in  the  fourth  year  of  the  hundred 
and  first  Olympiad,  B.C.  333,  he  broke  up  from  Gordion,  and 
proceeded  south-eastward  to  Ankura  in  Galatea,  now  Angara,  a 
large  city  and  pashalick  of  Anatolia,  to  Mazaka  in  Kappadokia, 
now  Kaisariah  in  Karaman,  a  fine  town  on  the  Halys,  now  Kizil 
Irmak  or  red  river,  flowing  northerly  into  the  Black  Sea,  and 
dividing  Anatolia  from  Roum.  From  Mazaka,  learning  that 
Darios  had  now  raised  a  great  army,  and  was  in  full  march  to 
*  Arrian,  I.,  xxx. 


296  ALEXANDER    THE    GREAT. 

meet  him  somewhere  about  the  passes  between  the  Mount 
Amanos,  Almadag  of  the  modern  geographies,  and  the  gulf  of 
Scanderoon  or  Aiasso,  with  a  view  to  dehver  battle  without  the 
confines  of  Upper  Asia,  he  struck  a  direct  southern  course  by 
Tyana,  supposed  to  be  the  modern  Ketch  Ilissar,  at  the  foot  of  the 
central  Tauros  chain ;  and  from  thence,  still  in  the  same  direc- 
tion, to  Tarsos,  famous  in  later  days  as  the  birth-place  of  the 
great  Apostle  Paul,  upon  the  river  Kydnos — then  a  powerful 
stream,  but  now  a  mere  rivulet,  scarcely  navigable  even  by  small 
boats — being  anxious  to  anticipate  the  Greeks,  and  occupy  that 
noble  city-  Here  he  was  detained  several  days  by  a  severe  ill- 
ness contracted  by  bathing  when  over-heated  in  the  ice-cold 
waters  of  that  mountain  torrent,  down  which  three  centuries  later 
Kleiopatra  sailed  in  her  golden  galley  in  such  pompous  state  to 
meet  the  bold  triumvir  Antony.  It  was  during  this  attack  that 
he  displayed  one  of  those  splendid  gleams  of  magnanimous 
generosity  which  are  the  redeeming  features  of  his  variable  and 
inconsistent  character;  for  being  warned  by  Parmenion  that 
Philip  his  Akarnanian  physician  had  been  bribed  to  poison  him, 
he  calmly  quaffed  his  potion  while  the  astonished  leech  was 
reading  the  inculpatory  letter.  An  act  of  generosity  and  confi- 
dence equally  creditable  to  both  parties,  and  justified  by  the 
result. 

Between  the  Mount  Amanos  and  the  sea  are  two  narrow 
defiles,  with  a  plain  between  them,  much  broken  itself  by  ridges 
of  knolls  and  hillocks,  and  intersected  by  torrents  flowing  from 
the  mountains.  Of  these  the  westernmost,  just  without  Tarsos,  is 
known  as  the  Kilikian  gates,  the  easternmost,  near  the  town  of 
Issus,  now  Aiasso,  as  the  Assyrian  gates,  the  word  gates,  pylai^ 
being  constantly  used,  as  in  the  famous  instance  of  Thermopylai, 
to  signify  a  narrow  gorge  or  defile  between  two  mountains, 
or  one  mountain  and  the  sea.  To  the  second  of  these  he 
despatched  Parmenion  to  guard  the  parses,  with  all  the  allied 


MARCH    TO    ISSOS.  29*7 

and  mercenary  foot,  the  Thrakians  of  Sitalkes,  and  tho 
Thessalian  horse,  and  himself,  so  soon  as  he  was  sufficiently 
recovered  from  his  iUness,  he  advanced  fi-om  Tarsos,  which, 
though  now  merely  a  wretched  Turkish  village,  retains  its 
ancient  name,  to  Anchialos,  a  city  which  being  ill  situated  and 
without  a  harbor,  has  entirely  disappeared  from  history.  Ilero 
he  saw  the  monuiueut  of  Sardanapalos,  with  a  statue  of  that 
prince  in  the  act  of  clapping  his  hands,  and  an  epigram  in 
Assyrian  verse,  which  is  thus  admirably  rendered  by  Byron  in 
his  fine  tragedy  named  from  the  royal  voluptuaiy,  whom  ho  has 
chosen  j,is  his  hei-o  ; 

Sardanapalos, 
The  king,  and  son  of  Anacyndaraxes, 
In  one  day  built  Anchialos  and  Tarsos. 
Eat,  drink,  and  play.     The  rest 's  not  worth  a  fillip. 

Leaving  Anchialos  he  came  to  Soh,  where  he  celebrated 
solemn  games  with  musical  and  gymnastic  exercises,  and  torch 
races,  and  a  gi-and  procession  of  all  his  forces  under  arms,  in 
honor  of  Asklepios,  and  thence  to  Magarsis,  where  he  sacrificed 
to  the  Magarsian  Athene.  Leaving  Magarsis  he  again  halted 
at  Mallos,  now  Cape  Malo,  which  was  said  to  be  an  Argive 
colony,  and  to  which  he  therefore  remitted  the  tribute  formerly 
paid  by  them  to  Darios.  While  he  tarried  at  this  place,  tidings 
reached  him  that  the  king  of  Persia  was  close  at  hand  with  all 
his  forces,  at  a  place  called  Soki,  said  to  be  two  days'  march,  fifty 
or  sixty  miles  from  the  x\ssyrian  gates,  on  hearing  which  he  at 
once  collected  his  army  and  marched  past  Issos,  and  through  the 
defile  to  Myriandros,  a  flourishing  town  and  seaport  on  the  gulf 
of  Scanderoon,  the  modern  site  of  which  is  undefined,  where  he 
arrived  on  the  second  day  after  the  receipt  of  the  tidings,  and 
where  he  was  detained  in  his  camp  all  the  third  by  a  violent 
storm  of  rain  accompanied  by  a  violent  tornado. 


298  ALEXANDER   THE    GREAT. 

And  here,  before  detailing  the  second  great  battle  of 
Alexander,  it  will  not  be  amiss  to  pause  a  moment  and  observe 
with  how  consummate  an  union  of  military  skill  and  political 
shrewdness  the  young  Makedonian  prince  had  proceeded.  No 
rash  impulse  of  inconsiderate  valor,  no  greed  of  rapid  and 
continuous  victory,  no  undue  ihiist  of  present  glory  at  the  risk 
of  future  disaster,  had  tempted  him  to  dash  on  in  pursuit  of  his 
immediate  object,  the  overthrow  of  the  great  king,  until  the 
whole  country  in  his  rear  had  been  subverted,  pacified,  restored, 
and  reinvigorated  by  just  and  merciful  measures,  and  left  in  the 
secure  and  permanent  occupation  of  a  sufficient  force  of  foreign 
Greeks  to  render  any  hope  of  counter  revolution,  particularly 
when  backed  by  the  contingents  of  the  hberated  Ionic  and 
Aiolic  cities,  vain  and  impracticable. 

All  the  western  coast,  from  opposite  Byzantion,  or  Constanti- 
nople, to  the  Levantine  sea,  all  the  southern  coast,  from  Rhodes 
to  the  Syrian  frontier,  had  been  first  taken  into  secure  possession, 
thence  by  skilful  marches  and  Countermarches  inland,  the  whole 
interior  of  Asia  Minor,  from  the  Dardanelles  and  Archipelago  to 
the  Kizil  Irmak,  or  Red  River,  and  the  Syrian  defiles  had  been 
conquered,  and  reduced  to  perfect  obedience  in  the  space  of  a 
single  campaign.  This  tract  of  land,  including  the  entire 
districts  of  Anatolia,  Karamania,  and  a  portion  of  Roum,  or  nine- 
tenths  of  the  whole  Peninsula,  if  it  may  be  so  called,  between 
the  Black  Sea,  the  Archipelago,  and  the  Levant,  above  five 
hundred  miles  in  length  by  above  three  hundred  in  width, 
exceeded  by  at  least  one  half  the  whole  area  of  Greece,  from 
the  northern  confines  of  Alexander's  own  dominions  to  the 
southern  extremity  of  the  Peloponnesos  or  Morea.  It  was 
occupied  by  a  powerful,  civilized,  and  highly  cultivated  race  of 
men,  was  thickly  strewn  with  the  wealthiest  and  most  magnificent 
cities  and  seaports  in  the  then  known  world,  and  probably 
contributed  the   largest   portion  of  the  entire  revenues  of  his 


ASIA    MINOR.  '2 .'9 

empire  to  the  treasury  of  Xerxes.  This  splendid  territory  he 
had  not  cursorily  vanquished  by  the  terror  of  his  arms,  to  rise 
against  him  so  soon  as  his  back  was  turned,  or  take  arms  against 
his  retreat  if  defeated  ;  nor  had  he  alienated  the  temper  of  the 
inhabitants  by  cruelty  or  wanton  depredation  ;  but  by  c]em;*ncy, 
justice,  and  the  imposition  of  moderate  tributes,  had  converted  it 
into  his  own  pi-operty  and  his  fast  friend,  a  rich  granary, 
storehouse,  and  treasuiy,  from  which  to  derive  supplies  of  all 
kinds,  a  firm  basis  for  future  military  operations,  and  a  ready 
way  for  retreat  should  disaster  overtake  him. 

How  different  from  the  wanton  rapacity  and  savage  pillage  of 
the  French  marshals  of  Napoleon  in  Spain,  by  which  they 
rendered  every  peasant  in  the  land  the  mortal  foe  of  France, 
ready  to  catch  at  the  sound  of  the  first  passing  bell  as  a  war 
tocsin,  and  all  athirst  for  vengeance  till  Gaerra  al  Cuchillo,  war 
to  the  knife,  became  alike  their  watchword  and  their  battle  ci-v  ! 
HoW  different  from  the  mad  advance  of  the  great  Corsican 
himself,  into  the  hostile  heart  of  devastated  but  unconquercd 
Russia,  leaving  Germany  subdued,  not  pacified,  in  his  rear, 
Hungary  refractory,  Poland  unsatisfied,  without  a  base  of 
operations,  without  magazines,  supplies,  friends,  in  the  country 
he  had  traversed,  leaving  to  himself  no  alternative  but  complete 
victory  or  utter  ruin,  no  retreat,  but  a  flight  through  fifteen 
hundred  miles  of  ravaged  and  exhausted  country,  with  every  city 
ready  to  become  a  Moscow,  every  river  a  Beresina,  in  his  route. 

The  object  of  this  great  work  he  had  accomplished  at  a  loss  of 
men  certainly  not  exceeding  three  hundred,  of  all  arms,  in 
actual  fighting,  so  that  it  is  probable  that  after  taking  into 
consideration  all  the  garrisons  he  had  left  beliind  him,  and 
all  the  deaths  of  men  whether  under  arms  or  by  casualties,  as 
well  as  the  reinforcements  he  had  received  from  Greece,  and  the 
enlistment  of  Greek  mercenaries  brought  over  to  his  own  side 
from  the  adverse  party,  his  army   was  increased  rather  than 


800  ALEXANDER   THE    GREAT. 

diminished,  and  that  the  force  with  which  he  stood  prepared  to 
dispute  the  diadem  of  Asia  with  Darios,  was  numerically  larger 
than  that  with  which  he  forced  the  passage  of  the  Granikos,  and 
now  much  stronger  in  that  confidence  in  themselves,  that  proud 
and  positive  morale^  which  so  often  is  the  giver  of  victory. 

Darios  up  to  this  time  had  determined,  according  to  the 
advice  of  his  best  counsellors,  to  await  Alexander's  issue  from  the 
defiles,  and  give  him  battle  in  the  open  champaign  country  of 
Assyria,  where  the  vast  plains  would  allow  him  to  deploy  his 
almost  innumerable  hordes,  and  perhaps  to  overflank  and 
surround  the  enemy,  while  the  whole  region  would  be  favorable 
to  the  manoeuvres  of  his  pow^erful  and  splendid  cavaliy.  And 
he  was  strongly  urged  by  Arayntas,  the  son  of  Antiochos,  who 
had  deserted  to  him  from  Alexander,  by  no  means  to  move  from 
that  district,  and  at  first  he  took  counsel  and  waited,  though 
impatiently.  But  the  tardiness  of  Alexander's  movements, 
caused  by  his  illness  at  Tarsos,  his  pomps  and  processions 
at  Soli,  and  the  sending  out  of  an  expedition  against  the  Kilikian 
mountaineers,  shook  his  resolve ;  and,  with  the  characteristic 
arrogance  of  a  vain  barbarian,  he  came  to  the  belief  that 
Alexander  was  afraid  of  him,  and  would  not  advance  against 
him,  if  he  were  not  already  in  full  flight.  He  determined, 
therefore,  in  spite  of  the  reasoning  and  assurance  of  Amyntas, 
who  insisted  that  Alexander  was  eager  to  meet  not  to  avoid 
him,  to  march  into  the  passes,  where  he  was  neither  able  to  avail 
himself  of  his  superiority  in  archers  and  javelineers,  by  deploying 
them  in  open  order,  nor  to  make  use  of  his  splendid  horse,  but 
gave  himself,  as  it  were,  shackled  into  the  hands  of  an  enemy 
who  certainly  was  not  one  into  whose  way  one  would  wiUingly 
cast  unnecessary  advantages. 

He  entered,  therefore,  the  defiles  of  Mount  Amanos,  known  as 
the  Assyrian  gates,  while  Alexander  was  actually  at  Myriandros, 
to  the  southeast  of  the  passes,  and  interposed  between  him  and  his 


COUNTERMARCHES  BEFORE  ISSOS.  301 

capital,  and  marclied  to  Issos,  now  Aiasso,  having  thus  accident- 
ally got  into  the  rear  of  the  Greek  army.  So  soon  as  the 
Makedonian  heard  this  intelligence,  which  at  first  he  was  inclined 
to  doubt,  as  scarcely  able  to  credit  such  an  excess  of  good  fortune, 
he  embarked  a  few  of  the  Royal  Companions  in  a  thirty-oared 
galley,  and  sent  them  by  sea  to  reconnoitre,  which  could  be  done 
so,  much  more  readily  than  by  land,  since  the  coast  hne  here  is 
much  indented  by  deep  bays  and  gulfs,  from  headland  to  head- 
land of  which  it  is  but  a  brief  sail.  These  soon  returning  with 
information  that  Darios  was  already,  as  it  were,  in  the  hollow  of 
his  hand,  he  was  vehemently  rejoiced  and  collecting  all  his 
officers  harangued  them  on  the  nature  of  the  contest  which  was 
now  imminent,  and  encouraged  them  by  the  enumerated  ad- 
vantages he  possessed,  especially  as  compared  with  the  deficiency 
ofXenophon's  army  in  spite  of  which  that  gallant  partizan  had 
resisted  all  dispiriting  influences,  and  conquered  the  Asiatics  in 
every  encounter,  although  he  had  no  Thessalian,  nor  Boiotian, 
nor  Peloponnesian,  nor  Makedonian  horse,  nor  Thrakians,  nor  in 
fact  any  cavalry  worthy  of  consideration,  nor  any  archery  or 
slingers,  with  the  exception  of  a  handful  of  Khodians  and 
Kretans. 

Then  ha\nug  caused  his  men  to  dine  and  having  sent  forward 
a  few  horse  and  bowmen  to  reconnoitre  the  road,  he  retraced  his 
steps  with  his  whole  army  as  soon  as  it  became  dark,  and  enter- 
ing the  defiles  at  midnight  posted  his  sentinels  on  the  cliffs  and 
halted  until  morning,  to  give  his  men  some  repose  before  the 
terrible  struggle  to  which  he  looked  forward  in  the  calm  con- 
fidence of  certain  victory. 

And  now  the  time  had  arrived  when  the  two  royal  rivals 
should  meet  in  the  field  face  to  face,  for  as  soon  as  it  was  day- 
light Alexander  led  his  men,  with  his  heavy  foot  in  front,  his 
cavalry  following  these  and  his  baggage  in  the  rear  of  all,  through 
the  defiles  ;  r'  fii^t,  where  the  pass  was  very  narrow,  in  an  ex- 


302  ALEXANDER    THE    GREAT. 

ceeding'Iy  cL'cp  narrow-fronted  column,  as  the  nature  of  the 
ground  compelled  him  to  do ;  and  gradually,  as  the  gorge  ex- 
panded, extending  his  front  both  to  the  right  and  left,  by  bringing 
up  his  rearward  files,  each  by  each,  on  the  outside  of  either  flank 
till  the  phalanx  had  acquired  its  due  proportion  both  of  rank  and 
file.  At  this  period,  the  usual  depth  of  the  phalanx,  as  con- 
stituted by  Philip,  was  sixteen  men  in  file  ;  and  it  does  not  ap- 
pear that  any  deviation  ever  took  place  from  this  formation,  the 
old  tactic  by  subdivision  into  enomoties,  pentecostyes  and  lochoi, 
having  been  entirely  discontinued,  and  remodelled  in  the  recent 
or  Makedonian  phalanx.  Kallisthenes,  the  sophist,  who  was 
present  at  this  battle,  states  that  in  the  first  instance,  the  phalanx 
in  defiling  through  these  gorges  was  drawn  up  thirty-two 
deep,  then  sixteen,  and  lastly  eight ;  but  Polybios*  has  demon- 
strated, by  measurement  of  the  ground  and  comparison  of 
numbers,  that  the  whole  of  his  description  is  an  absurdity..  He 
was  himself  no  soldier,  and  of  course  wrote  from  hearsay.  It  is, 
moreover,  evident  that  the  phalanx  could  not  be  manoeuvred  in 
this  manner ;  since  the  number  of  shields  in  file  was  invariably 
the  same,  and  not  that  only,  but  the  same  men  were  invariably 
file-leaders  and-rear  rankmen ;  consequently,  when  it  was 
necessaj-y  to  contract  the  fj-ont,  so  many  files  as  occasion  required 
halted  on  either  flank,  while  the  rest  marched  onward,  and  then 
obliquing  inward  from  the  left  and  right,  formed  a  second  column, 
with  as  many  shields  in  file  as  the  first,  and  so  on  ad  hifinitum  ; 
and  again,  when  it  was  desirable  to  extend  the  front,  the  second 
column  obliqued  to  the  left  and  right  from  the  centi-e  and 
marched  up,  on  the  outside,  to  their  original  places  on  the  flanks, 
and  so  on  with  third,  fourth,  and  fifth  columns  in  succession  to  the 
end,  till  the  proper  front  and  formation  was  again  recovered. 
Thus  the  depth  of  the  phalanx  was  never  really  altered ;  though 
in  passing  bridges,  defiles,  or  the  like,    it  could  be  formed  in 

*  Polyb.  xii.  17. 


MOVEMENTS  OF  THE  THALANX.  303 

column  of  any  number  of  sub-divisions,  each  consisting  of  any- 
given  numbf-r  of  shields  in  rank,  but  immutably  of  the  same 
number  in  file.  I  do  not  mean  that  the  depth  of  all  phalanxes 
was  the  same,  since  we  have  already  seen  them  varying  from 
eight  shields  of  Athenians  at  Marathon,  to  fifty  of  Thebans  at 
Leuktra,  but  that  on  whatever  number  of  men  jn  files  it  was 
resolved  to  fight,  on  that  they  invariably  manceuvred. 

For  it  must  be  observed  that  pivot  movements  were  unknown 
to  the  Greeks,  and  that  they  never  marched,  as  we  say,  by  the 
flank,  and  bringing  up  this  or  that  shoulder,  wheeled  into  line  to 
the  front,  owing  to  their  method  of  hand  to  hand  engaging, 
which  made  it  absolutely  necessary  that  the  best  man  and 
steadiest  soldier  should  be  the  leader,  and  the  second  best  the 
rear  rank-man  of  every  file,  whether  on  the  march  or  in  action. 
The  field  of  battle  it  appears  was  about  fourteen  stadia  in  width 
from  the  sea  on  the  left,  to  the  mountains  on  the  right,  and  ac- 
cording to  Polybios,*  one  stadium  will  contain  sixteen  hundred 
men  arrayed  sixteen  deep,  when  in  open  marching  order — six 
feet  being  allowed  to  each  soldier — or  twice  that  number  with 
their  shields  touching  in  the  synaspismos,  or  close  battle  order. 

The  number  of  men  requisite  to  form  the  true  ^Makedonian 
phalanx  was  sixteen  thousand  men,  or  a  thousand  shields  in  rank 
by  sixteen  in  file,  although  any  number  exceeding  thirty-two 
and  divisible  by  four  could  be  formed  on  the  principle  of  the 
phalanx.  I  conceive  it  probable,  therefore,  that,  assuming  the 
number  of  forty-two  thousand  assigned  to  Alexander's  infontry 
as  correct,  the  number  of  hea^y  foot  was  thirty-two  thousand, 
or  a  double  phalanx,  the  remaining  ten  thousand  being  archery, 
slingei-s,  and  javehneers,  who  did  not  fight  in  line.  These  men 
would  in  battle  array  have  occupied  ten  stadia,  leaving  four  more 
for  the  archery  and  hoi*se. 

These  latter  formed  eiglit  deep,  which  Polybios  states  to  be 
*  Polyb  xii.  17,  &c..He  Callisthenis  Tmperitia,  Arrian.  II.  viii. 


304  ALEXANDER   THE    GREAT. 

their  true  tactics,  occupied  a  stadium  to  eacli  eight  hundred 
men  in  marching  order,  or  half  that  distance  in  array  of  battle, 
leaving  tlie  necessary  intervals  for  their  manoeuvres  and  counter- 
marching-s.  The  whole  force  of  cavalry  would  have  required 
therefore  about  three  stadia  for  their  front,  leaving  one  stadium, 
or  something  over,  for  the  advance  and  retreat  of  the  light 
troops  to  the  van  and  rear,  independent  of  the  regular  intervals. 

I  think,  therefore,  that  we  may  assume  this  to  have  been 
Alexander's  disposition  in  the  battle  of  Issos.  To  himself,  as 
usual,  he  retained  the  command  of  the  right  wing,  giving  to 
Parmenion  the  leading  of  the  left,  along  the  sea  shore  ;  for  it 
must  be  remembered,  that  by  the  descent  of  Darios  by  the 
defiles  of  Mount  Amanos  into  his  rear,  the  natural  position  of  the 
armies  was  reversed,  so  that  the  Greeks  were  fio-htino^  with  their 
faces  to  the  west  and  their  backs  to  Babylonia,  and  the  Persians 
vice  versa. 

First  on  the  right  toward  the  mountains,  the  horse  not  ha\ing 
as  yet  deployed  from  the  rear,  he  placed  the  companions  of  the 
foot-guard,  and  the  hypaspistai  under  Nikanor  son  of  Parmenion, 
next  to  these  the  band  of  Koinos,  and  next — forming  the  left  of 
the  right,  and  centre  of  the  whole  army — that  of  Perdikkas.  On 
the  extreme  left  was  the  band  of  Amyntas,  then  that  of  Ptole- 
maios  ;  and  last,  touching  Perdikkas'  men  in  the  centre,  that  of 
Meleagros.  The  infantry  of  the  left,  generally,  w^ere  under  the 
direction  of  Krateros,  as  the  wdiole  wang  was  under  that  of  Par- 
menion, Avhose  orders  were  on  no  account  to  leave  an  interval 
l)etween  himself  and  the  sea  shore,  as  it  was  certain  that  Darios 
would  endeavor  to  profit  by  it,  in  his  vast  numerical  superiority, 
to  turn  and  envelop  both  flanks  of  the  Greeks. 

So  soon  as  the  pass  opened  out  into  a  species  of  small  plain, 
intersected  by  the  mountain  torrent  Pinaros,  now  the  Deli  Son, 
Alexander  brought  up  the  royal  companions  of  the  life-guard, 
with  the  Thessalian  and  Makedonian  horse,  from  the  rear  to  his 


LINE  OF  BATTLE  AT  ISSOS.  305 

extreme  right,  and  ordered  all  the  Peloponnesian  and  allied  cav- 
alry to  form  on  Parmenion's  left  along  the  sea.  In  the  mean- 
while Darios  learning  the  approach  of  Alexandei-,  pushed  twenty 
thousand  foot  and  thirty  thousand  horse  across  the  river,  using 
them  as  a  screen  wherewith  to  mask  his  movements  and  cover 
his  army,  while  he  was  arraying  it  in  line.  And  first  he  drew 
up  his  Greek  mercenaries,  thirty  thousand  strong,  opposite  to  the 
phalanx  of  the  Makedoniaus,  and  next  to  these  on  either  hand 
sixty  thousand  Kardakians,  who,  hke  the  Greeks,  were  armed 
as  heavy  infantry — for  the  ground  on  which  they  were  marehal- 
led  sufficed  for  the  formation  of  this  number  of  men  in  single 
phalanx — and  on  his  own  left  he  pushed  forward  twenty  thou- 
sand men  along  the  crest  of  the  mountains,  who  turned  Alexan- 
der's left,  and,  as  he  marched  onward,  actually  threatened  his 
rear ;  but  all  the  remainder  of  his  innumerable  multitudes,  said 
to  amount  to  six  hundred  thousand  fighting  men,  archers,  jav- 
ehneei-s,  and  slingers,  were  drawn  up  in  a  huge,  useless  mass,  in 
the  rear  of  the  Greeks  and  of  those  barbarians,  who  were  formed 
in  phalanx.  This  done,  he  recalled  the  thirty  thousand  horse 
who  had  cloaked  his  movements,  and  drew  the  greater  part  of 
them  up  in  front  of  his  right,  where  the  gi'ound  was  most  suita- 
ble to  cavalry  movements,  as  being  level  along  the  sea,  retaining 
a  few  squadrons  on  his  own  left,  near  the  mountains,  until  find- 
ing the  nature  of  the  ground  to  be  impracticable  to  cavalry,  he 
detached  them  also  to  his  right. 

Immediately,  on  perceiving  the  immense  force  of  cavalry  to 
which  Parmenion  was  now  affi'onted,  fearing  that  his  left  would 
be  broken,  he  detached  all  the  Thessalians  to  his  support,  causing 
them  to  ride  around  by  the  rear,  instead  of  crossing  his  fi-ont ; 
so  that  the  movement  might  be  unsuspected  by  Darios ;  in  fi-ont 
of  his  own  horse,  on  the  right,  he  drew  up  the  guides  under  Pro 
tomachos,  and  the  Paionians  led  by  Ariston,  and  the  archery  of 
Antiochos ;  but  the  Agrianians  of  Attalos,  with  some  cavalry 
14 


306  ALEXANDER    THE    GREAT. 

and  archei-s,  he  sent  against  the  enemy  who  had  passed  along 
the  hills  and  occupied  a  projecting  spur,  completely  in  the  rear 
of  his  right;  so  that  his  left  wing  was  formed  in  two  hues,  one 
facing  westward  against  the  Persians  beyond  the  river,  and  the 
others  eastward,  against  the  barbarians  on  the  hills.  He  added 
also  to  his  left  the  Kretan  archery,  and  the  Thrakians  of  Sitalkes; 
and  behind  the  whole  line  he  ordered  the  foreign  mercenaries. 
But  finding  that  his  own  phalanx  was  not  sufficiently  sohd,  he 
ordered  up  two  regiments  of  the  companions — that  called  the 
Anthemousian,  commanded  by  Persidas  the  son  of  Menestheus, 
and  that  called  the  Leugaian,  under  Pantordanos  son  of  Klean- 
der,  from  the  centre  to  the  right,  countermarching  them  secretly 
by  the  rear. 

But  now  when  the  barbarians  on  the  hill  made  no  effort  to 
descend  upon  his  rear,  he  caused  them  to  be  charged  by  the 
Agrianians  and  some  archery,  which  broke  them  with  ease,  and 
drove  them  up  to  the  very  summit  of  the  cliffs,  completely  out 
of  arrow  shot  of  the  army  ;  after  w^hich  he  contented  himself  by 
observing  them  with  a  body  of  three  hundred  horse,  wdiich  suf- 
ficed to  hold  them  in  check  all  day  ;  and  withdrawing  the  archers 
and  Agrianians,  supported  by  some  of  his  Greek  mercenaries,  he 
pushed  them  forward  on  his  right,  in  order  to  outflank  the 
Pei'sians. 

Darios  did  not  lead  forward  to  the  attack,  but  remained  on  the 
defensive  along  the  steep  and  rocky  banks  of  tte  river,  which  he 
had  in  some  places  protected  by  palisades ;  and  observing  this, 
Alexander  galloped  along  his  front,  calling  upon  the  men  to 
show  their  valor,  and  addressing  not  only  all  the  leadei-s,  but  the 
captains  of  squadrons  and  battalions,  even  of  the  mercenaries  and 
foreigners,  by  name,  when  any  one  was  conspicuous  for  peculiar 
courage  or  merit ;  and  loud  shouts  w^ent  up  on  all  sides,  as  they 
called  to  him  not  to  delay,  but  to  fall  on  at  once. 

Then  he  advanced,  but  very  gradually,  restraining  the  ardor 


307 

of  his  troops,  and  keeping  them  at  a  slow  march,  lest  the  front 
of  the'  phalanx  should  be  disordered  by  a  more  rapid  movement ; 
but  soon  as  he  came  within  the  i-ange  of  missiles,  he  led  in  person 
with  his  right  wing  at  an  impetuous  and  fiery  charge,  in  order  to 
come  quicker  hand  to  hand,  and  so  to  evade  the  shot  of  javelins  and 
arrows,  and  he  crossed  the  river  in  one  headlong  rush,  and  scat- 
tered the  Persians  of  the  left  as  with  a  thunderbolt.  But  the 
Greek  mercenaries  of  Darios  charged  home  against  the  Makedo- 
nian  phalanx,  where  it  was  left  uncovered,  in  consequence  of 
being  separated  from  the  right,  which  had  charged  so  furiously 
with  Alexander  that  it  could  not  keep  abreast  of  them,  o\ving  to 
the  pace  of  its  advance,  which  was  of  necessity  more  leisurely, 
and  the  broken  and  rocky  nature  of  part  of  the  ground  which  it 
had  to  traverse ;  and  the  conflict  here  was  both  furious  and  stub- 
born, for  the  mercenaries  of  Darios  fought  desperately  to  prevent 
the  Makedonians  from  ascending  the  river  banks,  and  to  retrieve 
the  victory,  jeopardized  by  the  flight  of  their  left  wing.  The 
Makedonians,  on  the  other  hand,  were  inspired  by  a  desire  to 
emulate  the  splendor  of  Alexander's  onslaught  on  the  left,  and 
by  the  pride  of  maintaining  their  reputation,  as  hitherto  uncon- 
quered  and  unconquerable  in  the  field.  Besides  this,  moreover, 
there  had  always  been  a  rivalry  of  races,  between  the  Makedo- 
nians and  the  pure  Hellenic  races.  And  the  struggle  between 
them  was  long  and  desperately  maintained  at  push  of  pike,  with 
the  bronze  bucklers  clanging  in  the  shock  of  the  close  conflict, 
and  the  loud  pagans  echoing  in  the  Greek  tongue  on  both  sides, 
and  the  wild  battle  clamor,  alale^  and  great  mutual  slaughter. 
And  there  fell  Ptolemaios  son  of  Seleukos,  and  many  othei-s, 
most  vahant  and  distinguished  men  of  the  Makedonians,  to  the 
number  of  a  hundred  and  twenty ;  nor  did  the  Greeks  yield  a 
foot,  much  less  turn  to  fly,  until  the  victorious  right  of  Alexander 
ha^^ng  pushed  their  left  bodily  off"  the  field,  so  that  their  whole 
flank  was  exposed,  wheeled    upon  them,   seeing  that  its  own 


308  ALEXANDER   THE    GREAT. 

centre  was  hard  pressed,  and  charging  home  full  on  their  shield 
arms,  cut  them  to  pieces  with  a  frightful  carnage. 

Up  to  this  time  the  Persian  horse  opposed  to  Alexander's  left 
had  fought  with  exceeding  gallantry,  for  not  waiting  the  advance 
of  the  Greeks,  they  had  dashed  forward,  crossed  the  river  in  full 
career,  where  it  rushed  over  a  shallow  bed  near  the  sea,  and 
charged  manfully  upon  the  squadrons  of  the  Thessalians.  These 
in  like  manner  charged,  and  to  the  shock  of  spears  succeeded  a 
close  and  terrible  melee,  with  broadsword,  scymetar,  and  battle- 
axe,  until,  Darios  having  already  fled,  and  the  Greek  mercenaries 
been  cut  to  pieces  on  their  left,  they  too  turned  rein,  and  fled  head- 
long, in  the  utmost  rout  and  confusion.  The  roads  were  bad, 
as  after  the  heavy  rains  which  had  lately  fallen  they  were  all 
poached  up  and  trampled  into  mire  by  the  march  of  the  myriads 
who  had  passed  over  them  ;  and  the  horses,  oppressed  by  the 
weight  of  their  own  ponderous  armature,  and  the  burthen  of  their 
riders,  armed  all  cap-a-pie^  labored  fearfully  in  the  flight.  And 
the  fierce  Thessalians  pressed  on  them  savagely — for  they  had 
suflfered  in  the  battle,  and  now  had  vengeance,  which  they 
worked  out  with  bloody  execution — and  as  it  was  no  retreat,  but 
an  entire  rout,  the  Persians  were  disorganized,  and  as  many  died 
trampled  to  death  by  their  own  comrades  as  fell  beneath  the 
bloody  spears  of  the  Thessalian  lancers.  Darios  himself  did  not 
his  duty  on  that  day  as  a  general,  a  soldier,  or  a  man — for  so 
soon  as  his  left  wing  was  broken  by  Alexander's  headlong  charge, 
long  before  the  best  portion  of  his  foi-ces  were  beaten ;  almost, 
indeed,  before  they  were  in  action — he  turned  his  chariot,  and 
fled  in  it,  so  long  as  the  ground  was  level,  at  the  utmost  speed 
of  his  horses ;  but,  so  soon  as  he  got  into  broken  ground,  on  a 
led  horse  ;  leaving  his  shield,  his  bow,  and  his  royal  robe  behind 
him  ;  and  what  is  far  more  discreditable  to  his  name  and  char- 
acter— since  even  the  weakest  and  most  cowardly  of  animals  will 
fight  to  the  death  in  defence  of  their  females — abandoning  his 


FLIGHT  OF  DARIOS.  309 

mother,  wife,  and  dauglitei-s,  who,  according  to  the  Pei*sian  habit, 
had  followed  him  in  the  campaign,  and  Avere  taken  with  his 
treasures  in  the  forsaken  camp. 

Alexander  pursued  him  hotly  with  his  cavalry  until  it  was 
dark  night,  but  was  unable  to  overtake  him  ;  for  his  pursuit  had 
been  delayed  by  the  sturdy  resistance  of  the  Greek  force  and  of 
the  Persian  cavahy — for  with  sound  judgment  and  soldierly 
coolness,  he  did  not  withdraw  a  man  from  the  immediate  front 
of  battle  until  the  whole  force  was  broken  and  destroyed. 

In  the  conflict  and  the  carnage  which  followed  it,  there  fell  of 
the  Persians,  Arsames,  and  Ptheomithres,  and  Artizues,  the  lead- 
ers of  the  cavalry  at  tlie  Granikos  ;  and  Sabakes  the  satrap  of 
Egypt,  and  Boubakes,  a  Persian  of  high  distinction ;  and  besides 
these,  it  is  said,  of  common  men  not  less  than  a  hundred  thou- 
sand, of  whom  ten  thousand  were  of  the  brave  hoi*se.  So  that 
Ptolemaios  the  son  of  Lagos,  who  pm-sued  in  person  with  Alexan- 
der, states  that  a  ravine,  across  which  they  had  to  follow,  w^as  so 
completely  bridged  by  the  dead  that  they  charged  over  it  as  on 
level  ground. 

Such  was  the  battle  of  Issos,  fought  in  the  month  of  Maimak- 
terion,*  corresponding  to  the  latter  part  of  November  and  the 
fii-st  of  December,  in  the  Archonship  of  Nikostratos,  at  Athens, 
in  the  fourth  year  of  the  one  hundred  and  first  Olympiad,  B.  C. 
333.  It  was  fought  on  the  oblique  method,  like  that  of  the 
Granikos ;  the  Greek  left  and  centre  being  partially  retired,  until 
Alexander  had  forced  back  the  Persian  left  with  singular  advan- 
tage, which  put  it  in  his  power  to  take  all  the  other  divisions  of 
the  barbarian  army  successively  in  flank,  and  so  to  destroy  them 
absolutely.  It  was  won  almost  entirely  by  the  tactics  of  the 
general,  smce  it  is  perfectly  evident  that  even  his  Thessalian 
cavalry  on  the  left,  with  the  single  exception  of  the  royal  com- 
panions, his  best  horse,  had  gained  nothing,  and  were  barely  able 

*  Polybios  xvii,  29- 


310  ALEXANDER    THE    GREAT. 

to  maintain  their  ground  against  tlie  spirited  exertions  of  the 
Oriental  cavalry,  while  the  Makedonian  phalanx,  having  the  dis- 
advantage of  the  ground  against  them,  if  anything  had  the  w^oi'st 
of  it  in  their  conflict  with  the  Greek  mercenaries  of  Darios — all 
Peloponnesian  republicans  and  soldiers  of  the  first  order — until 
the  thundering  charge  of  Alexander  with  the  guides  and  life- 
guards upon  their  naked  flank,  pierced  that  gallant  band  through 
and  through,*  and  made  such  a  carnage  in  their  broken  ranks, 
that  scarce  two  thousand  of  them  rallied  on  the  following  day 
about  the  person  of  the  fugitive  king. 

In  the  meantime  the  camp  of  Darios  had  been  captured,  with 
its  vast  treasures  in  plate,  garments,  armors,  furniture,  coined  and 
uncoined  gold,  and  all  the  profuse  and  lavish  luxuries  of  Orien- 
tal royalty  ;  and,  in  addition  to  all  this,  the  mother,  wife  and  sis- 
ter of  Darios,  together  with  two  grown-up  daughters  and  an 
infant  son,  were  made  prisoners,  beside  a  few  other  Persian  ladies 
of  rank,  but  not  many,  since  most  of  the  nobles  of  Darios'  court 
had  sent  their  women  to  Damaskos,  whither  the  most  part  of 
Darios'  treasury  had  been  sent  hkewise. 

It  has  been  made  the  most  of,  as  a  very  great  and  noble  trait 
of  Alexander's  character,  that  he  oflfered  no  indignity  or  violence 
to  these  captive  beauties ;  I  cannot,  however,  but  regard  these 
as  mere  rhetorical  flourishes  ;  since,  although  it  certainly  was  the 
custom  of  the  time  to  sell  whole  communities  into  slavery,  the 
capture  of  the  families  of  sovereign  princes,  or  even  generals  of 
high  rank,  was  a  most  unusual  occurrence ;  and  I  cannot  but 
beheve,  arguing  from  the  habits  of  that  day,  not  from  the  higher 
morality  of  our  own,  that  to  have  subjected  ladies  of  that  quahty 
to  any  disgrace  or  dishonor,  particularly  in  cold-blood,  after  they 
had  escaped  unscathed  from  the  tumult  and  terrors  of  the  sack, 
Would  have  reflected  infinite  reproach  and  shame  upon  the  con- 
queror.    Indeed,  it  is  my  conviction,  that  acts  of  licentious  do- 

*  Arrian  II.,  xiii. 


THE  CAPTIVE  QEJEENS.  311 

lence  on  the  part  of  generals  or  othei-s  in  high  command  toward 
female  prisonei's  were  as  rare,  and  would,  if  committed,  have 
been  esteemed  as  infamous,  as  in  our  own  times. 

Alexander  detained  these  ladies,  however,  in  captivity, 
although  he  caused  them  to  be  served  by  their  own  attendants, 
and  with  all  the  luxury  due  to  their  birth  and  title  as  queens  and 
princesses,  which  he  allowed  them  to  retain  ;  he  even  carried  them 
about,  with  him  in  all  his  marches,  and  in  one  of  the  latest,  before 
the  fatal  battle  of  Arbela,  the  unhappy  wife  and  mother  died  in 
durance,  leaving  her  marriageable  daughters  in  durance,  and  the 
heir  to  his  father's  throne  at  the  victor's  mercy.  It  is  evident 
enough  that  his  object  in  this  was  to  intimidate  Darios,  by  work  • 
ing  on  his  feelings  in  behalf  of  those  helpless  treasures,  into  early 
and  absolute  submission.  Surely,  there  was  Httle  magnanimity 
or  generosity  in  this  ;  nor  did  his  practice  in  this  instance  accord 
well  with  the  principle  of  which  he  constantly  boasted,  that  he 
waged  war  not  on  women  but  on  warriors ;  and  on  Darios  him- 
self, not  as  enemy  on  enemy  but  as  rival  against  rival,  for 
national  and  individual  glory,  and  for  the  honor  rather  than  the 
possession  of  empire. 

It  is  evident  that  the  distinction  is  not  a  difference,  for  to  sub- 
ject women  of  the  highest  rank  to  the  penalties  of  war,  by  de- 
taining them  close  prisoners,  is  in  effect  to  make  war  on  them  ; 
and  to  have  done  them  farther  wrong  would  have  overthrown  at 
once  all  his  pretensions  to  a  sort  of  chivalry,  which  though  fickle 
and  fantastic,  does  appear  in  some  sort  to  have  regulated  his 
conduct.  To  conclude,  I  fear  we  must  attribute  what  there  was 
of  generosity  in  his  conduct  toward  these  unhappy  ladies  to  his 
love  of  appearances  and  vain  thirst  of  glory,  while  all  that  was 
stern  and  selfish  must  be  assigned  to  his  natural  temper  and 
disposition. 

On  the  day  following  the  battle  he  decorated  those  of  his 
ofBcers  and  men  who  had  distinguished  themselves,  and  added 


312  ALEXANDER    THE    GREAT. 

large  gifts  of  money.  Balakros  the  son  of  Nicanor,  he  appointed 
Satrap  of  Kilikia,  and  filled  his  post  in  the  body-guards  by 
Euenes  the  son  of  Dionysios,  and  to  the  command  of  Ptolemaios 
son  of  Seleukos  he  promoted  Polyperehon  son  of  Simmias. 
Then  without  a  moment's  delay  he  sent  Parraenion  forward  with 
a  sufficient  force  to  make  himself  master  of  Damaskos,  where  the 
amount  of  wealth  taken  was  so  prodigious  that  the  relation  of 
it  almost  exceeds  the  hmits  of  credibility,  for  the  amount  of  coined 
money  is  said  to  have  been  two  thousand  six  hundred  talents, 
nearly  a  million  sterhng,  besides  five  hundred  pounds  weight  of 
wrought  silver,  and  other  booty  beyond  calculation,  in  tents, 
chariots,  tapestries,  house  furniture,  vases,  statues,  and  goblets, 
of  gold.*  The  loss  of  the  Makedonians,  by  which  this  decisive 
\nctory  was  won,  seems  to  have  been  three  hundred  hoplitai,  on 
whom  in  this  action  the  hardest  fighting  fell  and  a  hundred  and 
fifty  horse,f  by  whose  efforts  in  the  battle  and  the  flight  which- 
followed  it,  at  least  a  hundred  thousand  of  the  enemy  were  slain. 
Of  Darios'  Greek  mercenaries,  about  eight  thousand  men  under 
Amyntas  the  son  of  Antiochos,  Thymondas  the  son  of  Mentor, 
Aristomedes  of  Pherai,  and  Bianor  the  Akarnanian,  all  desertei*s 
from  Alexander,  fled  the  moment  the  action  commenced  and 
made  theii-  w^ay  through  the  mountains  to  Tripolis  in  Phoinikia, 
where  they  made  themselves  masters  of  shipping  and  escaped 
fii-st  to  Kypros  and  thence  to  Egypt,  wiiere  Amyntas  was  shortly 
afterward  put  to  death  by  the  natives. 

At  Damaskos  were  taken  several  revolutionary  agents,  sent 
from  the  Greek  cities  as  envoys  to  Darios,  but  all  these  Alexander 
prudently  and  politically,  not  in  my  apprehension  mercifully,^ 
pardoned  ;  for  his  victories  had  now  placed  him  above  all  fear  of 
danger  from  them,  and  he  felt  that  after  the  cruel  blow  he  had 
stricken  against  fallen  Thebes,  concihation  rather  than  intimidation 
was  his  game.  An  embassy  from  Darios  soon  after  reached 
*  Qiiintus  Curtius,  iii.  34.         f  Polybios,  xvii.  36.         t  Arrian.  II.  xv. 


DArJO.S     FAMILY.  313 

Llia,  praying  for  the  liberation  of  his  family,  and  offering  him 
splendid  conditions  of  peace,  hut  to  them  he  returned  a  stern 
refusal,  couched  in  savage  and  imperious  language,  forbidding 
him  to  presume  again,  to  treat  with  him  as  equal  with  equal, 
king  with  king,  but  as  a  slave  with  his  lord  and  master. 

It  has  ever,  I  confess,  been  a  marvel  and  a  mystery  to  me,  in 
what  part  of  this  man's  conduct  or  character  it  is,  that  his 
eulogists  discover  anything  magnanimous,  generous,  or  chival- 
rous ;  unless  it  be  in  a  sort  of  mad-headed,  inconsiderate  courage 
which  prompted  him  e\'er  to  be  the  first  where  blows  were  going, 
often  to  the  serious  detriment  of  the  service,  and  endangering  of 
the  army  ;  and  which  seems  to  have  arisen  rather  from  the  fiery 
excitabihty  of  his  temper  and  his  constitutional  insensibility  to 
danger,  than  from  anything  rational  or  moral,  without  which 
nothing  can  be  in  truth  heroical. 

In  the  meantime  Darios,  who  had  made  his  way  with  the 
relics  of  his  power  through  the  passes  of  Mt.  Amanos  into  the 
open  plains  beyond,  fled  with  the  utmost  speed  to  Thapsakos, 
where  he  lost  no  time  in  interposing  the  broad  and  powerful 
stream  of  the  Euphrates  between  himself  and  his  enemy,  although 
the  precaution  seems  to  have  been  needless,  inasmuch  as  Alex- 
ander showed  no  willingness  to  interrupt  or  even  hurry  his  flight ; 
since  immediately  on  hearing  of  the  capture  of  Damaskos  with  its 
imperial  treasuries,  he  turned  in  a  diametrically  opposite 
direction,  marching  down  due  south  along  the  shores  of  the 
Levant,  where  he  laid  siege  to  the  powerful  and  wealthy  city  of 
Tyre,  which  had  refused  him  admission  within  its  walls,  and  had 
gone  so  far  as  to  murder  the  heralds,  whom  he  had  sent  to  re- 
qun-e  their  submission.  The  cities  of  Byblos  and  Sidon  sur- 
rendered at  his  approach,  but  Tyre  being  strongly  situated  on  an 
island,  powerfully  fortified  and  protected  on  the  sea-side  by  a 
great  fliglit,  made  a  most  desperate  and  stubborn  resistance. 
Alexander's  first  attempt  was  to  build  a  mole  across  tke  channel 
14 


314  ALEXANDER    THE    GREAT. 

from  the  continent  to  the  island,  so  as  to  bring  his  engines  to  play 
upon  the  walls,  but  his  mole  was  constantly  impeded,  and  once 
actually  destroyed  by  the  fierce  sallies  and  counter-engines  of  the 
besieged,  assisted  by  storms  and  adverse  weather,  of  which  they 
took  the  utmost  advantage.  Machinery  and  military  engineer- 
ing was  brought  into  play  to  a  greater  extent  than  had  ever 
before  been  attempted,  and  in  no  respect  can  any  other  sieges  be 
compared  to  it,  in  antique  history,  but  those  of  Syracuse  de- 
fended by  Archimedes  against  Marcellus,  and  of  Jerusalem 
against  that  most  odious  and  cold-blooded  of  all  Roman  butchers, 
Titus  the  son  of  Vespasian. 

For  seven  long  months  it  foiled  all  the  efforts  of  the  Make- 
donian  to  reduce  it,  nor  is  it  in  the  least  degree  probable  that  he 
ever  would  have  taken  it,  had  he  not  again  collected  a  naval  force 
with  which  he  ultimately  stormed  it  in  the  eighth  month  after 
assailing  it.  From  this  time  forth,  whatever  there  had  been  be- 
f(3re  of  good  or  tolerable  in  the  character  of  Alexander,  disappears 
altogether,  and  unless  it  be  in  the  capricious  and  unavailing  tears 
which  he  is  said  to  have  shed  over  the  ashes  of  Darios,  we  find 
nothing  in  his  nature  that  is  not  hateful,  disgusting,  and  almost 
superhumanly  revolting  and  atrocious.  Of  the  Tyrians,  eight 
thousand  men  fell  in  the  assault  and  the  carnaofe  which  followed 
it,  and  of  this  slaughter  we  may  in  some  degree  acquit  the  king, 
as  it  is  probable  that,  if  he  had  endeavored  to  check  or  pacify  his 
eoldiery,  maddened  by  the  losses  they  had  undergone  and  the 
unexampled  severity,  and  length  of  the  defence,  he  would  scarce 
have  succeeded ;  but  it  is  not  to  be  denied  that  in  cold-blood  he 
sold  all  the  old  men,  women,  and  children,  except  such  as  were 
stealthily  saved  by  their  neighbors,  the  Sidonians,  into  hopeless 
slavery,  and  crucified  two  thousand  of  the  youth  around  the 
walls  of  the  place.  Thence,  insatiate  of  blood  and  unglutted 
with  gore  and  booty,  he  pursued  his  path  of  devastation  to  the 
frontiei-s  of  Egypt,  where  he  again  met  stern  resistance  at  the 


SIEGE  OF  GAZA  315 

walls  of  Gaza,  that  city  of  Gaza,  the  gates  of  which  had  been 
borne  away  in  ages  Vone,  by  the  giant  strength  of  Samson.  The 
siege  of  this  place  again  cost  hira  time,  and  human  hfe,  and  his 
own  blood — for  he  was  dangerously  wounded  here,  as  he  had 
been  twice  before  Tyre,  and,  in  the  carrying  the  two  cities, 
incurred  a  greater  loss  of  men  than  his  two  great  pitched  battles 
cost  him.  The  capture  of  this  second  stronghold  he  took  ad- 
vantage of,  whereby  to  disgrace  himself  immortally  by  the  base 
and  barbarous  murder  of  Boitis,  the  gallant  governor  of  the  place, 
who,  guilty  of  no  crime  but  the  brave  maintenance  of  the  liberties 
of  his  native  place,  was  brought  before  him  covered  with  wounds 
and  loaded  with  chains,  was  insulted  brutally  by  the  unkingly 
and  unmanly  conqueror,  and  then  by  his  orders  dragged  by  the 
heels,  perforated  and  secured  with  thong-s,  behind  a  chariot's 
Avheels  around  the  walls,  yet  living,  while  Alexander,  it  is  said, 
exulted  openly  over  his  success  in  imitating  his  great  ancestor, 
Achilles,  in  his  vengeance  on  his  enemies.  On  this  paltry  plea 
it  is  useless  to  comment.  The  very  existence  of  Achilles  is  hypo- 
thetical, and  this  brutal  deed  ascribed  to  him  by  Homer  is  re- 
lated as  an  act  of  signal  individual  vengeance  taken  for  the  death 
of  his  brother  in  arms  Patroklos,  and  in  direct  contrast  to  his 
ordinary  demeanor  which  is  represented  as  kind,  generous, 
courteous  and  placable,  alike  to  friend  and  foe,  so  soon  as  the 
rage  of  battle  had  subsided  in  his  bosom. 

Whether  this  base  and  felon  deed  was  committed  in  a  frantic 
emulation  of  the  hero  of  the  Iliad,  or — which  is  hr  more  prob- 
able— in  cold,  calculating,  merciless  policy,  to  deter  other 
governors  of  towns  from  a  like  pertinacity  of  defence,  it  is  equally 
detestable  and  accursed — after  that,  overlooking  all  his  jealous 
slaughters  of  his  best  and  bravest  generals  in  fits  of  tyrannical 
suspicion,  or  in  orgies  of  bestial  drunkenness,  I  regard  it  almost  a 
crime  in  the  Historian  who  dares  apply  to  this  capricious,  jealous, 
cruel  and  f^mta'^tical  despot,  the  degraded  title  of  a  hero.     Brave 


SIG  ALEXANDER    TFIE    GREAT. 

lie  unquestionably  was,  as  every  bull-do^  is,  and  as  ninety-nine 
of  eveiy  hundred  men — for  of  all  others,  this  much  admired  and 
over-rated  gift  of  mere  physical  courage,  is  the  commonest  and 
cheapest ;  and  it  is  owing  to  the  extreme  rarity  of  cowardice, 
no  less  than  to  its  loathsomeness,  that  men  regard  a  coward  as 
a  monster,  rather  than  a  man — and  with  that  one  exception  of 
braveiy,  I  can  see  no  other  quality  that  he  possessed  which 
should  preserve  him  from  the  utter  execration  of  mankind. 

From  Gaza  he  passed  downward  into  Egypt,  which,  never  a 
willing  vassal  to  the  Persian  kings,  surrendered  voluntaril}^  to 
his  arms,  and  after  foundilig  Alexandria — which  Miiust,  I  tliink, 
be  regarded,  in  connection  with  the  other  details  of  this  portion 
of  his  expedition,  rather  as  an  act  of  regal  ostentation  than  of 
policy  or  patriotic  foresight — rushed  away,  dragging  his  army 
after  him,  through  wastes  of  burning  sand,  m  search  of  the  tem- 
ple of  Hammon,  whose  venal  priests  he  easily  induced  to  pro- 
claim him  the  son  of  the  god,  and  himself  a  divine  king,  and  one 
to  be  approached,  not  with  human  reverence,  but  ^ith  sacrifice 
and  adoration. 

The  battle  of  Issos  was  dehvered,  as  I  have  stated  above,  in 
the  beginning  of  the  winter  B.C.  833.  Tyre  and  Gaza  were 
carried  in  the  following  year,  in  the  month  Hecatombaion,  cor- 
responding to  the  latter  part  of  July  and  the  beginning  of 
August,  in  the  archonship  of  Aniketos,*  according  to  Ai'rian — 
or,  as  Diodoros  says,  of  Nikeratos  ;f  and  it  was  not  until  the 
month  of  Pyanepsion,  corresponding  to  the  end  of  October  and 
commencement  of  ]S'o\'ember,  in  the  second  year  of  the  one  hun- 
dred and  twelfth  Olympiad,  B.C.  331, in  the  archonship  of  Aris- 
tophanes,J  after  a  lapse  of  two  years,  that  he  returned  from  tliis 
absurd,  if  not  insane,  career  of  superstitious  folly  and  childlike 
vanity,  to  follow  up  his  advantages,  and  decide  the  contest  foj 

*  Arrian  II,,  xxiv.  f  Diodoros  xvii.  40. 

t  Arrian  III.,  xvi-     Died.  xvii.  49. 


FALSE  MOVEMENTS.  31*7 

the  crown  of  Persia  on  the  plains  of  Arbela.  A  graver  mihtary 
error  than  this  diversion  from  his  true  course  and  true  purpose  1 
cannot  conceive,  or  one  that  casts  a  greater  doubt  upon  the 
reahty  of  Alexander's  ability  as  a  strategist.  As  a  mere  tacti- 
cian and  lighter  in  the  field  he  was  cei'tainly  of  the  first  strength ; 
but,  judging  from  this  movement,  undertaken  for  no  conceivable 
reason,  and  from  which  no  possible  benefit  was  derived,  I  con- 
sider him  hable  to  the  charge,  not  only  of  want  of  fixity  of  pur- 
pose and  soundness  of  judgment,  but  of  serious  strategetical 
incapacity. 

It  is  idle  to  speak  of  the  danger  of  leaving  such  places  as 
Tyre  and  Gaza  in  his  rear,  or  of  suffering  such  a  granaiy  and 
store-house  as  Egypt  to  continue  in  his  possession ;  for  in  the 
first  place,  their  geographical  position,  separated  by  leagues  and 
hundreds  of  leasrues  of  barren  and  burnina;  deserts  from  the 
regions  into  which  Darios  had  betaken  himself,  rendered  it 
impossible  that  either  those  cities  or'  that  province  could  have 
made  any  efiectual  diversion  in  his  favor,  even  if  they  had  desi- 
red to  do  so.  And  secondly,  none  of  the  tributary  cities  or 
remote  dependencies  of  the  Persian  kings  ever  served  them  volun- 
tarily, or,  if  they  did  so  at  all,  from  loyalty ;  and  Egypt,  as  the  result 
showed,  was  ftir  better  disposed  to  revolt  herself  from  the  arms 
of  Darios  than  to  strengthen  him  against  his  enemies. 

The  consequence  of  this  ftmlty  and  unmeaning  movement  to 
the  southward,  when  he  ought  to  have  been  following  Darios 
up  'svith  the  utmost  pi'omptitude  and  perseverance — which  had 
he  done,  that  unfortunate  prince  must  have  lost  his  capital,  and, 
probably,  his  whole  empire,  without  the  possibility  of  raising  an 
ai-my  to  strike  another  blow  hr  it,  and  that  long  before  Tyre  had 
fallen — the  consequence,  I  say,  of  that  absurd  movement  and 
expedition  was  his  being  compelled,  almost  two  years  afterward, 
to  fight  a  third  and  most  unnecessary  battle  against  a  much 
lai-ger  army  than  he  had  yet  encountored,  in  ground  exceedingly 


J?  18  ALEX  A  XD  En    THE    GREAT. 

adveree  to  himself,  and  as  advantageous  to  the  Orientals,  who 
had  gained  experience  from  disaster — and,  in  fact,  to  risk  the 
defeat  which  he  very  narrowly  escaped — his  left  wing  being  very 
nearly  defeated,  his  rear  turned,  and  his  encampment  actually 
sacked  by  the  barbarians,  at  Arbela. 

No  one,  however  ignorant  of  military  afFaii-s,  but  must  per- 
ceive that  an  Rrmj  of  a  million  of  men  cannot  be  brought 
together,  armed  and  embodied,  in  a  moment ;  and,  in  fact,  we 
find  that  it  was  not  until  after  Alexander's  return  from  the  great 
oasis  in  the  African  desert,  above  two  thousand  miles  distant,  and 
after  a  lapse  of  two  entire  years,  that  he  was  enabled  to  take  the 
field  against  him.  We  have  seen  that  his  forces  were  com- 
pletely dispersed ;  that  on  his  arriving  at  Thapsakos,  after  the 
battle,  the  Persian  king  could  muster  only  four  thousand  men 
under  his  standard ;  so  that  a  vigorous  pursuit,  even  had  it 
failed  to  capture  him,  could  not  have  failed  to  drive  him  into  the 
extreme  north-eastern  provinces — to  which  he  fled  after  Arbela — 
and  to  leave  his  capital,  and  all  the  wealth  and  power  of  his 
empire  in  the  hands  of  the  conquerors.  His  communications 
were  all  safe  with  Makedonia  and  Greece  at  large,  through  Asia 
Minor,  which  afforded  him  an  admirable  base  of  operations 
against  Lower  Asia,  governed  as  it  was  by  his  own  officers,  and 
secured  him  a  safe  retreat,  should  the  worst  have  occurred.  But 
when  we  consider,  in  war  above  all  things,  the  immense  advan- 
tage of  dealing  successive  blows,  each  after  each,  before  the  stun- 
ning effect  of  the  last  has  passed  away ;  the  importance  of  acting 
against  a  people  demoralized  and  dispirited  by  defeat,  and 
despairing  even  of  safety  by  arms,  rather  than  of  giving  them 
time  to  recover  courage,  growing  out  of  the  assailant's  tardiness 
and  want  of  energy ;  and  last  of  all,  the  great  influence  which 
the  fall  of  their  capital  produces  on  any  nation — but  more  espe- 
cially upon  the  Orientals — we  cannot  fiiil  to  see  that  Alexander 
threw  away  a  chance,  if  not  a  certainty,  of  terminating  the  war 


BEFORE    ARBELA.  319 

at  a  blow  ;  and  so  far  from  gaining  any  adequate  advantage  by 
the  delay,  weakened  his  own  army,  exposed  it  to  needless  toils 
and  perils,  and  alienated  the  people  of  Syria  by  his  ruthless  cru- 
elty, with  no  possible  object  that  I  can  discover,  unless  it  were 
the  spoils  of  the  proud  and  wealthy  Tyre,  so  long  the  mistress 
of  the  seas. 

It  was  early  spring  of  the  year  331,  when  Alexander  took  his 
departure  from  Memphis,  and  returned,  through  Phoinikia,  by 
the  same  way  he  had  come,  receiving  congratulatory  embassies 
from  all  the  Greek  states,  regulating  the  tributes,  and  accepting 
the  submission  of  the  conquered  provinces,  as  he  passed  ;  but  he 
did  not  reach  Thapsakos  and  the  fords  of  the  Euphi-ates,  which 
Darios  had  crossed  a  few  days  after  the  battle  of  Issos,  until 
the  month  Hecatombaion — the  same  in  which,  on  the  pre- 
vious year,  he  had  taken  Tyre.  Here  he  found  Mazaios,  with 
three  thousand  horse  and  two  thousand  Greek  mercenaries, 
appointed  to  defend  the  passage  of  the  river,  but  they  made  no 
offer  at  defence,  flying  without  drawing  a  bowstring,  leaving 
the  Makedonians  to  cross  the  stream  unmolested.  Hence  he 
marched  up  the  Euphrates,  keeping  the  river  on  his  left,  through 
Mesopotamia,  in  a  northerly  direction,  with  his  back  toward 
Babylon,  ha\Hng  learned  from  some  scattered  prisoners  of 
Darios'  army  who  were  taken  on  the  march,  that  his  rival 
was  encamped  on  the  Tigris,  with  a  much  larger  army  than 
he  had  in  Kilikia,  and  intended  to  make  a  stand  there,  to 
obstruct  his  passage.  Thither  then  he  followed  with  all  speed, 
as  if  to  make  up  for  the  time  he  had  wasted  during  the  two  past 
seasons ;  but  when  he  reached  the  banks  of  the  river,  he  found 
neither  Darios  nor  any  forces  left  to  confront  him,  and  crossed 
the  Tigris,  without  any  opposition  from  the  enem}^,  but  with 
great  difficulty,  owing  to  the  strength  and  rapidity  of  the 
current. 

On  the  following  day  a  few  horse  showed  themselves  on  the 


S20  ALEXANDER    THE    GKEAT. 

plain,  when  Alexander  instantly  charged  with  the  body-guard, 
and  one  squadron  of  the  Companions,  and  the  guides,  and  though 
they  fled  without  striking  a  blow  he  pursued  them  so  sharply 
that  he  killed  a  few  and  made  several  prisonei-s,  from  whom  he 
learned  where  Darios  lay,  and  of  what  troops  his  army  was  com- 
posed.    For  he  had  now  called  in  all  the  wild  and  barbarous 
tribes  from  the  shores  of  Kaspian  to  the  Persian  gulf,  Indians  and 
Baktrians,    and    Sogdianians,    under  their    Satrap  Bessos,  and 
Sakians  of  the  Skythian  race,  horse  archers,  serving  not  as  sub- 
jects of  Darios,  but  as  allies  of  Darios;  and  Barsaentes  their 
Satrap  had  brought  the  Arachosians  and  the  hill-tribes  of  India, 
and    Satibarzanes  brought  the   Arkians.      The  Parthians,  and 
Hyrcanians,  and  Tapuroi  all  cavalry,  were  then  under  Phrata- 
phernes.     Atropates  led  the  Medes,  and  with  the  Medes  were 
enrolled  the  Kadusians,  the  Albanians,  the  Sakesinai ;  but  the  tribes 
fi-om  the  Pei-sian  gulf  were  commanded  by  Orondobates,  and 
Ariobarzanes,  and  Otanes.     The  Uxians  and  Susians  followed 
Oxathres,  the  son  of  x^bulitos.     Bupares  led  the  Babylonians, 
and  the  scattered  tribe  of  Karians  and  Sitakinians,  mustered  with 
the    Babylonians.       Mithraustes  and  Orontes    commanded    the 
Armenians,  Ararakes  the  Kappadokians,  and  Mazaios  the  troops 
of  Koilesyria,  and  Syria  between  the  rivers.     Their  whole  force 
amounted  to  forty  thousand  horse,  a  million  foot,  t\vo  hundred 
scythed  chariots,  and  fifteen  elephants,  which  had  been  brought 
thither  by  the  Indians  proper  from  beyond  the  Indos.     And  with 
this  enormous  armament,  Darios  was  awaiting  his  approach  in 
the  plains  of  Gaugamela  on  the  river  Bumodos  about  seventy 
miles  distant  from  the  city  of  Arbela,  now  Erbil,  in  a  country 
perfectly  level  and  free  from  the  slightest  inequality  of  surface  ; 
for  Darios   had  been  adxised  that  his  defeat  on  tlie  Issos  was 
caused  by  his  wanting  the  room  to  display  his  forces,  and  by 
/uggednor-s  of  the  surface  hindering  the  action  of  his  cavalry,  and 
behoving  tliii-- — as  it  was  indeed  in  good  part  true — had  em 


THE   FIELD  OF  ARBELA.  821 

ployed  his  numbers  in  cutting  away  every  hillock,  and  filling  up 
every  hollow,  so  that  the  whole  field  w^as  practicable  for  his 
chariots,  and  for  the  charge  of  his  admirable  horse. 

On  gaining  this  intelligence  Alexander  halted  his  army,  and 
remained  where  he  was  four  days,  which  he  spent  in  fortifying 
an  entrenched  camp  ^^dth  a  fosse  and  a  palisade,  within  which 
he  determined  to  leave  all  his  baggage  and  supernumeraries,  and 
all  the  soldiers  who  chanced  to  be  hors  de  combat^  while  he 
would  advance  himself  with  the  fighting  men,  carrying  nothing 
but  tlieir  arms,  and  deliver  battle  on  the  spot.  The  armies  were 
at  this  time  about  eight  miles  asunder ;  but  there  was  a  range 
of  low  hillocks  between  them  which  intercepted  their  \iew,  nor 
until  Alexander  had  marched  half  the  intervening  distance  and 
ascended  the  hills,  did  he  discover  the  countless  multitudes  of 
the  enemy  filling  the  plains  almost  beyond  the  reach  of  eyesight 
with  all  the  gorgeous  glitter  and  barbaric  pomp  of  Asiatic  war- 
fare. And  here,  it  is  said,  Parmenion  advised  him  to  attack  the 
enemy  by  night  in  his  camps,  and  that  Alexander  refused,  saying 
that  he  came  to  fight  battles  not  to  steal  them. 

He  decided  well,  although  that  unquestionably  was  not  his 
reason ;  though  it  w^as  well  too  that  he  should  give  it  as  such, 
since  it  was  likely  to  encourage  the  soldiers,  who  were  not,  it 
should  seem,  in  such  high  spirits  as  usual,  having  fallen  into  a 
panic  once,  wdien  no  enemy  was  within  miles  of  them,  as  they 
marched  through  Mesopotamia,  and  ha\ing  been  again  so  much 
disordered  in  fording  the  Tigris  that  had  they  been  attacked  by 
Mazaios  they  would  surely  have  been  defeated.  But  Alexander 
well  knew  that  in  a  night  attack,  the  least  disorder  or  want  of 
combined  action  must  be  fatal,  and  that  the  risk  must  be  greater 
to  a  small  force  like  his  own,  the  only  chance  of  which  was  per- 
fect unity  of  movement,  and  intelligent  concert.  He  deferred 
the  battle,  therefore,  to  the  next  morning,  and  spent  the  after- 
noon in  carefully  reconnoitring  the  ground,  which  he  suspected 


822  Ai.EXANDr.R    THE    GREAT. 

to  be  perforated  vvitli  pitfalls,  and  strewn  with  caltlirops  and 
crowsfeet,  to  lame  his  horses.  It  is  said  that  in  the  morning  of 
the  battle  he  slept  so  late  and  so  soundly  that  Parmenion  had 
hard  work  to  arouse  him,  so  anxious  had  he  been  of  late,  lest  the 
enemy  should  persist  in  refusing  action,  and  devastating  the 
country  behind  him  as  he  retreated. 

And  well  he  might  be  anxious,  and  self-reproachful,  for  it  was 
entirely  his  own  fault  that  Darios  had  an  army  there  at  all,  to 
encounter  him  ;  for  not  one  man  of  all  the  myriads  there  assem- 
bled came  from  the  regions  which  he  had  traversed,  but  had 
been  brought  up  at  vast  labor  and  expense  of  time  and  money 
from  the  extreme  regions  of  the  east,  the  north,  and  the  south, 
almost  from  the  limits  of  the  frigid  to  those  of  the  torrid  zone. 
Doubtless  he  now  felt  and  acknowledged  to  himself  that  for  the 
idiotic  vanity  of  being  styled  the  son  of  Hammon,  he  had  lost 
the  opportunity  of  being  actually  king  of  Asia,  and  that  he  had 
in  consequence  all  his  battles  to  fight  over  again  here  at  Arbela, 
and  that  except  in  being  so  far  advanced  into  the  bowels  of  the 
land,  and  having  in  his  favor  the  prestige  of  victory,  he  was  not 
one  iota  the  better,  than  he  was  on  the  eve  of  the  Granikos. 
Had  Napoleon  won  the  battle  of  Issos  in  November,  he  would 
have  been  crowned  in  Babylon  before  the  new  year.  Nothing 
in  war  is  of  so  much  consequence  as  time,  and  the  best  judge  and 
economist  of  time  is  the  greatest  general.  But  now  Alexander 
was  in  the  field,  and  there,  as  is  admitted,  he  had  few  superiors 
— he  had  desperate  valor,  he  possessed  the  full  confidence  of  his 
men,  he  was  in  command  of  as  fine  an  army  as  ever  marched  to 
victory,  and,  last  not  least,  his  fortune  never  failed  him,  though 
certainly  he  tried  it  to  the  utmost.  The  army  of  Darios  was  thus 
arrayed,  for  the  plan  of  his  battle  was  taken  in  the  original  draft 
as  Aristokelos  states.  On  the  left  were  the  Baktrian  cavalry,  the 
Daai,  and  the  Arachosians,  and  next  to  these  the  Pei-sians,  hoi*se 
and   foot    commingled.      Then    counting  fiom  the    right    the 


THE    ARRAY    AT    ARBELA.  ,323 

Susians  and  to  the  right  of  these  the  Kaduslans  up  to  the 
centre  of  the  whole  array.  To  the  extreme  right  of  the  Hne  the 
Medes  were  ranked  with  the  men  from  Koile  Syria,  and  Mesopo- 
tamia ;  the  Parthians  and  Sakian?,  the  Hyrcanians  and  Tapiroi, 
\he  Albanians  and  Sakesinai  closed  up  with  the  centre,  whore 
Darios  fought  in  pereon,  with  the  corps  known  as  the  ffinsmen 
)f  the  king,  and  the  Persian  immortals  having  golden  balls  on 
the  reverse  of  their  spears,  and  the  Indians  and  the  Karian  exiles 
and  Mardian  archery.  The  Uxians,  Babylonians,  Sitakinians 
and  nations  from  the  Persian  gulf  were  drawn  up  in  deep  masses 
behind  the  centre.  On  the  left,  opposed  to  Alexander's  right 
were  the  Skythian  cavalry,  with  about  a  thousand  Baktrians,  and 
a  hundred  war  chariots  ;  the  elephants  were  opposed  to  the  body- 
guard with  fifty  chariots,  and  on  the  extreme  right  of  the  Persians 
stood  the  Armenian  and  Kappadokian  horse  with  the  last  fifty  of 
the  scythed  cars  ;  but  the  Greek  mercenaries,  who  could  alone 
hope  to  withstand  the  shock  of  the  Makedouians,  were  stationed 
in  the  centre,  on  either  hand  of  Darios  and  his  Persian  body- 
guard. 

Against  this  formidable  array  Alexander  ordered  his  men  thus. 
On  the  right  of  his  line  were  the  Royal  companions  of  the  horse 
life-guard,  the  first  of  whom  were  the  squadron  of  body-guards, 
commanded  by  Kleitos  son  of  Dropidas,  then  the  squadrons  of 
Glaukias,  of  Ariston,  of  Sopis  son  of  Hermodoros,  of  Herakleides 
son  of  Antiochos,  of  Denetrios  son  of  Athamenes,  of  INIeleager, 
and,  last  of  the  royal  squadrons,  of  Hegesilochos  son  of  Ilippo- 
stratos.  But  Philotas  the  son  of  Parmenion  commanded  the 
whole  body  of  the  household  cavalry.  Next  to  the  hoi-se  was 
the  royal  foot  guard  of  the  hifpasijistai^  and  then  the  remainder 
of  those  troops.  After  them,  who  were  under  the  command  of 
Nikanor,  a  second  son  of  Parmenion,  stood  the  regiments  of 
Koinos,  Perdikkas,  Meleager  son  of  Neoptolemos  of  Polyperchon 
of  Amyntas  under  command  of  Sinmias,  that  day — for  Amyntaa 


r-124  ALEXANDER    THE    GREAT. 

was  on  recruiting  service  in  Makedonia,  and  lastly,  to  the  left  of 
the  whole  phalanx,  of  Krateros  son  of  Alexandres,  who  com- 
manded all  the  infiintry  of  the  left. 

Next  to  the  phalanx  were  the  allied  horse,  under  Eriguios  son 
of  Larekos,  and  the  Thessalians  of  Philip  son  of  Menelaos  ;  and 
Parmenion  had  the  leading  of  all  the  cavalry  of  the  left,  and  kept 
about  his  own  person  the  best  of  the  Pharsalian  horse  and  most 
of  the  Thessalians.  Such  was  the  array  of  the  front  line,  but  in 
the  rear  of  these  he  had  formed  a  second  line,  whose  leaders  had 
oi-ders  to  form  front  to  the  rear,  in  case  of  the  enemy's  turning 
their  flanks  and  attacking  them  in  reverse.  On  the  right,  sup- 
porting the  royal  squadron,  were  half  the  Agrianians,  led  by 
Attalos,  the  Makedonian  bowmen  under  Brison,  and  what  were 
called  the  old  bands  of  mercenaries  under  Kleander.  In  the  van 
of  these  were  the  guides,  and  Paionian  horse,  led  by  Aretes  and 
Ariston  ;  and  again,  in  the  van  of  these  the  allied  cavalry  under 
Menidas.  But,  in  advance  of  the  royal  squadron,  and  the  other 
Companions,  were  the  rest  of  the  Agrianians  and  the  archery, 
and  the  javelineers  of  Balakros  opposed  to  the  scythed  chariots  ; 
and  Menidas  had  orders,  in  case  the  enemy  should  turn  that 
flank,  to  take  them  in  flank  with  a  flying  charge  as  they  wheeled ; 
so  was  the  right  wing  ordered.  But  in  the  rear  of  the  left,  to 
guard  against  a  flank  attack,  were  the  Thrakians  of  Sitalkes,  the 
aUied  cavalry  of  Koiranos,  the  Odrysians  under  Agathon  son  of 
Turimma,  and,  in  the  van  of  all  these,  the  mercenary  troopers 
commanded  by  Andromaclios  the  son  of  Hiero.  With  the  bag- 
gage guard,  the  Thrakian  infentry  were  posted  in  reserve ;  the 
whole  of  Alexander's  forces  amounting  to  forty  thousand  foot, 
and  seven  thousand  horse — a  small  foi'ce,  indeed,  as  it  would 
seem,  to  contend  in  the  open  field  against  a  million  of  men.  But 
in  truth,  as  all  these  Oriental  battles  show,  the  Greek  soldiers 
were  only  actually  opposed  to  so  many  men  as  could  be  bi'ought 
to  bear  upon  them   at  one  instant ;  for  the  moment  the  fii-st 


THE  ATTACK  AT  ARBELA.  325 

stniggle  was  over  tlie  battles  were  ended,  since  the  Orientak 
could  never  be  made  to  act  in  succession  as  reserves,  but 
when  those  who  were  exposed  to  the  first  brunt  turned  their 
backs,  all  fled  in  headlong  rout  and  irretrievable  confusion.  So 
that  in  reality  the  vast  numbei's  of  those  Asiatic  hordes  rather 
swelled  the  carnage  of  their  own  ranks,  and  enhanced  the  glory 
of  the  Greeks,  than  increased  their  difficulties  or  added  to  their 
danger. 

So  soon  as  the  armies  were  feirl}"  fj-ont  to  front,  Alexander  as 
usual  charged  fii-st  with  the  cavaby  of  his  right  wing,  and  the 
Persians  met  him  in  full  career,  greatly  outflanking  him  to  the 
right,  and  the  Skythians,  who  were  wheeling  round  his  flanks, 
were  engaged  with  the  troops  set  to  oppose  them ;  and  still 
Alexander  led  at  full  gallop  to  the  spear-hand,  and  was  almost 
beyond  that  part  of  the  plain  which  was  levelled,  when  Darios 
feai'ing  that  his  chariots  would  be  rendered  useless,  directed  all 
the  advanced  cavalry  of  his  left  to  turn  Alexander's  right,  and 
prevent  his  farther  progress  to  that  hand.  And,  as  they  did  so, 
Alexander  launched  Menidos  with  the  mercenaries  against  them  ; 
but  the  Skythian  and  Baktrian  hoi'se  charged  Menidos  home,  and 
broke  his  squadrons  by  the  vast  superiority  of  their  numbers, 
when  Alexander  brought  up  Ariston's  Paionians,  and  the  allies, 
who  broke  the  barbarians  in  turn.  These  again  were  supported 
by  fresh  squadrons  of  Baktrians,  and  rallying  on  their  supports, 
fought  liand  to  hand  furiously  with  thti  Greeks,  and  Alexander's 
men  fell  fast — for  they  were  sorely  overmatched,  and  the  Sky- 
thians were  better  accoutred  with  defensive  armor — still  the 
Makedonians  could  not  be  forced  oflf  their  ground,  and  charging 
constantly  in  open  column  of  squadrons,  at  last  bore  the  enemy 
bodily  out  of  their  lines.  Then  the  barbarians  launched  their 
chariots,  hoping  to  dislocate  the  phalanx,  and  cut  it  to  pieces 
with  the  formidable  scythes.  But  in  this  they  were  sorely  disap- 
pointed, for  the  Agi-ianians  and  the  javehneei-s  of  Balakros,  who 


326  ALEXANDER    THE    GREAT. 

were  in  front  of  the  royal  companions,  received  them  with  a 
shower  of  missiles,  which  they  could  not  brook,  and  seized  the 
reins  ;  dragging  the  drivers  down,  and  surrounding  the  horses, 
cut  them  to  pieces.  Some  few  passed  through  the  ranks,  which 
opened  to  receive  them ;  and  these  ran  away,  doing  no  damage, 
to  the  rear,  where  they  wei-e  mastered  by  the  grooms  and  hoi-se- 
boys  of  Alexander's  army. 

But  as  Darios  now  advanced  along  his  whole  front,  Alexan- 
der ordered  Aretes  to  charge  the  horse  who  were  wheeling 
round  his  right ;  and  as  this  charge  succeeded  to  perfection,  and 
separated  the  cavalry  from  the  barbarian  phalanx  on  the  riglit, 
Alexander  himself  charged  with  all  his  cavalry  of  the  Royal  Com- 
panions and  his  phalanx  fall  into  the  gap,  at  a  tremendous  pace 
and  with  the  terrible  battle-cry.  For  a  short  space  the  strife 
was  stubborn  and  hand  to  hand  ;  but,  as  Alexander  and  the 
life-guard  charged  in,  irresistibly,  plunging  their  spears  into  the 
faces  of  the  Persians,  and  riding  them  down  with  the  sheer  weight 
of  their  horses,  and  as  the  Makedonian  phalanx  fell  in  upon  them, 
Rohd  as  a  wall,  and  bristling  with  the  terrible  sarissai,  the  Asiat- 
ics could  endure  it  no  longer,  and  Darios  himself  was  the  first 
man  to  turn  and  fly.  And  at  the  same  moment  the  Skythian 
horse  gave  way  before  the  onset  of  Aretas,  and  in  that  quarter 
of  the  field  all  was  utter  ruin  and  carnage  among  the  Pei-sians ; 
for  the  Makedonians  trampled  them  under  foot  and  slaughtered 
them  at  ['leasure.  • 

But  Simmia=5,  with  his  regiment  and  those  to  his  left,  was 
unable  to  join  in  the  pursuit,  but  halted  his  phalanx,  and  main- 
tained a  standing  fight ;  for  intelligence  had  reached  him  that 
the  Makedonian  left  was  worsted.  And  thus  the  front  being 
opened,  some  of  the  Indian  and  Persian  hoi-se  broke  through  the 
centre  and  cut  their  way  to  the  camp  and  the  baggage-guard  ;  and 
there  was  desperate  fighting  there,  for  the  barbarian  prisoners  of 
war  rose  on  their  captors,  and,  takino^  up  arms,  made  a  great 


STORM    OF    THE    CAMP.  32*7 

slaughter  of  the  unarmed  camp  followers ;  and  the  cry  went 
through  the  tents  that  victory  was  with  the  Persians,  and  the 
hearts  of  Sisygambis  the  mother  of  Darios,  and  her  captive 
granddaughters,  beat  high  between  hope  and  terror.  But  the 
hope  was  soon  ended,  for  the  troops  who  were  drawn  up  for  that 
purpose  in  the  rear  of  the  front  line,  wheeled  instantly,  and  form- 
ing face  to  the  rear,  took  the  plunderers  of  the  camp  in  reveree, 
and  making  a  fearful  slaughter  of  them,  recovered  all  that  was 
lost  in  that  quarter. 

But  in  the  mean  time,  the  Persian  right,  ignorant  of  the  flight 
of  Darios,  had  completely  turned  the  left  of  Parmenion  ;  so  that, 
far  from  being  able  to  assist  Alexander  or  to  press  the  flying  foe, 
he  was  unable  to  hold  his  own  ground,  but  sent  to  the  king  for 
aid.  He,  having  no  enemy  in  his  part  of  the  field  who  was  not 
already  in  headlong  flight,  turned  most  unwiUingly  from  his  pur- 
suit, for  he  had  strong  hopes  of  capturing  Darios  and  terminating 
the  war  with  a  thunderstroke.  He  knew,  however,  too  well  the 
consequence  of  leaving  a  field  half  won,  and  wheeling  hard  to 
his  own  left,  with  all  the  cavalry  of  the  Royal  Companions, 
charged,  as  hard  as  they  could  spur  their  horses  to  the  shock,  on 
the  right  of  the  barbarians.  The  first  whom  they  encountered 
were  the  worsted  Parthians  and  Indians,  and  the  bravest  of  the 
Persian  horse,  retreating  from  the  Greek  camp,  and  this  was  the 
heaviest  and  fiercest  conflict  of  the  day ;  for  finding  themselves 
cut  off",  and  seeing  no  hope  of  safety  unless  by  dint  of  sheer  blows, 
they  charged  up  face  to  face  against  Alexander,  without  hurling 
a  javelin  or  turning  a  charger,  but  struck  each  man  at  the  man 
opposed  to  him,  and  slashed  and  hewed,  and  were  slashed  at 
and  hewn  down,  unsparing  and  unspared.  In  the  end,  however, 
Alexander  and  the  Greek  valor  prevailed,  though  sixty  of  the 
Companions  were  killed  outright  in  that  short  melee,  and 
Hephaistion  and  Koinos  and  Menidas  were  wounded. 

And  now  Alexander  was  on  the  point  of  attacking  the  extreme 


328  ALEXANDER   THE    GREAT. 

1-ight  wing  of  the  enemy,  having  swept  their  whole  front  fi-ora 
the  extreme  left,  when  he  perceived  that  his  work  was  done  to 
his  hand  by  the  gallantry  of  his  Thessalians,  who  never  failed 
him,  so  that  he  was  enabled  to  return  to  the  pursuit  of  Darios — 
whom  he  followed  on  the  S2)ur  so  long  as  there  was  light  to 
see — but  when  he  had  crossed  the  Lykos  or  Great  Zab,  not  far 
from  the  spot  where  the  Greek  leaders  were  murdered  in  the 
expedition  of  Kyros,  he  halted  fijr  a  few  hours  at  midnight,  to 
recruit  his  men  and  horses ;  and  on  the  following  morning 
resumed  the  .chase  as  far  as  to  Arbela,  seventy  miles  distant  from 
the  field  of  battle,  hoping  there  to  take  Darios  ;  but  he  had  again 
escaped — perhaps  unfortunate  that  he  did  so,  for  he  might  have 
found  the  compassion  of  his  enemy  a  surer  stay  than  the  loyalty 
of  his  false  friends.  Of  Alexander's  personal  attendants  there  fell 
in  the  conflict  and  the  pursuit  a  hundred  men  and  above  a 
thousand  horses,  half  of  them  belonging  to  the  Royal  Companions, 
between  wounds  and  weariness ;  the  entire  loss  of  the  Makedo- 
nian  army  being  about  five  hundred,  while  that  of  the  enemy 
was  counted  at  three  hundred  thousand  killed,  and  more  prison- 
ers than  slain,  with  all  the  elephants  and  camels,  and  all  the 
wealth  and  treasures  of  the  camp. 

And  this  action,  in  fact,  terminated  the  war ;  for  from  Arbela 
Alexander  marched  straight  to  Babylon,  which  sent  out  a  depu- 
tation of  the  priests  and  chief  men  of  the  city  to  meet  him,  with 
gifts  and  the  keys  of  the  city,  acknowledging  him  conqueror  and 
king.  Thence,  after  a  short  pause,  which  he  spent  in  ordering 
the  government,  appointing  officers,  regulating  tributes,  and 
estabhshing  everything  on  a  solid  foundation,  he  marched  in 
twenty  days  to  Susa,  the  royal  dty  and  seat  of  government, 
where  he  became  master  of  all  the  trejisures  accumulated  by  the 
Pei*sian  kings  for  ages — including  all  the  spoils  carried  away  from 
Greece  by  Xerxes,  and  fifty  thousand  talents  of  silver — equal  to 
fifteen  millions  sterhng — and  virtually  king  of  Asia.    From  Suza 


THE    PURSUIT.  329 

he  pressed  hard  on  the  traces  of  Darios,  through  India,  and, 
sending  out  his  generals  in  all  directions  to  complete  the  subju- 
gation of  the  country,  pursued  himself  day  and  night,  with  his 
light  troops  and  horse — chasing  the  more  earnastly  when  he 
knew  that  Darios  was  in  peril  from  the  treachery  of  Bessos — 
killing  liorees  and  wearing  out  men,  but  himself  indefatigable  ; 
until  at  length,  when  he  had  but  five  hundred  soldiers  left  about 
him,  he  found  his  hapless  rival  breathing  his  last,  pierced  with 
numerous  wounds,  and  having  endured,  as  the  climax  of  all  ago- 
nies, that  of  expiring  by  the  treacherous  hands  of  false  friends, 
without  a  friendly  hand  to  wipe  the  death  sweat  from  his  brow 
or  to  close  his  dying  eyes. 

His  enemy  and  conqueror,  they  say,  wept  over  him ;  certainly 
he  buried  him  ^\^th  all  the  honors  due  to  a  king,  and  in  a  kingly 
sepulchre  ;  but  not  till  after  he  had  robbed  him  of  all  that  makes 
life  valuable — family,  friends,  station,  country,  life — for  if  it  was 
not  by  his  hands  or  by  his  orders,  it  was  by  his  instrumentality, 
that  he  died. 

So  after  making  him  a  widower,  fatherless,  and  a  beggar,  he 
wept  over  him,  and  buried  him  as  a  king.  The  king's  tears  and 
the  kingly  burial  availed  the  senseless  clay  about  the  same. 
But  they  were  in  truth  offered  to  the  vainglory  of  the  hving, 
not  to  the  memory  of  the  dead,  and  so  their  purpose  was 
answered. 

The  death  of  Darios  occurred  in  the  third  year  of  the  one 
hundred  and  twelfth  Olympiad,  330  B.C. ;  so  that  four  yeai*s 
only  had  elapsed  between  his  passage  of  the  Hellespont  and  his 
succession  to  the  undisputed  throne  of  Asia,  which,  had  he  used 
ordinary  foresight  and  energy  after  the  battle  of  Issos,  he  might 
have  grasped  two  years  sooner. 

And  here  I  leave  Alexander — for  it  is  not  his  hfe  nor  his  char- 
acter that  I  am  relating,  but  his  military  and  strategetical 
career,  which  I  regard  as  terminated  here ;  so  far,  at  least,  as  to 
15 


330  ALEXANDER    THE    GREAT. 

enable  us  to  form  a  judgment  of  liis  qualities,  merits,  and  defects, 
as  a  strategist. 

It  is  ti'ue  that  his  life  lasted  four  years  longer,  and  that  those 
four  yeai*s  were  passed  in  almost  incessant  warfare ;  that  he  over- 
run the  countries,  shedding  human  blood  like  water,  from  the 
shores  of  the  Kaspian  Sea,  which  he  looked  upon  the  first 
of  Greeks,  perhaps  of  Europeans — to  the  banks  of  the  Indus, 
down  which  his  galleys  sailed  triumphant  to  the  Pei-sian  Gulf, 
and  thence  ascended  the  Red  Sea  to  his  Egyptian  province — 
that  he  gained  fruitless  victories,  barren  of  all  but  slaughter, 
whithei-soever  he  went,  and  founded  cities,  the  very  names  of 
which  have  perished ;  that  he  risked  his  own  life  and  that  of  his 
followers  as  recklessly  in  the  storming  of  some  paltry  Indian 
village,  as  when  all  was  at  stake  on  the  fields  of  the  Issos  or 
Gaugamela. 

But  beyond  desperate  fool-hardy  courage  and  the  admu-able 
discipline  of  his  unrivalled  troops,  there  is  little  to  observe  and 
nothing  to  admire  in  the  details  of  his  latter  campaigns.  His 
cruelties,  his  debaucheries,  his  capricious  jealousy,  and  almost 
insane  tyranny,  are  so  well  known  that  I  need  not  dwell  on  them 
as  a  counterblast  to  the  dazzling  splendor  of  his  glorious  careei*, 
as  it  is  called,  of  victory  and  renown. 

He  died,  as  it  has  generally  been  stated  by  historians  and 
almost  universally  received,  of  the  consequences  of  a  more 
frantic  orgy  of  drunkenness  than  was  usual  even  for  hira — 
but  as  it  is  now  pretty  satisfactorily  ascertained,  of  one  of  those 
devouring  and  fatal  fevers  peculiar  to  the  Punjaub  and  the 
banks  of  the  Scinde,  whither  he  had  pushed  his  franticai 
pursuit  of  glory.  So  that  the  drunkenness  was  the  consequence 
of  the  burning  thirst  which  accompanies  that  peculiar  fever,  not 
the  fever  the  consequence  of  the  drunkenness.  So  he  died,  but 
not  with  him  died  the  evils  he  had  done,  for  he  bequeathed  his 
empire  on  his  death  bed  to  the  bravest — he  might  as  well  have 


HIS    STRATEGY.  331 

said  with  Pyn'hos  of  Epiros,  to  the  sharpest  sword,  for  that  was 
the  arbiter  appealed  to  through  many  an  age  of  blood  and 
barbarism  among  his  successors. 

His  career  has  been  compared,  in  my  opinion  most  unjustly, 
to  that  of  Napoleon — there  being  but  two  points  of  resemblance 
between  them,  the  extent  of  the  territories  they  overran  and 
devastated,  alike  without  consolidating  an  empire,  or  founding  a 
dynasty — and  the  oceans  of  blood  they  shed  to  gratify,  not 
satiate,  their  boundless  ambition.  As  a  general,  Alexander 
cannot  for  a  moment  stand  in  juxtaposition  with  the  mighty 
Corsican,  who  never  took  a  leaf  out  of  any  man's  book  of 
strategy  whereby  to  win  a  battle ;  but  where  the  difficulties 
waxed  the  greatest  and  the  dangers,  thence  drew  the  most 
splendid  inspirations,  thence  produced  his  most  marvellous  re- 
sources. The  history  of  his  battles  is  as  various  as  the  battles 
themselves  are  numerous,  and  each  is  a  study  and  a  lesson  in 
itself.  Alexander's  battles  were  all  cast  in  the  same  mould,  all 
won  on  the  same  principle,  and  that  principle  not  his  own,  but 
the  oblique  method  of  Epaminondas ;  overpowering  the  enemy's 
left  by  his  own  personal  attack,  with  his  centre  and  left  with- 
dravvn,  and  then  wheeling  to  his  own  left  and  enfilading  the 
ranks  opposed  to  him  by  a  flank  attack.  Nor  did  he  do  this  as 
Epaminondas  did — by  a  concentration  of  force  on  a  single  point, 
so  that  his  onset  must  to  a  mathematical  certainty  succeed — but 
by  reliance  on  the  prestige  of  his  great  name  and  the  vehemence 
of  his  personal  onslaught.  In  any  one  of  his  battles,  had  the 
enemy  been  able  to  make  head  against  him  for  half  an  horn- 
longer  than  he  did,  the  Makedonian  army  would  have  been 
beaten  to  a  certainty.  Never  was  a  won  battle  nearer  lost, 
unless  we  except  Marengo,  which  was  not  one  but  two  battles 
fought  in  one  day,  than  that  of  Arbela,  for  the  day  was  lost  on 
the  left,  more  than  doubtful  on  the  right,  and  the  camp  taken  in 
the  rear,  when  Alexander's  personal  rush  upon  the  centre  carried 


332  ALEXANDER    THE    GREAT. 

all  before  it,  and  the  flight  of  Darios  gave  him  a  victory  which 
might  even  then  have  been  long  contested,  if  not  won,  by- 
Persia.  His  own  death  while  leading  would  at  any  moment 
have  lost  all,  for  it  was  his  own  fiery  com'age  and  the  terror  that 
attached  to  his  name,  not  his  plans  or  his  tactics,  that  conquered. 

As  a  daring  soldier  and  superb  cavalry  officer  he  was  undeni- 
ably great,  and  with  but  two  rivals,  one  of  the  middle  ages,  one 
of  these  latter  days — Coeur  de  Lion,  and  Joachim  Murat,  whom 
in  very  much  of  his  military  character  he  most  resembles. 

As  a  man,  he  stands  so  immeasurably  below  Napoleon  that  I 
am  almost  ashamed  to  mention  them  together,  for  Napoleon, 
though  stern,  inflexible,  and  careless  of  human  life  where  policy 
required  its  taking  oflf,  was  as  far  removed  as  possible  from 
cruelty,  while  Alexander  was  barbarous  beyond  Henry  VIII. 
and  Nero,  in  his  fits  of  frenzy,  sacrificing  like  the  former  his 
nearest  friends  to  his  moods  of  tyrannical  suspicion,  and  rejoicing 
like  the  latter  in  strange,  unusual,  and  hideous  tortures  of  his 
victims. 

For  the  rest,  he  has  left  no  Simplon  and  no  Code  Napoleon  to 
stand  up  perdurable  monuments  of  beneficent  genius  above  his 
sea  of  bloodshed    he  has  literally  left  nothing  beyond 

A  name  at  which  the  world  grew  pale, 
To  point  a  moral  and  adorn  a  tale. 

He  was,  however,  a  great  and  appointed  instrument,  as  I 
believe  all  tlie  world's  great  conquerors  have  been,  in  the  hands 
of  the  Almighty,  either  for  the  preservation  or  for  the  punish- 
ment of  nations. 

I  believe  that  to  him  mainly  it  is  due  liiat  Europe  was  not 
enslaved  by  the  Asiatics ;  for  the  Greeks,  di\nded  as  they  were  by 
intestine  feuds,  could  have  offered  no  resistance  to  their  combined 
power,  except  when  themselves  combined — as  they  could  only 
be  by  the  iron  hand  of  a  military  despotism.     The  Romans  had 


SUMMARY    OF    HIS    CHARACTER.  333 

not  yet  emerged  from  their  small  Italian  struggles,  nor  attained 
such  national  weight  or  military  science  in  those  days,  as  could 
have  enabled  them  to  turn  the  scale,  had  Asia,  once  possessed  of 
Hellas  as  she  was  of  the  Ionian  cities,  and  added  to  her  Tyrian, 
Sidonian,  and  Carthaginian  fleets — for  in  such  a  war  Carthage 
would  have  o-one  hand  in  hand  with  Persia — the  terroi-s  of  the 

o 

Makedonian   Phalanx,   the    Peloponnesian    Hoplitai,   and   the 
•  invincible  triremes  of  Attika. 

Therefore,  in  some  sort,  we  owe  gratitude  to  the  wild 
conqueror,  and  it  may  be  that  we  are  in  some  sort  indebted  for 
the  language  we  speak,  and  the  hberty  we  enjoy,  in  a  hemi- 
sphere he  never  dreamed  of,  to  the  \dctories  of  Alexander  of 
Makedon. 

It  may  be  thought  that  the  judgment  I  have  expressed  in  this 
instance,  is  over  severe  ;  for  so  our  nature  appears  to  be  consti- 
tuted, that  the  eclat  and  splendor  of  great  personal  valor,  the 
extent  of  mighty  countries  overrun  and  subdued,  produces  such 
wonderful  effects  on  the  minds  of  men,  that  the  gorgeousness 
and  glitter  of  feats  of  arms  and  the  palms  of  victory  efface  all 
considerations  of  mortal  suffering  on  the  battle  field,  in  the 
dungeon  or  on  the  scaflfold,  and  hve  forever  conferring  a  false  and 
fitful  immortality,  long  after  the  groans  and  sorrows  of  the 
victims  have  sunk  into  the  silence  of  oblivion  and  the  tomb. 
Yet,  if  we  consider  calmly  the  atrocities  committed  by  his  ordeas 
and  under  his  authority  at  Thebes,  at  Tyre,  at  Gaza,  and  the 
barbarous  torments  inflicted  in  cold-blooded  pohcy,  alike  on  the 
good  and  gallant  Britis  and  on  the  brutal  and  bloodthirsty 
Bessos — if  we  remember  the  unrelenting,  if  not  undeserved, 
slaughter  of  the  high-spirited  and  brave  Parmenion,  the  ruthless 
slaughter  of  the  hardy  Klutos,  who  had  saved  his  own  life  in 
the  desperate  melee  of  Issos — if  we  recount  the  woes  inflicted 
on  the  brave  population  of  a  loyal  country,  fighting  in  defence 
of  their  own  liberties,  the  fearful  waste  of  blood  in  his  reckless 


334  ALEXAN^DER    THE    GREAT. 

and  fruitless  battles,  we  shall  have  no  reason,  I  think,  to  doubt 
the  correctness  of  the  verdict  which  condemns  him  as  the 
rashest  of  conquerors,  and  the  cruellest  of  all  who  have  laid 
claim  to  the  much  misapplied  title  of  hero. 


Ii# 


VIII. 

HANNIBAL 


HIS  BATTLES  OF  THE  TICINUS,  TREBBIA,  THRASYMENE,  AND  CANNae. 
HIS  CAMPAIGNS,  CONDUCT,  AND  CHARACTER. 

It  cannot  fail,  at  first  sight,  to  strike  even  tlie  most  unob- 
servant reader  of  ancient  history  with  something  of  wonder,  that 
we  know  so  httle  distinctly,  and,  if  I  may  so  express  myself, 
individually,  of  this  man,  the  greatest  captain,  beyond  all  ques- 
tion, of  antiquity  ;  perhaps — his  means  and  the  then  state  of  mih- 
tary  science  considered — the  greatest  of  all  ages. 

The  causes  of  this  general  ignorance  are  manifold ;  but  the 
most  important  are  the  entire  absence  of  any  Carthaginian  nar- 
rative of  the  circumstances  of  the  Punic  wars ;  and  the  io^norance 
oi-  favoritism  of  the  Greek  and  Roman  writers  on  the  subject — 
Polybius  having  been  a  pei-sonal  friend  of  Scipio  and  Loelius ; 
and  Livy,  wi-iting  so  long  after  the  occurrence  of  the  facts  which 
he  describes,  that  it  was  not  much  easier  for  him,  than  it  is  for 
us,  to  arrive  at  the  real  truths  of  what  he  received  as  history,  or 
its  materials ;  the  legends,  namely,  of  the  illustrious  Roman 
houses,  and  the  funeral  orations  of  consulars  and  senatoi-s,  which, 
for  the  most  part,  contained  as  many  falsehoods  as  they  counted 
lines. 

It  is  more  remarkable,  however,  that,  until  the  Colossus  Nie- 
buhr  came  upon  the  stage,  no  modern  historian  was  clear-sighted 


336  HANNIBAL. 

enough  to  discern,  tnrough  the  thick  mists  which  prejudice, 
blind  error,  or  intentional  falsehood,  have  accumulated  over  the 
ages  of  fioman  repubhcanism,  even  a  ghmpse  of  the  transcendant 
genius,  unrivalled  mihtary  foresight  and  resource,  unwearied  per- 
severance, and  indomitable  patriotism,  of  this  gi-eat  captain^  this 
gi*eat  politician,  and,  in  spite  of  some  defects,  which  were  those 
of  his  age  rather  than  his  own,  this  great  man. 

Niebuhr,  it  is  true,  hved  not  to  bring  down  the  history  of  that 
wondrous  nation,  on  whose  early  ages  he  first  poured  the  hght 
of  intelligence,  to  the  days  of  the  hero,  w^hom  I  shall  endeavor 
briefly  to  set  before  my  readers  in  his  true  light ;  but  from  one 
passage  in  his  third  volume  it  is  clear  that,  had  he  lived  to  write 
of  the  second  Punic  war,  he  would  have  done  justice  to  the 
incomparable  greatness  and  genius  of  this  much-belied  and  unap- 
preciated leader.  In  that  passage  he  speaks  of  "  Scipio  as  tow- 
ering above  his  nation,  as  much  as  Hannibal  above  all  nations," 
and  to  any  person  who  has  carefully  studied  the  career  of  the 
great  Carthaginian,  in  the  graphic  pages  of  Arnold's  magnificent 
history — alas !  like  Niebuhr's,  left  incomplete,  by  the  mitimely 
death  of  the  author — it  will  be  evident  that  in  this  phrase  there 
is  nothing  of  hyperbole. 

Professing,  myself,  to  adduce  no  new  fact,  scarce  even 
theory,  concerning  this  remarkable  soldier,  it  strikes  me  that  a 
short  digest  of  his  campaigns,  divested  of  the  dry  details  which 
render  historical  studies  displeasing  to  the  superficial  reader,  and 
combined  with  some  comparisons  of  his  deeds  with  those  of  other 
greatest  soldiers,  may  prove  neither  unpalatable  nor  unuseful  to 
the  perusers  of  ephemeral  literature  ;  while  it  may  tend  to  clear 
the  memory  of  a  much  misrepresented  hero,  from  the  prejudiced 
opinions  naturally  instilled  into  us  by  our  school  readings  of 
Horace's  immortal  odes,  and  "  Livy's  pictured  page." 

Hannibal  was,  it  would  seem,  born  a  general — his  father, 
Hamilcar,  was  the  greatest  of  his  nation  and  his  day ;  to  him 


HIS    OATH.  337 

succeeded  Ilasdrubal  his  son-in-law,  to  him  Hannibal,  the  greatest 
of  his  race,  supported  by  his  brothei-s,  Hasdrubal,  the  younger, 
and  Mago,  both  generals  of  extraordinary  ability,  and  with  the 
exception  of  Scipio  alone,  both  superior  in  coiq)  tV  ml^  resource, 
and  strategy,  to  any  Roman  leader.  Never  did  one  family  pro- 
duce such  a  galaxy  of  military  splendor.  It  must  not  be  under- 
stood, however,  that  they  were  merely  born,  for  they  were  con- 
stantly bred,  soldiers ;  the  camp  was  theu*  home  from  their  early 
childhood  ;  the  clang  of  arms  and  the  din  of  martial  music,  was 
the  lullaby  of  their  almost  cradled  sleep  ;  and,  when  they  came 
to  the  years  of  adolescence,  the  battle  field  was  alike  their  play- 
ground and  their  school,  and  their  great  father  their  tutor  in  the 
rudiments  of  strategy,  which  none  could  better  teach.  Hannibal 
was  but  nine  years  old,  when  he  accompanied  his  father  to  Spain, 
that  father  having  first  made  him  swear  upon  the  altar  that  he 
would  never  be  the  friend  of  Romans.  "  Hannibal*  swore,  and 
to  his  latest  hour  never  forgot  his  vow."  The  boy  swore  igno- 
rantly  at  the  time,  though  he  forgot  not ;  but  it  must  not  be 
supposed  that  the  father  dictated  that  vow^  ignoi-antly,  nor  even 
in  the  bitterness  of  blind  hatred,  or  the  darkness  of  political  pre- 
judice and  passion.  The  man  probably,  even  then,  discovered 
dimly  the  future  greatness  of  the  child  ;  the  patriot  assuredly  had 
discoved  the  inherent  and  eternal  antagonism  of  Rome  and  his 
country,  the  immutable  necessity  that  one  of  those  two  must  fall 
and  leave  the  other  the  world's  mistress. 

Rome  had  just  come  off  conqueror,  and  humbled  Carthage  to 
.almost  the  lowest  degradation,  after  a  long  and  doubtful  strife  of 
two-and-twenty  years,  waged  upon  sea  and  land  with  changeful 
fortunes.  Carthage  had  lost  her  wealthiest  colonies,  and  above  all 
the  dominion  of  the  seas ;  for  the  time  she  could  maintain  the  con- 
flict no  longer,  but  the  genius  of  Hamilcar  saw  where  her  vital 
energies  might  be  renovated,  and  whence  a  mortal  blow  might 
*  Arnold,  II.  257. 


338  HANNIBAL. 

be  dealt  against  her  now  triumphant.  To  Spain  he  sailed,  and 
in  Spain  he  laid  the  plans,  and  began  the  system,  which  his  far 
greater  son  carried  out,  and  by  which  he  shook  Rome  to  its 
foundation. 

For  two-and-twenty  years  peace  lasted  between  the  rival 
states ;  and  during  those  two-and-twenty  years,  thanks  to  the 
absence  of  Carthaginian  and  the  paucity  of  Roman  annals,  we 
know  but  little  of  the  individual  progress  of  the  great  Punic 
family,  except  that  they  had  conquered  and  consolidated  a  vast 
and  wealthy  Carthaginian  empire,  including  almost  the  whole  of 
S[)ain  south  of  the  Ebro,  abounding  in  rich  mines  of  gold  and 
silver,  and  swarming  with  a  martial  population  which  formed  the 
very  flower  of  the  Punic  armies.  On  the  death  of  Hamilcar  he 
was  worthily  succeeded  by  Hasdi-ubal,  his  son-in-law,  whose  pro- 
gress in  farther  consohdating  the  Punic  power  in  Spain,  and 
whose  eminent  abilities  displayed  in  the  foundation  of  New  Car- 
thao-e,  at  that  time  the  Gibraltar  of  the  Mediterranean  by  its  com- 
manding  and  central  position,  so  far  alarmed  the  Romans  that 
even  then  they  would  have  renewed  the  war  with  Carthage,  had 
they  not  been  deterred  by  the  terrors  of  a  Gaulish  invasion. 
Three  years  had  elapsed,  when  Hasdrubal  was  assassinated  in 
his  tent,  and  by  the  common  voice  of  the  army,  ratified  by  the 
decree  of  the  Senate,  the  youthful  Hannibal  was  chosen  in  his 
place. 

Up  to  this  time  we  know  nothing  of  the  future  hero,  except 
his  parentage  and  vow  ;  for  the  next  twenty  yeai-s  he  filled  the 
world  with  his  renown,  and  had  his  fortunes  matched  his  greatness 
and  his  glory,  the  world  to-day  would  be  no  more  like  that  it  is, 
than  it  would,  had  the  Saracens  over-run  and  subjugated  Europe 
in  the  day  of  Charles  Martel. 

Scarce  any  one  at  all  famihar  with  history  can  have  failed  to 
observe  the  extraordinary  parallelism  between  the  campjiigns, 
the  military  conduct,  and  the  fortunes  of  Hannibal  and  Napoleon. 


PARALLEL   WITH    NAPOLEON.  339 

That  parallelism  is  thus  strikingly  touched  upon  by  Arnold. 
"  Twice,"  he  says,  "  in  history  has  there  been  witnessed  the 
struggle  of  the  highest  individual  genius  against  the  resources 
and  institutiois  of  a  great  nation  ;  and  in  both  cases  the  nation 
has  been  victorious.  For  seventeen  years  Hannibal  strove  against 
Rome  ;  for  sixteen  years  Napoleon  Bonaparte  strove  against  Eng- 
land ;  the  efforts  of  the  first  ended  in  Zama,  those  of  the  second 
in  Waterloo."  The  extraordinary  similitude  of  the  genius,  con- 
duct, and  military  character  of  these  two  giants  in  arms,  is 
far  from  ending  with  this  general  resemblance.  Almost  fi'om 
point  to  point,  their  destinies  are  similar.  At  the  age  of  twenty- 
six,  Hannibal  was  elected  to  the  supreme  command  of  the 
Carthaginian  armies,  and  thenceforth  to  the  close  of  the  war  he 
disposed  at  his  will  the  resources,  and  held  in  the  hollow  of  his 
hand  the  councils  of  his  country.  At  the  age  of  twenty-six, 
Napoleon  assumed  the  command  of  the  army  of  Italy,  and  from 
thence  his  fortunes  and  his  will  were  those  of  France.  The  scenes 
of  the  glory  of  both  were  the  Alps  and  Italy.  Both  had  the  faculty 
of  seeing  at  a  glance  where  the  blow  must  be  planted,  which 
should  cripple  the  enemy  ;  both  delivered  that  blow  instantane- 
ously and  irresistibly.  Both  had  the  same  reliance  on  their 
cavahy  as  an  arm  of  service ;  Hannibal  winning  by  it  all  his 
greatest  victories,  and  Napoleon  insisting  to  the  last,  that  cavalry 
m  equal  force,  equally  led,  must  conquer  infantry.  Both  van- 
quished every  leader  in  the  field,  whom  he  personally  encounter- 
ed, save  the  very  last ;  and  there  is  probably  no  one  so  prejudiced 
as  to  assert  at  this  day  that  either  Hannibal  or  Napoleon  found 
in  his  conqueror  a  superior  in  strategy  or  in  military  genius. 
Nor  does  the  similarity  end  even  here  ;  for  both  found  their  final 
vanquishers  in  generals  made  in  Spain  by  conflicts  with  their 
own  lieutenants,  who  were  in  no  wise  superior  to  other  eminent 
leaders  of  theu-  enemy ;  and  both  ultimately  perished  miserably, 


340  HANNIBAf.. 

in  exile,  victims  to  the  counti-ies  which  they  had  kejjt  so  long  in 
awe  and  perturbation. 

In  a  military  point  of  view,  the  correctness  of  their  coup 
(Toeil ;  the  lightning  speed  with  which  they  followed  up  con- 
ception by  execution  ;  the  power  of  concenti-ation,  by  which  con- 
stantly inferior  on  the  whole,  in  force,  they  were  ever  superior  at 
the  point  of  action;  the  marvellous  foresight,  by  which  they 
showed  seeming  rashness  to  be  real  prudence  ;  the  thunderous 
crash  with  which,  when  they  dehvered  battles,  they  annihilated, 
not  conquered,  their  antagonists  ;  nay,  the  unerring  certainty 
with  which  they  threw  themselves  on  the  communications  of 
their  enemy,  and  defeated  at  a  blow  the  most  skilful  combina- 
tions, were  identical  in  these  two  mighty  captains — none  other, 
in  my  opinion,  ever  have  possessed  the  same  qualities,  or  used 
them  with  the  same  effect.  Both  were. the  makers  of  their  own 
systems,  the  founders  of  their  own  schools ;  but  on  the  whole,  I 
must  consider  Hannibal  as  the  greater  strategist  of  the  two  ; 
because,  in  the  first  place,  he  was  the  prime  originator  and 
inventor,  while  his  great  eulogist,  and  in  some  points  imitator, 
had  the  benefit  of  his  example,  as  well  as  that  of  other  mighty 
conqueroi-s  ;  and  in  the  second  place,  because  with  means  infi- 
nitely inferior,  against  obstacles  infinitely  gi*eater,  and  without 
the  aid  of  modern  science,  he  accomphshed,  what  may  be 
held  to  have  been,  in  the  then  condition  of  the  world,  results 
nearly  equal. 

As  men  of  genuine  greatness — I  shall  observe  only,  that  no 
single  act  of  Hannibal's  life  ever  subserved  to  any  selfish  motive 
or  ministered  to  his  own  aggrandizement ;  and  that  no  single 
aet  of  Napoleon's  did  not  so.  The  consideration  of  self  would 
seem  never  to  have  occurred  to  the  one ;  to  have  been  ever  pre- 
sent to  the  other.  Both  were  fanatics  for  glory ;  the  one  because 
his  own  was  his  country's  ;  the  other,  because  his  country's  was 
Ills  own.     Both  wei-e  accused  by  their  enemies  of  great  moral 


ALLEGED    CRIMINALITY.  341 

crimes  and  turpitude;  and  both,  in  the  main,  unjustly.  It  is 
one  of  the  sad  truths  concerning  warfore,  but  no  less  a  truth ; 
that,  in  playing  the  game  of  war,  with  nations"  for  playthings 
and  the  world  for  a  field,  expediency  must  be  in  a  great  degree 
the  moral  rule ;  and  that,  if  the  game  is  to  be  played  at  all,  the 
sujQferings  or  the  lives  of  individuals,  even  if  those  individuals  be 
counted  by  thousands,  must  not  be  considered,  where  the  suffer- 
ings or  the  hves  of  miUions  are  in  question.  The  sin  hes  in  the 
flaying  the  game  at  all,  not  in  the  details  or  the  practice  of  the 
play.  Both  these  great  men  were  stern  and  unrelenting  in  cai'- 
rying  out  the  hues  which  they  held  it  true  policy  to  lay  down  ; 
neither,  so  far  as  history  shows,  was  tainted  in  the  least  degree 
by  anything  resembling  personal  cruelty.  Both  have  been 
accused  of  faithlessness — a  charge  never  in  any  case  to  be  much 
regarded,  as  brought  between  nations;  for  nations  are  ever 
prompt  to  reclaim  loudly,  when  the  losers,  against  deeds,  the 
like  of  which  themselves  commit  readily,  when  the  winners.  In 
the  case  of  Hannibal,  the  Romans  had  all  the  history-writing  to 
themselves ;  thence,  Punic  faith  is  to  this  day  the  proverb  for 
entire  faithlessness.  Had  the  French  writers  alone  made  the 
world's  annals  of  the  late  great  struggle,  "  perfidious  Albion  " 
had  gone  down  a  byeword  to  all  ages.  Had  the  English  held 
the  like  station,  the  utter  faithlessness  of  Napoleon  would  have 
become  proverbial  with  posterity. 

But  to  return,  from  this  striking  parallel,  to  our  immediate 
hero,  we  find  that  he  devoted  the  two  first  years  of  his  chief 
command,  to  completing  the  subjugation  and  pacification  of 
Spain  ;  and  the  third  to  the  conquest  of  Saguntum,  a  city  aUied 
to  the  Romans,  situate  on  the  river  Ebro ;  a  city,  therefore, 
which  the  Carthaginians  were  bound  by  treaties  not  to  disturb ; 
a  river  which  they  had  no  just  right  to  cross.  Hence,  the  sole 
cause  of  the  charge  of  perfidy  against  Hannibal.  A  treaty  was 
unquestionably  violated  by  Hannibal ;  as  the  Romans  had  vio- 


342  '  HANNIBAL. 

lated  another  treaty  far  more  flagrantly,  at  the  close  of  the  fii-st 
Punic  War ;  and  as  they  would  unquestionably  have  violated 
any  that  existed  now,  had  it  been  to  their  interest  to  do  so.  The 
truth  is  simply  this,  that  the  two  nations  had  been  at  peace  as 
long  as  either  deemed  it  very  essential  to  be  at  peace.  Both 
were  preparing  for  war;  Hannibal  was  ready  the  first,  and 
therefore  struck  the  first  blow.  He  wished  to  serve  his  country  ; 
his  country  deemed  that  he  was  serving  her,  and  therefore  sus- 
tained him ;  and  so  well,  in  truth,  did  he  serve  her,  that  had  the 
genius  and  character  of  Carthage  borne  any  relation  to  those  of 
Rome,  such  as  the  genius  and  character  of  Hannibal  bore  to 
those  of  the  ablest  Romans,  Rome  must  have  succumbed  in  the 
unequal  contest ;  and  the  world  to  this  day  would  probably,  if 
not  certainly,  have  been  Semitic  or  Phoenician,  and  Asiatic, 
not  Roman  and  European,  in  its  language,  its  civilization,  its 
religion. 

But  of  this  Hannibal  thought  not;  nor,  had  he  thought, 
would  have  cared  anything.  His  business  was  to  provoke  a  war 
with  Rome,  and  then  'to  deal  her  one  home-stricken  blow,  that 
should  paralyze  her  at  once  and  forever.  This  was  his  business, 
as  he  saw  it ;  and  he  was  one  to  do  that  which  he  saw  his 
business,  as  thoroughly  as  Cromwell  or  Napoleon. 

Hannibal's  plans  were  now  fully  laid,  and  without  further 
delay  he  put  them  into  execution.  It  was  already  late  in  May, 
when  he  set  out  ffom  Carthagena  for  the  Ebro,  having  to  cross 
five  degrees  and  a  half  of  latitude  before  reaching  the  Pyrenees, 
and  to  conquer  the  whole  half-Romanized  territory  north  of  that 
river,  before  entering  Gaul — tlien  an  unknown,  unexplored,  and 
barbarous,  though  highly  warlike  country,  the  geography  of 
which  was  less  familiar  to  the  Roman  or  Carthaginian  of  those 
days,  than  is  that  of  Central  Africa  to  us  at  this  period.  His 
force,  on  crossing  the  Ebro,  was  ninety  thousand  foot  and  twelve 
thousand  horse,  besides  elephants,  which  was  reduced  by  detach- 


MARCH    TO    THE    ALPS.  *  343 

ments  and  losses  in  the  field  to  fifty  thousand  foot  and  nine 
thousand  horse,  before  he  crossed  the  Pyrenees.  In  those  days, 
field  artillery  there  was  none,  nor  its  equivalent ;  but  engines  for 
casting  huge  stones  and  beams  into  beleaguered  cities — as  effect- 
ive, perhaps,  against  the  imperfect  fortifications  of  those  days  as 
our  battering  artilleiy — did  exist ;  and  of  these  Hannibal  was 
unable  to  carry  any  with  him,  if  he  had  any  in  Spain,  or  even  if 
the  Carthaginians  knew  the  use  of  them,  which  seems  to  be 
doubtful ;  and  to  his  weakness  in  this  arm,  the  failure  of  his  ulti- 
mate attempts  against  Rome  is,  I  believe,  wholly  to  be  attributed. 
It  is  a  proof  of  his  wonderful  power  of  adapting  himself  to  cir- 
cumstances, and  of  his  tact  in  deahng  with  barbarians,  that  he 
actually  traversed  the  whole  of  France,  from  the  Pyrenees  to  the 
Rhone — a  tract  of  vast  forests  and  difficult  morasses,  swarm- 
inof  with  fierce  and  warlike  savag^es — with  little  loss  and  no 
serious  opposition.  So  rapid  had  been  his  motions,  and  so 
mcredulous  were  the  Romans,  though  forewarned,  of  the  possi- 
bility of  such  a  march,  that,  although  the  consular  armies  had 
time  to  have  disputed  the  passes  of  the  Pyrenees  with  him,  he 
had  actually  crossed  the  Rhone,  and  gained  three  days'  march 
toward  the  Alps,  after  a  slight  skirmish  with  the  Roman  light- 
horse,  before  the  Consul  Scipio  was  aware  of  his  arrival  in  Gaul. 
That  general,  finding  himself  anticipated,  did  good  service  to  his 
country,  and  acted  on  sound  mihtary  principles,  sending  his  con- 
sular army  on  to  Spain  by  sea,  under  his  lieutenant,  while  he 
himself  took  ship  for  Pisa,  crossed  the  Appenines,  and,  having 
command  of  the  Praetorian  ai-mies  of  twenty-five  thousand  men, 
between  Placentia  and  Cremona,  before  Hannibal  had  descended 
from  the  mountains,  was  in  readiness  to  receive  him,  on  his  ap- 
pearance in  the  plains. 

Hannibal,  in  the  meantime,  had  plunged  into  the  passes  of 
the  Alps,  in  so  far  as  we  can  judge,  by  the  valley  of  the  Isere, 
with  thirty-seven  elephants,  in  addition  to  the  force  of  infantry 


344  •  HANNIBAL. 

and  cavalry  as  specified  above.  Now,  it  appears  to  me,  that  to 
compare  Napoleon's  parage  of  the  Alps  with  that  of  Hannibal, 
is  much  as  it  would  be  to  compare  the  voyage  of  Columbus  to 
the  passage  of  an  Atlantic  steamer — the  former  travelled  over 
roads,  difficult  indeed  and  dangerous,  but  still  roads^  with 
bridges,  depots  of  provisions,  and  friendly  inhabitants,  through 
a  country  perfectly  known,  thoroughly  explored,  and  accurately 
surveyed  for  his  own  purposes  by  his  own  incomparable  engi- 
neers. The  latter  forced  his  way  through  unknown  passes,  over 
bridgeless  ravines,  with  no  aid  of  modern  science,  no  pontoons  or 
devices  of  engineering,  no  provisions  or  forage  save  what  he  car- 
ried with  him,  fighting  his  way,  inch  by  inch,  through  hordes 
of  hostile  barbarians,  and  that  with  men  and  animals  from  the 
almost  tropical  chmate  of  Africa,  who  perished,  in  thousands,  by 
the  inclemency  of  weather  unendurable  to  southern  constitutions. 
Add  to  this,  that  it  is  an  undoubted  fact,  that  the  limits  of  eternal 
snow  lay  far  lower  down  the  mountain  sides  in  those  days  than 
now,  and  that  much  of  the  great  Carthaginian's  line  of  march  lay 
within  and  above  those  limits.  Napoleon's  celebrated  passage 
was  made  at  the  expense,  to  use  his  own  words,  "  of  a  few  acci- 
dents"— Hannibal's  at  the  cost  of  thirty-three  thousand  men  out 
of  fifty -nine  thousand,  and  all  the  elephants  but  eleven.  The 
terrible  disparity  of  loss  shows  the  disparity  both  of  difficulty 
and  audacity.  The  merit  of  the  conception  rests  incontestably 
with  Hannibal ;  who  did  what  no  man  had  ever  dreamed  of 
doing  before  him,  and  which  it  might  not  be  possible  to  do  at 
all.  Napoleon  did,  with  splendid  ability,  certainly,  and  prodi- 
gious celerity,  what  he  well  knew  had  been  done  before,  and 
could  therefore,  unquestionably,  be  done  again. 

The  results,  in  both  instances,  were  precisely  similar.  It  is 
now  nearly  certain  that  Hannibal  crossed  the  Isere,  followed  the 
upward  coui-se  of  the  Rhone,  surmounted  the  Alps  by  the  pass 
of  the  little  St.  Bernard,  descended  the  Val  d'Aosta,  and  thence 


PASSAGE    OF    THE    ALPS.  345 

marched  eastward  into  the  country  of  the  Insubrians,  where  he 
expected  to  find  alhes,  and  to  raise  the  Cisalpine  Gauls  against 
their  old  enemies  the  Romans.  Their  country  lies  north  of  the 
river  Po,  in  the  neighborhood  of  Placentia  and  Cremona — Roman 
colonies  on  that  great  river — and  it  was  on  the  banks  of  the 
Tesino,  a  northern  tiibutary  of  that  stream,  that  the  two  rival 
nations  first  came  into  contact.  This  affair  of  cavalry  has  been 
magnified  into  a  battle,  though  it  was  but  a  skirmish,  except  in 
the  prestige  of  success,  and  in  the  proof  it  gave  of  the  superi- 
ority, never  again  doubtful  during  the  whole  war,  of  the  Afi-i- 
can  to  the  Roman  cavalry.  The  Numidians  were  the  Cossacks 
of  that  age,  mounted  on  incomparable  barbs  and  Arabs,  une- 
qualled as  horsemen  and  lancers  ;  the  heavy-armed  Carthaginian 
horse  were  complete  cuirassiers,  fighting  with  charged  lances  and 
long  cutting  sabres.  The  Roman  cavalry,  never  a  favorite  or 
successful  arm  of  their  service,  wore  no  cuirasses,  and,  for  weapons, 
caiiied  weak,  inefficient  javelins,  and  the  short  stabbing  sword  of 
the  infantry,  which  was  entirely  inefficient  as  a  trooper's  weapon. 
In  this  affair  of  the  Ticinus,  the  heavy  Carthaginians  met  the 
Roman  horse  in  fi'ont  with  a  steady  charge,  while  the  wild 
Numidians  broke  in  upon  both  theu'  flanks,  and  routed  them  in 
an  instant.  The  country  was  entirely  open  and  favorable  to  the 
movements  of  cavalry ;  the  Romans,  therefore,  crippled  in  that 
arm,  were  forced  to  retreat ;  re-crossed  the  Tesino,  breaking  the 
bridge  behind  them  ;  crossed  the  Po  also,  and  posted  themselves 
under  the  walls  of  Placentia.  Hannibal,  without  pursuing, 
passed  the  Po  higher  up,  by  a  bridge  of  boats,  and  being  rap- 
turously received  by  the  Gauls,  descended  the  right  bank  of  the 
river,  and  offered  battle  to  the  Romans.  But  they  expecting 
reinforcement  by  the  other  consular  army,  of  Sempronius,  declin- 
ed it;  and  in  a  few  days  afterward  retreated  several  miles 
southward,  up  the  valley  of  the  Trebbia,  and  encamped  among 
the  first  spurs  of  the  Appenines,  where  they  were  comparatively 


346 


HANNIBAL. 


safe  from  Hannibal's  tremendous  cavalry,  which  they  had  already 
learned  to  dread.  The  Carthaginian  had,  in  the  fii-st  instance, 
taken  post  to  the  eastward,  in  order  to  intercept  the  expected 
approach  of  Sempronius  from  Rimini,  on  the  iVdriatic ;  but  now, 
learning,  perhaps,  that  this  consul  had  given,  or  anticipating  that 
he  would  give  him,  the  shp,  by  turning  aside  into  the  hill- 
country  to  the  southward,  far  below  Cremona,  he  threw  himself 
at  once  upon  the  main  communications  of  the  Romans,  placing 
himself  directly  between  them  and  the  magazines,  on  which  they 
were  subsisted,  at  Placentia  and  on  the  Upper  Po,  precisely  as 
Napoleon  did  by  the  Austrians  at  Marengo ;  thus  straitening 
them  of  supplies  in  their  camp,  while  his  own  cavalry  swept  the 
plains  in  every  direction,  keeping  all  his  communications  open, 
and  the  friendly  Gauls  abundantly  suppKed  him  with  provision, 
as  he  lay  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Trebbia. 

Meantime,  the  junction  between  the  two  consular  armies  was 
effected,  and  by  this  means  the  effective  force  of  the  Romans  was 
raised  to  above  forty  thousand  men ;  while  that  of  Hannibal  had 
been  so  much  swelled  by  the  accession  of  Gaulish  recruits,  that 
he  w^as  anxious  to  deliver  battle  almost  on  any  terms ;  the  rather, 
that  the  subsistence  of  his  army  had  weighed  heavily  on  the 
Gauls ;  who,  fickle  and  treacherous,  even  beyond  the  wont  of 
barbarians,  were  showing  sjanptoms  of  impatience  at  his  pro- 
ti-acted  sojourn  among  them.  His  great  superiority  of  cavalry, 
moreover,  both  as  regards  quality  and  nunibers,  rendered  him 
confident  of  success  in  the  extensive  plains  of  the  Po.  Sempro- 
nius was  now  in  command  of  the  whole  Roman  forces,  Scipio 
being  still  hors  de  combat  from  a  wound  received  in  the  affair  of 
cavalry  on  the  Tesino  ;  and  as  this  general  had  no  taste  as  yet 
of  Hannibal's  quality,  and  found  himself  cut  off  from  his  maga- 
zines, which  the  Carthaginians  were  now  beginning  to  master, 
and  insulted  in  his  very  camp,  on  his  own  side  of  the  river,  by 
the  Numidian  hoi*se  and  Balearic  shngers,  he  merits  no  reproach 


BATTLE    OF    THE    TREBBIA.  347 

for  having  determined  to  give  battle  on  fair  ground ;  for  with 
such  a  force  as  he  commanded,  purely  homogeneous  and  Roman  ; 
such  a  force,  in  a  word,  as  had  never  within  a  century  encoun- 
tered an  equal  foe,  he  was  justified  in  expecting  \'ictory  over  any 
troops  in  the  known  world.  He  was  falling  short  of  provisions, 
moreover,  and  there  was  great  danger  of  a  general  Gallic  rising, 
in  case  the  population  should  be  encouraged  by  the  protracted 
inactivity  of  the  Romans. 

To  deliver  battle,  under  such  circumstances,  was  therefore  sol- 
dierly and  justifiable  on  all  sound  military  principles ;  to  do 
so  rashly,  however,  and  hastily,  and  that,  too,  on  ground  and  at 
time  of  the  enemy's  choosing — such  an  enemy  too,  and  so  supe- 
rior in  horse — was  unpardonable.  Yet,  just  this  thing  did  Sem- 
pronius. 

It  was  now  mid-winter,  for  neither  of  the  belligerents  had 
thought  of  going  into  winter  quarters — Hannibal,  from  the 
imminent  necessity  of  striking  quickly  and  decisively,  and  the 
Romans,  from  the  impossibihty  of  suffering  him  to  keep  the  field 
un watched.  Even  now,  the  climate  of  the  plains  at  the  foot  of 
the  Alps,  included  in  the  districts  of  Lombardy  and  Piedmont,  is 
severe  and  inclement  in  the  winter  season  ;  but  in  those  times, 
when  the  country  lay  in  gTeat  part  uncleared  and  covered  with 
primitive  forest,  it  was  far  more  tempestuous  and  cold  than  at 
present. 

The  Trebbia  swollen  with  snow-water,  ice-cold  from  the  frozen 
Appenines,  ran  now  a  breast-high  torrent,  though  in  the  sum- 
mer droughts  its  pebbly  bed  might  be  crossed  almost  dry-shod. 
Across  this  paralyzing  stream  Sempronius  suflfered  Hannibal  to 
allure  him,  on  a  wild  morning,  with  flying  sleet  storms  and  snow 
gusts,  by  a  false  attack  and  feigned  retreat,  to  his  own  side  of 
the  river ;  and  that  too  without  allowing  his  men  to  breakfast ; 
while  the  Carthaginians,  expectant  of  what  was  to  come,  had  fed 
heartily,  and  armed  themselves-  in  their  tents  by  blazing  fires. 


348  HANNIBAL. 

In  addition  to  this  advantage,  an  ambuscade  of  two  thousand 
horse  and  foot  had  been  concealed,  under  Mago's  command,  in 
an  old  watercourse  covered  with  brushwood  and  coppice,  which 
Sempronius,  negligently  or  disdainfully,  left  in  his  rear,  as  he 
hurried  on  to  attack  the  enemy,  w^ho  had  drawn  out  from 
their  camp,  and  formed  hne  of  battle,  facing  the  river,  to  oppose 
him. 

The  order  of  battle  was  simple,  and  on  both  sides  the  same ; 
indeed,  it  was  the  only  order  then  in  use,  the  centre  being 
formed  of  the  heavy  infantry,  covered  by  their  hght  troops  and 
skirmishers,  with  the  cavalry  on  either  flank.  So  far  as  I  can 
observe,  this  form  was  rarely  deviated  from  by  the  ancient 
mihtary  nations  ;  the  cavalry  were  mvariably  directed  against 
cavahy;  and,  after  an  equestrian  combat  which  generally 
terminated  in  the  chase  of  one  party,  for  miles,  perhaps  leagues, 
from  the  field  by  the  other,  a  secord  engagement  followed  be- 
tween the  sohd  infantry  which  often  led  to  the  occm-rence  of 
drawn  battle.  The  same  defect  of  strategy  is  observable  in  all 
Prince  Rupert's  fighting,  during  the  English  civil-w^ar,  who,  in 
four  or  five  difierent  pitched  battles,  had  he  wheeled  on  the 
flanks  and  rear  of  the  Parliamentarian  foot,  after  scattering  their 
horse  by  his  headlong  charge,  would  have  terminated  the  war 
at  a  blow.  Hannibal,  w^ho  made  more  use  of  his  cavalry  aiin 
than  any  other  general  of  antiquity,  never  appears  to  have  at- 
tacked infantry  in  front  with  horse,  or  even  in  flank,  until  the 
enemy's  cavalry  were  in  flight;  and  yet  the  Roman  foot — as 
foot  the  best  undoubtedly  in  the  world — were  from  their  armature 
of  hea\y  missile  javelins  and  short  stabbing  swords,  not  difiering 
much  from  the  larger  bowie  knife,  peculiarly  unfitted  to  resist  th<3 
charge  of  cavalry,  which  their  loose  and  open  order  was  calcu- 
lated to  invite. 

o 

The  result  of  this  battle  was  as  must  be  foreseen  from  th^ 
preceding  events  which  led  to  it.     In  the  fight  itselt  there  wa^ 


THE    CONFLICT.  349 

little  strategy  ;  tlie  great  abilities  of  Hannibal  bad  been  displayed 
in  the  manoeuvres  by  which  he  compelled  the  enemy  to  deliver 
battle,  and  then  induced  him  to  deliver  it,  at  disadvantage,  and 
on  ground  selected  by  his  enemy.  The  rest  he  left  to  his 
soldiers,  confident  that  they  would  do  their  work  to  his  satisfac- 
tion ;  nor  was  his  confidence  disappointed.  He  was,  moreover, 
in  the  open  field  gTeatly  superior  to  his  enemy,  even  without 
taking  the  exhaustion  and  ill-phght  of  the  legionaries  into  con- 
sideration, who  fought  wet  to  the  skin,  chilled,  and  fasting, 
against  men  full-fed,  fresh,  and  warm,  from  their  recent  camp- 
fires.  His  cavalry,  ten  thousand  strong,  six  thousand  of  whom 
were  incomparable  African  cuirassiers  and  Xumidians,  could  not 
be  checked  by  the  feeble  legionary  cavalry  of  four  thousand-,  for 
a  single  instant.  The  Balearian  slingers  and  African  archery 
were  as  much  superior  to  the  Roman  light  troops,  who  fought 
only  ^-ith  slender  javeHns  ;  the  Itahans  never  having  been  famous 
for  the  use  of  the  bow.  The  velites  of  Sempronius,  therefore, 
were  driven  in  upon  the  legionaries  at  the  first  onset,  and  passed 
through  the  intervals  of  the  Manipules  to  the  rear,  while  the 
cavalry  were  scattered,  as  by  a  thunderbolt,  on  both  wings 
simultaneously,  by  the  Carthaginian  elephants  and  horsemen. 
The  soldierly  qualities  of  the  Roman  foot  did  not  fail  them  in 
this  emergency — in  fact  never  did  fail  them  throughout  the  war, 
for  when  opposed  to  foot  they  were  never  beaten — for  they 
maintained  the  fight,  exhausted  as  they  were,  with  advantage, 
until  Maharbal,  whom  Arnold  styles  not  unjustly  "  the  best 
cavalry  officer  of  the  first  cavahy  service  in  the  world,"  leaving 
the  pui-suit  of  the  flying  horse  to  his  Numidians,  unequalled  in 
such  operations,  thundered  on  botft  their  flanks  with  his  elephants 
and  cuirassiers,  and  to  complete  the  whole  Mago,  bui-sting  from  his 
ambush,  broke  down  upon  their  rear,  horse  and  foot,  pell-mell, 
and  pierced  them  through  and  through.  The  legions  of  the 
centi-e,  still  undismayed  and  unbroken,  cut  their  way  straight 


350  HANNIBAL. 

through  the  African  foot  before  them,  and  reached  Placentia 
in  safety,  though  the  whole  Carthaginian  army  was  interposed ; 
the  rest  were  slaughtered  ruthlessly  and  unremittingly,  according 
to  the  u'sajjes  of  ancient  warefare,  until  the  ice-cold  watei's  of  the 
Trebbia  checked  the  pui'suit  of  the  victors,  and  saved  the  residue 
from  slaughter.  During  the  same  night  Scipio  with  the  shattered 
rehcs  of  the  army,  re-crossed  the  Trebbia  and  joined  his  colleague 
in  Placentia ;  w^hence  in  a  few  days  they  retreated  separately, 
Scipio  on  Rimini,  Sempronius  across  the  Appenines  into 
Etruria,  leaving  Hannibal  at  the  close  of  his  &-st  short  campaign 
the  master  of  all  Cisalpine  Gaul,  or,  in  other  words,  of  all  Italy, 
north  of  the  Appenines. 

Hannibal,  politic  ever,  and  fearing  to  distress  his  new  and 
fickle  aUies,  by  wintering  among  them,  and  so  compelling  them 
to  subsist  his  troops,  made  an  eflfort  to  cross  the  Appenines,  but 
the  cold  was  too  severe,  and  the  passes  were  impracticable  to  his 
hot-blooded  southern  cattle,  so  that  he  was  forced  in  his  own 
despite,  after  losing  all  his  elephants  but  one,  to  return  and  winter 
among  the  reluctant  and  faithless  Gauls,  from  whom  he  appeai-s 
to  have  apprehended  even  assassination. 

In  the  following  year,  new  consuls  having  been  chosen  at 
Rome,  Caius  Flaminius  and  Cneius  Servihus  Geminius,  soldiera 
were  le\'ied  very  ngorously  and  an  immense  force  set  on  foot ; 
two  several  consular  armies,  each  consisting  of  four  Roman 
legions,  or  about  twenty-four  thousand  men,  besides  an  equal 
force  of  allies  of  the  Latin  name,  were  opposed  to  Hannibal, 
covering  the  two  diflferent  roads  which  led  to  Rome,  the  Flami- 
nian  by  the  Adriatic  coast,  and  the  Emilian  through  Tuscany. 
Servihus  took  the  command  itf  heu  of  Scipio  at  Rimini,  on  the 
Adriatic,  and  Flaminius  that  of  Sempronius,  at  Arezzo,  a  town  of 
Tuscany,  situated  among  the  Appenines  on  the  confines  of  the 
states  of  the  church,  about  a  hundred  and  twenty  miles  due 
north  of  Rome.     So  that  apparently  Hannibal  could  not  advance 


MARCH    THROUGH    NORTHERN    ITALY.  351 

upon  Rome,  without  encountering  the  one  or  other  of  these  two 
powerful  hosts.  Many  reasons  had  induced  both  parties  to  open 
this  campaign  at  an  early  season,  and  in  fact  Flaminius  was  in 
the  field  so  soon  as  the  15th  of  March.  Hannibal,  however,  had 
no  idea  of  affi-onting  the  might  of  Rome  in  her  .own  central  Latin 
territory,  much  less  of  attacking  her  walls,  when  he  had  no  means 
adequate  to  the  storming  of  such  petty  garrison  towns  as 
Placentia,  Cremona,  and  the  other  Roman  colonies  planted  in 
the  half  subjugated  districts  of  Cisalpine  Gaul.  His  game  was 
to  rekindle  the  ancient  feuds  of  Samnium  and  Campania,  against 
their  haughty  mistress,  and,  subsisted  on  the  wealth  of  the  rich 
plains  of  La  Puglia  and  the  Terra  di  Lavoro,  to  wear  out  the 
patience  of  the  Roman  allies  by  devastating  their  territories, 
until  he  should  be  able  to  raise  all  Southern  Italy  in  one  common 
league  against  their  common  mistress ;  and  then,  and  not  until 
then,  to  strike  a  home  blow,  which  should  be  at  once  irresistible 
and  decisive.  Skilfully  avoiding,  therefore,  both  the  main  roads 
he  marched  almost  due  south,  down  the  valley  of  the  Serchio, 
through  a  tract  of  almost  impassable  morasses,  among  which  his 
army  suffered  severely,  upon  the  Valdarno,  which  he  entered 
some  twenty  miles  westward  of  Florence,  and  plundered  it  with 
extreme  severity,  compensating  his  men  for  their  previous  toils  by 
the  enjoyment  of  those  rich  districts.  Thence,  finding  that 
Flaminius  moved  not  from  his  post  at  Arezzo,  he  advanced 
rapidly  through  Tuscany,  turning  that  Consul's  left  to  the  west 
and  southward,  and  passing  onward,  with  Cortona's  mountain 
citadel  unmolested  on  his  o^vn  left,  direct  upon  the  Lake  of 
Perugia — better  known  as  the  fatal  Thrasymene — which  he  ap- 
proax^hed  on  its  northern  side,  as  if  it  were  his  intention  to  strike 
the  watei-s  of  the  upper  Tiber,  and  so  enter  the  very  heart  of  the 
Latin  country,  and  descend  on  Rome  itself,  leaving  both  her 
consular  armies  far  to  rearward.  To  effect  this  he  had  made  a 
long  and  circuitous  flank  mai'ch  close  under  the  position  of  a  con- 


352  HANNIBAL. 

centrated  enemy ;  a  manoeuvre  singularly  hazardous  if  executed 
in  the  face  of  an  alert  and  active  foe.  It  was  such  a  ma- 
noeuvre which  lost  Austerlitz  to  the  Russians,  and  Salamanca 
to  Marmont ;  but  Hannibal's  superior  cavalry  enabled  him  to  ex- 
ecute it  in  the  plains  without  fear  of  molestation  from  an  enemy 
whom  he  had  now  completely  outwitted. 

Satisfied  by  this  that  Hannibal  desired  to  avoid  him,  Fla- 
minius  broke  up  from  Arezzo,  and  pursued,  in  hot  haste,  fearing 
only  that  his  fugitive  enemy,  as  he  vainly  imagined  him,  would 
have  already  entered  the  basin  of  the  Tiber,  and  commenced  the 
devastation  of  the  especial  territory  of  the  city.  But  Hannibal 
had  foreseen  the  movement,  and  prepared  a  trap,  more  terrible 
than  that  even  of  the  Caudine  forks,  for  his  unwary  pursuer. 

The  road,  which  passes  to  the  northward  of  the  lake  Thrasy- 
mene,  or  Perugia,  into  the  Latin  country,  traverses  at  first  a  nar- 
row defile  between  steep  cliffs  and  the  deep  waters  of  the  lake, 
and  then  turns  abruptly  to  the  north,  crossing  a  little  lap  of  land 
between  low  hills  to  the  left  and  ri^ht.  Within  this  o'orjxe  Han- 
nibal  had  paused,  and  crouched  like  a  lion,  for  his  spring.  With 
his  Africans  and  Spaniards  he  barred  the  road  in  front,  on  the 
crest  of  the  ridge,  where  the  road  wound  upward  from  the  lake. 
His  Gauls  he  posted  with  his  cavalry  on  the  left  of  the  pass, 
among  the  low  hills ;  his  archery  and  slingers  on  the  right,  while 
he  garnished  the  tops  of  the  cliffs,  above  the  pass,  with  light 
troops  and  the  Gaulish  auxiharies.  Fortune  and  the  weather 
favored  him,  no  less  than  the  ground.  Flaminius  arrived  late, 
after  a  forced  march,  at  Passignano,  just  without  the  passes  ; 
encamped,  and  before  daybreak  entered  the  defiles,  without 
reconnoitering  or  sending  forward  an  advanced  guard  ;  thinking 
only  how  best  he  might  overtake  his  flying  enemy.  A  thick 
mist  from  the  lake  covered  all  the  low  grounds  and  defiles,  while 
the  heights  above  were  bright  in  the  clear  atmosphere ;  still 
onward  marched  the  doomed  column,  crowded  in  dense  aiTay, 


LAXE    TIIRASYMEXUS.  353 

and  marcliing  at  their  fastest  pace,  emulous  to  fall  on  the  rear  of 
the  enemy.  Not  a  sound  was  heard,  not  a  bowstring  was 
drawn,  until  the  head  of  the  cohimn  was  ascending  the  last 
height,  whereon  the  Africans  and  Spaniards  were  posted,  and 
the  rear  was  entangled  in  the  defiles,  and  overlooked  by  the 
Gallic  auxiliaries.  Then  at  once,  before,  behind,  and  on  both 
flanks,  broke  on  their  ears  the  slogan  of  the  Gauls,  the  clang  and 
clatter  of  the  Numidian  horse,  and  the  fatal  whistle  of  the  bul- 
lets, slung  hke  hail  into  their  ranks  by  the  fierce  barbarians. 
The  van  alone  cut  its  way  clear  through  the  troops  that  opposed 
them,  and  escaped  for  a  while,  six  thoiLsand  strong,  to  one  of 
the  neighboring  villages.  They  alone — for  of  the  centre  and  the 
rear  of  tliat  doomed  army  not  one  man  escaped  to  tell  the  talo 
of  the  disaster.  The  thirsty  lance  of  the  Numidian,  the  clay- 
more of  the  Gaul,  and  the  deadly  missiles  of  the  Balearians  did 
their  work  thoroughly.  Flaminius  died  hke  a  soldier,  in  the 
field  which  he  had  lost,  and  although  Hannibal  sought  for  his 
body,  to  which  he  would  have  given  honorable  sepulture,  it 
never  was  discovered  whether  it  was  engulfed  in  the  deep  watei*s 
of  the  lake,  or  was  confused  in  some  pile  of  mangled  corpses. 
He  slept  soundly,  and  his  countrymen  forgave  his  rashness  for 
his  valor.  It  is  said,  that  an  earthquake  made  the  soil  to  reel, 
unheeded,  under  the  feet  of  the  combatants,  so  deadly  and 
despairing,  on  both  sides,  was  the  conflict. 

Before  the  sun  set,  the  six  thousand  men,  who  had  escaped, 
were  prisoners  to  Maharbal  and  his  indefatigable  horse.  Of  fifty 
thousand  men,  fifteen  thousand  only  were  left  alive,  and  these 
prisonei-s ;  of  whom  the  Italians  were  discharged,  free  and  with- 
out ransom,  while  the  Romans  were  kept  in  strict  custody,  to  be 
sold  as  slaves  or  slain,  according  to  the  pleasure  of  their  captors ; 
so  ran  the  laws  of  antique  warfare. 

There  was  no  force  between  the  conqueror  and  Rome  ;  but  no 
rash  impulse,  no   overweening   confidence   induced    that    wise 
16 


354  HANNIBAL. 

leader  to  deviate  from  his  preconcerted  jjlan,  or  to  enter  the 
Latin  country,  in  which  he  well  knew  that  he  should  find  a  bare 
and  devastated  country,  a  deadly  enemy  in  every  male  inhabitant, 
an  impregnable  fortress  in  every  Latin  town.  Even  on  the  day 
succeeding  the  defeat,  the  little  borough  of  Spoleto  shut  its  gates 
against  his  horsemen,  and  he  had  neither  the  means  nor  the 
inclination  to  assault  it.  He  devastated,  however,  the  whole  rich 
plain  fi-om  the  Tiber  to  Perugia  and  Spoleto ;  and  then,  leisurely 
crossing  the  Apennines  in  the  direction  of  Ancona,  descended 
the  shores  of  the  Adriatic,  through  the  country  of  the  Abruzzi, 
into  La  Puglia,  even  to  the  Gulf  of  Manfredonia ;  possessing  the 
whole  country,  from  the  Apennines  eastward  to  the  Gulf  of 
Venice  ;  and  from  Ancona  southward  to  the  Ofonto,  in  what  is 
now  the  kingdom  of  Naples.  During  this  long  excursion,  he 
put  to  the  sword  e\'ery  Latin  and  Roman  who  was  taken ;  a 
policy  bloody  indeed  and  cruel,  but  of  which  the  Romans  could 
not  at  least  complain,  since  their  own  practice  was  the  massacre 
of  every  living  thing,  even  to  domestic  animals,  in  captured  cities. 
Living  with  his  troops  on.  the  fat  of  the  land,  he  recruited  his 
invaluable  cavalry  with  rich  herbage  of  the  fertile  plains  of  the 
south,  and  so  made  war  feed  war,  at  the  greatest  cost  to  the 
enemy.  Still  no  state  joined  him ;  no  city  opened  its  gates  ;  nor 
had  he  the  means  of  forcing,  either  by  storm  or  blockade,  even 
the  meanest  of  the  Roman  colonies  : — this  is  sufficient  answer  to 
those  empty  declaimers  who  would  censure  so  consummate  a 
master  of  the  art  of  war,  as  Hannibal,  for  want  of  energy  in  not 
storming  Rome  itself. 

At  this  time,  though  the  Romans  had  no  individual  man  who 
could  be  compared  for  a  moment  with  Hannibal,  the  spirit  of  the 
people  was  admirable  and  heroic  to  the  utmost.  Not  a  word 
was  spoken  of  surrender  ;  not  a  soldier  was  withdrawn  from  any 
foreign  station  ;  only  a  Dictator  was  appointed,  fresh  levies  were 
drawn  together,  Rome  hei;self  was  put  in  a  state  of  defence,  and 


ENTERS    SAMNIUM.  355 

the  whole  countiy  was  ordered  to  be  devastated,  the  corn  de- 
stroyed, and  every  house  and  hamlet  burned  to  the  ground, 
wherever  he  should  turn  his  march. 

This  doubtless,  as  well  as  the  hope  of  driving  the  allies  into 
revolt  against  Rome,  so  soon  as  they  should  find  Rome  helpless 
to  protect  them,  induced  him  to  avoid  the  Latin  country,  and  to 
bide  his  time  patiently  and  with  stern  perseverance.  The  peo[)lc 
of  La  Puglia  would  not  join  him  ;  therefore,  he  crossed  the 
Apennines  again,  into  the  Samnite  country,  a  hundred  years  before 
so  deadly  hostile  to  the  Romans.  But  Benevento,  its  capital, 
was  now.  a  Latin  colony,  and  like  all  its  sister  towns,  steadily  shut 
its  gates  against  him.  Laying  its  territories  waste  on  e\'ery 
side  the  terrible  invader  rolled  the  tide  of  devastation  onward, 
ascended  the  Voltorno  till  he  found  it  fordable,  then  crossed  it, 
and  rushed  down  like  a  torrent  of  lava,  sweeping  all  before  him 
with  pitiless  conflagration  into  the  very  garden  of  Italy,  tiie 
glorious  Falernian  plain,  the  pride  of  Campania.  Summer  had 
scarce  yet  commenced ;  a  long  campaign  was  still  before  him  ; 
Fabius  the  Dictator  was  in  the  field  watchino;  him  from  the  hills 
where  Hannibal  could  not  assail  him  ;  for  unaided  by  their  in- 
vincible horse,  the  Carthaginian  foot  could  not  cope  with  the 
legionaries — the  rawest  levies  beating  them  with  ease,  when 
fighting  from  behind  intrenchments.  Hannibal,  it  must  be  re- 
membered, had  no  base  of  operations,  no  fortified  garrisons,  no 
guarded  magazines,  no  hope  of  reinforcements  from  the  rear  ;  his 
hospitals,  his  magazines,  were  necessarily  in  his  camp  ;  his 
granaries  and  store-houses  were  in  the  fields  of  his  enemy  and  her 
allies.  Thence  it  became  a  trial  of  patience  between  Fabius,  the 
Delayer,  as  he  delighted  to  be  termed,  and  Hannibal,  who,  per- 
ha[)S,  deserved  the  title  better,  for  prompt  as  he  was  to  strike 
when  a  blow  was  to  be  stricken,  he  never  once  struck  a  blow  un- 
timely. Hannibal  waited  patiently  the  time  when  the  allies 
should  desert  Rome  as  unable  to  defend  them ;  or  when  Rome, 


366  IlAiNNIBAL. 

conscious  of  their  near  defection,  should  descend  to  fight  in  a 
fair  field,  in  order  to  defend  their  loyalty.  Fabius  waited 
patiently  the  time  when  Hannibal  should  expose  iy  weak  point 
to  an  attack,  or  should  attack  at  a  disadvantage — but  that  time 
never  came. 

Once  Fabius  thought  that  he  had  taken  his  great  antagonist 
as  in  a  net,  and  that  he  could  not  escape  one  more  example  of 
the  Caudine  Forks  ;  but  by  a  simj^le  stratagem  his  wily  enemy 
baflfled  his  deep  laid  schemes ;  extricated  himself  from  the  toils, 
without  the  loss  of  one  man  ;  and  returned  into  his  old  quartei-s, 
east  of  the  Pyrenees,  loaded  with  plunder,  to  pass  the  autumn  and 
winter  at  his  ease,  leaving  the  Dictator  and  his  system,  a 
stumbling-block  to  his  friends,  and  a  laughing-stock  to  his 
enemies.  So  discontented  indeed  were  the  people,  that  a  bill 
was  passed  at  Rome,  giving  equal  power  to  the  master  of  the 
horse,  Minutius,  and  the  Dictator,  and  dividing  the  armies 
between  them  ;  but  it  soon  became  apparent  that  if  the  system 
of  delaying  was  ineffective,  the  system  of  delivering  battle  to 
Hannibal  was  fatal.  For  Minutius,  venturing  to  do  so,  was  ver}^ 
severely  handled ;  and  a  second  route  of  the  Trebbia  was  pre- 
vented only  by  the  timely  rescue  of  the  slow  Dictator. 

No  farther  action  marked  that  autumn ;  Hannibal  went  into 
wmter  quarters,  well  assured  that  one  of  two  things  must  occm* 
in  the  ensuing  campaign — either  the  Romans  must  dehver  battle 
to  retain  the  fealty  of  the  aUies,  when  he  looked  forward  confi- 
dently to  an  overwhelming  rout  of  their  forces,  which  itself  would 
induce  defection  of  the  allies — or  they  must  again  abandon  them 
yet  another  season  to  plunder  and  devastation ;  when  they  would 
assuredly  rise  in  revolts  unsohcited. 

The  steadiness  with  which  this  great  captain  adhered  to  his 
first  system,  is  worthy  of  all  praise,  as  a  quality  of  the  highest 
strategetical  ability;  and  scarcely  second  to  it,  the  mihtary 
observer  must  rate  the  care  with  which  he  nurtured,  cherished, 


CARE    FOR    HIS    CAVALRY.  S5l 

and  preserved  his  great  resource,  his  invaluable  cavalry,  never  to 
be  ]-eplaced  if  once  lost.  Nor  will  the  tactician  fail  to  remark,  in 
this  connexion,  the  difference  between  the  conduct  pf  the  Cartha- 
ginian, and  that  of  the  great  French  Emperor ;  who,  by  reck- 
lessly sacrificing  in  the  morning  of  the  18  th  of  June,  his  incom- 
parable cuirassiers  and  dragoons  against  the  immovable  English 
squares,  suffered  that  to  be  converted  into  an  utter  rout,  which 
might  have  been  only  a  severe  check,  had  his  retreating  columns 
been  covered  at  night  by  the  fourteen  thousand  unrivalled 
cavalry,  the  bulk  of  whom  were  uselessly  expended  in  vain 
charges  on  an  impenetrable  infiintry,  and  lay  cold  on  the  red  clay 
of  Waterloo. 

At  Rome,  in  the  mean  time,  there  was  discontent  from  within 
and  clamor  from  without.  The  hot  spirits  within  cried  Shame, 
that  Roman  armies  should  avoid  any  enemy  in  the  field  ;  the 
cold  spirits  without  cried  Shame,  that  Rome  should  see  her  allies 
sufller  the  extremities  of  war,  without  striking  one  blow  to  aid  or 
dehver  them.  The  crisis,  for  which  Hannibal  had  been  so  long 
waiting,  had  arrived. 

The  consuls  of  the  year  were  elected  with  a  direct  reference  to 
the  question  of  giving  battle,  or  no  ;  and  the  choice  decided  the 
question  in  the  affirmative.  The  consular  armies  had  lain  during 
the  winter  at  Canusiura,  a  small  town  to  the  south  of  the  Ofanto, 
deriving  their  support  from  a  large  magazine,  which  they  had 
estabhshed  at  Cannte. 

In  this  campaign  Hannibal  took  the  initiative,  and  again 
threw  himself  suddenly  on  the  communications  of  the  enemy, 
getting  unexpectedly  into  their  rear,  and  surprising  their  mag;i- 
zines  at  Cannae  ;  in  the  citadel  of  which,  as  a  place  of  some 
strength,  he  established  himself.  The  campaign  had  not  opened 
so  early  as  usual  in  this  season,  for  the  corn  was  already  ripen- 
ing ;  yet  the  consuls  had  not  yet  reached  the  camp  at  Cauusium, 


358  HANNIBAL. 

when  tlie  proconsuls  sent  for  instructions  from  the  senate  how  to 
act,  after  their  supphes  had  been  thus  cut  off. 

The  answer. was  the  arrival  of  the  consuls,  Terentius  Varro,  of 
plebeian,  and  Lucius  ^iiiilius  Paullus,  of  the  highest  patrician 
blood,  with  reinforcements — raising  the  Roman  force  to  about 
ninety  thousand  men — and  orders  to  risk  a  battle.  On  their  ar- 
rival, they  marched  upon  Hannibal,  and  found  him  encamped  on 
the  left  bank  of  the  Ofimto,  at  about  nine  miles  distant  fi-om  the 
sea,  on  very  open  ground,  highly  advantageous  to  cavalry  opera- 
tions. Perceiving  this,  the  Consul  ^mihus  was  desirous  to 
retreat  farther  from  the  sea,  into  the  hill  country,  where  the  Car- 
thaginian cavalry  would  be  less  efficient,  and  whither  he  sup- 
posed Hannibal  would  be  compelled  to  follow  him,  so  soori  as  the 
crop  on  the  seaboard  should  be  exhausted.  Varro,  however,  of 
a  bolder  and  more  sanguine  temperament,  when  his  day  for 
command  arrived,  took  steps  which  must  needs  bring  on  an 
action,  by  interposing  himself  between  Hannibal  and  the  sea, 
with  his  left  on  the  river  and  his  right  on  the  town  of  Salapia. 
Hannibal  at  once  mai'ched  down  upon  the  Roman  camp,  and 
offered  battle,  which  ^Emihus,  in  his  turn  being  in  command, 
declined.  Some  unimportant  manceuvring  followed,  in  which 
the  Romans  were  somewhat  the  sufferers.  A  few  days  elapsed, 
when  Varro  forded  the  river  and  drew  out  in  battle  array,  on 
the  right  bank,  upon  which  his  right  flank  now  rested.  Hanni- 
bal immediately  followed  his  example,  and  crossing  the  Ofanto 
at  two  points,  drew  out  opposite  to  him. 

This  battle  is  the  most  worthy,  of  any  in  ancient  history,  unless 
perhaps  it  be  that  of  Leuctra,  of  the  attention  of  both  the  scholar 
and  the  tactician ;  for  it  is  the  prototype,  and  very  counterpart, 
in  its  arrangement  and  results,  of  those  of  the  greatest  pitched 
battles  the  world  has  ever  witnessed — Fontenoy,  Aspern,  and 
Waterloo.  And,  if  I  do  not  err,  the  result  must  ever  be  the 
same,  where,  of  two  armies,  equally  matched  for  courage  and 


ARRAY    AT    C'ANN.E.  359 

strength,  and  equally  well  led,  the  one  rushes  in  sohd  column  of 
attack  into  the  centre  of  the  other ;  which,  if  steady  enough  to 
fight  in  line,  must  envelop  and  overwhelm  it.  Such  was  the  fate 
of  the  all  but  victorious  square  of  the  Highlam.lers  at  Fontenoy ; 
such  of  the  terrible  column  of  Lannes  at  Aspern  ;  such  of  the 
ten-ific  final  onslaught  of  Ney  with  the  young  guard  on  the 
heights  of  Mount  St.  Jean ;  and  such,  even  more  markedly,  was 
the  result  of  the  battle  now  under  consideration. 

For  some  inexplicable  reason,  the  Roman  army,  which  was 
infinitely  superior  in  numbers  and  quahty  of  infantry,  and  the 
habit  of  which  was  to  fight  ever  in  line,  was  crowded  into  deep, 
narrow  columns,  on  this  occasion. 

On  the  extreme  right  of  the  Roman  line,  next  to  the  river, 
were  the  Roman  knights,  and  next  to  these  the  legions ;  on  their 
left  the  alhed  infantry,  and  on  the  left  again  the  cavalry  of  the 
Latin  name. 

Opposing  these  in  order,  stood,  next  to  the  river,  the  Gaulish 
and  Spanish  horse  ;  then  half  the  African  foot,  armed  hke  the 
legionaries;  then  the 'Gaulish  and  Spanish  foot,  and  to  their  left 
the  remainder  of  the  Africans,  with  their  left  covered  by  the 
Numidian  horse. 

Thus  far  all  was  even ;  but  Hannibal  had  purposely  arrayed 
the  Carthaginian  army,  precisely  as  the  English  army  was  drawn 
up  at  Waterloo,  owing,  in  the  lattei*  instance,  to  the  formation  of 
the  ground ;  that  is  to  say,  in  a  great  convex  line,  with  the  apex 
toward  the  enemy. 

On  the  signal  being  given,  the  cavalry  charged  on  both  sides  ; 
and,  although  the  Roman  knights  fought  stubbornly,  they  could 
not  resist  the  onslaught  of  Hasdrubal,  who  chased  them  up  the 
river  bank,  slaughtering  them  unsparingly,  till  seeing  them 
utterly  dispersed  and  broken,  he  wheeled  across  the  whole  rear 
of  the  Roman  host,  and  falling  on  the  Latin  horse,  who  still  held 
their   own   against  the    Numidian  skirmishers,  scattered  them 


860  HANNIBAL. 

like  a  thunderbolt.  Meanwhile,  the  Roman  legions,  seeing  th } 
Carthaginian  infantry  advancing  in  a  wedge — instead  of  with- 
drawing their  own  centre,  as  they  should  have  done — rushed  in 
toward  the  centre  fi'om  the  flanks,  till  they  were  all  crowded  into 
a  vast  dense  single  column,  which  forced  its  way  onward  by  the 
weight  and  fury  of  its  own  desperate  charge.  Thus,  the  Gauls 
and  Spaniards  in  the  centre  of  the  Punic  line  were  pushed  back 
bodily  into  the  rear,  so  that  the  Africans  on  the  wings,  who  had 
been  originally  withdrawn,  were  now  in  advance ;  and  the  whole 
Carthaginian  army,  from  being  a  convex,  had  become  a  concave 
line,  overlapping  and  tearing  to  pieces  the  flanks  of  the  long 
unwieldy  Roman  column,  with  their  assailing  wings. 

Precisely  similar  to  this  catastrophe,  was  that  of  the  British 
column  at  Fontenoy,  where  the  French  and  Enghsh  forces 
reversed  their  usual  mode  of  fighting — the  latter  attacking  in 
column,  the  former  resisting  in  line.  Precisely  similar  was  the 
check  and  overthrow  of  Lannes'  terrible  column  at  Aspern. 
And,  with  but  one  exception,  precisely  similar  even  to  the  small- 
est details,  were  the  whole  tactics  of  the  last  decisive  charge  at 
Waterloo.  The  exception  is  this,  that  whereas  the  Punic  hne 
of  battle  at  Cannae  became  concave,  from  convex,  by  the  retro- 
gression of  the  centre  ;  the  British  line  at  Waterloo  underwent 
the  same  change  by  the  advance  of  its  flanks.  In  both  actions 
the  attacking  column  plunged  into  a  concave  hne,  carrying  all 
before  it ;  until  its  head  was  checked  by  the  steadiness  of  the 
resisting  centre,  its  flanks  ravaged  by  the  onslaught  of  the  wings, 
and,  to  complete  the  parallel,  in  both  cases,  its  rear  torn  to 
pieces  by  a  charge  of  cavalry,  its  own  cavalry  having  been  long 
before  expended — for  at  the  close  of  the  bloody  day  of  Cannre, 
Hasdrubal,  returned  from  the  slaughter  of  the  Latin  liorse,  broke 
in  upon  the  rear  of  the  still  struggling  legionaries,  and  cV)sed 
the  conflict  by  such  a  butchery  as  history  but  seldom  ■  as 
recorded. 


THE  CARNAGE.  361 

Strange  results  followed  this  catastrophe.  All  the  Southern 
alKes  deserted  from  Rome's  authoi-ity,  except  the  Latin  name ; 
and,  even  of  these,  twelve  colonies  refused  their  contingents. 
Still  Rome  disdained  to  treat ;  and  Ilannibal,  unable,  for  want  of 
artillery  or  of  sufficient  disciphned  and  steady  infantry,  to  attack 
her  walls,  was  compelled  to  maintain  the  war  in  the  Southern 
provinces.  From  that  day  forth  the  Romans  fought  no  more 
pitched  battles;  and,  having  regular  supi)lies,  while  Hannibal 
was  compelled  to  forage  for  his  subsistence,  they  could  rarely 
be  forced  into  action.  Whenever  he  did  so,  indeed,  his  superi- 
ority of  resource  and  ability  inevitably  told ;  but  the  war  was 
henceforth  changed  into  a  war  of  sieges  ;  and  in  those  Hannibal 
fought  at  disadvantage,  for  his  cavalry  could  not  be  brought  to 
bear,  and  his  infantry  were,  as  I  have  before  observed,  inferior 
to  the  legions.  Still,  never  were  the  talents  of  the  great  Cartha- 
ginian so  conspicuous  as  in  these  later  campaigns,  when  the 
Romans  selected  none  but  soldiers  of  proof,  and  those  soldiers 
had  learned  strategy  even  through  being  beaten  by  Hannibal. 
His  manoeuvres  about  Tarentum  ;  his  marches  to  and  fro,  deal- 
ing tremendous  blows  on  all  hands  ;  his  presence  seeming  almost 
ubiquitous,  cannot  fail  to  remind  the  reader  of  Napoleon's  finest 
campaign,  in  my  opinion,  which  terminated  with  the  abdication 
of  Fontainbleau. 

His  reappearance  before  the  walls  of  Capua,  when  confident 
that  he  was  leagues  distant  before  Tarentum,  the  Romans,  by  a 
vast  combined  movement,  had  surrounded  that  city,  and  already 
exulted  in  the  sure  prospect  of  its  fall,  only  to  vanish  like  morning 
shadows  before  the  mere  splendor  of  his  presence,  seen  on  the 
distant  summit  of  Tifata,  surrounded  by  his  veteran  invincibles, 
js  so  complete  an  antecedent  to  Napoleon's  similar  reappearance 
at  Dresden,  and  the  scattering  of  the  allies,  that  if  the  names  and 
geography  were  changed  one  narrative  might  do  for  either. 

When  on  his  removal  to  the  south,  the  Romans  gathered 


362  HANNIBAL. 

again  about  the  fated  walls  of  Caj^ua,  and  fortified  themselves  in 
their  leaguer  with  lines  of  circumvallation  and  countervallation 
which  mocked  his  army's  strength,  what  decision  could  be 
sounder,  what  conception  grander,  what  execution  more  masterly 
than  that  of  his  forced  march  upon  Rome  itself,  in  the  hope  of 
drawing  them  from  their  half-won  prey  ?  What  more  romantic 
than  his  actually  hurling  his  javehn  over  the  Colhne  gates  of 
Rome,  and  wasting  the  immediate  territory  of  the  city  with  the 
sword  and  fire  before  the  very  eyes  of  her  Senators  ?  It  is  true 
the  Romans  did  not  raise  the  siege,  and  that  to  his  great  regret 
they  did  take  Capua  ;  but  that  in  no  wise  detracts  from  the  cor- 
rectness of  his  mihtary  principles,  or  the  magnificence  of  his 
military  achievements. 

This  was  in  the  sixth  year  of  the  w^ar  ;  for  five  yeai-s  more  ho 
struggled  on  with  varying  success,  but  unvarying  courage  and 
conduct ;  in  the  eleventh  year  Hasdrubal,  his  brother,  followed 
in  his  footsteps  from  New  Carthage  to  the  Alps,  passed  them, 
and  entered  Italy  with  powerful  reinforcements,  which  might 
well  have  changed  the  fortunes,  would  certainly  have  protracted 
the  duration,  of  the  war.  But  he  was  intercepted  by  vastly 
superior  forces,  concentrated  against  him  by  means  of  Claudius 
JSTero's  splendid  forced  march  from  one  to  the  other  end  of  the 
Peninsula,  utterly  defeated  and  killed. 

This  was  the  great,  the  one  great  Roman  achievement  of  the 
war  ;  and  it  was  disgraced  by  a  deed  of  the  foulest  atrocity. 
Hannibal's  first  information  of  his  brother's  defeat,  was  that 
brother's  pale  and  bloody  head  cast  over  the  entrenchments  of  his 
camp.  Yet  he  had  sought  for  Flaminius'  body  to  give  it  honor- 
able burial ;  and  when  Marcellus  was  slain  he  buried  his  remains 
with  all  honor,  and  sent  his  inurned  ashes  to  his  son. 

The  defeat  of  Hasdrubal  was  the  real  downfall  of  all  Hannibal's 
prospects  of  success  ;  for  it  had  long  been  evident  that  his  single 
army  could  not  eflfect  the  destruction  of  the  Roman  Republic  ; 


FORTUNE  OF  VTAR  CHANGES.  363 

and  Carthage,  with  Spain  now  wrested  from  her  grasp,  could 
oflfer  him  no  aid.     Indeed  she  was,  ere  long,  to  be  so  hard 
pressed  at  home,  as  to  require  his  all-powerful  arm,  alas  !  no  longer 
powerful  to  preserve  her.     All  he  could  now  do,  was  to  act  on  the 
defensive ;  and  he  did  that  as  brilliantly  and  eftectively,  as  he 
had  before  assumed  the  offensive.     Before  he  was  recalled  to 
fight  at  home  for  the  very  existence  of  Carthage,  he  had  main- 
tained himself  for  seventeen  years  in  the  heart  of  an  enemy's 
country,  without  reinforcements,  supplies,  or  moneys  except  what 
he  took  from  the  enemy ;  he  had  traversed  and  retraversed  every 
portion  of  the  peninsula,  from  the  Po  to  the  Gulf  of  Tarentum, 
wasting  it  with  fire  and  sword  at  his  own  will ;  he  had  won  three 
pitched  battles,  which  are  to  this  day  the  admiration  of  all 
stra.tegists ;  he  had  beaten  every  force  that  ever  met  him  in  the 
field  ;  he  had  never  sufiered  a  defeat  -,  and  w^hen  he  withdrew 
from  the  shores  of  Italy,  he  did  so,  not  that  the  Romans  drove 
him  thence,  but  that  Carthage  needed  him  elsewhere.     At  Zama 
he  was  overpowered,  not   vanquished;  for   the   Romans   were 
superior,  in  both  numbers  and  quality,  of  both  horse  and  foot. 
And  the  Numidians,  to  whose  irresistible  onset  and  impetuous 
horsemanship  Hannibal  had,  in  great  part,  owed  his  previous 
successes  over  the  Romans — for  with  their  thundering  charge 
he  terminated  the  crisis  of  almost  every  battle,  crushing  their 
indomitable  infantry  under  foot,  after  having  broken  and  exter- 
minated  their    weak   cavalry — were   now   arrayed    under   the 
savage  and  revengeful  veteran  Massinissos  on  the  side  of  Scipio. 
There  was  little  manoeuvrmg  in  this  action,  but  much  hard 
fighting  ;  and  it  was  won  in  the  end  by  the  stubborn  hardihood 
of  the  Roman  reserve  of  Triarii  brought  fresh  into  action  with 
their  long  spears,  after  all  the  forces  of  the  Carthaginians  had 
been  successive!}^  wearied  out  and  cut  to  pieces. 

Scipio  gained  no  laurels  by  that  \nctory  beyond  the  barren 


364 


Il.VX.N'IRAL. 


honor  of  being  styled  tlie  conqueror  of  Hannibal,  whom  all  men 
•of  all  countries  knew  to  be  his  better. 

And  Rome  earned  eternal  disgrace  by  her  persecution,  even 
unto  the  death,  of  the  aged,  friendless,  helpless  exile,  during 
whose  hfe-time  she  could  not  but  tremble. 

Take  him  for  all  in  all,  not  looking  for  virtues  incompatible 
with  the  times,  the  country,  and  the  state  of  society  in  which  he 
flourished  ;  weighing  what  he  did  against  the  means  with  which 
he  did  it ;  judging  his  acts  by  his  motives,  and  his  character  by 
his  conduct ;  I  think  we  shall  not  err  in  pronouncing  him,  one  of 
the  purest  patriots,  and  the  greatest  captain,  without  excep- 
tion, whom  this  world  has  yet  seen,  or  perhaps  will  see  for  ever. 


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traying a  heart  susceptible  to  the  higher  and  better  feelings  that  adorn  and  dignify  man." 
—  Weekly  Eclectic. 

"  The  adventures  he  and  his  shipmates  met  with  in  Tarious  qnartf rs  of  the  globe,  are 
narrated  in  an  unpretending  style,  but  with  graphic  power.  Several  of  these  narrations 
are  of  exciting  interest,  and  they  so  closely  follow  each  other,  that  the  reader  will  find  it 
impossible  to  lay  down  the  book  until  he  has  reached  the  last  -ps^a.''— Portland  Tran- 

6Ciii>t. 

"  This  is  a  delightful  matter-of-fact  volimie,  for  which  we  predict  a  great  many  readers." 
— ChH-iti(in  Intelligencer. 

"  It  is  a  work  which  does  credit  to  the  moral  and  literary  character  of  the  navy." — K 
Y.  Evangelist. 

"  It  is  well  wiitten,  avoiding  coarseness  and  slang,  and  will  be  a  pleasant  companion  for 
the  w  inter  evenings." — Cincinnati  Ilerald. 

"Tlie  author  has, a  great  variety  of  expenence,  and  he  has  made  out  of  it  cot  only  an 
agreeable  but  instructive  book." — Albany  Arc'^m. 

"  It  is  tilled  with  lively  portraitures  of  naval  life,  and  must  be  read  with  interest  both 
by  seameu  and  landsmen." — 2f.  Y.  Triluae. 

"This  is  a  pleasing  book,  abundantly  teeming  with  the  thrilling  casualties  of  'hair- 
breadth 'scaites' which  beset  the  paths  of  those  who  plough  the  euchafed  bosom  of  the 
deep,  and  is  strikingly  characterized  by  the  winning  graces  of  modesty  of  tnne  and  a  re- 
tiued  simi)licity  of  narration." — Washington  Republic. 


ANNALS  OF  THE  Q'JEENS  OF  SPAIN.    By  Anita  Geoege.    2  vols.   12k:o. 
Price,  .$2  50. 

"Of  the  manner  in  which  she  has  peiformed  her  task,  it  is  enough  to  say  that  she  has 
won  the  distinguished  commendation  of  W  m.  H.  Prescott ' — X.  Y.  EvangeUst. 

•'  Mrs.  George  follows  steadily  the  highway  of  her  subject  without  diverging  to  any  by- 
paths of  speculation  and  illustration,  iicr  object  appoiirs  to  be,  to  give  as  much  informa- 
tion as  possible  in  small  compass,  in  which  she  succeeds."— -t^^rary  World. 

"The  authoress  has  worked  her  way  through  the  scattered  rubbish  of  the  past  and  pro- 
duced a  work  of  immediate  and  lasting  interest." — Bangor  Courier. 

"The  work  is  \vritten  in  a  clear  and  vivacious  style,  and  is  an  accession  to  the  popular 
literature." — Praii'ie  Herald. 


ilitiiJiljAjt  O   iHuw     woUn. 

THE  CAPTAINS  OF  THE  OLD  WORLC— Their  Campaigns— Character,  and 
Conduct  as  compared  with  the  great  modem  SU-ategists— From  the  I'ei-sian  Wars  to 
the  end  of  the  Koiiian  Koput)lic.  iiy  1Ie.nry  W.  llEiiUEKT.  1  vol.  12mo.,  with  illus- 
trations, cloth.     Price,  $1  25. 

OoKTKNTS.— The  Military  Art  among  the  Greeks  and  Eomans— Miltiades,  the  soi  ofCl- 
mon— His  battle  of  Marathon— Themistocles,  his  sea-fight  otf  Salamis,  ^c— Pausauias, 
tlie  Spartan;  his  battle  of  riataia,  &c.— Xenophon,  the  Athenian;  his  retreat  of  tho 
Ten  Thousand,  cScc. — Epaminondas,  his  Campaigns,  battle  of  Leuktra  and  Mantinela — 
Alexaudor  of  Macedon,  his  battles  of  the  Granikos,  Issos,  and  Arbela,  &c.— llaunibal, 
Lis  battles  of  the  i  icinus,  Trebbia,  Thrasymene,  and  Canije. 

"Tlie  tlieme  is  full  of  interest,  to  which  Mr.  Herbert's  known  literary  ability  and  classi- 
cal taste  may  be  expected  to  give  due  exposition.  Tlie  work  is  aa  original  one — the  ma- 
terial of  which  he  claims  to  derive,  not  from  modern  books,  but  from  the  ancient  authentic 
sources  of  history  which  he  has  examined  for  himself." — U.  S.  Gazette  <£;  A^.  American. 

"Mr.  Ilerbeft  has  succeeded  admirably— and  lias  produced  a  work  that  will  entitle  him 
to  a  high  rank  with  the  best  authors  of  his  native  and  his  adopted  country." — Syracuse 
Star. 

"Tlie  exploits  of  those  captains  are  detailed,  whose  achievements  exerted  the  most 
powerful  influence  on  the  destinies  of  the  world.  The  author  is  a  well-read  historian,  and 
has  contemplated  the  events  he  describes  with  the  eye  of  a  philosopher  and  scholai-." — 
PhiludeljjUia  Frea  yterlan. 

"Tills  is  a  powerful  and  brilliant  delineation  of  the  captains  of  the  Old  World— it  opens 
with  tlie  three  great  Wars  of  Greece,  and  traces  the  course  of  Hannibal  in  the  most  capti 
vating  i^xy^e.'— Albany  Spectator. 

"  To  a  nervous  and  pointed  style  the  author  adds  the  research  of  a  scholar  and  the  en- 
thi^iasni  of  a  man  of  action.  The  strategies  of  warfare^ — the  arming  of  troops,  and  the 
stem  conflicts  of  man  with  man,  are  of  course  congenial  subjects  to  one  whoso  knowledge 
cf  skill  in  woodcraft  is  proverbial,  and  Mr.  Herbert  consequently  enters  iuto  them  with 
gusto  and  with  clearness  of  perception." — The  Albion. 

"This  volume  which  is  intended  to  be  the  first  of  a  scries,  includes  seven  of  the  greatest 
generals  of  antiquity,  beginning  with  Miltiades  and  ending  with  Hannibal.  The  facts  are  all 
drawn  from  the  most  authentic  sources,  and  the  characters  displayed  with  imcommoa 
skill  and  effect.  It  was  a  bright  thought,  the  bringing  together  of  these  illustrious  names 
in  one  group." — Albany  Argus. 

" 'Jhe  writer  draws  a  comparison  between  them  and  the  great  modern  strategists,  and 
gives  an  exceeuiiigly  interesting  and  graphic  picture  of  tho  celebrated  conflicts  of  olden 
limes  from  the  Persian  wars  to  the  Punic  wars."— A^  Y.  Observer. 

"This  is  an  unique  .ind  able  work.  It  displays  sound  and  varied  scholarship,  united 
with  a  knowledge  of  the  military  art  rarely  possessed  by  a  civilian.  There  is  a  truth  and 
freshness  about  the  descripiions  that  show  tho  author  to  be  no  second-hand  compiler,  but. 
one  who  has  drawn  his  knowledge  from  a  careful  study  of  the  Greek  and  Roman  historiajis 
in  their  native  garb.  We  would  recommend  this  work  to  the  attention  of  the  young  stu- 
dent,  as  a  better  manual  of  antiquities  relative  to  the  military  art,  than  any  set  treatise  on 
th3  subject,  while  its  views  of  historical  epochs  and  political  relations  are  equally  valuable 
and  trustworthy.  Ills  analysis  of  the  character  and  strategy  of  the  ^t»at  captains  of  auti 
quity  is  full  of  ititorost  and  instrnotioii."'— A'!  T.  RacorcJer. 


DARLEY^S  ILLUSTRATED  EBlTiBN  OF 

REVERIES  OF  A  BACHELOR      Or,  a  Book  of  the  Heart.    By  Ik.  Marveu    1 

vol.  8vo.  with  twenty-five  ilkistratious.     Trice,  in  cloth,  fall  guilt,  $4  00 ;  in  morocco 

extra,  $6  00. 
The  illustrations,  designed  by  Darley,  and  engraved  by  Whitney,  Kinnersley,  Hcrrick, 
&c.,  are  considered  by  good  judges  as  the  finest  ever  executed  in  this  country,  and  the  Fnb- 
lisfier  promises  the  most  elegant  Gift  Book  of  the  season.     This  book  having  already  gone 
through  fifteen  editions,  has  been  stereotyped  anew,  expressly  for  this  edition. 


MRS.  KIRKLAND, 

THE  EVENING   BOOK;  Or,  Fireside  Talk  on  Morals  and  Manners,  with  Sketches 
of  Western  Life.     By  Mrs.  C.  2A.  Kirkland.    1  voL  8vo.  cloth,  full  gilt,  $3  50;  mo- 
rocco extra,  .$5  00. 
The  contents  of  this  elegant  volume,  all  written  by  Mrs.  Kirkland,  are  as  follows : — "  House- 
hold"— Hospitality — Mystery  of  Visiting — Significance  of  Dress — Conversation — What 
shall  we  be"? — Fastidiousness — Bush  Life — Street  Servants  at  Home  and  Abroad — The 
Log  School  House— Standards— Sketch  of  a  Case,  or  a  Physician  Extraordinary— The 
Dark  Side— Courting  by  Froxy— Growing  old  gi'acefnlly- The  .:  own  Pov^r,  a  Western 
EeTniniscence — The  Village  School — The  Singing  School — A  Wedding  in  the  Woods. 
The  volume  is  elegantly  illustrated  with  fine  steel  engravixgs,  designed  by  Dallas, 
and  engraved  by  Burt. 
"  This  is  one  of  the  most  delightful  of  Mrs.  Kirkland's  works,  and  will  be  wholly  popu 
lar,  for  the  sketches  and  essays  it  contains  treat  of  subjects  pertaining  to  home  life  and 
social  manners.     'J  he  essays  are  varied  with  a  number  of  tales  and  sketches  of  Western 
adventure,  as  entertaining  as  some  of  the  pictures  in  the  fair  author's  "New  Home." — Mrs. 
EUet. 


V/ATCHING  SPIRITS.    By  Mrs.  Ellet,  Author  of  "Women  of  the  American  Revo. 

lution."'     1  vol.  8vo.  with  fine  steel  engravings.     Bound  in  cloth,  full  gilt,  price  $2  50, 

and  inorocco  extra,  price  $3  50. 
•'  We  have  looked  over  this  beautiful  book  \vith  great  delight — the  great  doctrines  of  the 
gospel  are  fully  presented,  and  this  touching  and  attractive  subject  invested  with  all  the 
grace  and  sweetness  of  a  pure  and  womanly  heart." — Sowtliern  Watchman. 


i  i.\\Ji  ^    Dolu  6    £iii;i*iO'i^    of 

YOUNG'S  KMGHT  THOUGHTS,  with  a  memoir  of  the  Author,  a  critical  view  of 
his  writings,  and  explanatory  notes.  By  James  R.  Boyd,  In  1  vol,  Svo,  Elegantly 
illustrated  «ith  Westalls  designs,  engraved  by  Burt.  Price,  in  cloth,  full  gilt,  $4  00, 
in  morocco  extra,  $6  00.    Also,  uniform  with  "Young." 

MILTON'S  PARADISE  LOST,  with  copious  Notes,  Explanatory  and  Critical,  By 
James  Egbert  Boyd.    1  vol.  Svo.    Elegantly  Illustrated  with  :« martin's  Illustrations. 

"  Professor  Boyd  has  evidently  elaborated  the  notes  with  great  care,  and  many  a  reader 
will  thank  him  for  having  rendered  intelligible  and  exquisitely  beautiful,  what  before 
scarcely  seemed  to  have  any  meaning."' — Albany  Argus. 

"  Professor  Boyd  has  prepared  this  edition  with  copious  notes  and  introductory  remarks 
to  each  Book,  by  which  everything  obscure  is  explafi^ed,  while  the  various  beauties  of 
thought  and  style  are  happily  pointed  out."— J/art/ord  Herald. 


VAG  AfviUNDO  ;  Or,  THE  ATTACHE  IN  SPAIX.    By  John  E.  Warren.    1  voL 
12mo.    lYice,  $1  00. 

"Tlie  author  of  the  volume  before  us  bas  evidently  many  of  the  necessary  qualifications 
for  a  traveller  in  Spain.  Light-hearterl  and  gay,  his  good  humor  ne\er  deserts  him,  and  lie 
is  disposed  to  view  everything  through  a  c.ouleur  de  rose  medium.  Much  of  this  illusion 
may  perhaps  be  ascribed  te  the  senoritai  who  appear  to  have  exercised  unbuund<d  sway 
over  the  susceptible  heart  of  our  Attache.  In  his  eyes  Spain  is  a  paradise  of  houries  of 
bewitcliingbeau'y." — London  Literary  Gazette. 

"The  Attache,  enjoying  peculiar  advantages  frem  his  oflicial  position,  made  the  most  of 
his  privileges,  and  has  given  us  a  daguerreotype  of  that  singularly  romantic  country  and 
people  in  a  style  at  once  lucid,  lively  and  readable."— 7'/; e  Leader. 

"  We  have  seen  more  elaborate  -works  upon  Spain  than  this,  but  few  abound  more  with 
agreeable  incidents  and  pleasant  descriptions.  The  writer's  imagination  revels  amidst  the 
soft  and  beautiful  scenes  in  which  he  finds  himself,  and  lie  contrives  to  make  the  objects 
which  pass  before  hira  almost  as  visible  and  palpable  to  his  readers  as  they  wore  to  him- 
self."— Albany  Argus. 

"  He  seems  to  have  made  good  use  of  his  means,  for  the  book  is  full  of  incidents,  told  in 
a  rather  lively  manner,  and  with  due  sensibility  to  the  romantic  scenery  as  well  as  to  the 
romantic  history  of  Spain  "—A'.  Y.  Evening  Post. 

"The  author  is  a  man  of  unquestionable  talent  and  keen  observation.  He  paints  with 
great  power,  and  sketches  manners  and  men  with  the  hand  of  a  master.  There  is  an  in- 
tenseness  and  earnestness  throughout  the  entire  book  remarkable  in  these  days  of  literary 
foppishness  and  superficiality."— 0??6ir'Za  Uerald. 


THE  FALL  OF  POLAND.  Containing  an  Analytical  and  Philosophical  Account  of 
the  Causes  which  conspired  in  the  Euin  of  that  Nation — Together  with  a  History  of 
t!ie  Country  from  its  Origin.  By  L.  C.  Saxton.  ,  2  vols.  12mo.  With  Illustrations. 
Trice,  $2  50. 

"The  entire  work  is  no  hasty  utterance  of  crude  opinions,  f^r  the  anther  has  evidently 
fitted  iiimself  fur  the  task  he  has  undertaken,  by  a  study  of  history  generally,  and  particu. 
larly  by  a  careful  collation  of  tI;ose  writers  that  bear  upon  the  subject.  In  order  to  be 
more  complete,  the  various  topics  are  arranged  under  difierent  heads :  as  Eeligion.  Gov- 
ernment, Great  J\Ien,  Civilization,  Society,  A:c.,  thus  enabling  the  student  to  refer  directly 
to  the  subject  which  he  may  desire  to  see,  and  fitting  it,  with  its  approjiriatx^  index,  to  ni.ake 
a  valuable  work  for  the  library." — Newark  Daily  Advertiser. 

"  It  is  the  product  of  great  thought  and  research,  and  presents  a  complete  and  accurate 
view  of  the  hi.story,  government,  laws,  religion,  popular  character,  and  in  short  everything 
connected  with  Poland  that  can  hjive  an  interest  for  the  schols'-  or  the  statesman.  It  is  ■. 
solid,  symmetrical,  and  glowing  incorporation  of  all  the  great  points  of  interest  of  one  ol 
the  most  interesting  nations  of  modern  times,  and  deserves  to  be  placed  among  the  endur- 
ing ornaments  of  American  literature  '' — A''.  Y.  Courier  tfe  Enquirer. 

"He  h:us  gone  in' o  his  subject  with  thoroughness— having  been  many  years  in  gather- 
ing his  materials,  and  giving  them  symmetry  and  form." — Host  an  Transcript. 

'The  author  lias  set  himself  to  the  task  with  great  zeal,  and  with  quite  an  e.xtensive 
kiicw ledffc  of  the  acces-orics  of  his  subject." — Oineinnati  Daily. 


LIFE  OF  ALGERNON  SIDNEYj  with  sketches  of  some  of  his  contemporaries  aud 
extracts  from  his  Correspond snce  and  Political  Writings.  By  G.  Van  Santvooid" 
1  vol.  12mo. 

"The  style  of  this  work  is  clear,  precise,  always  forcible,  and  at  times  eloquent,  we  ask 
our  readers  to  purchase,  and  go  through  with  oua  chapter,  they  will  read  the  reat  with- 
out om*  asking  " — FoughJceepsie  American. 

"  Jlr.  Van  Santvoord  has  drawn  his  character  and  related  the  incidents  of  his  life  with 
a  warm  appreciation ;  and  he  has  thrown  in  some  admirable  short  sketches  of  some  of  his 
compatriots.    We  recommend  his  book  warmly." — American  Review. 

"A  volume  of  manly  strength,  bringing  under  review  the  most  exciting  scenes  and 
noblest  deeds,  and  presenting  characters  of  some  of  the  greatest  men  who  have  figured  in 
British  History."— JV.  Y.  Observer. 

"  This  Work  is  graphic,  vigorous,  and  accurate.  It  necessarily  combines  sketches  of 
other  leading  characters— such  as  Vane,  Bradshaw,  Cromwell,  and  Milton.  There  are 
more  interesting  facts  condensed  in  a  small  volume  than  we  have  met  in  any  similar  pro- 
duction."— American  Artisan. 


New  and  Elegant  Juvenile  Books. 

TALES  OF  SliiiMExH  DAYS  AND  W^m  NIGHTS. 

A   GRANDMOTHER'S   RECOLLECTIONS.     By  EUa  Eodman,  with  six  tinted 
Illustrations.    1  vol.  16mo.  cloth. 
"  This  is  a  simple  narrative  of  household  reminiscences,  more  pleasing  than  many  a 
book  of  far  greater  pretensions." — Courier  and  Enquirer. 
"  This  book  is  filled  with  entertaining  and  instructive  matters."— C%ro7i.  and  AUas. 
"  It  tends  to  throw  a  mild  and  attractive  light  over  home,  and  to  minister  to  those 
gentler  feelings,  which  find  their  best  soil  in  the  quiet  and  purity  of  the  sanctuary  of  child- 
hood."—  Weekly  Sun. 

"  The  style  of  the  book  is  simple,  lively,  and  attractive ;  it  must  become  one  of  the 
favorites  of  the  day,  especially  among  young  readers." — Southern  Literary  Gazette. 
BRAGG ADOCIO9    A  book  for  Boys  and  Girls,     ^j  Mrs.  L.  C.  Tuthill— with  six 

tinted  illustrations.    1  vol.,  16mo.  cloth. 
GULLIVER  J  01 ;  his  Three  Voyages,  being  an  Account  of  his  Marvellous  Adventure 
in  Kailoo,  Hydrogenia,  and  Ejario.    By  Elbert  Perce.    1  vol.,  16mo.  with  six  tinted 
Illustrations,  cloth. 
THE  YOUNG  EMIGRANTS— Madelaine  Tube— the  Crystal  Palace— in  1  vol.  16mo, 
with  Illustrations,  cloth. 


UNCLE  FRANK'S  HOME  STORIES. 

A  beautiful  Series  of  Juveniles — entirely  new.    By  F.  C.  Woodworth,  in  6  vols,  uniform 
style,  with  eight  tinted  engravings  in  each  volume. 
\.    A  BUDGET  OF  WILLOW  LANE  STOPJES. 
2.    A  PEEP  AT  OUR  NEIGHBORS. 
8,    THE  MILLER  OF  OUR  VILLAGE,  AND  SOME  OF  HIS  TOLLS. 

4.  THE  STRAWBERRY  GIRL,  OR  HOW  TO  RISE  IN  THE  WORLD. 

5.  THE  BOY'S  AND  GIRLS  COUNTRY  BOOK. 

6.  THE  LITTLE  MISCHIEF-MAKER. 

This  Series,  by  one  of  the  most  popular  writers  in  America,  in  the  department  of  Juvenile 
Literature,  is  confidently  recommended  by  the  Publisher,  as  unequalled  in  respect  to  ita 
mechanical  beauty  and  literary  interest,  by  any  similar  publication. 


LECTURES   ON    ART— AND  P0ZM3.    By  Washington  Allston.    Jtu. 

Eichard  Henry  Dana,  Jr.  Contents— Lectures  on  Art,  pages  3-167— Aphorisms,  &^a- 
tenccs  written  by  Mr.  AUston  on  the  walls  of  his  Studio,  pages  167-179 — The  Hypo- 
clioudriac,  pages  179-199— Poems,  pages  199-317.    1  vol.  r2mo.    Price,  $1  '25. 

"There  is  a  store  of  intellectual  wealth  in  this  handsome  volume.  It  is  a  book  of 
thought.  Its  contents  are  the  rich  and  tasteful  productions  of  the  scholar  and  artist,  who 
had  mind  to  perceive  and  skill  to  portray  much  that  is  unseen  by  ordinary  minds,  as  well 
as  intelligence  and  power  to  exhibit  whatever  is  grand  and  beautiful  both  in  the  pliysical 
and  mo4-al  world." — Cfiristian  Observer. 

"These  are  the  records  of  one  of  the  purest  spirits  and  most  exalted  geniuses  of  which 
this  country  can  boast.  The  intense  love  of  the  beautiful,  the  purity,  grace  and  gentleness 
which  made  him  incomparably  the  finest  artist  of  the  age,  lend  their  charm  and  their 
power  to  these  productions  of  his  pen.  *  *  *  There  are  in  his  poems  feeling,  delicacy, 
taste,  and  the  keenest  sense  of  harmony  which  render  them  faultless.'"— A?.  Y.  EvaTijgelist. 

"  As  a  writer  we  know  of  no  one  who  in  his  writings  has  exhibited  such  an  appreciation 
of  what  constitutes  beauty  in  art,  correctness  in  form,  or  the  true  principles  of  composi- 
tion."— Proridenee  Journa  I. 

"  "We  commend  them  to  the  intellectual  and  the  thoughtful,  for  we  know  that  no  one 
can  read  them  without  being  wiser,  and  we  believe  the  better." — Albany  State  Register. 

"  The  production  of  a  most  ethereal  spirit  instinctively  awake  to  all  the  harmonics  of 
creation." — ALhuiiy  Argus. 

"  The  exquisitely  pure  and  lofty  character  of  the  autlior  of  these  lectures  and  poetic 
fragments  is  well  expressed  in  them.  It  gave  their  structure  a  freshness  and  calmnesa, 
and  their  tone  a  purity  that  remain  to  charm  us,  and  that  are  equally  admirable  and  de- 
lightful."— The  Independent 

"  His  lectures  possess  great  attractions  for  every  one  aiinin?  at  cultivation  of  mind  and 
refinement  of  taste,  while  his  poems,  which  elicited  so  high  praise  when  published  singly, 
are  &ure  to  receive  it  when  as  now  embodied  in  a  more  classic  form." — Natchez  Courier. 

"  The  lovers  of  American  literature  aud  art  will  rejoice  in  the  possession  of  these  ma- 
tured fruits  of  the  genius  Avhich  seemed  alike  skilled  in  the  use  of  the  pen  and  pencil.'" — 
Newark  Daily  Advertiser. 


POEMS  AND  PRC3E  WRITINGS.  By  Kiciiard  Hkxry  Dana.  2  vols  12mo. 
Price,  $2  50. 
"Mr.  Dana's  writings  are  addressed  to  readers  of  thought,  sensibility  and  experience. 
By  tenderness,  by  force,  in  purity,  the  poet  paints  the  world,  treading  in  safety  the  dizziest 
verge  of  passion,  through  all  things,  honorable  to  all  men  ;  the  just  style  resolving  all  per- 
plexities, a  rich  instruction  and  solace  in  these  volumes  to  the  young  and  old  who  are  to 
come  hereafter." — Literary  World. 

'•'■  r.Ir.  Dana  is  evidently  a  close  observer  of  n;iturc,  and  therefore  his  thoughts  art-  origi- 
nal and  fresh."— 7>'Me  Democrat. 

"In  addition  to  the  Poems  and  Prose  Writings  included  in  the  former  edition  of  his 
Works,  they  contaiu  some  short,  practical  pieces,  and  a  number  of  reviews  and  essays  con- 
tributed to  different  periodicals,  some  of  them  as  much  as  thirty  years  sinve,  and  now  re- 
published for  the  first  time— as  the  expression  of  the  iimiost  soul,  these  wruings  beai-  a 
strong  stamp  ol  originality. '—A'".  Y.  Tribune. 


THE  EPOCH  OF  CREATION.  The  Bcrlpture  Doctdoe  Contrasted  with  tiie 
Geological  Theory.  By  Eleazer  Lord,  with  an  Introduction  by  Kev.  E.  W.  Dick- 
inson, D.l^.    1  vol.  12mo.     Price,  $1  00. 

"  We  have  here  a  work  for  the  study  of  the  intellectual  man  of  the  world  as  well  as  the 
Christian  man  of  God.  The  subject  is  discussed  with  masterly  ability  and  with  a  force  of 
logic  whicli  will  impress  conviction  upon  many  doubting  minds." — Tioy  Budget. 

"We  arc  heartily  glad  to  gee  this  book.  We  ask  Christian  scholars  to  read  the  volume, 
thinking  learned  men  will  find  something  here  to  think  of.  It  is  no  child's  book,  it  is  not 
a  bigofs  book.  It  is  a  masterly  defence  of  God's  ancient  word  against  modern  theory,  and 
demands  attention." — IT.  Y.  Observer. 


INCIDENTS  IN  THE  LIFE  OF  A  PASTOR.    By  Eev.  Wm.  Wisnek,  D.D.    1 
■vol.  12mo.,  3d  edition.    Price,  $1  DO. 

"  The  writer  is  a  shrewd,  sensible,  practical,  and  eminently  experienced  divine,  in  early 
life  a  lawyer,  and  all  his  life  a  thinking,  earnest  man."— JV]  T.  Ohserver. 

"It  is  not  a  book  of  controvensy,  or  extended  stories;  it  tells  its  truth  unaffectedly  and 
forcibly,  and  in  so  doing  utters  volumes  of  theology.  A  more  suggestive  work  we  have 
seldom  seen.  Its  solemn  facts  seize  upon  the  conscience  and  heart  with  a  power  that  sur- 
passes all  the  force  of  rhetoric"— iV^  Y.  EcangelUt. 


INDICATIONS    OF    THE    CREATOR;    Or,  the   Natural   Evidences  of  Final 
Causes,    By  Geokge  Taylok.    1  vol.  12mo.     Price,  $1  00. 

"  A  careful  review  of  tlie  discoveries  in  Astronomy,  Geology,  Comparative  Physiology, 
and  the  other  Practical  Sciences,  for  the  purpose  of  showing  the  natural  evidences  of  the 
existence  of  the  Creator.  He  holds  fii-mly  to  the  truth  of  Itevelation,  and  does  not  seek 
to  make  the  ligiit  of  nature  sufficient  for  human  guidance.  The  work  is  dearly  written, 
and  is  marked  by  great  thoughtfulness  and  candor." — IT.  Y.  Comviercial. 


i.HES¥SR^S  NSW  WORK. 

THE  LIFE  AND  TRIALS  OF  A  YOUTHFUL  CHRISTIAN  IN  PURSUIT 
C  F  HEALTH,  as  developed  in  the  Biograjihy  of  2sathauiel  Cheever,  M.I).  By 
Eev.  Henry  jT.  Cheever,  with  an  Introduction  by  Eev.  George  B.  Cheever,  D.D.  1 
vol.  12mo.    Price.  $1  00. 

"  Two  brothers  thus  uniting  in  Memorials  of  a  third,  will  present  a  volume  of  great  in- 
terest.  We  knew  the  subject  of  the  fraternal  work,  and  loved  him  for  his  gentleness  and 
worth,  which  -will  be  fitly  commemorated  in  these  pages." — N'.  Y.  Observer. 


PRlr/ITiVE  CHURCH  OFFICES.    Erom  the  Princeton  Eeview.    Uniform  with 
Alexander  on  the  Psalms.'    1  vol.     Price,  63  cts. 

"These  essays  are  reprinted  from  tie  Princeton  Eeview,  with  corrections  and  additions 
by  their  author,  whose  trenchant  pen  will  be  recognized  wherever  he  makes  his  mark  "— 
N.  Y.  Observer. 

"  The  views  they  present  are  sound,  scriptural,  and  discriminating,  and  worthy  of  the 
attention  of  the  Christian  -pnhMc." —Christicm  Observer. 


"  No  one,  we  predict,  will  ever  lay  down  the  volume  with  that  common  exclamation 
on  his  lips—'  I  can't  get  interested  in  it,'  for  it  grapples  to  the  reader  with  hooks  of  silver, 
which  hold  him  quite  as  fast  as  if  they  were  made  of  steel." — Boston  QazeUe. 

FRESH  GLEANINGS,  or  a  New  Sheai  from  the  Oil  Field ot  Contircntal  Etii\,[,.. 
Ik.  Marvel.    1  vol.,  12mo.  ' 

"This  book  should  be  read  by  all  who  can  appreciate  a  style  fall  of  gra"  -  'oniposi- 

fcion  replete  with  original  and  striking  thoughts." — JBoston  Journal. 

"Agi-eeable,  quaint,  humorous,  philosophical,  pathetic,  charming,  iVfa'-'-elt 

It  is  as  refreshing  to  the  mind,  wearied  with  the  thrice-told  u.      .  cov       '':al 

travel  to  dip  into  his  fresh  sparkling  pages,  as  a  plunge,  this  hot ".  'd, 

diamond,  deer-haunted  waters  of  some  mountain  lake.    "We  have  \.  , 

thick,  dainty  pages,  and  our  eye  has  glided  along  the  stream  of  his  s,  • 
pleasant  thoughts,  humorous  expres">ion3,  and  characters  pair+   ■■ 

like  daguerreotype  portraits — very  Steruc-like  and  exceedingly  fi..     -ui.  ho 

end  we  are  startled  at  the  rapidity  with  which  the  feet  of  Time,  tl'-wer-n •  ■  .ve  trod- 
den."— Albany  Atlas. 

"A  series  of  the  liveliest,  newest,  most  taking  and  most  gi-aphic  sketches  of  out  of  the 
way  scenes,  character  and  incidents,  that  were  ever  done  up  between  a  pair  of  bookbinder's 
covers." — Commercial  Adcertlser. 

^'^ 
r. 
"  This  is  decidedly  the  most  agreeable  book  of  the  season.    It  reminds  one  by  an  occa- 
sional association  of  ideas,  rather  than  resemblance,  of  imitation  of  Sterne's  Sentimtinai 
Journey,  and  some  of  Longlellow's  transatlantic  sketches  ;  but  its  freshness,  it^  variety, 
graphic  descriptive  power,  and  genial  sympathies,  are  all  its  own." — Buffalo  Advertiser.    .. 

THE  BATTLE  SUMMER.    Being  Transcripts  fiorn  Personal  Observation  in  Paris 
during  the  year  1S48.    By  Ik.  Marvel.    With  Illustrations  by  Dakley.    1  vol.,  12mo 

"  It  is  a  series  of  pictures — sketches  of  scenes  whi^h  passed  under  the  author's  eye.  It 
Is  most  ably  done,  and  shows  the  hand  of  one  gifted  with  genius  and  destined  to  make  his 
mark  on  the  literature  of  his  country." — iV^  Y.  Courier  and  Enquirer 

"  The  book  is  filled  with  a  series  of  pictures  and  sketches  more  gi-apliic  it  would  be  diffl 
cult  to  find." — New  York  Recorder^ 

"Like  a  talented  and  enthusiastic  artist,  he  placed  himself  In  the  best  positions,  and 
caught  the  lineaments  of  each  scene  to  be  transferred  to  his  canvas.  *  *  *  lu  truth,  he 
has  furnished  a  gallery  of  portraits  which  are  very  life  like." — Pres'oyterian. 

"  An  elaborate  history  would  fail  to  convey  so  vivid  and  ti-uthful  a  conception  oi  the 
rise,  progress  and  manner  of  the  '  second  reign  ol  tcrroi*'  as  is  to  be  obtained  from  this  work-' 
— Portland  Transcrijjt. 

"  It  is  by  far  the  most  able  and  most  Impressive  account  of  the  scenes  in  Paris,  and 
reveals  a  povver  of  description  that  will  give  the  author  a  rame."— iV.  Y.  Evangelist. 

THE   LORGNETTE,  or  Studies  of  the  Town.    By  an  Opera-Goer  (Ik  Maevel) 
2  vol.,  I2mo.    Set  otf  with  Dakley's  Design. 

DREAM  LIFE.     BylK.MAKVEu    1  vol.,  12mo. 


RURAL  homes;  Or, sketches  OF  HOUSES  suited  to  A-merican  Country  Life. 
With  over  70  Original  Plans,  Designs,  &c.    By  Geevase  Wheelee.    1  voL  12mo. 
^  Price,  $1,25. 

mmences  with  the  flrst  foot-tread  upon  the  spot  chosen  for  the  liouse;  details  the 
'■  leratious  that  should  weigh  in  selecthig  the  site;  gives  models  of  buildings  ditfering 
■ter,  extent,  and  cost;  shows  liow  to  harmonize  the  building  with  the  surrounding 
6cener\  ,  ..^  (^i?s  how  healthfully  to  warm  and  ventilate  ;  assists  in  selecting  furniture  and 
il-.:  innume;  ie  articles  of  utility  and  ornament  used  in  constructing  and  finishing,  and 
conclndf=  ■»-'  "  •'  practical  directions,  giving  useful  limits  as  to  drawing  up  written  de- 
scsij^tK  ,;-_>  »*iis  and  contracts. 

"'^''t&steful  volume,  Mr.  "Wheeler  has  condensed  the  results  of  an  accom- 
•^  "'  art,  and  the  liberal  professional  practice  of  it. 

■  leV :.'y  re  ••->mmend  this  elaborate  production  to  the  attention  of  gentle- 
'  'lil'lii  -^  or  renovating  their  country  houses,  to  professional  architects, 
ri.iiination,  who  wish  to  know  what  is  trulj^  eloquent  in  this  beau- 
tiiux;.  V   cuitT\-/iie  a  taste  worthy  to  cope  with  "judgment  of  wisest  censure." 

"Th€  ':"^'''^uch  o&'iablishments  is  carefully  considered,  no  less  than  the  comforts  they 
should  affoi  .  ^he  display  they  can  (honestly)  pretend  to,  and  all  the  adjuncts  that  go  to 
complete  th(^deal  of  a  convenient  and  elegant  mansion." — iV^  Y.  Mirror. 

"It  is  extremely  practical,  c*><itaining  such  simple  and  comprehensive  directions  for  all 
wishing  at  any  time  to  build,  being  in  fact  the  sum  of  the  authors  study  and  exi.>erience  as 
aa  tticliitect  Jor  xAauy  years." — Albany.  Spectator. 

'""Jn  ^'heelers  remarks  convey  much  practical  and  useful  information,  evince  good 
taj^e  and  a  proper  appreciation  of  the  beautiful,  and  no  one  should  build  a  rural  house 
,  without  first  hearing  what  ho  has  to  recommend." — Philadelphia  Presbyterian. 

"Important  in  its  subject,  careful  and  ample  in  its  details,  and  charmingly  attiactive  in 
its  style.  It  gives  all  the  information  that  would  be  desired  as  to  the  selection  of  sites — 
the  choice  of  appropriate  styles,  the  particulars  of  plans,  materials,  fences,  gateways,  furni- 
ture, warming,  ventilation,  specifijcations,  contracts,  &a,  concluding  with  a  chapter  on  the 
intellectual  and  moral  efl'ect  of  rural  architectui'e." — Hartford  Religious  Herald. 

"A  book  very  much  needed,  for  it  teaches  people  how  to  build  comfortable,  sensible, 
beautiful  country  houses.  Its  conformity  to  common  sense,  as  well  as  to  the  sense  of 
beauty,  cannot  be  too  much  commended." — J^.  Y.  Courier  &  Enquirer. 

"No  person  can  read  this  book  without  gahiing  much  useful  knowledge,  and  it  will  be  ji 
great  aid  to  those  who  intend  to  build  houses  for  their  own  use.  It  is  scientific  without 
being  so  interlarded  with  technical  terms  as  to  confuse  the  reader,  and  contains  all  the  in- 
formation necessary  to  build  a  hotise  from  the  cellar  to  the  ridge  pole.  It  is  a  parlor  book, 
or  a  book  for  the  workshop,  and  will  be  valuable  in  either  place." — Buffalo  Commercial. 

"This  work  should  be  in  the  hands  of  every  one  who  contemplates  building  for  himself 
a  home.  It  is  filled  with  beautifully  executed  elevations  and  plans  of  country  houses  from 
the  most  unpretending  cottage  to  the  villa.  Its  contents  are  simple  and  comprehensive, 
embracing  every  variety  of  house  usually  needed." — Loivell  Courier. 

"To  all  who  desire  a  delightful  rural  retreat  of  "lively  cottagely"  of  getting  a  fair  equiv- 
alent of  comfort  and  tastefulness,  for  a  moderate  outlay,  we  commend  the  Kural  Ilomee  of 
V-.  Wlieeler."— iV.  Y.  Evening  Post. 


THE  FRUIT  GARDEN.  Second  Edition.  A  Treatise  Intended  to  Illustrate 
•nd  explain  the  Physiology  of  Fruit  Trees,  th©  Theory  and  Practice  of  all 
operations  connected  with  the  Propagation,  Transplanting,  Pruning  and  Training  of 
Orchard  and  Garden  Trees,  as  Standards,  Dwarfs,  Pyramids,  Espaliers,  &c.,  the  laying 
out  and  arranging  different  kinds  of  Orchards  and  Gardens,  the  selection  of 
suitable  varieties  for  different  purposes  and  localities,  gathering  and  preserv- 
ing Fruits,  Treatment  of  Disease,  Destruction  of  Insects.  Descriptions  and  Uses 
of  Implements,  &c.,  illustrated  vvith  upward  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  figures,  represent- 
ing different  parts  of  Trees,  all  Practical  Operations,  Forms  of  Trees,  Designs  for 
Plantations,  Implements,  &c.  By  P.  Carry,  of  the  Mount  Hope  Nurseries,  Rochester, 
New  York.    1  vol.  I2mo. 

"  It  is  one  of  the  most  thorough  works  of  the  kind  we  have  ever  seen,  dealing  in  particular 
as  well  as  generalities,  and  imparting  many  valuable  hints  relative  to  soil,  manures,  pruning 
and  transplanting.'"— ^o.sto»  Gazette. 

"A  mass  of  useful  information  is  collected,  which  will  give  the  work  a  value  even  to 
those  who  possess  the  best  works  on  the  cultivation  of  fruit  yet  published." — Ecening 
Post. 

"Ilis  work  is  one  of  the  completest,  and,  as  we  have  every  reason  for  believing,  most 
accurate  to  be  obtained  on  the  subject.'" — 2!f.  Y.  EvangelM. 

"  A  concise  Manual  of  the  kind  here  presented  has  long  been  wanted,  and  we  will 
venture  to  say  that,  should  this  volume  be  carefully  studied  and  acted  upon  by  our  in- 
dustrious liirmers,  the  quantity  of  fruit  in  the  State  would  be  doubled  in  five  years,  and  tho 
quality,  too,  greatly  improved.  IT  ere  may  be  found  advice  suited  to  all  emergencies,  and 
the  gentleman  former  may  find  direction  for  the  simplest  matters,  as  well  as  those  which 
trouble  older  heads.  The  boolc,  we  think,  will  be  found  valuable."" — Newark,  Dailg 
Advertiser. 

"  It  is  full  of  directions  as  to  the  management  of  trees,  and  buds,  and  fruits,  and  is  a 
valuable  and  pleasant  iioo]^.."— Albany  Eoeuing  Journal. 

"  The  work  is  prepared  with  great  judgment,  and  founded  on  the  practical  experience 
of  the  Author — is  of  flir  greater  value  to  the  cultivator  than  mo-st  of  the  popular  compila- 
tions on  the  subject.""— A^.  Y.  TriOune. 

This  Book  siopplies  a  place  in  fruit  culture,  and  that  is  saying  a  great  deal,  while  wo 
have  the  popular  works  of  Downing,  Thomas,  and  Cole.  Mr.  Barry  has  then  a  field  to 
himself  which  he  occupies  with  decided  skill  and  ability.— P/'ai/*ie  Farmer'. 


A  DOMESTIC  HISTORY  OF  THE  REVOLUTION,  hy  Mrs.  E.  F   Ellkt.    1 
vol.  12iiio.  cloth,  $1  UO. 

This  is  a  new  work,  entirely  different  from  the  Women  of  the  Kevolution,  by  the  samo 
author.  It  embraces  a  complete  outline  of  the  History  of  the  American  Ifevolution,  but 
illustrates  more  particularly  the  Domestic  History  of  that  eventful  period.  In  this  re- 
spect it  is  absolutely  an  original  contribution  to  American  History,  and  will  be  found  to 
be  interesting  as  a  book  for  general  reading,  suited  for  private  and  public  libraries,  and  aa 
a  class  book  for  reading  in  schools. 


